It was just yesterday that we began the day on the other side of the world in Armenia. We were wrapping up a fascinating trip that also included trips to Turkey and Azerbaijan, three countries and four languages in five days. Certainly no rest for the interpreter. After we got back to Washington yesterday afternoon, then we went right into meetings, back-to-back meetings over at the NSC, which is the routine in Washington as many of you know. Most of you lived through some of the meetings and you understand why I waited until after the last meeting until I turned my interpreter loose yesterday.

    The Beltway does have confusing vernacular. It is great to be back in the United States from those places. My hope today is that after nine months in D.C., you won’t need an interpreter for the remarks I am about to make. I don’t think you will because we’ve got a very visionary audience assembled here. I think you’ll understand what is behind my remarks. And I think you will see in a few moments what it all has to do with enhancing our Armed Forces’ capability to fight and win in tomorrow’s joint battle space.

    I thank General Shaud for the chance to return to Beverly Hills for this hat trick of sorts because it is my third time and third year in a row that I’ve spoken at this terrific conference. As always, I am honored to stand in front of such a distinguished audience with Secretary Peters – by the way I followed your wake over here and those cars that were bounced out of the way, most of them have recovered [Laughter]. Injuries weren’t too bad. Our chief of staff Mike Ryan and his wife Jane. Jane is responsible for my wife not being here because she said we ought to have puppies and so we had puppies and that is where Mary Jo is--taking care of these three-day old puppies. General Eberhart and Les Lyles and Tom McKee our AFA chairman. And John thank you for the introduction. And to our partners in the commercial sector, many of them I know and I will talk to you later this evening. And, of course, to a true American hero John Shaud.

    Those of you who have heard my pitches before at AFA events know that I have enjoyed a few jokes at General Shaud’s expense. It all goes back to when I used to work for him and he made a lot of jokes at my expense so we’ve turned the tables here a little bit. General Shaud, I was really against doing it this time. I said I think this has gone too far. I was really worried that he’d order a hand count of the ballots that got me invited and send me packing. It amazes how some people fight so hard to get to Washington while those of us in uniform are fighting so hard to get away from it. General Shaud bear with me. I think you’ll appreciate that.

    I got his invitation to speak and it said, I’d like you to speak on the topic of Joint Vision 2020, particularly the role of space and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance or ISR in achieving that vision and that is a great topic. We were all set to explore that subject but then a second letter came from General Shaud. It arrived three months later. It asked me to speak on my views of the challenges affecting the vital military-commercial civil partnership in space. Another great topic that we could spend a lot of time talking about.

    You can see the dilemma I was facing. I read the letters. I read them again. I even read them a third time, but I was no closer to resolution of what to talk about. I put on my staff on it right away. First, CNN declared that the first letter was valid before we had even half finished reading the second letter [Laughter]. My special assistant was speed reading the letters. He read them twice. Three days later my assistant was seen holding letters up to the light. She found what may have been a staple mark, but only one hole was complete through. Was there a missing attachment?

    At one point a staff member on TDY called in and reminded us of how General Shaud’s letter had tilted in the past. Eventually we moved the operation into the courtyard of the Pentagon so we could have observers all around and make sure we were doing a fair process of trying to sort this out and then an army of grammarians reported to discern the intent of the line "we would ask you to talk to the subject of" and to rule on dangling participles. We just have to know, since General Shaud double voted, which letter to count [Laughter]. Actually, I like both. Both fit perfectly into what I will leave you with today. Both are key to how our capabilities in space will define our national strength, including the military’s ability to fight and win our nation’s wars.

    For my theme to make sense, you have to think in terms of the Cold War. The good news is that from the standpoint of our old adversary, the Soviet bear, it is over. The bad news is that at least from my point of view and from what I gather was somewhat discussed this morning, despite having convinced ourselves otherwise, I think we are often still fighting it. I know it is a bold statement to make, especially nearly a decade after the fall of the Soviet Union, but my premise centers on the idea that a bureaucracy developed over the 50 years of the Cold War continues. It continues for most of because that is all we’ve ever really known. It stifles the progress necessary in today’s environment to achieve that vision we are after. My idea is that in three areas in particular, I’d like to talk about – information security, technology and processes – our persistent Cold War mind set is slowing the progress we are making toward achieving tomorrow’s vision.

