The men and women of Air Force Space Command join me in congratulating our 12 Outstanding Airmen. We've done that several times over the last day, but the fact of the matter is, we can't do it enough. What we recognize here is our enlisted force and the thousands upon thousands of outstanding airmen that you've heard the Chief and the Secretary talk about, serving around the world. I am not sure "outstanding" covers it. Thank you for all you do [Applause].

If there was any doubt about what a great Secretary we have, the golfers in the audience can check their watch and note that we are ahead of time. Sir, you are going to make your tee time [Laughter].

I am going to talk about space. I am here as the commander of Air Force Space Command and that is what I will focus my remarks on. That is not to say that what we are doing in U.S. Space Command or what we are doing in NORAD in terms of the combat air patrols, AWACS, the 130s that John Handy provides, computer network operations and information operations, are not important. I'll be glad to address those in a question and answer period, if you'd like to ask a question about that. But I am going to focus my remarks this morning on space operations, what we are doing now to support Tommy Franks and Enduring Freedom and what I see as a glimpse ahead in each one of these mission areas.

You've heard the Chief and the Secretary talk to it. We all know it. We all feel it, that we certainly are a transformational service. We have been that way since 1947. I'd offer, we'd probably been that way since 1907, when we bought the first military aircraft. But as you look at this strategic guidance here and you look at what is in parenthesis and what is highlighted, that is what your Air Force is all about. That is what we do, day in and day out for this great nation. So, once again, if I can invest in it, I certainly would. There are some areas where we need some money. But the future has never been brighter and when you think about the future, you can't help but think about space and when you think about space, you can't help but think about the future. We are going to step through some mission areas here. We'll start with the one that we are all most familiar with - force enhancement. This is the one we have worked the hardest on for the last decade, since Desert Storm. Some would say it was our first space war. I am not going to argue with that. But what I would offer is it is the first war where we truly understood how we could leverage space capabilities, capabilities that were built, designed for national reasons, and how we could use that at the tactical and the operational level. And we've been working so hard over the last decade. The analogy I use is a two-engine airplane. We had both throttles back toward idle, in terms of space control and force enhancement. We've moved that force enhancement throttle right on up to military. Let's talk about each of these, please.

In terms of communications, it is the lifeblood of a military organization. Why do we want communications? We want it for situational awareness. We want it for command and control or control and command, as Hal Hornburg talked to you yesterday. So it's very, very important. This is not a science, it is an art - what is the right mixture of SATCOM? What is the right mixture of fiber optics, compared to SATCOM? We'd prefer fiber optics, much more bandwidth available. We'd like the prize. But we all know, for the foreseeable future -I would offer to you forever - we are going to have to go places where SATCOM is not available or we are not going to be able to use it. We have to pursue fiber optics. If it is not available, we'll have to pursue SATCOM.

There are some who say curb your appetite. Just learn to live with what you have. I think that is shortsighted. I would offer to you that the successes that we've achieved in the wars and the contingencies over the last ten years is because we have the right communications. We are on this flight path of increased capabilities. You can see how our demand has changed, despite the fact that we have put people in harm's way, we use much more bandwidth. I don't think that is bad and I would offer that you need to help us with data compression, a backbone in the sky, lasercom, all those kinds of things that are so important so we have the communications we need.

In terms of supporting Tommy Franks, we have doubled the bandwidth that is available to him. We have doubled the bandwidth that is available to him in this conflict. Some of that is a good news story in that we've gone out and we've established the global broadcast system. We have brought that online for Tommy, which he didn't have prior to the conflict. We've gone out and bought additional commercial capabilities, but quite frankly, we've picked the pocket of other CINCs. They are not happy about that, but they understand because they know we would do the same thing for them, if they were sending people in harm's way.

This slide shows you the change in those different SATCOM areas since 11 September as we've worked to support Tommy. The fact of the matter is, we have to make some tough decisions here in terms of EHF, in terms of wide band, in terms of our mobile users. But I would offer to you that the requirements are valid, all we have to do is work hard on how we are going to meet those requirements, how we do that in a smart way, and we certainly need industry helping us to do that.

