By Joseph E. Sutter
Chairman of the Board
Air Force Association

The first flight of ten Minuteman I missiles came on alert at Malmstrom AFB, Montana in October 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Many of us recall those very dangerous times as the U.S. and Soviet Union faced off in a major nuclear confrontation. President Kennedy later referred to those ICBMs as his “ace in the hole”, a welcome addition to demonstrate U.S. resolve that contributed to the eventual retreat from this dangerous confrontation by the USSR.

The nuclear landscape is far different today than 1962, or during the height of the Cold War. When I entered active duty in 1969, there were more than a thousand U.S. ICBMs on alert status. Both the U.S. and Russia have slashed nuclear inventories from tens of thousands of warheads, to around 2000. And the President is about to sign an agreement that would reduce levels even further. Many people may believe all US ICBMs have all been dismantled, and surprised to learn we still quietly, safely, and securely maintain 450 Minuteman III ICBMs on day-to-day alert. If the average citizen is unaware of this, rest assured our potential adversaries and our partners are keenly aware of this reliable force providing global stability protecting the U.S. and our friends and allies.

As we decide what mix of forces we will retain under this new arms control agreement, it is important to carefully consider the many unique attributes that the Minuteman provides to strategic deterrence. Most importantly, the U.S. ICBM force provides a quiet but clear 24/7 signal to friends and foes alike of U.S. commitment. Many of our allies have sharply curtailed or foregone nuclear programs because they reside securely under the U.S. deterrent umbrella. All ICBMs on day-to-day alert are under the positive control of the Commander in Chief. This “steady state” condition provides considerable advantages if there is a potential crisis. It allows the President the option to maintain the status quo, and not face the difficult choice to escalate tensions by posturing non-alert systems, which could further destabilize an already dangerous situation.

U.S. basing also raises considerably the consequences of any attack. An attempt to defeat our ICBM force would require a large, unmistakable act of aggression thereby raising the threshold of deterrence. Most U.S. ICBMs now carry just a single warhead, and individually represent relatively low value targets to a potential attacker, and a single warhead missile is less threatening than one that carries multiple weapons. In short, our ICBM force strengthens nuclear stability.

With tight budgets, it is important to remember that ICBMs are the least expensive strategic system to operate and maintain. Based in the north central U.S., the force has positive, reliable and redundant communications links with higher authorities that allow positive command and control.

The Minuteman III has been the backbone of our missile force for decades. In fact, I was a young lieutenant at Minot AFB, North Dakota when the first MM III went on alert in 1970. With upgrades and refurbishment of the guidance, propulsion, and other systems, USAF officials estimate the MM III can be sustained beyond 2020. But we must begin now to plan for a replacement of this critical deterrent system. There are technologies and operations concepts to further reduce operations and maintenance costs, including manpower requirements. At the same time, we have the opportunity to make a follow-on system even safer, more secure, and effective. As our nuclear forces are further reduced, there is an even greater premium on reliability and effectiveness. We no longer have the “luxury” of multiple varieties of ICBMs, bombers, and submarine-launched missiles that can provide a hedge in the event of a sudden, unexpected problem in one system.

Like the others in the nuclear stockpile, Minuteman weapons were designed and tested decades ago. We have come to rely on a stockpile stewardship program that places a premium on simulation, modeling and scientific assessments in the absence of nuclear testing. Therefore, a modern, responsive nuclear production capability and infrastructure are essential to maintain the safety, effectiveness, and reliability of the entire U.S. nuclear stockpile – regardless of the numbers.

The long range strike mission and nuclear deterrence have long been core functions of the U.S. Air Force and will remain so in the decades ahead. As we decide which forces will remain under the new arms control environment, it’s essential that decision makers fully and fairly consider all that the U.S. ICBM force adds to stability, deterrence, and our overall defense strategy. It remains our ace in the hole – now and into the future.

Joseph E. Sutter is Chairman of the Board of the Air Force Association, an independent, nonprofit, civilian education organization promoting public understanding of aerospace power and the pivotal role it plays in the security of the nation. He is retired from the Air Force, having served most of his career in the nuclear career field, including command of a missile wing.