    Numerous examples, some from each of General Shaud’s topics – space-enabled ISR and the military-commercial partnership will help illustrate the problem. Nowhere is it more evident than the area of information security. During the Cold Wars, we established a downright Byzantine security apparatus for controlling classified information. At the time it seemed as though it was absolutely necessary. Back then, knowledge was power. The more we knew about them and the less they knew about us, the better off we were. More importantly, who had the knowledge had the power. Not everybody needed access to all the information.

    Today we are faced with a somewhat different dynamic. Knowledge superiority is still power, but it is no longer an end itself. Satellite pictures we used to carry around in locked brief cases can now be bought off the Internet by anyone with a modem and a credit card. More importantly, we discovered that the winner in the battle space is no longer the person who has instant access to essentially the knowledge security information, it is the person who makes the fastest and best decision based on the knowledge. You win in today’s battle space through decision superiority. The battle space is so dynamic and flexible, you can’t always tell who will need what information and when.

    A second lieutenant in Bosnia performing what we would have termed basic tactical missions during the Cold War now makes decisions and act with strategic implications on a routine basis. Joint Vision 2020 acknowledges that is where the power is today and will be tomorrow. If individual troops and junior leaders exercise such power, why then do we continue to concern ourselves with maintaining knowledge security, style security restrictions.

    I am not advocating that we do away with all our efforts to protect information. That would be absolutely foolish. But I am suggesting that we take a look at what drives us to keep certain kinds of information classified at a particular level or compartment it into stove pipes. I am suggesting that we break through the Cold War mind set that might no longer be in our best national interests. I know this is something that General Eberhart confronts on a daily basis with the space control mission, with computer network attack and computer network defense.

    Let me give you another example from Kosovo that I know most of you in the Air Force audience know well. On at least one mission in that conflict and I am sure many more, we had Dutch F-16s flying combat air patrol for our B-1s. It was the perfect example of just the kind of coalition warfare that defines our operational future. The only problem was that on closer inspection, the example wasn’t so perfect. The Dutch F-16s and B-1s couldn’t talk to each other secure. Why? Because the encryption equipment on the B-1s used was U.S. only. We were unwilling to share it with our very allies we knew we needed to be on our team for this particular fight. The result was that the Serbian air defense units were able to listen in on not-secure radio communications between the pilots flying those missions.

    In my view, that was completely wrong focus for security emphasis. We chose to put that encryption equipment ahead of the lives of those young air crews.

    What led us to that? In part, it had to be a Cold War-style concern stuck on knowledge superiority instead of evaluating its effect on the decision superiority of the coalition pilots flying combat. The result was, that concern for security of information pre-empted the more appropriate concern for the risk our combatants were taking, not to mention the success of the coalition mission.

    Everybody understands that we want to protect things like encryption gear for the sake of national security. That is not the point here. But I would say that in some cases, we risk our national security more by not working well with our allies. It is a pervasive problem. You see it in everything from combat examples to the more mundane daily work routine. I see it everyday in the Pentagon. If you are familiar with the capabilities of the Palm Pilot, which most of you probably are, you will understand exactly what I am talking about.

    Clearly managing information is the key to doing the job right. I have a terrific staff that helps me do that. But I know from my experience in Colorado Springs, that I’d have to carry around a lot of information that would have to be updated fairly frequently and that is where the Palm Pilot part comes in.

    I went to my new staff in the Pentagon, told them what I wanted and said I want all my computer desktop files, my email, my contact list and a calendar from the network server and I want to do the same for certain reference documents and I want access to the Internet all in one portable pocket size system. Furthermore, I want the ability to update that almost instantaneously whenever I felt the need. They said that is great general. Instead of lugging a ton of paper around and a large 20-pound laptop, you want to do it all on one of those hand-held things. I said yes, that is exactly what I want. They said, boy that would be cool. I was kind of peaking their interest. So I said when can I get one of these? They said, oh you can’t. I said why not? They said it basically boils down that we’ve never done it that way before and the concern that some of the information I wanted was coming from classified files even though the information I wanted was the unclassified part.

