Admiral Ellis: It is a great pleasure to join with all of you today and to speak a few moments about what is going on in the United States Strategic Command. Admittedly, I am probably the token joint representation here. But in reality, one of the great joys about coming here is the fact that I am joining old colleagues and old friends. As we’d say in Navy parlance, "old shipmates." There are far more familiar faces out there than you might imagine and I think that is a tribute to the joint character of the war fight that the Secretary spoke of earlier and I suspect John and Lance and others talked to this yesterday, because that really is the way it is.

Now, many of you visionaries perhaps might have foreseen a day when a Navy fighter guy would address the Air Force Association. There are probably not many of us in the audience who would have envisioned the day when one would sit behind Curtis LeMay’s desk. But perhaps more than anything else that signals how far we’ve come and where we’re going together as we focus on those challenges ahead.

In fairness, the headquarters at Offutt, whether it was Strategic Air Command, whether it was the old United States Strategic Command, or the new United States Strategic Command, there is a great history of jointness there. For those of you who weren’t aware of the chronology, and it is an important distinction, on the 30^th of September last year, we stood down, dis-established the United States Strategic Command. We also, on that same day, in Colorado Springs, dis-established the United States Space Command. And on the first day of October at Offutt we stood up a new organization, comprised of many of the elements of both of those great commands and their storied histories and legacies, but still nonetheless a new command with a new mission that I’ll describe in a little bit of detail for you this morning. It was an exciting time for all of us.

For the history buffs in the crowd, I’d like to at least begin with a description of the joint service contributions at Offut. The Army was there early. It was Fort Crook in those days—that is my house on the right up there by the way—when it was still a prairie and they had just planted the trees. It is named for the guy on the left who had taken Geronimo’s surrender in 1896 and they arrayed themselves on the parade ground for a number of years after. The Army couldn’t hold the ground, however, and the Army Air Corps took it over and began a series of operations. That is the 61^st Balloon Squadron in 1918. I don’t think there are any members from that in the audience today, despite the seniority of us all. The pictures on the upper right and the top are reflective of the Martin Bomber Facility that was created across the runway. It sprang up nearly overnight at the start of the Second World War and produced 1500 Martin Marauders and 500 B-29s before the war was over, a real tribute to American industry and the uniform-industry partnership, in my view.

Things changed dramatically as Curtis LeMay came on the scene and with the new Strategic Air Command, that is the old air room on the left. They are literally standing on platforms and measuring bomber routes with lengths of string, if you can’t see from the back. Sputnik came on line, a real challenge for us, in 1957, as the space race began. Coincidentally, the same year the United States Air Force deployed its first missile wing. Our satellite didn’t get in the air until January 1998 and that is Kennedy’s famous Reich University speech, where he said, "Some see things as they are and ask why; I see things as they might be and ask, why not?" Finally, in the upper right hand corner, that is the old patriarch, General Curtis LeMay. As you can tell from the expression on his face, he is on board a Navy ship at that time. [laughter] Seriously. He is, he is.

But there is a great history of deterrence and contributions to it and the sensors and the technology that supports it all in both the former United States Space Command and the old United States Strategic Command and we have brought those commands together in ways that many could not have imagined, at a pace that many could not have imagined since it wasn’t even a gleam in anybody’s eye a year ago and now it was done, on the first of October. And as we all know, by bureaucratic standards, that is something approaching light speed.

Why did we do this? A fair question. I don’t need to be pedantic with this audience of great professionals. But this is a different world in which we find ourselves. There are different threats out there. We bring different capabilities to the fore and to the table. There is, in all honesty, a growing number of threats that have a global character. There are things that transcend regional boundaries. There are global wars on terrorism. There are global cyber threats. There are threats to systems on space potentially. There are non-state actors that move from region to region. There are global threats out there and it is appropriate that many of them be addressed in a global character. It is important that we blend the seams between regions and that we have at least an overarching approach in some areas, not just to the threats themselves, but to the systems and capabilities that the nation has that are essential to countering those threats. Many of those capabilities are global in character. Not all of them are on orbits. Some of them are resident in our webs, in our networks and the like, but they are clearly global nonetheless. It is a dramatically changed international security environment and now we had the opportunity to form a command that for the first time combines all of these elements of space operations, integrated missile defense on a global scale, global strike capabilities—that transcends the classic role of SAC and the old United States Strategic Command and for the first time brings in advanced conventional information operations and, by direction in the Nuclear Posture Review, includes special operations forces in the nation’s strategic war plans. And then, finally, we’ve got integrated information operations and I’ll talk about all of those in a little bit of detail here in a moment.