Navigation and timing. It is sad in one way. It is good news in another. That we take GPS for granted. When we look back at Desert Storm, how many GPS bombs did we drop? Zero. Zero GPS bombs. So if we wanted a precision weapon, what did we have to have? Good weather.

When was the last time we've had trouble synchronizing and making sure everybody has the right time, that our systems are synched up? We take that for granted. So, whether it is navigation or whether it is timing, GPS is so very important. On the order of 50 percent of the bombs dropped have been JDAM bombs. And, in terms of the accuracy that we have provided, it is all fuzzed up for security reasons, but we are providing accuracy half again as good as the operational requirements document stipulates. Half again. So those young men and women are out there and when those birds come in view of the theater, they are working hard to update them and make sure they provide the best data available.

The bad news for us fighter pilots is we can't blame the bomb on the GPS. If you've got a bad bomb, it is because of something else. Now that doesn't mean your bomb is half again as good. But that means you are not going to have a bad bomb because of GPS.

And we've got to stay the course on NAVWAR, GPS 3, etc., whatever we call that, we have to have increased power. We have to be able to burn through jamming. We have to be able to provide increased accuracy, signals in the areas where we are operating only for us and deny it to others and then the rest of the world has good navigation and timing information. We want GPS to be the coin of the realm. We don't want people to go elsewhere.

Next, missile warning battlesspace characterization, technical intelligence, defense support program. Three decades old. Designed for national reasons to support national requirements. Back to Desert Storm, we decided that we could use this system at the operational and tactical level. Smart young men and women like those sitting in the third row figured that out and we've counted on it to this day, not just for national strategic, but also for theater, as it is shown here. Very, very important.

We have also realized that we can use it for battlespace characterization. We can use it for environmental and natural events. And we can use it for technical intelligence. And make no doubt that technical intelligence is the key to making sure that we have the proper missile warning in the future so that we can type that missile, so we know where it came from and where it is going to go, what its capabilities are.

But as good as this system is and we believe the follow-on system will be space-based infrared, first of all, as the Secretary said, we've got to get our arms around this program. Industry and government are working on this now. Mr. Teets in the lead. The fact of the matter is, we cannot have schedule and cost problems like we are seeing. But one thing is for sure - the right answer is not to back off the requirements. The requirements are valid. We have learned to count on DSP doing this so we ought not accept less from SBIRS. In fact, we ought to accept a lot more.

When you talk to people who were on the ground floor of DSP, they will tell you, "General, we had no idea how we might one day be using DSP." I would offer to you, that even though we sit down and look at the operational requirements document, we have no idea how we one day might be using SBIRS. Very, very important.

But as good as one system is, it is a mistake to put all your money on one system. The physics are such that the answer is what? Fusion. The fusion, as the Chief says, of air and space, any other sensors you have out there.
ISR is very, very important to the intelligence preparation of the battlefield. PBA - Predictive Battlespace Awareness. As we look forward in terms of ISR, once again, we have to have systems that are responsive, not just at the national strategic level, but at the operational and tactical level.

We have to make our decisions based on what's right, based on analysis. Where do we get the best bang for the buck? Is it air breathing or in space? I would offer to you the right answer is some place in between. We can make assumptions and go in and be space-centric here and your answer is SBIRS and you need no multi-mission, you need no Joint STARS, etc., or vice versa. We know that near one of those is the right answer.

We are working hard on our analysis of alternatives to decide exactly what the right way is to address this moving target indicator on the ground and what the right mixture is - support throughout the Air Force and all the interested agencies - NIMA, NRO, etc. We are going to get this right. We are going to get this right, but we need space-based radar. I don't know how many. I don't know if it is NEO or if it is LEO but we have to make those decisions over time. that is the only way we are going to get to surveillance as opposed to reconnaissance and that is where we need to be.

