THE ARMY-AIR FORCE DOCTRINAL DISPUTES:
SYMPTOMS OR CAUSES

by
Gene Myers
September, 1997

ADDRESSING THE CAUSES | RECOMMENDATIONS | JOINT FORCE SPECIALIZATION | BIBLIOGRAPHY

The US Air Force and Army have for several years been embroiled in a series of interservice doctrine "food fights" surrounding control and tasking of joint force air assets, component commander responsibilities, delineation of joint force component areas of operation (AO), counter air and missile defense interrelationships, and others. These issues are typified in statements, all of which have been heard by this author, such as "The ground commander controls all air in his AO;" "If the ground commander tells the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) to do interdiction, he will do it;" or "Theater missile defense is nothing more than offensive and defensive counter air and should be controlled by the JFACC." These statements and others are emotionally charged and step on the rapidly changing doctrinal "turf" of the two services. Attempts have been made for several years to iron out many of these issues at the two star and below level with limited success.

The numerous doctrinal issues currently being debated between the Army and Air Force center on control of the "deep battle" space (including air activities there) at the theater/Joint Force Commander (JFC) level and the need for Air Force provided close air support (CAS) for ground maneuver forces. From the Air Force perspective, obvious attempts by the Army to gain control of air power for CAS and especially deep surface battle operations will dilute the Air force's theater-wide effectiveness and are contrary to Air force basic doctrinal beliefs. These beliefs include the idea that air and space (aerospace) power is best applied by airmen as an integrated force to gain control of the air environment, in interdiction, strategic attack, and close air support of surface forces.¹ As clearly stated by Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, commander of Allied ground forces during the Normandy invasion:

Air Power is indivisible. If you split it up into
compartments, you merely pull it to pieces and
destroy its greatest asset--its flexibility.²

The problem here is that while each service must attend to its interests in these interservice squabbles, in doing so both are merely treating symptoms and are not addressing the overarching problems that are generating these confrontations.

ADDRESSING THE CAUSES

The genesis of the current spate of doctrinal challenges is that the U. S. Army is finding itself on the verge of becoming irrelevant as a major contributor in the largest future theater conflicts. I say this for the following reasons:

First, current Army force structure and doctrine was developed/deployed during an era of containment of the Soviet threat. Large, powerful garrison forces from an 800,000 man Army were stationed in strategic regions (Europe and Korea for example) to halt a heavy armored assault. As a result, our Army was structured with corresponding in-place heavy armor backed up by similarly equipped CONUS reinforcements and reserve components, frequently with forward pre-positioned equipment. Armor was seen as needed to counter adversary armor and as required by a doctrine that stressed offensive maneuver--the same theories prevalent during World War Two. Organic aviation firepower as augmented by a large, powerful, forward deployed Air Force could provide cover, support, and air superiority for lumbering armored formations. Doctrines such as the 1980s vintage AirLand Battle and Follow-on Force Attack (FOFA) wedded theater air power to the destruction of second echelon enemy ground forces and the prosecution of the land forces campaign with little thought given to air power's independent contribution to the overall effort.³ This type of structure was effective as long as the threat remained the same; the Army and Air Force remained large; the Air Force remained dedicated to a supporting role for US Army maneuver schemes; and as long as there was no need for large scale deployment of Army forces to meet major regional contingencies.

Second, with the decline of the Soviet monolith and the dismantling of the bipolar world both the Army and Air Force faced major force and funding cuts. Forces were slashed, forward bases were closed, and the Air Force reorganized itself with an eye toward a larger independent role. In the vacuum left by the collapse of both Western colonialism and the Soviet empire, ethnic, religious, and national conflict rose to levels unseen in modern history. Many of these would challenge US and allied interests or would demand humanitarian action.

In short, the worst happened--the forces shrank, the threat changed, and the need for deployments increased.