What we have done, for those of you who that think we didn’t change the name. We did change the name. There is a perception that we kind of jacked the old name up and slid a new organization under it. That is not true. All of us came up in an era where the term "strategic" equaled "nuclear." Well, that is the way it is anymore. What we’ve done, if you go back to Webster’s and look up the word strategic, you don’t find the word nuclear in there at all. You find the themes and the definitions with which we are so familiar from our military education and our own experience. Just as there is a tactical operational, there is a strategic level to warfare. These are the things that are important to the success of large-scale military operations. These are the things that are important to the prosperity and the needs of the nation, but that are available in short supply on a domestic level. There are lots of definitions of strategic, none of them equal nuclear. What we have done is create a new command with a new name and a new definition of strategic, returning to the classic definition that we all learned in our PME.

Why did we do this? Well, the two guys on the right had a small role in all of this. But in reality each of them in separate venues and at separate times have highlighted the opportunity and the potential for such an effort. When he was former Secretary of Defense Mr. Rumsfeld, Secretary Rumsfeld and the Space Commission studied hard the elements of our prosperity and our success in space, assessed the things that could be done to better preserve and enhance our capabilities to move the process forward at a speed that perhaps had not been achieved despite our efforts in recent decades, and what can we do to safeguard those systems on which we are increasingly reliant. This is one of the important conclusions out of this and one of them is that disparate space activity should be merged, chains of command adjusted and those dot-dot-dots lead to a final phrase that said, "clear accountability established." That was the objective that the space commission saw as essential and that is one of the reasons that we brought these two great commands together, to bring together for the first time, not just the AOR—the old "space-is-the-place" bumper sticker that John and I remember from our ops deps days—not just beyond orbit systems and the like, but the missions on a global scale that those systems support. So it goes from requirements to procurement to operation to oversight in a way that I would argue we have not been able to approach space before. I think it is a great news story for space. I think it is a great opportunity for the nation and we intend to deliver on it.

The President directed change. When he talked about new concepts of deterrence and the fact that the old concepts are not optimal or not adequate for the new environment, he also talked about the defensive capabilities that are coming online as the incredibly talented people—engineers and scientists and military professionals and MDA—begin to deliver on that system in the years ahead. How do you operationalize that? How do you blend it together with an offensive capability so that the offense and defense are worked in tandem, with single operational pictures and command and control and the kinds of things that we would do if we were starting from a clean sheet of paper? That is an important consideration.

The QDR brought new concepts–assured, dissuade, deter, defeat, defend. All of those are now part of our military and strategic lexicon. The Nuclear Posture Review, a top secret document, you may have read it in the LA Times [laughter], when it came out last year the fact of the matter is it highlighted a number of things that the President has said we must do. One of them was draw down our operation with deployed strategic nuclear warheads over the next decade to between 1,700 and 2,200. I think that is certainly an appropriate thing to do and a goal that we are going to achieve. It is the assumptions that came as part of that Nuclear Posture Review that are equally important, however, and it talked about the delivery of advanced conventional capabilities to replace them, the blending in of information operations capabilities, the non-kinetic options and the like and how can we better address all of the systems that are now available in this continuum with deterrence and acknowledge that the nuclear end of the deterrent continuum is no longer adequate for a number of the challenges that confront us. Lots of things that came out of that are going to bear very heavily on the way we go in the United States Strategic Command in the years ahead.

Finally, the Unified Command Plan changes. We brought the two commands together, the two missions together and then we are going to continue to review the options to flatten, to refine and to reorient the structure that supports our nation’s strategic and military capabilities in the years ahead. We had three versions of the Unified Command Plan in one year. It was published in June, changed in August and changed again when the President signed change 2 on the 10^th of January this year. That is phenomenal and that indicates a commitment to tailor things as we go, to accept that we may not have the perfect vision, we can’t wait for it to become perfect, we need to change, go where we think is right and get on with it, and that is what we are about at Offutt at United States Strategic Command these days.

I tell my junior officers—or I used to, when all else fails—read reference A. Well, this is reference A. This is the Unified Command Plan. The first change brought space and information operation responsibilities to United States Strategic Command. The classic space operations that have been so well and capably executed and overseen by United States Space Command, with great support from Air Force space and other elements over the last 16 years. The missile defense and space-based support requirements and then the military lead for computer network defense and computer network attack. That came to us in the summer time frame.

Change two, the one the President just signed, came out on the 10^th of January, brought four previously unassigned mission areas. I once made the mistake when briefing the Secretary of Defense of calling these "new" mission areas. And, as is his want and is right, he said, "Jim, they are not new mission areas. They were previously unassigned mission areas and they are about to be assigned to you." And so I understand direction when I get it. And that is how they play out and we’ll talk about each of those as we go through here in sequence.

