By General Michael E. Ryan, USAF, Retired
The United States Air Force has been attempting to replace their aging Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) force consisting primarily of old HC-130 tanker aircraft and HH-60 helicopters. The recapitalization effort has run into some stumbling blocks. The selection process for replacement helicopters was deemed flawed by the Government Accountability Office. The Air Force has corrected the process and is now on the verge of a go ahead decision except for an intervention from an outgoing official in the Department of Defense.
Recently Mr. Young, the holdover head of DOD acquisition, cut the Air Force CSAR tanker replacement from 7 to 2 and, in what appears to be an attempt to delay or derail the decision on the CSAR helicopter, has questioned the need for a dedicated force. The need for the force has gone through the rigorous pentagon process that approves requirements and has the support of the combatant commanders worldwide. It is interesting that an official who is supposed to oversee the purchase, not the requirement for approved programs, opines negatively on the requirement at the eleventh hour as he leaves the Pentagon. Several of his uninformed quotes pertain. "The whole (Concept of Operations) CONOPS is doubtful…" and "We have a lot of assets that can be used in rescue missions with planning…"
First, the CONOPS is based on the inherent and solemn promise to the combat aircrews of all services that, should they go down, military leaders will make all reasonable efforts to rescue them. Not to reveal the operational art, but time is of the essence, for the longer an aircrew is down, the more likely they will be captured. Therefore, orchestrating a rescue is an intense and time compressed activity, involving almost every asset available to the commander to provide diversions, air cover, defense suppression, command and control, escort and the applicable rescue force. The CSAR forces are poised on alert well forward of other operational fixed wing aircraft ready to react rapidly, not just for downed airmen, but for any members of the joint force in jeopardy. I’m not sure how this CONOPS is doubtful, given that Air Force CSAR forces rescued nearly 3000 individuals on over 1000 missions in CENTCOM since 9/11. No knowledgeable commander I know thinks this concept or its purpose is flawed.
Second, the idea that CSAR can be done effectively by non dedicated assets, is belied by the fact that the combatant commanders ask for these dedicated forces as a prerequisite before commencing operations. Indeed, 21% of all AF CSAR helicopters are forward deployed to the CENCOM AOR today. That is the highest percentage of any services rotary winged force. Because most CSAR missions by their very nature cannot be preplanned, success depends on a combat team of tankers, helicopters, and escort aircraft honed through constant training to work together and operate in a hostile environment on short notice. Doing that with untrained "pick-up" crews courts disaster.
If the CSAR forces are to survive and succeed, they need and deserve to be equipped with the most modern and capable systems.
The CSAR tanker force is what allows the combat rescue helicopters to extend their reach. The tankers also act as a vital link in the command and control system. That CSAR tanker force is made up of only 32 HC-130s, about half the number required. Their average age is 42 years old and their old and worn systems have about 40% of the force not ready for combat at any given time. At a rate of 2 per year it would take more than 30 years to meet the required force. That paltry rate cannot be allowed to continue.
The combat crews need a modern helicopter, one that is swift, agile, quiet, armed, with self protection, net enabled and with mission systems that allow them to perform the rescue tasks in severe conditions. Their current equipment does not. The CSAR HH-60s are operationally limited and at the end of their service life. It is a credit to the hard working men and women who maintain and fly them that they are still operating at all. It is also unfortunate that there is no alternative until the next combat search and rescue helicopter is chosen, built and fielded. The first replacements will take until 2013 to be fielded even if the decision is made today. The challenge will be to hold the combat rescue force together until then.
Just as in a rescue mission, time is of the essence. It is imperative that the Defense Department move swiftly to bring on the tanker replacement in numbers and to bring the CSAR helicopter competition to a satisfactory conclusion that provides our rescue forces with the best equipment for their dangerous mission. Lives depend on it.
General Michael E. Ryan (Retired) was Chief of Staff for the United States Air Force from 1997 – 2001. During his career he participated in and directed CSAR operations.