However, the late 1990s Army's force structure and doctrine are stuck in the Cold War. The tanks, short-range helicopters, and heavy support dependent forces are still there but need to react in a totally different way. They need to be mobile and easily deployable, but except for the airborne corps, aren't. They need to reduce reliance on heavy armor, but haven't (a C-5, our largest transport, can only accommodate one M1A1 main battle tank per sortie). And in light of corresponding reductions in Air Force forces and resulting conflicting mission priorities, the Army needs to develop effective, easily deployable ways to provide close air support and close interdiction for itself, but hasn't.

Desert Storm should have been a disaster for American ground forces. In the five months it took to deliver the requisite forces to theater--the hundreds of tanks and armored personnel carriers, helicopters, and elaborate support structure--Iraq should have struck, but didn't. We got a reprieve.

The result of the above is that unless the Army has sizable forces stationed in the immediate area, an increasingly unlikely event, future conflicts will require substantial time for the Army’s armor heavy force structure to be deployed to theater. XXVIII Airborne Corps is available for rapid deployment, but is so lightly armed as to require substantial direct support by either Air Force or Naval air--much as the Marines require today from their own organic air. This leaves the US Army with the dilemma of either sending light airborne forces in the face of all possible threats or possibly not being able to supply forces at all.

In an attempt to remedy some of its mobility problems, the Army has placed the equipment for one "heavy" armored brigade (two tank and two mechanized infantry battalions with associated support units--4,200 tracked and wheeled vehicles including 123 seventy ton M1 tanks) permanently on board seven 50,000 ton class maritime prepositioning ships. The force's purpose is to provide the capability to "project decisive force in response to regional crises."⁴ This assumes, of course, that the crisis the brigade is responding to is conveniently near a shoreline that is reasonably close to the deployment vessels. Interestingly enough, the stated rationale for this move was to provide a unit equipped to "defeat a heavy armored attack"--or use armor to defeat armor.⁵ It should also be noted that this unit represents but a very small fraction of the force deployed to the Persian Gulf during Desert Shield, but occupies a very large piece of available sea lift.

The U. S. Air Force, while facing much the same force structure reductions as the Army, dramatically improved its capability to project potent combat power over great distances in minimum time. Desert Storm and Bosnia have proven the service’s capability to dominate the airspace over the adversary and deliver decisive strategic and interdiction strikes against vital enemy targets. Like it or not, precision weapons and increasing system range have made air power, whether Air Force or Naval, the force of choice for politicians desirous of politically acceptable solutions to messy international confrontations--solutions that virtually demand quick resolution and minimum allied and collateral casualties.⁶ The Air Force’s global perspective and rapid deployment capability when combined with Naval off shore presence and Marine amphibious potential have combined to deliver a life threatening blow to US Army prestige and sense of mission.

To make matters worse for the Army, the Air Force is now touting that aerospace power is now the force of choice for stopping an invading land army, especially in light of the lack of forward deployed or quickly available land forces.⁷ The essence of traditional US military strategy for a major land conflict is to halt invading forces by whatever means available, then build up our own substantial surface force, launch a massive counter offensive to defeat the enemy's military, and then terminate hostilities on our terms. Disappointingly, this strategy is reinforced in this year’s Secretary of Defense's Defense Guidance.⁸ But geopolitical necessity and fiscal constraints are changing things. Dr Edward Luttwak concluded that “Fixed garrisons based on heavy ground forces with air, naval, and strategic-nuclear components were appropriate to cope with geographically fixed threats. They are not appropriate to cope with contingencies that could materialize as threats in unpredictable locations”-which is increasingly the nature of the global environment.⁹

In the post Cold War era, the vast majority of Army forces will most likely just not be available in enough time and enough numbers to do much good in real high intensity crisis situations distant from peacetime garrisons. We need to remember that it took six months to build the Desert Storm force even before the most recent defense cuts occurred. Air Forces, whether of the Air Force or naval variety, are obviously far more responsive than that, and are therefore the force of choice for quick response needs.¹⁰