Everyone gets to write a mission statement and I rewrote ours. There are some key elements that I’d like to point out. It is full spectrum, global strike. That means just what it says, full spectrum. It is not just nuclear. It is not just conventional. And it includes all of the capabilities that are out there. Coordinated space and information operations capabilities to meet both deterrent and decisive national security objectives.

Peace is still our profession, but we all have to acknowledge, given the results of our recent past, that sometimes you actually have to very reluctantly put down the shield and pick up the sword. That is what it is about when we talk about decisive capabilities.

We provide operational space support, integrated missile defense, global C⁴ISR and specialized planning expertise to the joint war-fighter. We are everywhere, as are many of your organizations if you are still in uniform and supporting General Franks and our other regional combatant commanders today and it is likely that we will continue to do this in the future because it is appropriate. No longer do we have the resources—nor does any regional combatant commander’s staff—to satisfy the needs when major operations begin to kick off, or specialized skills are required. We gladly, willingly flow those forward. We need to do it in a more focused manner. We need to do it with forethought. It should not be a pick-up team in a pick-up game and we are committed to enhancing that already robust support to the folks on the tip of the spear.

Componency. This is what it may or may not look like when all things sort out here. This is a change for those of you who may recall how United States Strategic Command was previously supported by elements of our nation’s military capabilities. We had historically worked through small task forces that provided the bombers, the ICBMs, the tankers, the submarines on both coasts and the like to support our classic nuclear deterrent mission. My personal view is that we need to rethink concepts of componency and acknowledge that we could not have enough task forces to possibly satisfy the span of control and the span of responsibilities that has migrated to this command. We should not get into a position, as some interpretations of the law require, that an organization or a unit can only be co-comm to a single individual, can only work for a single individual. We have to find mechanisms that allow me to interface with senior leadership in each of these service components with their concurrence and cooperation to work through them to task the capabilities that are resident in their subordinate commands. It is what I call capabilities-based componency. I can’t afford to replicate those capabilities in my headquarters and many cases, in IO and other special areas, the gene pool is too shallow. There aren’t enough skilled professionals to do it all. We’ve got to be able to reach those skills where they exist. Use them to plan and use them to write doctrine, to use them to actually execute, if called upon, some of these critical missions. It is the purview of the services to define how they want their componency relationship to exist with the United States Strategic Command and indeed with any joint commander. I certainly acknowledge that. There are still discussions ongoing within some of the services as to the exact details of that. One item of note up there is the Marines have come forward and now I have a Marine component to United States Strategic Command that never existed before. As a result of the bringing together of the space elements, SMDC, Space and Missile Defense Command on the Army side and then the GIOC and joint task force computer network operations now are under my purview as well.

Another key point that has to be addressed in my view is relationships with national agencies. These combat support agencies, how do you establish a componency-like relationship with them? How do you get beyond the MOUs and MOAs that perhaps don’t have the rigor and the discipline that you need to ensure that the capabilities that are resident in those great organizations are fairly blended in to our war-fighting capabilities? These are key questions that I think beg a fundamental discussion of what is componency? What is our intent? And how do we need to modify it to better satisfy the reality that many of these resources or agencies need to support a wide-range of combatant commanders and therefore the old single co-comm relationship may no longer be adequate for the challenges of the future?

This is one of those "oh my God!" charts. When you put it up there, that is what people say. The implication here is that as we move into the spring time frame, we are going to a non-traditional structure at United States Strategic Command. My view is you have two options—you can organize for what you do the most or you can organize for what is most important. The J organization in my view often-times is organized to support the administrative tasks and the processing and what you do the most. I think we are going to try organizing for what we do that is most important and that is why you see the operationally-focused, mission-specific taskings that you see there. We are going to have divisions, led by flag and general officers that support those elements that you see there—information operations, strike warfare, both a nuclear and a conventional piece of that, global operations—as we transition what historically at Offutt had been a planning headquarters to an operationally focused headquarters that overseas global operations. And it is important cultural change and one that is really at the focus and the heart of our efforts as we redefine the headquarters. The combat support piece is obvious. And then the policy and resources bring together the J-5, J-8-like kind of skills that are an important part of any staff that has a fundamental requirements focus as ours will in dramatic new areas, as I’ll talk about in just a moment.

Underpinning that is the JIC, the Joint Intelligence Center, under operations and a Joint Targeting Center that supports the Strike Warfare branch. Those types of things are ways in which we can realign and reorganize our intelligence structure to better support the needs of the war-fighter. It should not be a stand-alone element. It has got to be embedded with the rest of the organization to make it all work.

