By Joseph E. Sutter
January 26, 2009

Lobbied by those with long-held agendas, the new Administration may be in a rush to judgment on three key issues involving America’s nuclear forces – major reductions in nuclear warheads, development of a replacement warhead, and de-alerting ICBMs.

Reductions in warheads. Despite near-universal desire for a nuclear free world, this noble goal is certainly a long way off. Russia and the U.S. have drastically cut strategic stockpiles, but Russia seems to be increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons for its security and retains a large inventory of tactical nuclear weapons. China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are steadily building their nuclear systems and others are actively seeking nuclear capability. The primary discussion should not be “how low to go,” but must begin with an understanding of how nuclear weapons contribute to our overall national security strategy. Lower is not always better. We must consider the policy, stockpile, and operational factors to help us decide on further nuclear weapon reductions ― not settle on to some arbitrarily low number in haste.

Development of a replacement warhead The Departments of Energy and Defense have actively sought a replacement warhead with comparable capabilities, but with advanced safety and security features and to be certifiable without nuclear testing. More reliable and effective weapons may permit even further stockpile reductions. The replacement warhead is part of a larger nuclear infrastructure program our nation must undertake to preserve our deterrent. (Today, the U.S. is currently the only declared nuclear power that does not have the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead). Sadly, Congress has put the reliable replacement warhead (RRW) program on hold. This should be reversed. We cannot rely forever on nuclear weapons designed and tested decades ago.

De-alerting ICBMs. De-alerting ― removing the ability of ICBMs to respond within minutes – has appeal in some sectors of academia and elsewhere. But when examined in some detail, it is a bad idea. First, it does not make us safer. America’s nuclear posture has been reduced extensively, but the need to maintain a visible, effective and on-alert deterrent force ― to demonstrate our resolve to allies and adversaries alike ― has not. And the unintended consequences of de-alerting ICBMs, particularly if done unilaterally, could be disastrous. Verification would pose enormous challenges. There is scant evidence that others would respond positively to a unilateral decision to de-alert. If further mutual arms reductions remain a U.S. goal, it is not clear how unilateral de-alerting moves us in that direction.

Past studies have shown there will be no cost savings with de-alerting, and it may even cost more than the status quo. Removing the warheads and placing them in a central storage location would present a very lucrative target to an attacker, and it would take more than a year to re-alert the force. Regardless of how we de-alert, the Air Force needs trained personnel, ready equipment, and the supporting infrastructure to maintain the systems day-to-day, and to reconstitute the force if directed. Failure to do so will make it virtually impossible to return the missiles to ready status. (But allowing the force to atrophy to the point it is not longer viable may be the ultimate objective of some de-alerting advocates). Safety and security become major concerns with rusty equipment and crews – this at a time when we are striving to reinvigorate the nuclear enterprise.

Many nations rely on our nuclear deterrent for their security and some have foregone building their own nuclear program because of this U.S. guarantee. Taking ICBMs off alert sends the wrong signal to those we are pledged to protect, as well as those we seek to deter.

Finally, the 450, single warhead U.S. ICBM force provides a strong, stable deterrent everyday, and perhaps when needed most – to decision makers and the President in a crisis. Any adversary would clearly understand the enormous consequences of trying to attack hundreds of targets on sovereign U.S. territory. Alert ICBMs would not force the President to face the difficult decision to re-posture, fearing that such an action could be perceived as an escalation and send exactly the wrong message to an adversary and prompt him to strike first.

Conclusion. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently said, we must be realistic about the world around us ― about challenges and our inability to predict what other nations will do. One reason our nuclear arsenal remains vital is because we simply cannot predict the future. He is exactly right, and we should tread carefully and not accept some of the “catchy” ideas being put forth today when it comes to our nuclear deterrent. Nothing less than our existence depends on it.

Joseph E. Sutter
Chairman of the Board
Air Force Association

Joseph E. Sutter is Chairman of the Board of the Air Force Association, an independent, nonprofit, civilian education organization promoting public understanding of aerospace power and the pivotal role it plays in the security of the nation. He is retired from the Air Force, having served most of his career in the nuclear career field, including command of a missile wing.