While the Army sees direct air power support to its deployed forces as vital to its primary mission of "preparing to conduct prompt and sustained land combat operations,"¹¹ the Air Force, is convinced that close air support is the least productive way to contribute to the overall success of a campaign. Both decreasing air power resources and evolving doctrine will likely reduce the availability of Air Force assets for the CAS role.¹² Air Force doctrine is no longer a result of the traditional Tactical Air Command-Army Training and Doctrine Command liaison that produced the surface battle dominated Air Land Battle doctrine and the Strategic Air Command's domination of "strategic" nuclear deterrence.¹³ The Air Force has been restructured both organizationally and doctrinally with full corporate input to its unique service doctrine. While recognizing the need for retaining a close air support capability, the service is now seizing the opportunity provided by technology and global change to play a far more decisive role. With its range and increasing stealth and precision, gaining air superiority and going directly to the heart of an adversary’s vital structure and delivering crippling blows to government, infrastructure and deep military forces are now seen as its most valuable contribution--a contribution seen by air power theorists over 70 years ago but only recently made a practical reality by technological advances.¹⁴

Again, this contradicts Army philosophy which has historically sought decisive engagement(s) with an enemy’s ground forces as the ultimate means to deliver strategic victory.¹⁵ Driven by the necessity to attain victory over the opposing land forces, Army doctrinal attention is directed to the “close-in” ground battle while Air Force doctrine is increasingly directed toward the rapid projection of power and the “deep” battle--the one at the operational and strategic levels.¹⁶ This basic conflict is not new; it predates World War Two. The difference is in both the fact that technology has provided the means for a greater, more decisive aerospace power role in global conflict and that the political and global strategic situation now demands it. There will be little time or patience among America's political leaders or the electorate for long deployment schedules. Unlike Desert Storm, future reasonably well equipped adversaries will be less likely to allow a large scale, time consuming American force build up that will assure their defeat even if a deployment is ordered. There will be little public or political support for large scale and costly ground engagements once forces are deployed. As a result, future conflicts will be more “come as you are” affairs.

On the down side for the Air Force is the fact that the same budget reductions that gutted America's massive forward deployed field armies have drastically reduced the number of immediately available Air Force forward bases and the total number of combat forces.¹⁷ While reducing the Air Force's incentive to support large scale ground attrition warfare, the reductions serve as a catalyst for application of limited air power armed with precision weapons against targets that have a greater impact on the overall operation--counterair, deep interdiction, and strategic attack--further diverging Army and Air Force doctrine and force structure. From the Air Force perspective and many in congress, just as the Marines have with their air wings, the Army has built a substantial force of combat helicopters that along with short-range artillery, rockets, and missiles provide close support to their engaged forces. It should be used for such while leaving the majority of Air Force and available Naval air to do other tasks. In arguing for specialization of service forces, particularly air forces, as the key to true jointness, Steven L. Canby writes, "There is nothing inherently wrong with four tactical air forces per se, as long as each is different and costs are controlled."¹⁸

However, it appears that the Army is eschewing jointness through specialization and attempting to gain control of at least two of the air forces to provide protection/close support while developing its own deep weaponry as a hedge against the non-availability of that air power in that role (deep interdiction). In essence, the Army is between a rock and a hard place. It has thus far been fairly unsuccessful in its attempts to gain control of a greater share of available theater air power to protect lightly armed deployed forces. In this effort, Army doctrinaires have utilized such doctrinal devices as joint target coordination boards (JTCBs) and joint force fires coordinators (JFFCs) at the theater joint force commander level, limiting the command authority of the joint force air component commander (JFACC), or attempts to officially codify the dual hating of the land component commander as the joint force commander. Army/Air Force doctrinal confrontations over issues such as the definition of "joint fires", control and coordination of theater assets, delineation of component areas of operation, and others are all manifestations of these ecclesiastical battles, but nonetheless are merely symptoms of the underlying problems of the Army's fear of loss of strategic mission and the divergence of respective service doctrines. What can be done?