The information operations being culled out as a separate entity is a tentative effort. Right now, we are working hard to get our arms around that. I’ll talk about that in some detail in a moment. But until it matures, until it comes with enough rigor and solidity to it, it is a little early to cross-matrix that through the entire organization, though all of us who believe in IO know that that is ultimately where it belongs. We felt it was a little early to rip the baby out of the cradle and put it to work here. So, we are going to nurture it a little bit in a separate category of information operations, until it gets the robustness and maturity that we think is justified in order for us to present it as a legitimate alternative to kinetic capabilities for the nation’s civilian leadership.

A key element to the national agency liaison down at the bottom, my view is that liaison folks are always helpful. But I tend to view that sometimes as an exchange of hostages and not as really active and functioning and involved members of the organization. I’ve asked the agencies, each of them, to investigate other possibilities. Perhaps rather than a permanent single person on site, I need a 30-person team for six months to work on a very specific plan with an objective of solving a problem and delivering something at the end of it. Maybe that is the way we ought to relate to each other, rather than having someone who sits in the back of the conference room and reports to his headquarters what was said in the weekly meeting. That is a bit too pejorative. They tend to be very, very good people, but they don’t bring enough critical mass—you should excuse the expression at Offutt—to the process to help us accomplish some of the fundamental tasks that are ahead of us. We are looking for different ways in which to tap their skills. They are significant skills, I might add.

The first of the previously unassigned missions is global strike, the capability to plan for and deliver rapid limited-duration extended range precision kinetic and non-kinetic effects half a world a way. A lot of discussions about sensitivities with the regional combatant commanders. It matters not whether there is an ED or an ING after the word "support." It is not about ownership. It is about capabilities. It is about the realization that there are issues and circumstances where speed counts and where you need to get to the target as quickly as you can. In those kinds of contexts, I could envision scenarios where support-ed might be the right and appropriate latch up.

And we need to have planning capabilities. We need to have pre-orchestrated options. We need to have the capability to bring that to bear, very very quickly and in an accelerated manner, much as Charlie Holland and many others are working in the war on terrorism to deal very quickly with emergent opportunities and threats. It is fully integrated with the regional combatant commander, even in the supported role, because clearly there are intelligence pieces and other resources that are going to be absolutely essential to pull this off. We also see a very legitimate supporting role. Again, not taking it away from the regional combatant commander or his regional components, but if alerting is a problem, if access is a problem, if those kinds of things challenge us, as they have in the past, then we need to look at other options. John and I remember well some guy with a cell phone sitting outside the fence in Aviano calling Belgrade as airplanes went wheels in the well, giving them the weapons load, the approximate time on tanker and when we expected them over target. If we’ve got those kinds of issues, maybe it would be nice to bring in a capability that does not require the in-theater support, that does not pre-alert your adversary that you are coming, and still allows you to deal with the threat in a very real and capable fashion. That is what we are looking for in global strike. It is not just nuclear, though clearly that is an element of that continuum. We are focusing now on the advanced kinetic special operations and other non-kinetic capabilities that could be brought to bear.

Nuclear deterrence is still an important element of our national security strategy, even though it is perhaps not as visible as it was when we all grew up watching Jimmy Stewart in Strategic Air Command in the 1950s. It is an important piece of reality in today’s world and we all are increasingly confronted with that, as you look at events that are unfolding in the Korean peninsula and elsewhere. There are aging systems that need to be seen, too, both delivery systems—we are well aware of the bomber road map and the plans for the B-52, as that great and capable aircraft stretches its life from 50 to 80 years of age. We’ve got Minuteman III upgrade programs that are in the works. The Navy is extending the life of its submarine launched ballistic missile boats from 30 years to 44. All of these things are stretching out our life. We only have a single delivery platform that is still in production and that is the Navy’s D-5 missile. Everything is out of production. And we have to see to the care and feeding of those aging systems and understand the importance of that as we look to the future. We’ve got to be able to plan more effectively. We’ve got to be able to address the contingencies that confront us because we have a set of capabilities that were designed for a much different world in which we now find ourselves. There are aging stockpile concerns that need to be legitimately addressed as the average age of those weapons is now measured in decades rather than years, much as Secretary Roche addressed some of the systems that are ours on the tactical side as well.

And then we need to look at deterrence concepts for the future. We’ve seen that the President’s direction is certainly appropriate to draw down the nation’s nuclear stockpile to the absolute minimum number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons required for the security of the nation. That is where we are headed. But an important part of that is going to be sustaining these concepts while we look to whatever the future holds and we want to be a part of that dialog.