    They saw their jobs, in my view, as technicians and information managers while I saw their jobs as technologists and problem solvers. When you think about it, it was absolutely the right response, but for a security environment, a technology that went away ten years ago, at least. Ten years ago I would have expected and welcomed that kind of concern without batting an eye. They were just doing their job. The problem is, they are still doing their job from ten years ago and not the ones we need them to do today.

    As it was, we found a young Air Force lieutenant, Jim Tresher, who solved the problem. He wrote a simple basic program that extracts and verifies the unclassified portions of the information I need when I run to command sync up my Palm Pilot. Think about that for a minute. Folks who have done fabulous work for us, who have been around for years, figured out why we couldn’t do it. A sharp young man with a silver bar on his shoulder, just recently became part of our system, figured out how we could do it. As he did, he asked two of the most compelling and appropriate questions of all – how do I solve the problem? Why were we doing it this way in the first place? There is a lesson in there for all of us old heads. Maybe it is time to listen to those young folks first for starters. And to answer Jim’s intuitive questions, then the larger question then applies – why are we tying our hands with a Cold War legacy mind set.

    It is almost as if we are reluctant to fully exploit the advantages of what modern technology brings us out of fear that it will upset the relative stability of the system we built to fight the Cold War. The problem is, that we are failing, perhaps subconsciously, to acknowledge that many of the premises we built the security practices for are gone. We are starting to fully realize that the technology can’t help us to deal with that new environment. We just have to throw off the cold war restrictions that have outlived their utility and that limit our ability to obtain the critical element in today’s security environment, that is decision superiority.

    Take for example the satellite launch business, familiar to most of us. I am sure you probably talked about this today. Our goal has been launch on demand, a really catchy bumper sticker phrase. It is just the kind of capability that will help us achieve the full spectrum dominance we propose in Joint Vision 2020. The problem is, that despite our best efforts, we are not much closer to true launch on demand than we were when this phrase was first developed. I would submit it is because we haven’t asked the questions my young lieutenant asked, like, how do I solve the problem? And, why are we doing it this way in the first place? We propose outsourcing as a solution, but as valuable as that will be for the military, it doesn’t get at the real issue.

    Our launch business grew up during the Cold War, when we had big satellites, some redundancy on orbit and a very progress launch process that in fact served us well. It didn’t matter if each launch vehicle was custom built for each payload. We could tolerate that. But as Kosovo taught us, that simply won’t work in today’s battle space.

    Suppose, for example, that during that conflict we needed a new imaging satellite on orbit. Even if we had that payload sitting in a barn, our current process would have taken way too long. That satellite would have finally arrived in orbit about three months after the conflict was over. As it was, the bad guys capitulated. But at some point in the future, we’ll face a different situation. It will be one in which our ability to launch space control satellites, micro-sats or space-maneuver vehicles on demand will be key to the decision superiority we need to gain full spectrum dominance over an adversary and in the field.

    At some point, we’ll have the likes of common-launch vehicle, standard buses and stack-off the pad capabilities to get there. And EELV will give us a good start. But there is much more work to be done. I know sometimes it is not just a question of technology. Sometimes technology just gets in the way, including the mind set that hinders the adaptation we need to deal with change.

    A funny story I heard that illustrates this point comes out of the heated space race of the 1960s. It seems our good friends at NASA needed a writing system for zero gravity confined to its space capsules. After considerable research and development, they came up with the astronaut pen. Some of you probably have them in your pocket today, given as presents. They worked beautifully and even enjoyed modest success as a novelty. The Soviets faced the same problem and used a pencil [Laughter]. Sometimes it seems we get so enamored with technology and the processes that arise from its applications that we lose sight of the ultimate objective. Sometimes even the processes themselves get in the way.

    That is nothing new. I am reminded of an experience I had flying F-4s in Southeast Asia. I was flying as a fast-forward air controller. A fast-forward air controller from another base that had been shot up and was landing at our base and I was dispatched from squadron ops to take the truck out there and pick him up. They landed and were towed into the revetment. You could see they were from Kurat and they had those tiger teeth and mouth stitched right through the nose almost to the cockpit. As the crew was getting down, I happened to know the crew and we flew in the same area, so I said where did you guys get hit? They said, as they took out their 1:50,000 map, right here. It was at dogshead and they pointed to the exact spot on the map where it was and I said, I’m pretty interested in that because I’ll be flying to that exact same spot this afternoon.