RECOMMENDATIONS

First, the US military as a whole must come to the realization that while warfare is a "joint" endeavor, that jointness does not in any way imply that we should approach each situation with an "everybody plays" mentality. We employ military force to address vital needs, not to provide opportunities for the services to ply their respective trades. While we must train and plan to apply force in a synergistic joint manner, not all contingencies will require every service. Operational failures like Desert One and organizational debacles like Grenada were the result to a large extent of too much jointness--insisting that every service participate at the cost of operational effectiveness. In particular, while sometimes operationally necessary, large casualty intensive ground operations should be avoided where the opportunity exists to attain objectives without them--jointness does not dictate either ground or air combat. As former Air Force Chief of Staff, General Fogleman, said in October 1995:

". . . in the fast-moving, post-Cold War world,
crisis response and joint warfighting are not equal
opportunity enterprises--we must avoid the rush to
participate in a given operation just to have our
component represented, particularly when such presence
violates sound judgment or impedes the overall effectiveness
of the joint operation."¹⁹

In some cases the capability to accomplish national objectives without undue risk of casualties and prolonged involvement rests to a large extent with the precision application of air power, something that was proven in Desert Storm and the skies over Bosnia. In cases where a major commitment of ground forces to combat is necessary, air power can provide major close support and reinforcement if needed, but still should be applied to best advantage in attaining air superiority (if required), in strategic attacks against the enemy's national command and control and infrastructure, and in interdicting major force and support elements as deep as possible. "The point is to avoid the use of ground forces in bloody engagements if possible. If the bloodletting cannot be avoided, then airpower--everybody's airplanes--will be there to help out."²⁰

Second, to be operationally viable in a future characterized by dispersed regional contingencies requiring rapid reaction by varying combinations of US and allied forces, the US Army should make itself as mobile as possible and as capable as possible of attending to its most important stated missions of rapid deployment, close engagement of enemy ground forces, and the taking and holding of hostile territory. That means:

• Ridding itself of the "garrison mentality" that was fostered by a 40 year cold war stand off in Europe and Asia. Large scale set piece battles between heavy forward deployed armies, while still a possibility in some contingencies, are for the most part a thing of the past. While the opponent may still possess heavy armored forces, the need to rapidly deploy US ground forces into such an environment will reduce the utility of the armor needed to counter the opponent's forces. In such a situation, and in all others requiring rapid response to conflict or potential conflict situations, the US will have to rely more on initiative, surprise, rapid maneuver, and high technology weapons and on a specialized approach to warfighting tasks among the services. The degree to which aerospace forces can accomplish any necessary ground force attrition without the messy involvement of our own forces, as with the rapid halt scenario discussed earlier, they should.

• Reducing reliance on heavy armor. The recent advances in technology that have improved all aspects of American warfighting capability should be harnessed to allow maneuver and anti-tank protection without reliance on 70 ton pieces of equipment that are extremely difficult, expensive, and time consuming to move. This does not imply total elimination of the armor branch; some need for heavy armor will remain, especially in garrison, forward deployed situations such as Korea or Saudi Arabia or in military operations other than war where a more "leisurely" deployment may be allowable and where tanks can deliver a clear message that friendly forces should not be trifled with. However, dragging such forces to every contingency will severely reduce the Army's overall effectiveness in the new global environment and will provide a potential vulnerability as adversaries acquire light, comparatively inexpensive, precision anti-armor weapons of their own as a cost effective alternative to heavy land force formations. One Army officer recently asserted the continued need for armor but strongly argued that it should change; it should be more specialized (open terrain vs urban operations), far lighter, agile, and more easily deployed with a variety of weapons.²¹ But another analyst commented with respect to the Army's continued reliance on the tank, ". . . we may be basing our national security on a system that is becoming obsolete for the requirements of the future battlefield."²²

• Developing a truly capable organic close support capability that can be rapidly deployed with varying formations. The need for close air support of ground units is indeed a vital one, but as Air Force/Navy air power force structure decreases and mission demands increase, availability for CAS will be less. When combined with the demands of what are seen by air power leaders as more productive tasks in strategic attack and interdiction, the need for the Army to provide more of its own close support becomes evident. This would improve Army capability to do what it does best and allow the air and naval components to apply their air assets in activities which they do best.²³ It would further enhance the clear delineation of "areas of operation" and eliminate much of the perceived need for continued doctrinal debate between services. This does not imply that Air Force and Naval air should be prohibited from providing direct support to land forces. It means that the Army must assure its capability to provide CAS for itself as much as possible by fielding easily deployable air and ground close support systems. It also means that airpower must not be seen as flying artillery to be synchronized by the ground commander.