Again, the sustainment piece is important. Secretary Roche talked it in terms of the tactical challenges. It is equally true for the on-orbit resource, as he also alluded to. We also have to look at what is really transformation. I do not allow the ‘T’ word to be routinely used in my headquarters. My theory being that if you have to keep telling people you are transformational, perhaps you are not. But I do think that part of the transformational concept is not just buying new things. It is using old things in different ways and we are looking at how we can use existing platforms and concepts and capabilities in a dramatically different environment. The SSGN is a part of that, an example of the Navy’s strategic missile boats that are being converted to other missions. We see silver bullet-type forces, precision grooming on certain systems to ensure the reliability meets the nation’s needs while we look at alternatives for the future and acknowledge that we simply can’t put replacements and shouldn’t put replacements for all of these systems, item for item, into the procurement queue. That queue is already full. So we’ve got to look at other issues while we prioritize those needs for the nation’s national security demands of the future.

Information operations. No matter how broadly you define the term, in my view, you don’t define it broadly enough. In fact, if I were king, I’d say it really ought to stand for integrated operations rather than information operations. I think information is a bit too limited. It includes everything we do. We all understand that. The responsibility has come to me, and it is the first time that IO has ever been assigned to anyone on the uniformed side with responsibility. I’d say Space Command had the computer network defense and computer network attack elements, but remember, the Department of Defense IO, in addition to CNA and CND, includes electronic warfare. It includes strategic deception. It includes operational security. It includes psychological operations. It includes psyops as well. All those pieces are a part of how we define information operations and now that is being brought together in a single, uniformed organization. And that is us.

Clearly there are challenges in bringing all those disparate stove pipes together, the programs that are resident in agencies and services and the like and becoming in essence, the nation’s IO armory. Not the trigger puller, but the guy who at least catalogues and understands those capabilities, looks for overlap or gaps, addresses how the future might look and then provides those capabilities to the war-fighter at the tactical, operational or strategic level as required. We think there is great opportunity there if we are ever going to realize the potential of IO, if we are going to ever get it beyond the realm of the science project, if we are ever going to be able to offer that as a genuine alternative to a kinetic option for the nation’s leadership, we are going to have to establish weapon system reliability rates and probabilities of successful execution and the like that are far in excess of that in which we have today.

As John and I employed these systems in 1999, we were perennially frustrated by some of that while we were as fascinated by the promise that it offered. But we are not there yet. We think that bringing all these elements together into a single organization may allow us to better focus ourselves to ensure that we do get there as quickly as possible. There is a possibility someday that instead of writing an IO annex to a military war plan, we’ll write a military annex to an IO plan, which is really the way it ought to be done, when you think about it.

Integrated missile defense. Our role in this, as currently codified and we are working through the details of a terms of reference with the joint staff, is to take Ron Kadish’s efforts out of the MDA and to operationalize them. To provide the battle management command and control architectures, to provide the concepts of operations on a global scale and to support the missile defense capability as it has now been defined. Many of you are fully aware that this is far more than the ground-based, mid-course segment that was the beginning of this nation’s capability. What it now implies is everything that the nation can bring to bear with the ballistic missile threat. That includes the Patriot PAC3s, wherever they might be found, the AEGIS ships off the coast, when those capabilities deliver, the airborne laser, when it is online, the ground-based, mid-course whatever terminal defense or deception you might have and also, quite frankly, what I call the pre-boost phase of missile defense, which is actually hitting the thing before it leaves the pad. All of these things need to be brought together in a cohesive way. The capabilities need to be then offered and presented as with any force-provision capability to the regional combatant commander who legitimately has the responsibility for defending his AOR. We think there is an important role on a global scale for ensuring common conops, common battle management systems, common architectures and the like and they can all be brought together at the time it is needed. Because, the time for response in these kinds of scenarios is measured in seconds. As General Larry Welch said at the Defense Science Board last year, there isn’t going to be time to wake up anybody if this goes down, much less the President of the United States. So you’ve got to have systems that everyone can rely on. You’ve got to have rules of engagement that are clearly understood. It is a tremendous operational challenge as much as it has been a technical challenge and that is the role that we are going to assist the Missile Defense Agency with as we take on integrated missile defense responsibilities here in the year ahead.

Global C⁴ISR. Perhaps the most nebulous of the new responsibilities. Those of you who have heard me speak before know that I don’t like this term, "C⁴ISR." I feel it does us a disservice. The command and control challenges are very different from the communications and computer challenges. The I-word has a challenge all its own and then ISR falls into yet another category. We can perhaps delude ourselves if we think we are putting money toward C⁴ISR, you ought to ask the question, "well, which letter are you putting that money toward because each of them has disparate challenges?" But we do see real opportunities to be the spokesman for the war-fighter in terms of the requirements to oversee the development of these systems that are coming. As John Stenbit and others look to the future and assess what transformational communication architecture ought to look like and what transformational communication systems that support it ought to be defined as. It is important that we understand, as war-fighters, what that is going to deliver. It is also important...[end of tape]

...down architecture and we work the theater up, it takes it all the way up to the National Command and Control System, the presidential communications and that which other senior civilian leaders use in support of all crises, not just military operations. Those are in significant need of upgrade to ensure that we’ve got not just the hardness that we’ve always had, but now get the capabilities and capacity that technology can deliver while still safeguarding the security of those systems that is absolutely essential for our historic STRATCOM mission as well as for all of the missions that are going to confront us in the future.