Next, weather. Many people say, well, we'll just turn on the Weather Channel. Well the Weather Channel doesn't work very well in Afghanistan and other places. Very, very important the strides we've made in terms of forecasting, observation, getting the information to the war fighter. Very, very important.
And when we talk about weather we don't talk just about the terrestrial weather but also space weather. And what effect it might have on operations. I tell you, we need industry's help here. Because I am a little frustrated because I get these forecasts of space weather, but I have a hard time tracing those down to exactly, so what? So what happened? We need to build some models. We need to do some analysis. We need to increase our emphasis, our investment, both in intelligence, intellect and dollars.

Now many people jump immediately to weapons in space or blowing things up in space. But I would offer to you that the pillars of space control start with surveillance. We've got to know what is up there. Space order of battle, if you will. How does it work? What does it do? So surveillance is very, very important. The other pillars are prevention and protection, preventing others from using our assets, if we think they are getting an advantage from it.
Protection. Make sure that they can't deny us the use of our assets. And they are watching very closely. They know how we are using GPS. They know the leverage that we get from SATCOM, weather, etc...so they are beavering away out there trying to figure out how they deny us the use of our space capabilities and we've got to be able to protect them.

Even when you get into negation, I would offer to you that there are many other ways to negate an enemy the use of space capabilities other than blowing things up in space. Blow them up on the ground. You can jam them. There are lots of things you can do. You can use non-kinetic means.

We've worked hard supporting Tommy Franks through prevention, ensuring that we buy up as much imagery as we possibly can, of the AOR. That imagery is not available. Checkbook, if you will. Assured access if what I call it. This is pretty expensive, though. I don't know if we want to do this over time. But that is one way - diplomatic is another. And that is essentially what we did during Bosnia.

For those who say, you can't say space control, there was a while in the 1990s when we couldn't say space control. We couldn't talk about it. I think that is terribly naive. The fact of the matter is, that just like in any other medium, we've got to be able to operate and we've got to deny others the ability to operate at what we think it is costing us on the battlefield, especially the lives of our young men and women.

Next, space support. As you know, we go back to 1994 and a decision was made, which I applauded at the time and I still applaud, but I think it is time for another decision, and that is that NASA would do the reusables and the Department of Defense (read: the Air Force) would work expendables in terms of launch vehicles. That was exactly the right site picture. It brought about the double ELV as we know it today, which has been very successful, short of a launch, which I'm sure will be successful this summer. But when you stop and think about it, when NASA looks for a reusable, they look for a reusable in terms of the replacement of the Shuttle. That is a much different reusable than the Secretary and the Chief and the CINCs are interested in. They launch on schedule. They've got to have 100 percent success rate. And they don't want to sortie, if you will.

We need to do all of the other things and we could accept a little bit of risk because ours will be unmanned. NASA and the Air Force have been working hard on the study on the way ahead for reusables. The Secretary has talked to Dan Golden and now Sean O'Keefe about this. We are going to get this right. And you know all the reasons we need reusables. We need reusables so that we can sortie. So that we don't have to wait a 179 days as we did for the last Titan IV to launch. We need reusables so that we can replenish on orbit, so that we can go up and do maintenance on orbit. And we need reusables so that we can drive the costs down because you are never going to drive the cost down to what we want it to be if you are using expendables. I would offer to you there is another reason we want to use and develop reusables. And we'll talk about that in the next mission area, which obviously we don't usually talk about, but I think it is important.

Force application. When we talk about force application today, from or through space, our option is the big guys. Let me be very, very clear here-they are wonderful warriors. They are dedicated, motivated on the northern tier out there, 24/7/365, regardless of the weather, regardless of what is going on in the world, they are there, providing nuclear deterrence. I offer to you that for the foreseeable future, they are going to be. Regrettably. I'd like for them all to go away. But if there is one nuclear weapon on the face of the earth, I know who I want to own it. I don't think it is a question if. It is a question of how many we have in the future. So we have to modernize this force and we have to draw down the Peacekeeper force in a safe, intelligent way. And we have to protect our people while we do this and I know once again, the Chief and Secretary are committed to this.