    In my mission briefing, as Intel was briefing, I was waiting for them to brief about the guns and dogshead. But I didn’t get that so I raised my hand at the end of the briefing and I said what about the guns at the dogshead? Oh, there have been unconfirmed pilot reports that we have guns at the dogshead, but until that goes to Saigon and 7^th Air Force says there are guns at dogshead, it is just unconfirmed reports [Laughter].

    It is not too far off the mark what we put up with today. Some folks tell us what they think we need to hear as opposed to us pulling information that we really need. Some things have just not changed a whole lot.

    That is why we are working hard to fix some of these processes that we think maybe are broken. In particular, we are focusing on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council that John mentioned. As you know, I serve on that council along with the vice chiefs of all the services and we have two alums here today – Ed Eberhart who spent many hours in that same room and Les Lyles. I think how we improve the JROC process will prove to be critical in fielding future systems that contribute to the joint fight. So far, we’ve had some success with this evolution we are going through.

    The JROC seeks to more efficiently use service resources by helping put together capabilities for the warfighting CINCs. In a nutshell, it means using the intellectual power of our joint warfighting capability assessment teams and that is just a fancy name for a bunch of folks from OSD and the services and the Joint Staff and the Unified Commands working on strategic issues from the standpoint of joint architectures and agreed to concepts of operations. That means focusing on meeting the conceptual overarching warfighter requirement of launch on demand, rather than specifically on a system like EELV, for example.

    The idea is to ensure wide integration interoperability of new systems within a common joint architecture and in support of the common concept of operations before we bend metal or force steel on another piece of potentially stove pipe hardware. The benefit should be two fold – it fixes a stove pipe process that is inadequately advanced joint warfighting and the process itself seeks to help develop systems that don’t perpetuate the Cold War service-centric stove pipes that we’ve been so prone to.

    I have told a few stories today that might leave you with the wrong impression. So might leave here thinking we’ve faced an entrenched bureaucracy that will prevent us from achieving the promised outlined in Joint Vision 2010. Nothing could be further from the truth and I really don’t believe that. On the contrary, I am very optimistic we will solve the problem, particularly with the help of those in this audience today.

    By the way, I know most of you in this audience today so I know you are the ones that can make this work. We’ve got members of government here. We’ve got members of the services here and civilian industry. There is nothing we can’t do. My intent today with those examples, that maybe to go a little bit to one side, was simply to show why it is so important that we make some progress.

    We have a terrific road map in place for ensuring we can prevail in tomorrow’s battle space. Joint Vision 2020 and the Air Force has done a pretty good job of putting their vision statement right in sync with that. We can achieve that vision if we cast off the bureaucratic weight that impedes our progress. I am confident we can do that, too. In fact, our young men and women serving out there today are counting on all of us to make that happen.

    To the Air Force Association, thank you very much for the opportunity to share my thoughts and today’s audience thank you very much for taking the time for listening.

    Q: What are you taking up in the JROC right now?

    General Myers: What we are wrestling with is, what are those strategic topics that we are going to be addressing with this year’s money. The ones I talked about are over-arching architectures and concepts. I think Ed would agree that what we’ve done with the JROC in the past is, things come floating through there and it is like being in a sausage factory where at the line they are saying USDA approved, but you don’t have any say about what that sausage looks like or what is in it at the front end. That is way to late to ensure systems are able to integrate and interoperate with other systems or that they meet the capstone requirements documents on things that aren’t directly related.

    What we are trying to do is capture it on the front end so when it comes rolling off, it is not so important that we go stamp it. I think the services like it because frankly it will stop those kind of food fights we get into late in the game where you say this isn’t interoperable or doesn’t meet this need and then you tell some poor program manager, I know you are out of your management reserve, but oh by the way, we are going to have to modify your program and you get into all these fights that we get into. We are hoping we can some of these joint systems roll off that make it a little bit easier at the back end. That is the idea. We are working on strategic concepts. There are about three of them we are going to try to fund this year. As you would expect, most of them have to do with the seams in our warfighting apparatus today. That is where most of them will probably start. I think we’ll get into heavier things later on. It is conceivable we could get into some real interesting things in a couple years, but probably not at first. We’ll pick at the low-hanging fruit first.

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