We also think that there is an opportunity here to talk trade-offs, to talk global concepts, for the first time to assess the costs of on-orbit resources versus upgraded air-breathers versus terrestrial capabilities and maritime systems and the like and that perhaps we can offer the war-fighter’s views on of those things as we work towards those concepts of persistence and steering capability that John and Vern Clark have been so vocal about needing and in fact have so properly identified as a key requirement.

We also then need to understand that as we become more network-centric, as we come to rely more heavily on this grid, that security of that is going to be more important than ever. It is not going to help us if we create a very fragile spider web that increases, not decreases, our vulnerability in terms of numbers of nodes or their softness. My JTF CNO commander uses a candy bar analogy. He says we are crunchy on the outside and soft and gooey on the inside. Once people get inside, as they will, they really can run amok and do you damage. We’ve got to find concepts that allow us internally to compartmentalize—as we say in the Navy in shipbuildings—to have compartments, damage control, where we can isolate people that break into your systems and then dispatch a damage control team or a kill team, as your choice, to deal with that threat and we’ve got to look at it in that context rather than assume that 100 percent defense is possible. It is not. That is one of those curves that always approaches the limit, but never quite gets there and it will always be some level of vulnerabilities we’ve got to have a contingency capability that works once that outer boundary, no matter how robust it is, gets breached.

We do a great deal of support for regional combatant commanders as do most of the CINCs and that is going to continue. As I say, no combatant commander has the resources or the task to do it. A great deal of the planning for the Afghan air campaign was done in the basement of my headquarters and properly so. Much of the planning for the ongoing operations as they prepare for what may or may not unfold in the Arabian Gulf in support of Tommy Franks at Central Command has also been federated to us. Again, that is something that is increasingly a part of the way we do business on a global scale. There are additional pieces that are parsed out to Pacific Command and other elements in support of the folks that are in most need. We send teams forward, space and information operations elements out of the old United States Space Command theater planning and response cells out of the old STRATCOM, bringing those together in a cohesive way so that when Tommy Franks gets the assistance and the cavalry rides to his assistance, it is not single riders arriving from all points of the compass who’ve never worked together, met each other or who have competing demands for reach-back bandwidth and the like. Wouldn’t it be nice if we formed them up into a single cavalry troop, had them arrive as a unit that had trained together, worked together, plugged in seamlessly into his headquarters, knew what reach-back they needed and then we became the 1553 data bus, if you will, at United States Strategic Command, where we can go for federated targeting, information operations support, BDA, whatever else he needs? We can feed to him on the front lines. We think that there are real efficiencies that could be realized as a result.

This is an important slide. It is important for a number of reasons. First off, in far more articulate a manner than I ever could, the Secretary and Lance Lord over the last two days have articulated our reliance on all of the capabilities that are resident in space. The surveillance piece, protection and prevention. We’ve got to know what is going on up there. Some of the challenges associated with that have been brought to the fore in recent weeks as we’ve worked in support of the Columbia disaster.

Force enhancement is well known to us. It is that joke Lance told yesterday about the young Marine who didn’t have anything from space. All he needed was his M16 and this little box that tells him where he is. There is such a reliance on these systems now that people take it for granted. They have no understanding or appreciation from whence it comes or what essentially is needed to get it to them. It is important that we educate our people to understand those capabilities as much as continue to provide them.

Space support. I was at the Cape yesterday looking at some of that aging infrastructure and addressing the challenges of the future, as we look for assured access and the like. All of these things are important capabilities. I am still the Department of Defense manager for manned space flight and support shuttle operations in that context and my staff has been heavily involved, as you might imagine, over the last couple of weeks.

Then the final piece is force application. We have systems that transit through space. We have no weapons in space and there are no plans to put them there. However, we should not be so sanguine as the Secretary noted, that others might be as forbearing and we need to at least continually alert and assess capabilities or concepts that might be needed to counter those threats, should they arrive.

