



## Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies

**Presentation: "Operation Enduring Freedom: A New Model for Airpower"**  
**Ritz-Carlton Pentagon City, Virginia**  
**October 19, 2011**

**Gen. T. Michael Moseley, USAF (Ret.)**  
**Dr. Rebecca Grant, Director, Mitchell Institute**

**General Moseley:** Dr. Grant, thanks for that warm introduction. I do have a couple of admissions to make, or confessions.

Her Majesty, the Queen, is quite a lady. Jenny and I have had the opportunity to spend a lot of time with her and with her family and they are wonderful, wonderful people. I have not had the chance to discuss Texas A&M football or a move to the Southeast Conference with her, but I will in the future because I believe that's a good thing. Being a Cowboy fan and an Aggie, you live with football demons most of the year. So I'd like to share that with her.

Jenny's not here tonight but she sends her warmest regards also. As I look around the crowd, there are a lot of you folks in here that know her as well as you know me, and she spent close to 40 years in the Air Force as well. So as I look at guys that I've flown with and operated with, I can say the same for your husbands and your wives, whether you're in the United States Air Force, the Saudi Air Force, the Russian Air Force, the Japanese Air Force or others, it's the same. Families are important.

The last confession I'll make to you is my two children, a daughter and a son, were both born in Air Force hospitals. The daughter is married to an Air Force Academy grad, a member of the 4/22 at Nellis. My son is going through his F-16 checkout now, going back to Nellis. My daughter-in-law spent four tours in the Air Force to include a combat tour with everybody else. And three granddaughters all born in Air Force hospitals. There's not much else I can do. [Laughter].

Dr. Grant, thanks for the invitation. General Dunn, for the Association, it's good to see you guys and for all the friends that I've had the privilege to operate with along the way, it's a real treat and an honor to see you.

Two guys up front here, though, as I talk about Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom played a big part of this. Here's the intel guy who was the A2/J2 and the Loggie who was the A4/J4/7/6/whatever. These two guys when it comes to integration of intelligence and the building of airfields and the operating of airfields, I can only hand the credit and the thanks to you two guys.

Let's talk a little about Operation Enduring Freedom because I think that's a useful conversation to have these days. Then let's chat just a little bit about the transition to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Then I'll share some thoughts with you about what I see and what I think from my travels and the business that I'm involved in and what I see perhaps on the horizon.

I was in the building that morning when it got hit. In fact Chuck Wald and I and Hugh Cameron and several others from the staff were in that building as we were talking about the transition, Waldo coming back up to Washington and me going to Shaw. And so when the airplane hit the building, we went through the obligatory not understanding what was happening when airplanes were hitting buildings in New York, but it dawned on us pretty easy that this was not accidental, and especially when the airplane hit the Pentagon.

Of all the frustration that day, I'll tell you, I don't know what it was like being a senior naval officer on 7 December 1941 looking down on Pearl Harbor watching the main gun line of the Pacific Fleet burn, but I can tell you what it's like to be a senior Air Force officer on the parade deck in front of the Pentagon watching it burn. It really really kind of pissed me off.

So I was truly blessed to be able to leave soon and go to Afghanistan and be able to deal with bad people. In that transition I singled out these guys. Gene Renuart was the 3 at CENTCOM, so there are a group of people in here that were as intimately involved in all of this as me, and I am truly thankful and blessed to have had an opportunity to serve alongside when we went through this, and I know you guys will agree with the next few things I'm going to talk about because we didn't really have much of a clue about Afghanistan.

Remember, we had spent, up until that point we had spent close to ten years operating in no-fly zones. The first wing deployed in August of 1990 into the eastern province of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, outside of Dammam and we have not really come back since then. So 21 years or so of straight combat.

When you think about that, it's a pretty interesting comparison with other periods in time. When you think about from Desert Shield/Desert Storm until right now, you could have a young lady or a young man enlist in the Air Force, go through all the training and spend a full 20 years in the United States Air Force and retire and have known nothing but the no-fly zones and continuous combat in Mogadishu and Bosnia and Kosovo and Afghanistan and Iraq, et cetera.

I don't know that there's any other time in the history of the United States Air Force that we've been in continual running combat for 20-plus years.

So think about that September/October 2001 timeframe. This was a period of multiple UN resolutions. It was a period of sometimes confused ROE, it was a period of operating in those no-fly zones and being shot at almost every day, it was a period of frustration. Our hosts in the region, be it the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and their gracious approval and partnership to operate in the Kingdom; our friends in the UAE, the same way; our friends in Kuwait, the same way. So the baseline that we start this is really a no-fly zone template that we then fall in on. And remember the basing in the AOR at the time is mostly tankers, combat search and rescue, a lot of ISR — intelligence, surveillance reconnaissance stuff, and a handful of strike assets. That's kind of how we start this.

