By Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap Jr.

Recent reports of major airstrikes in Iraq alert Americans to the most surprising feature of the military's surge in Iraq: the increasing evidence that high-technology air power is a decisive element of today's counterinsurgency warfare.

And the evidence is not confined to just the last few weeks. While the 20 percent growth in ground troops was absolutely critical to suppressing violence in Iraq, so too was the nearly 400 percent surge in bombing that occurred in 2007.

This significant but rarely reported fact runs counter to the anti-air power bent of the much-vaunted counterinsurgency doctrine issued by the Army and the Marine Corps in late 2006. It largely confined its discussion of air power to a five-page annex, and even that meager treatment discourages its use.

No matter. U.S. commanders departed from the doctrine and exploited air power in all its dimensions. (Besides airstrikes, the numbers of airlift and reconnaissance flights also jumped in 2007.) The result? As the use of air power increased, American and allied Iraqi casualties dramatically declined.

Air power's unprecedented success as a counterinsurgency weapon contradicts the historical studies the Army and Marine Corps relied upon to develop their doctrine. Most of the earlier campaigns preceded air power's continuing "precision revolution."

That transformation encompasses not just a new generation of highly accurate munitions but also revamped processes linking ground controllers, reconnaissance drones, satellites and advanced command-and-control centers.

While tragic errors still occur, air power today delivers stunning yet highly accurate force. In fact, Marc Garlasco, a Human Rights Watch activist and a frequent critic of the military, recently said "airstrikes probably are the most discriminating weapon that exists."¶

Precision technology is no longer limited to bombs. Air drops, which reduce the need for convoys on mine-infested roads, now can deliver supplies with extreme accuracy.

Most importantly for defense planners, air power's counterinsurgency success shows it can address a very wide range of threats. Ground power is not quite as adaptable.

Experts insist counterinsurgency is so unique that it demands specialized troops imbued with a different attitude and skill set than those prepared to fight conventional foes. Also required are costly investments in purpose-built equipment with limited value beyond counterinsurgency situations.

A classic example is the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle. Although shielded against improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and small arms, these gas-guzzling behemoths are easy targets in conventional war.

Virtually defenseless against air attack, the high-silhouette MRAPs are also vulnerable to even the less capable tank and artillery forces still found in militaries around the world. Nevertheless, the plan is to spend $22 billion to buy more than 14,000 MRAPs, evidently so we can prepare for more Iraq-type operations.

But in a complicated 21st-century world, America needs more than just the counterinsurgency-focused organizations that the Army and Marine Corps are becoming. Why?

Ground forces trained and equipped to fight low-tech guerrilla wars are not easily - or quickly - reconfigured to conduct high-tech operations against a sophisticated major power. In contrast, air power's flexibility readily lets it employ much the same capabilities in any type of conflict.

Ironically, the precision that makes air power so valued in fighting insurgencies was not really developed for that purpose. Actually, it was acquired primarily to put fewer pilots and aircraft at risk when striking high-value targets in well-defended areas, principally during high-intensity wars with nation-states. Regardless, air power's precision is now prized in all kinds of conflicts.

In short, air power does not require the wholesale recalibration the land forces now say they must have to succeed in different environments. What air power needs, however, is an update to its increasingly geriatric inventory of warplanes, which today average more than 24 years of age.¶

If that modernization happens, America will have the dynamic force it ought to have to meet the full range of future challenges.

The writer, an Air Force major general, is the author of "Shortchanging the Joint Fight?" , an assessment of the Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual. The views expressed are his own.