All of this is tremendously important, but what is most important is space operations, but I didn’t mention it until last. I didn’t mention it until last because space operations is a part of all of the other pieces that I spoke to you earlier about. I don’t care whether it is global strike, C⁴ISR, information operations or missile defense integration; all of those capabilities are reliant on space. This is a platform and an underpinning and a foundation for everything we do. And it is important to understand that. I think we sometimes do ourselves a disservice if we talk about space in isolation. We need a complete understanding and we certainly have that at the United States Strategic Command on how reliant we are on these capabilities and what essential care and feeding must be delivered in the years ahead to continue to sustain it. There are single point vulnerabilities. There are issues with launch vehicles and those kinds of capabilities that are important for the nation’s security and some of that can legitimately be transferred to the commercial side and the private sector, but much of it cannot, as we are beginning to see in so many other areas. When the chips are down and you really need it, it sometimes it is very, very helpful to have it in uniform and active, if the circumstances dictate.

So this is United States Strategic Command today. We have reclaimed the classic definition of strategic. It is no longer strategic equals nuclear. Strategic equals strategic in the classic sense that we all learned in War College. Last year was our year of concepts. Great concepts. Great discussions about previously unassigned missions, the benefits of mergers and the like. This year is the year of execution. This year, we deliver.

The service component-agency relationships will be the key to our success. We will not have the skills and the depth required to do all of this in our headquarters. We are not going to get that manpower. I don’t want that manpower. What I need is assured access to those skills wherever they reside in our Department of Defense. And if I get that, as a team, we are going to advance the ball and we are going to cross the goal line here by the end of the year.

I think we can improve and consolidate our support to the regional combatant commanders. They like what we give them. But I think we can do better. And I want to do better. And then finally, we understand that while a lot of other organizations have a piece of some of those previously unassigned missions, that when they call the organization that is solely responsible for oversight of the nation’s nuclear capability at the strategic level, that phone rings on our desk. We are very mindful of the rigor and discipline that our predecessors brought to that task and we are committed to delivering that capability and that oversight in the years ahead that is absolutely essential that this remain, as it always has been, a zero-defect program.

As I said, 2002 was the year of concepts. And 2003 is going to be a year of delivery. The cover letter for change 2 to the UCP, from the President of the United States, says that on the first of January 2004, I will report to the President of the United States that I have achieved full operational capabilities in each of these areas or I will define those elements that have not been achieved and what is required to achieve them.

In the fighter business, we call that putting the "who" in this process. That is the responsibility and accountability that we have got. We are excited about it.

That is the new logo of the United States Strategic Command. I crafted it. When we brought the two organizations together, there was a lot of discussion, a lot of people came forward—new command, new concepts, we need a new logo. What we did was bring essential elements, great traditional legacies of both of the commands, from which we sourced our elements. We retained the mailed fist and the lightning bolts and the olive branch, that was part of Strategic Air Command of the United States Strategic Command and we brought over the globe and the satellite constellations that were so much a part of the United States Space Command’s logo and legacy of great service for over 16 years. That is how we have begun and with that, I’ll be delighted to take any questions.

Q: With all this ongoing change, how is your merger with SPACECOM coming along?

Admiral Ellis: It is actually going very well. I have spent a lot of time at Peterson, not just with the great young men and women that have been a part of the organization, the civilian support for many, many years, but also with the community and with the components over there, with Lance Lord and his support and Joe Cosmano on the Army Space side and we worked this in a way that I think was appropriate. We made no attempts to, as I told people on the first of October, there were not moving vans backing up all over Colorado Springs. While it is my intent, and I think appropriately, to consolidate into a single headquarters those elements that need to be consolidated from a policy standpoint, and all the other pieces that need to be brought together, space was going to be an essential part of this organization. As I think you can get the character from my speech that it is, they need to be resident with us. There are other things that are legitimately and appropriately, either literally or figuratively, hard-wired into Cheyenne Mountain in support of Ed Eberhart at NORAD that will remain there and should remain there. We are pleased with that progress. We adjusted the rotation so that if people had less than a significant amount of time remaining, they stayed there, and their relief will report into Omaha so that we didn’t jerk families around in the middle of school years and those types of things. But our goal is, and I think we’ll get there, that by June or July, over 400 of those billets and many of the people will have been relocated to Omaha and will be on about it as well as with the command and control elements that are an important part of the space operations piece, which is, as you know, a 24/7/365 operationally focused effort.

Q: How do you see us as being prepared to defend against a computer attack, either by terrorists or other potential enemies?