But if you are going to get to what the Secretary talked about, if you are going to get to the Global Strike Task Force of the year - you pick it - 2025, 2030, 2040, you are going to kick down the door, in my view, with weapons through space and possibly from space. That is how you are going to kick down the door. Now, you are not going to then not need the F-22, the B-2, the carrier, the Army, the Marine Corps. But the threat array will be such, I believe, that you are going to kick it down from or through space and we have to dedicate ourselves now - you know how long it takes to develop these things - to be ready for that. Whether it is a conventional ICBM, which causes people to shudder, or whether it is a CAV or Pegasus off a B-52, whatever it might be, we've got to develop those capabilities in the coming decades.

And then, if you are ever truly going to get missile defense right, in my view, you are going to do it from space. Especially if it is more of a global nature - missile defense, as opposed to what we heretofore refer to as national missile defense. You are going to do it with space-based lasers or things like that.

The way ahead? We talked about that. That was just summarized for those of you like me who have a short memory. But when you look at the bottom, once again, as we go back to the quote we showed at the beginning, that handful of transformational goals that the Secretary of Defense unveiled at the National Defense University a couple of weeks ago, he said this [quote shown on screen]. I would have been glad to write that for him. But his staff came up with that on their own, based on what they believe is important and what he believes is important. And there is no doubt, how important this will become and increasingly so in the years ahead.

I thank you. I didn't again talk about NORAD. I didn't talk about information operations, computer network operations and US Space Command, I would be glad to do that during the question and answer period. I do have to say how professional those men and women out there who are flying these CAPs are, day-in and day-out, over 15,000 sorties without an incident, without an accident, without an FAA complaint. How professional they are and they are citizen-airmen and in this case, augmented by the active force. What wonderful men and women we have out there [Applause]. Thank you.

Q. What options are NORAD looking at to reduce the Noble Eagle optempo on Air Force units? For example, could you include Navy or Marine Corps fighters?

General Eberhart: First of all, as we look at the optempo and the perstempo, it concerns us. And as we look at the way ahead, it is one of the factors that we are considering. But I need to be very clear and say that when we make a recommendation on a change in status, a change in the number of airplanes involved, of people that are involved, the combat air patrols we fly, the schedule, we make that not based on optempo and perstempo. We base that on threat. We base that on what other actions have we taken to mitigate, to reduce the risk? That is what is important. Because if our nation needs us to do that forever, to protect this nation, our people, its key infrastructure, then we ought to spend those dollars.

I believe that in the long term, this is not the right way to work this problem. The President, Governor Ridge, the Department of Defense and Department of Transportation are implementing other ways that are much more effective - security at our airports, bag matching with passengers, air marshals, cockpits that are secure, that can't be penetrated. An awareness in the American people - as the Chief would say, they are all sensors. If they see something that looks odd, peculiar, they are taking action.

Also, the briefings to the crews that you no longer say "yes sir, no sir." You know, actively resist to the point of hitting somebody over the head with an axe. By the way, the guy looked pretty good to have been hit over the head with an axe. But that is the way to work this problem. Better communication with FAA, with NORAD. Being able to see the internal picture, not just the external radar picture. Being able to respond a lot quicker than we could have on 11 September. The list goes on and on, but once again, I have to emphasize, that we ought not back away from this, based on perstempo and optempo. We ought to back away from it because it is the right thing to do. And we are sharing those responsibilities after 11 September. We had Marines, Navy, Guard, Reserve, active duty all involved. And we had the NATO AWACS that Speedy talked about helping us.

Q. Based on lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom, how can we better integrate information warfare capabilities with our space operations?