We had a force deployment model that was basically a no-fly zone model. When I was lucky enough to be in command at Eglin, Mike was in command at Langley. Between Eglin and Langley we spent most of our time in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with F-15 deployments because we couldn't get approval to use USAFE or PACAF or anybody else. So our deployments were over and over and over and over again. In fact I met Waldo on one of those deployments when we were trapped on the tanker, sleeping and eating on the tanker on the way over while the guys deployed. Waldo had just got his hand trapped in a closing garage door and he looked like a frog with the wires and stuff coming out of his hand. But it goes back until we got into a habit pattern of no-fly zones. The command and control was no-fly zones. The force rotation models were no-fly zones. The ROE was no-fly zones, the spins were no-fly zone. The intelligence piece, the logistics piece, munitions, fuel, all no-fly zones. And I share that with you because this changes quickly when we get into something that looks like Afghanistan.

We had almost no situation awareness in Afghanistan. Before I left Washington I called down and asked the staff, do you guys have any maps so in the tanker on the way over to Manama I can at least kind of get familiar with this. The staff came back and said we don't have any maps of this place. We're trying to find them ourselves. We're calling up everything we can find.

So I got the exec in and I said do me a favor. Take this \$20, \$30, go over to the National Geographic Building and get me a map of Afghanistan. So I fought, much to the demise of the intel guys, I fought most of the campaign in Afghanistan off of a National Geographic map. [Laughter]. Which was an excellent map, by the way.

Only to be followed up by the Iraqi campaign with another National Geographic map.

So the SA, we didn't have much on this place. We knew it was as long way off. I spent a lot of time in Riyadh, in Abu Dhabi, in Kuwait City and Manama, and in Masqat, less time in Doha, but I spent a lot of time with my friends that I'd known before just asking them, what do you guys know about this place? They knew a bit more than me, but not much.

What I did figure out early on is that 600 miles from epicenter Arabian Sea to targets in Afghanistan, and it's 600 miles over the Hindu Kush mountains from Bishkek into targets in Afghanistan. Six hundred miles.

If you fly out of Kuwait or if you fly out of other places, then that adds up. But from those distances you begin to kind of get an idea of the complexity of air operations at a place that we haven't been in. You fly single engine fighters over the Hindu Kush mountains out of Bishkek into targets in Afghanistan, it's a little bit different game.

Tankers. This is going to be a recurring theme tonight. Tankers becomes the long pole in this business about how do you get air power to a place where it can be decisive or it can be the chosen tool to be able to deliver a kinetic effect or a message? You need tankers to be able to get that.

The bomber guys will say well, we had a lot of bomber presence, and we did, and that was a very very big piece early on. But the distances from Diego Garcia to targets in Afghanistan are the

same distance as they are from Tampa to Juneau, Alaska. So if you're a B-52 guy or a B-1 guy, your distances that you're operating every day are from Tampa to Juneau and back. Tankers.

The mission definition. Gene and I spent a lot of time on the phone discussing back and forth, kind of feeding off of each other from Tampa Prince Sultan Air Base, what is it that we're about here? Is this something isolated? Is this something bigger? What is it you want us to do and how can we make that happen as soon as possible with as much effect as possible? So the definition of the ROE was kind of a growing animal. It wasn't fixed up front. It's not as clean as Maxwell would teach. The spins certainly weren't clean up front. You kind of have to get into the water, swim around a little bit, get out, think about it, and then begin to write down what works and what doesn't work. So that is an evolving notion while you're delivering ordnance. You're working your way through the rules of engagement, the special instructions, and you're working your way through the logistics support.

What did we know about the Taliban and al-Qaida? Those of us that spent a lot of time in CENTCOM kind of had an idea but we didn't really know much about this. We didn't have an architectural diagram of who the players are, who they were related to, what was their organizational structure. We didn't have any of that. We thought we knew who the major players were, but we didn't really have an understanding that we have now ten years later, about what al-Qaida looked like.

The Taliban, a little bit different animal. But we still didn't know much about that. We knew that they were bad people and they treated people poorly. They were rude. They harbored terrorists, and that was enough after 9/11. They paid a pretty dear price for that.

But if you had given me an essay test early on about describe the command relationships within al-Qaida and within the Taliban and compare and contrast al-Qaida and Taliban, who the players are, where they live. I would have had to been absent that day. I'd have had to figure out a way to think about that.

The one thing that we began to focus on early on though relative to the Taliban is what were their apparent centers of gravity relative to geographic locations? That ends up being Mazar-e-Sharif and Kandahar and to a certain extent Kabul. So we knew that if we could get at them at Mazar-e-Sharif and then we could get them running, they would all head to Kandahar because that's where they all played high school football. We'd have shots at them on the way down there and then we'd be able to deal with them. But that was not well known early on.

Command and control. This is a fascinating study in itself. Remember what our command and control lash up looked like. Almost everybody in this room has been involved in this in one way or another. I entered this movie in the early '90s when the command and control element was in the basement of the RSAF building in Riyadh. We stayed in the [Usubmidam] housing area. We went through the hole in the wall, across the parking lot, down under the parking lot, into the RSAF building, into the basement of the RSAF building and that's where our command center was.