• Embracing the concept of service specialization and abandoning attempts to develop longer range combat support weapons such as ATACMS and long-range combat helicopters and concentrating on much needed closer support systems. Devoting vital Army funds to systems that duplicate air power strengths will lessen that service's ability to provide the more important close support capability and, as a result, force air power assets to be diverted from other vital missions. It will also foster the continuation of time consuming and divisive doctrinal disputes that in the end provide benefit to no one.

• Abandoning attempts to "capture" as much air power as possible to provide cover for its deployed surface forces. Such doctrinal assaults delay development of needed Army capabilities addressed above, risk reducing the vital theater-wide impact of air power, and is a waste of valuable staff time for both services. Diluting the capability of limited long-range air and space assets to concentrate on deep targets will neither supply adequate cover for ground forces nor supply national or theater leadership with adequate interdiction and strategic attack capability.

Finally, the US Air Force must also ensure its ability to accomplish its most vital tasks--rapid, long-range projection of ground and air power; precision attack of "deep" targets; and maintenance of air superiority. In this context it is important for USAF airmen to remember two things: their service was not created to serve as aerial artillery in providing close air support for ground forces, and long range is a vital commodity, one that is increasingly important as forward bases disappear or, as current national strategy clearly points out, are increasingly vulnerable to potential adversaries’ asymmetrical strategies utilizing long-range missiles or terrorist attacks (tankers, bombers, long-range airlifters, and F-111 like attack aircraft are crucial).²⁴ In a clear departure from the land force-centric AirLand Battle doctrine of the 1980s, the Air Force mission at the close of the 20th century is to project potent aerospace power over long distances in minimum time. While the service can and does "support," it is best used as a decisive, offensive force. This means:

• Assuring the ability to attack deep strategic and interdiction targets in support of national and theater objectives. It means that Air Force leaders must be prepared to provide what they promise--a truly responsive force that is capable of striking hard and deep and of interfering with the enemy's plans and eliminating his means of support. In a world where budget and force cuts demand specialization over duplication, it is especially important that the Air Force maintain the ability to pick up where more limited range Army support weapons leave off-to concentrate on deep or long-range operations while surface forces concentrate on close operations. This implies a strong capability to both apply power at "the seams" and to centrally command and control it. Especially in instances of large scale joint theater operations, this further requires a strong Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) with the requisite authority and doctrinal guidance to apply air power in the most effective manner. Joint force doctrine addresses the need for such centralized control of air power, but in catering to all the services’ desires to control a piece of the pie tends to fall well short of the charter needed in an environment of scarce assets and increasing global demands.²⁵ Failure to follow through on the promises outlined in its own strategic vision document of developing a true long-range space and air force with strategic perspective could mean the Air Force would eventually evolve back to a supporting arm of surface force maneuver.²⁶

• Developing the capability to deliver on its assertion that aerospace forces can in fact stop a large-scale land force invasion. This will require the ability to rapidly apply massive, extremely accurate firepower to all elements of moving armored columns. In order to respond in places like Korea or Kuwait where there is little room for maneuver or for the trading of territory for time, aerospace forces must be there fast and furious. The recently completed Quadrennial Defense Review says, “Failure to halt an enemy invasion rapidly can make the subsequent campaign to evict enemy forces from captured territory much more difficult and costly.”²⁷ Long-range strike and superb intelligence will be the order of the day.

