“The Air Force is going out of business,” the Secretary of the Air Force recently said. “At some time in the future [aircraft] will simply rust out, age out, or fall out of the sky. If you want an Air Force, at some point you need to buy airplanes.” That time is now.

On Nov. 2, 2007, during a routine training mission over Missouri, an F-15 fighter jet broke apart in mid-air. The canopy ripped off as the nose and cockpit broke away from the aircraft, breaking the Air National Guard pilot’s left shoulder, but he ejected and parachuted to safety.

The cause was fatigue failure of one of four longerons that provide stiffness to the fuselage, much as a keel does for a boat. As a result, the entire fleet of 441 air superiority F-15s was grounded for more than two months for inspection. On January 9 about 60 percent of the A, B, C and D model F-15s were returned to flight, but the remaining 182 remained grounded indefinitely. That is the equivalent of putting three aircraft carriers out of business.

Why should you care? The grounded aircraft are no longer available to provide air superiority for US troops or air defense over the United States. It will take months for many pilots to regain flying proficiency. It is increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain our aging fleet.

In 1973, the average age of Air Force aircraft was eight years. Today it is more than 24 years. Our KC-135 aerial tankers and our B-52 bombers are more than 46 years old. More than 800 aircraft of all types are grounded or flight restricted. Old aircraft break in new and unpredictable ways. Older fighters are losing their technological advantage and face international fighters that equal or exceed them.

We’re in this position largely because of the acquisition vacation of the 1990s. We never got back on track, and seventeen years of continuous combat operations by the Air Force have taken their toll.

Replacing our aging tanker fleet is the Air Force’s number one acquisition priority. A replacement combat search and rescue helicopter is another. Many of our C-130E transports are non-flyable and our giant C-5A transports are unreliable and operate under serious restrictions. In fact, we currently lease outsized cargo aircraft from Russia. Yet the new C-130J and the C-17 strategic airlift production lines are scheduled to close. That means replacement aircraft are not even budgeted. Finally, punctuated by the F-15s on the ground, the need for more F-22 Raptor fighters is critical.

The F-22 is the most capable fighter in the world. Designed to replace the F-15, the production total has been cut deeply. Three independent studies support a fleet of about 381 F-22s, but arbitrary budget restrictions have capped the number at 183. That is not enough, and fails to provide even one downsized F-22 squadron for each of the ten Aerospace Expeditionary Forces the Air Force deploys.

The F-22 line is scheduled to terminate in 2011. The first F-35 fighter, meant to replace aging F-16s and A-10s, rolls out in 2013, leaving a two-year gap between active fighter production lines.

Incredibly, the Air Force might soon have not one open production line for transport, bomber, or fighter aircraft. This has implications for our aerospace industrial base and our ability to keep the lead in aerospace technology. The Air Force is smaller today than what we had at the start of World War II. There is no telling what threats we will face in the future. In the past, we have not successfully predicted what the next war will look like. Even if large near-peer countries do not become threats (e.g. Russia and China), the weapons they build will fall into the hands of nations that are.

We need properly funded acquisition programs to modernize and replace (recapitalize) worn out aircraft. The Air Force must also be allowed to retire those that are no longer feasible to operate. Too often, a parochial Congress prevents retirements. Air Force recapitalization demands at least an additional $20 billion annually. Despite the fact we are in a global war on terrorism, defense spending (without supplemental spending bills which satisfy only near term operational requirements) is near post-WWII lows as a percentage of Gross National Product. We should increase defense spending to at least four percent of our GNP.

As a nation, how much strategic risk can we accept before taking action?

Scott P. Van Cleef
Brig Gen, USAF (Ret)
Fincastle, VA