Admiral Ellis: I think in terms of the CND piece, we’ve done fairly well. The JTF CNO has been online for some time and that team and that element and their co-location with DISA and the monitoring that they have of the web. You know, I get calls about two or three times a week of anomalies that they see and actions that they are taking and so I am reasonably confident that against the threats that are out there, that we can deter those kinds of efforts. What I am more concerned about is the next generation of hackers. And how do you ramp up to deal with that? How do you ensure that, as I said earlier, once they penetrate—I mean, no matter how good your defenses are—there is going to be a trap door or a software glitch or something that somebody hasn’t previously identified. We can never, in my view, guarantee that no one will get in. The question is, do you really have that internal response capability and how quickly can you prevent people from doing severe damage to our networks? That is our next challenge, I think, and one that we are aggressively working towards. From a classic, internet-type unclassified side, I think we are in good shape. And so far our classified secure networks have not been compromised.

Q: Will the new STRATCOM missions, will you still maintain your focus on assurance of nuclear forces?

Admiral Ellis: You bet. As I mentioned in the conclusion there, I always like to remind people of that. That is fundamentally important to us and it can never go away and we have to keep the eye on those particular systems and that particular technology that we’ve got. We’ve got aging challenges. We’ve got system challenges. But the success since the Nuclear Posture Review came out of funding initiatives to support the Department of Energy that addresses, through NNSA, some of the stockpile concerns, together with the great resources being applied by the Navy and the Air Force to sustain the delivery platforms, ensures that that remains a deterrent, a credible deterrent to support the appropriate security needs of the nation. We will never let our eyes wander from that one. The price of letting that one go is too great.

Q: Could you comment on recent reports that North Korea’s missiles can now potentially reach our West Coast?

Admiral Ellis: No. You’ve seen the same press reports I have, and we all know or are aware because they’ve been unclassified reports of some of the test results from the North Korean programs in the past. I think it is kind of sobering in a way because it highlights one of the great concerns that we have and indeed it is early in my slides and it is an important part of a lot of the issues and deliberations as we refocus national security strategies—the challenge that is confronting us with proliferation of these, not just the delivery systems but the weapons that they carry. And how do you deal with that? And what kind of deterrent concepts are appropriate? And what kind of systems and capabilities need to be designed for a very different future? It is a bit sobering for all of us who are old enough to have remembered earlier conflicts, the fact that there is a homeland security character to the looming crises that confront us that we’ve not see in this nation ever before. I think that conveys in ways that perhaps nothing else can that this is a real threat. It is not a paper threat. It is not something we created in order to justify higher defense budgets or the like. This is the world in which we find ourselves.

And in many cases a lot of the technologies and systems and concepts that served us so well in the bipolar deterrent days don’t adapt as well for the challenges of today and the future and that is why this transformation, this reassessment, is so critical to our way ahead. We just can’t throw money at everything. We’ve got to really think through the needs, prioritize and assess what is essential for literally the defense of the nation and our allies, as well as our interests around the globe.

Q: How do you see the relationship between you and the components in identifying requirements in a new mission area such as global strike and missile defense?

Admiral Ellis: We will carve out a role that supports the regional combatant commanders and the war-fighters. In many of these areas that are assigned to us for oversight, I think it is important that we understand the needs and that we are not going to make this up in Omaha. We are going to poll and meet with the regional combatant commanders. We are part of exercises through Joint Forces Command and our own engagement efforts to better understand the needs. It is important that, as I have the opportunity and great privilege to be a part of some of the sessions where we assessed the capabilities that are online for the future—systems like SBIRS and others that I am given the opportunity to speak for the war-fighter—I am given the opportunity to talk to what that young captain and major and lieutenant colonel on the front lines really need and we intend to ensure that we do that clearly and vocally and unambiguously and that is the goal that we’ve set for ourselves.

Q: How do you see your command on the evolution curve for doing the actual planning for attacks with global strike?

Admiral Ellis: Through the generosity of Hal Hornburg and 8^th Air Force we have already begun to work that piece, given the capabilities that are most readily at hand. I don’t need to tell you what those are in terms of long-range, global, conventional capabilities. We also think it is appropriate to look to the future and consider other alternatives and systems that have not been created. Because, remember, when you talk about the Nuclear Posture Review, and they are talking advanced conventional capabilities, that is not the PGM capabilities of today. That is the next generation and beyond the next generation and what it is we’d like to be able to do, not because we just want to have that capability, but because it legitimately gives us the potential to deal with threats that are likely to confront us in the future. We need to think in different terms about that.

We also need to acknowledge that there is an IO element, there is a role for SOF, as we’ve seen Charlie Holland begin to expand that capability with Special Operations Command. And then clearly there is a need for an advanced kinetic capability as well that goes beyond that. And platforms like SSGN and certainly hypersonic air vehicles and other things that are just now beginning to come together as concept definitions and the like and the Air Force and the other services we think are going to have an important series of systems that need to be assessed for their potential contribution in that role. But we aren’t content with what we have. We have to deal with what we have today and the bomber force has responded magnificently in doing that on short notice. But we need to move beyond that as the years unfold.

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