• Understanding the Army's concern over that service's perceived loss of mission capability and developing interim measures (identified as such) to ensure Army ground forces remain a potent combat force. This may require that Air Force and Naval air be prepared to dedicate more of their resources to close air support until Army resources are able to assume more of the role. Thereafter, if Army leaders are willing to accept smaller areas of operation for which they will be responsible with shorter range weapons systems, the Air Force must be willing to accept tight control of air activity within those areas and possibly some loss of funds earmarked for close air support functions and weapons.* However, the Air Force cannot afford to have significant force elements become the air arm of light mobile Army forces similar to the operational concept the US Marines apply to their air arm, or because the US Army demands that its area of operations in an operational theater be so large as to circumscribe independent air activity. The requirements of air superiority, interdiction, and strategic attack dictate that one of the services must be focused primarily on their accomplishment. Both the Army and Marines have highly capable air components that, while they are slow and difficult to deploy in the Army's case, are primarily designed and doctrinally employed for direct support of their ground elements.
  ___________________________

* Over the past couple of decades the size of the land force component’s area of operation has been steadily growing with depths of 400 or more kilometers, at least in exercises, not unusual. With restrictive rules of engagement on airpower in these AOs, and with ground commanders demanding control of air activity therein, this limits the ability of aerospace power to accomplish its missions other than direct support of ground forces. This is simply because so much of the battlespace is controlled by the ground commander who has a close battle perspective.

JOINT FORCE SPECIALIZATION

In the final analysis, the essence of this discussion centers on the need to foster more specialization and less duplication of missions and forces between the Army and Air Force. Both services have vital roles to play in a fluid and unstable global environment. The doctrine of joint force action itself stresses the need for each service to provide its unique capabilities and forces to the operation; to forgo that requirement is to hinder joint force preparedness and raise the cost of the defense establishment as a whole. Again, Steven Canby writes,

"There is no conflict between specialization and
synergism; indeed specialization on the battlefield
generates (dynamic) synergism."²⁸

In the same vein, Air Force Chief of Staff, General Merrill McPeak said in 1994, "we simply cannot afford to configure each service's combat forces for sustained, independent operations."²⁹ Political and budgetary necessity have dictated that the time when Air Force, Naval, and Army components could each try to be all things is over. The choice is simple yet a difficult one to make--provide certain core functions best suited to a particular Service’s “corporate culture,” training, and equipment or cease to provide any real military capability at all. We must achieve combined effectiveness and seamless joint capability even while eliminating redundancies.

In this context, while all other services have "air forces" that are designed to support their specific geographically bounded missions there is only one "Air Force" that, as Charles M. Westenhoff put it, is ". . . responsible for nurturing the potential of aviation, developing air capabilities to serve national (emphasis added) needs . . . and fostering special competence and expertise unique to conducting military operations in the air environment."³⁰ The US Air Force is the only service specifically tasked by public law to, “organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations in the air.”³¹ These are not tasks that the Army, Navy, or Marines are either capable of or directed to accomplish. Both by law and by custom the US Air Force is the “nation’s Air Force,” dedicated to operations in the air and space environment as an end in itself.

In the near term, the Air Force will be forced to address many doctrinal challenges in a direct manner in an effort to deflect attempts to divert aerospace assets away from their primary contribution to the nation's military capability. This will be necessary to the degree that Air Force senior leaders are unsuccessful in their attempts to develop workable compromises with Army leaders and to devise a joint doctrine that allows Army concerns to be assuaged at least to some degree by aerospace power in the near to mid term while working toward more specialized and easily deployable forces for the future. This will necessitate detailed attention to the hard learned lessons of service doctrine by senior Air Force leaders. It will also undoubtedly require the direct intervention of both services' leaders in the continuing doctrinal debates; continued junior and mid level working group discussions will produce nothing but prolonged stalemate with vital doctrinal and force structure issues remaining unsolved and national security in the balance.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(1) See the discussions of the need for centralized command and control of aerospace forces in Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Department of the Air Force, 1992, pp. 9, 16 & 17.

(2) Quoted in Lt Col Charles M. Westenhoff, USAF, Military Airpower: The CADRE Digest of Air Power Opinions and Thoughts, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1990), p. 18.

