Following the Cold War demise, there was a drastic reduction in the Civilian Acquisition Workforce, from 240,000 in 1990 to 124,000 in 1999. It was done fairly precipitously, without regard to skills retention and future needs. During the latter months of 2001, I did a study on the issue, including the concurrent demise of the Uniformed Services Acquisition skills and suggested what needed to be done to rebuild an effective DOD Acquisition Workforce, which at best would take 10 years. I published my Commentary on the DOD Acquisition Workforce in January 2002 in the Armed Forces Journal. In it I highlighted the fact that Congress, concerned about the issue, had passed the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) which laid down guidelines for creating, educating, and improving the DOD Acquisition Workforce. If properly implemented, it would blend education and experience in a carefully integrated sequence to establish a logical career progression from beginning to end for dedicated acquisition professionals, both military and civilian, rising to the highest levels of acquisition leadership and responsibility. It has not happened and will not happen under the present circumstances.

It is instructive to note that DAWIA has been amended many times since inception, attempting to further instruct OSD in compliance and implementation. The latest update, 10 USC Subchapter 111-Acquisition Corps, Section 1731-1737, dated July 1, 2007 directs the SECDEF to establish an Acquisition Corps in DOD. Section 1732 establishes Eligibility Criteria, including education, experience, and assignment, except that SECDEF may establish exceptions and waivers to the requirements of Section 1732. To date, there is no DOD Acquisition Corps. Each of the Services continue to separately manage their own acquisition people, but not as a DOD Acquisition Corps, and OSD have apparently accepted this approach

Over the last decade there have been numerous studies and proposals to “ Fix DOD Acquisition “ including the Defense Science Board, OSD Special Groups, other Independent Groups, and the Congress through legislation, most recently in the 2008 Authorization Bill. They have produced numerous lists of new processes and procedures to correct the system. Yet program schedule slips and overruns continue to occur. Processes and procedures don’t manage programs. People do!! DOD needs an acquisition fix which focuses on people, not processes.

There are two fundamental conditions necessary to creating a viable DOD Acquisition Corps.

1. There must be an Acquisition Institution, with a strong leader and with all the necessary people and resources, independent of other DOD entities and dedicated to the mission.
   
   
2. Within the Acquisition Institution there must be clear career paths for people to aspire to and rise to the highest levels of responsibility based on their performance and ability.

Simply legislating direction to OSD adds one more set of procedures and processes to an overloaded staff, who are emersed in a larger set of challenges. As a staff function, acquisition must compete for attention. OSD Staffs are transistory, and the OSD personnel system will resist protecting and supporting a dedicated Acquisition Corps.

The U.S. Air Force Systems Command was an Acquisition Institution. Headed by a 4 Star General with 53,000 people, military and civilian, responsible for AF Acquisition from Basic Research to major modifications to fielded systems. Over 90 percent of AF Engineers and Program Managers, as well a majority of contracting personnel were in the Command. Young people were brought into the Command and went through interspersed training and acquisition program assignments, matriculating to higher responsibilities as they progressed and demonstrated ability. It was also routine to send selected junior officers to a tour in an Operational Command, usually in aircraft maintenance, which provided invaluable hands on experience. The Institution needed the 4 Star General to not only nurture the Acquisition Workforce but also to protect individuals from discriminatory raids by the personnel system.

I spent 11 years in two programs, and two acquisition staff assignments before I became the Program Manager of the AF Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM). By then I had a fair amount of experience, including some “non fatal “ scars and bruises, which helped me to understand where the risks would be in the acquisition process. The Command had a “ Blue Room “ personnel assignment “ system so that the Commander and his key staff could keep track of the best and brightest and make sure they were progressing through the right career assignments. It was a given that within the Command, if you performed well you could aspire to be a 3 Star Product Division Commander. I aspired to be the Commander of AF Aeronautical System Division (ASD), and 10 years after being the PM of SRAM and AWACS, I did become the ASD Commander. Once AFSC was abolished in 1992, those top assignments did not always go to someone who worked his way up the acquisition career path, so many of the best and brightest concluded that getting to the top levels was chancy, and they switched career fields or went off to Industry.

Perhaps the biggest concern is the size and experience in the DOD Acquisition Work Force. The draw down in the 90’s created a aged work force, and the few new recruits, although bright and eager, created a work force that was and is thin and lacking in experience. It will take 10 years to rebuild the Acquisition Work Force. The Air Force takes 10 years to develop a seasoned fighter pilot. The same dedicated time span is also necessary to create a seasoned experienced acquisition Manager.

Without the creation of a strong focused Acquisition Institution and a dedicated and trained Acquisition Workforce, where young Military and Civilian Program Managers can aspire to the highest levels of responsibility, and are protected from the vagaries of the OSD and Service Personnel Systems, poor performance will continue.