General Eberhart: We are working hard on this in terms of information warfare, information operations. Part of the problem is that there is a definition here that covers the full spectrum from camouflage all the way to computer network attack, if you will. It is not just a horizontal spectrum that we are involved with, but also a vertical spectrum because you have information operations, information warfare at the tactical level, at the operational level and at the strategic level.

I would offer to you that it is the inherent right and responsibility of a commander at any and all levels to use, to initiate information operations, information warfare. But what we need to do better is as we integrate this across air, land and sea, as we do our planning at the operational and strategic level - there is a void there right now. There is a void that we are trying to fill in U.S. Space Command because we have some resident experts. At the Joint Resident Operations Center, the JOC and the Computer Network Operations Task Force. So we are using those individuals, augmented with some academia and other experts in the field, who are down at MacDill working at what we call the space and information operation element. Once again, it is not their job to execute. It is their job to plan and present the plan to the supported CINC. And when they execute, they execute through components. Or if it is a global execution, we would execute through U.S. Space Command.

Q. What are your thoughts on efforts in Europe to field a European GPS type system? Are you concerned about the implications of who could access such a system?

General Eberhart: I am very parochial. I alluded to that earlier. My preference would be that GPS remains the coin of the realm. And that people invest in GPS, use our system. It is good for this nation and in turn it allows us to continue to develop and evolve the GPS system through NAVWAR, as we discussed. I understand where people are concerned that, what if you turned selected availability back on? What if you deny us use of your GPS? I would offer to you that you've now seen two contingencies where we could have done that and we decided not to. I would say that the only time we will do that is if we are convinced that the enemy is using our GPS to defeat us on the battlefield. That is the only time we will take that step and the President makes that decision, so I can't really speak for the president, but I think that is what the decision will be.

And also we are going to go to this capability, this technology that will allow us that, if you are not on the battlefield, if you are not in the AOR, that you are still going to get a full-up GPS system. It is just people on the battlefield who don't have the military channels that wouldn't get that capability. Still don't trust you Eberhart, don't trust the United States, also there are some technical issues here, we want that in our industrial base, etc. Ok, I'll cry uncle. But what I would offer, what I would suggest, what I would ask is that it be compatible with our GPS system so that we don't have to re-outfit Speedy's aircraft to fly in Europe, our airplanes that are transmitting Europe of Johns.

Q. What is your vision for protecting/defending space-deployed assets?

General Eberhart: Obviously, we are concerned about the space element and the ground element. And we focus on both. Right now we see more of a threat and we are more concerned about protecting our ground elements and we do that in a classical force protection way with our great security forces men and women, and in some cases through contracts, etc.
Over time, as I've alluded to, we have to be more concerned about protecting our space assets that are truly in space and there are lots of different pieces to this puzzle.

First of all, we have to understand what the enemy has that could affect that. So good intelligence preparation of the battlefield, space order of battle. We ought not to then have to decide how we are going to counter. Do we again make this satellite redundant? Hardened? Do we have a constellation that is so robust that we can operate if one, two, three satellites are taken out? But I think the key, as always, is to go on the offense and make sure that they cannot mess with our satellite. Initially where they are going to mess with our satellite it is going to be from the ground. I think one day out there, they will be able to do it from space. But I am concerned right now about their capabilities on the ground. And that is where we are focusing our efforts.

Q. Can you give us your estimate of the Northern Command and how it would impact you at NORAD and U.S. Space Command?

General Eberhart: First of all, it is premature to talk about homeland security command, northern command, America's command or whatever the name may be, until the Secretary makes his recommendation to the President and the President decides what course of action to take.

A few things are clear - you've heard the Secretary of Defense say this, approximately two weeks ago, in that, whatever we do, NORAD is going to be involved, it is going to play a key role - aerospace warning, aerospace control since 1958. So whether the individual is going to be dual-hatted as CINC whatever in NORAD or whether NORAD is going to become part of a Northern Command, will remain to be seen, based on the President's decision and the discussions between the Canadian government and ours. But again I believe that NORAD will become married to or part of this new command, when this President elects to stand it up.

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