(3) Col Edward C. Mann III wrote of the post-Vietnam Air Force, "With tactical people wedded to supporting Army maneuver schemes and with strategic people committed to thermonuclear deterrence, true believers in strategic bombardment theory found themselves without a natural home." Edward C. Mann III, Col, USAF, Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1995) p.168. Also General Ronald Foglemen, recently retired Air force chief of staff said of the 1970s-80s era of TAC-TRADOC cooperation: “The primary role of tactical airpower was air-land support for the close battle-either directly from close air support or indirectly in the form of interdiction. As a result, in the United States Air Force, we turned our doctrinal work over to Tactical Air Command and TRADOC.” See General Ronald R. Fogleman, “Multinational Joint Doctrine . . . An Airman’s Perspactive,” presented to the NATO Army and Air Chiefs Conference, 11 October 1995, p. 5.

(4) See Captain James F. Pasquarette and Colonel William G. Foster, "An Army Brigade Goes Afloat," Proceedings, May 1994, pp. 89-92. Also, the final coordination draft Joint Pub 4-01.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to Joint Operations, discusses the Army-Navy afloat prepositioning ship program on page IV-12.

(5) Ibid., pp.90-91.

(6) In this context, then President George Bush said "Gulf lesson one is the value of air power . . . (it) was right on target from day one. The Gulf War taught us that we must retain combat superiority in the skies. . . . Our air strikes were the most effective, yet humane, in the history of warfare." Quoted in the Department of Defense Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992, p. 89.

Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman supported this when he said, "The American people are reluctant to send young troops in harm's way, and they shy away from commitments that might result in heavy US casualties. Similarly, they insist on minimizing unintended civilian casualties and collateral damage caused by our operations. In short, Americans have come to expect military operations to be quick and decisive so our troops can return home promptly." "Air Power and the American Way of War," presented at the Air Force Association Air Warfare Symposium, Orlando Florida, February 15, 1996.

(7) Maj Gen Charles Link in a presentation to the Headquarters US Air Force Strategy Forum, June 26, 1997 discussed the concept or rapid, decisive halt of an enemy army by aerospace forces. At the risk of oversimplification, it was his assertion that through the use of rapid, intense air attack with new highly precise weapons aerospace forces could halt the force and take the offensive option away from the enemy.

(8) See the Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress, April 1997, p 158.

(9) Dr Edward Luttwak, “Air Power in US Military Strategy,” in Richard H. Schultz and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1992) p. 17

(10)One recent analysis reported, “Most analyses of future MRCs share a common conclusion-airpower, and particularly heavy bombers, would play a crucial role in stopping an enemy invasion during the crucial Halting Phase while the US is still in the midst of deploying forces to the theater.” Barry Blechman and Paul N. Nagy, U.S. Military Strategy in the 21^st Century, (Arlington, VA: IRIS Independent Research, 1997), p 9.

(11) FM 100-5, Operations, Department of the Army, June 1993, p 1-4.

(12) In a recent article Eliot Cohen, Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University and director of the Gulf War Airpower Survey, decided in relation to Marine assets that, "fixed-wing close air support . . . will become increasingly rare." Threats to air assets in an increasingly sophisticated battlespace, problems of fratricide, and alternatives such as missiles and organic attack helicopters will reduce emphasis and suggests "that a major change is in the works." See Eliot A Cohen, "Airpower, the Next War, and the Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, November 1995, p.42.

(13) See discussion of Army TRADOC-USAF TAC doctrinal lash-up in Mann, Thunder and Lightning . . . ., pp 163-169. Also, Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman recently said, ". . .with strategic air power focused on deterrence, conventional capability became inextricably tied to air-land warfighting doctrine: The primary role of tactical air power was to support the close battle-either directly in the form of close air support or indirectly in the form of interdiction. As a result, we turned our doctrinal work over to Tactical Air Command and TRADOC." General Ronald R. Fogleman, "Multinational Joint Doctrine . . . An Airman's Perspective," presented to the NATO Army and Air Chiefs Conference, 11 Oct 1995, p.5.

(14) For a discussion of early air power theories of decisive application see Barry D. Watts, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, The Foundations of US Air Doctrine: The Problems of War, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1984), pp. 5-15.

(15) Army doctrine still says, "The objective of the military in war is victory over the opposing military force at the least cost to American soldiers." See FM 100-5, p. 1-4. Air power theorists would maintain that while this is true in some circumstances where force on force engagement cannot be avoided, it is the increasing function of air and space forces to surpass surface engagement and strike deep into the enemy's strategic "vitals." This perspective recognizes that there is more than one path to victory; and they all do not require defeating the enemy's army.

(16) See discussion of Army "deep battle" concept in Albert R. Hochevar, et al, "Deep Strike: the Evolving Face of War," JFQ, Autumn 1995, pp. 81 & 82.

(17) By 2000 USAF bombers will have been reduced to 178 from the 1985 level of 268 (-46%); fighter/attack aircraft to 2130 from 4,363 (-51%); and reconnaissance/special purpose aircraft to 137 from 499 (-73%). "McCain Calculates the Cuts," Air Force Magazine, February 1995, pp. 54-58.

(18) Steven L. Canby, "Roles, Missions, and JTFs: Unintended Consequences," JFQ, Autumn/Winter 1994-95, p. 74. DR Canby goes on to say, "Naval aviation is sea oriented and force projection keeps it from entangling with land-based aviation. Air Force tactical aviation should be 'operational,' while Marine aviation is more 'island' oriented and therefore appropriately 'tactical.'"

(19) See General Ronald R. Fogleman, "Multinational Joint Doctrine, p.9.

(20) Lt Col Gene Myers, USAF-Ret, "CAS is Not the Airpower Priority," Armed Forces Journal International, September 1995, p.9.

(21) See Ralph Peters, “The Future of Armored Warfare,” in Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp 50-59.

(22) Robert J. Bunker, "Don't Ritualize Armor," Armed Forces Journal International, February 1996, p.10. Mr Bunker went on to write about the effects of modern light weight, smart, precision weapons on armored, warfare, "Mobility would be sacrificed for survivability and extreme measures would be taken, such as the placing of pro-active armor and point-defense systems on the tank, in a futile effort to cope with the brilliant munitions and other advanced threats."

(23) See former Air Force Chief of Staff General Merril McPeak's comments on roles and missions, especially those centering on the need for more Army-Air Force specialization in conducting the deep and close battles, in General Merrill A. McPeak, "Roles and Missions," speech to the Heritage Foundation, Washington DC, 17 October 1994. Printed in Merrill A. McPeak, Selected Works: 1990-1994, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1995), pp. 327-333.

(24) See the discussion of adversary asymmetrical strategies in Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, (QDR) May 1997 , p 4.

(25) See Lieutenant Colonel (US Army, ret) William G. Welch’s discussion of the strength’s and weaknesses of current JFACC doctrine in “We’re Still Not Joint,” Proceedings, February 1996, pp. 59-61. Also consult Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995, and 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 14 November 1994, for their coverage of JFACC requirements and the need for centralized control of air power.

(26) See Global Engagement: A vision for the 21^st Century Air Force, Department of the Air Force, 1997

(27) QDR, p. 13. In this context, an experienced analyst recently commented that often the answer to halting a massive invasion in a era of reduced warning times and constrained resources will be to “. . . do it from the air, fast and furious, with an array of weapons ranging from heavy bombers and tactical aircraft to cruise missiles and other precision-guided munitions.” Philip Gold, “A new paradigm in warfare,” The Washington Times, August 19, 1997, p. A15.

(28) Canby, "Roles, Missions, and JTFs" p. 72.

(29) McPeak, "Roles and Missions," p. 328

(30) Charles M. Westenhoff, "Why We Need an Air Force, " JFQ, Autumn/Winter 1994-95, p. 65.

(31) Department of Defense Directive Number 5100.1, 25 September 1987, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, p. 19.

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