We eventually moved that from the RSAF building to Eskan Village. Gene Renuart was a part of all of that. We lived at Eskan Village for a while outside of Riyadh. Then we began to think well,

we need something bigger, so our Saudi brothers offer us a facility at Prince Sultan Air Base outside of Al Kharj. I don't know about my Saudi brothers, but Al Kharj is not necessarily a place that I would buy vacation retirement property. [Laughter]. But we got there. Then in the process we ended up building an early CAOC and then we added on to this CAOC with the help of our friends in the RSAF and we operated out of that.

About the first three weeks or four weeks we call our friends at 12th Air Force at Davis Monthan and we ask hey, can we borrow your portable CAOC? Because I wanted a backup. So we got the 12th Air Force portable CAOC and put it in a hospital KSPAN building I think for medical supplies at Al-Udaid. So we had the main CAOC at Prince Sultan and we had a backup at Al-Udaid. In that we asked for all the help we could get from NAVCENT from MARCENT, from ARCENT, and from our coalition partners. We had Saudi liaison officers in there, and at various times I would ask for senior general officers to come in there. Major General Badr Akhman came in and lived with us for a long time. The two Air Chiefs at the time, General Hanaidi and then General Abdul Rokman-al-Fasil were also part of all of that, so we, I was as open as you would expect me to be with our friends in the RSAF to be able to operate out of that facility.

The regional dialogue as we go along was not understood or very clean. Remember we fall into this because we're hit by airliners in the buildings. So to go to Kuwait City and sit down with General Fahd and General Yosef and have a discussion about Kuwait, or to go down to Bahrain and sit down with General Hamid, Hamid and Rashid — it sounds like an accounting firm — Hamid, Hamid and Rashid. But to sit down with those guys and talk about Sheikh Isa and Manama and to go do the same in Doha, Abu Dhabi with Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed and with the Air Chiefs there, and then of course Mohammed Mahfoud who is the Air Chief in Oman. And just sit down and say tell me. What do you think? How do you want this to look? It was probably one of the several full-time jobs that as the CFAC I thought I had.

As we began to get into the combat ops, I figured I had multiple full-time jobs. I had a full-time job with these guys being 9th Air Force Commander. Of course none of us were ever at Shah. My wife was there and your wives were there, but we were never at Shah.

I figured I had a full time logistics sustainment job that Dwayne took care of. I figured I had a full time operational job that Jim had a big part of taking care of. But I also figured I had a full time POL/MIL job going from capital to capital and kind of making sure there were no surprises. While we were figuring out with our friends at Tampa who then came forward, figured what the heck were the ROE and the spins, etcetera.

So I guess what I'm painting for you up front is a scenario that's not as clean sometimes as you get at Maxwell or Carlisle or Fort McNair. It's a scenario that evolves over time with good people in a variety of places thinking about a problem and working in an international environment where you can be absolutely open and honest with friends that are involved. And if you don't think that our friends in Kuwait and Bahrain and Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates and Oman, if you don't think they were involved, the Americans can show up in the theater to blast a couple and to topple a regime, then maybe you need to think a little bit more about POL/MIL things because you can't do this business without that open dialogue with your coalition and allied partners.

The immediate operational challenges, this is going to be a constant. No different than if Billy Mitchell were standing here. The immediate operational challenges were range and payload. Range and payload.

A sub-part of that is going to be survivable, lethality, persistence, et cetera. Got that. But the take-away bullets for an operation like this, and again when we do Iraq, is range and payload. You've got to be able to get to the targets, you've got to be able to provide some kind of persistent coverage, and you've got to carry a payload that's worth making the trip.

Fuel and munitions. Every day. Every day we had the discussion. How much gas do we have left and where's our bombs? And I wasn't even talking about carts and umbilicals and pylons and stuff like that. I figured Dwayne would take care of all of that. But I wanted to know how much fuel do we have and where's our bombs? Because we're dropping a lot of bombs. We're burning a lot of fuel.

Let me fast-forward to another vignette about Iraq. Because this comes back in the Afghanistan thing about being open and honest with your coalition partners as you go forward.

I was having a discussion in Prince Khaled bin Sultan's office in the Ministry of Defense in Aviation. He was the number two guy in their Ministry of Defense. We were talking about Iraq and talking about things that we would need to ask. The way I always couched that. I would always say, "Your Highness, I may need to come to you and ask you to help." And he would always say, "You know the answer will always be yes." And I'd say, "I know, sir, but it's a burden because I don't want to ask you anything that's going to be in any way a problem for the Kingdom." He goes, "No, try me, what's your request?"

I said, "Your Highness, we need fuel." He looked at me, and I said, "We need lots of fuel." [Laughter]. As he always does, he'll get that little smile, and I'd say, "Your Highness, I'm talking millions and millions and millions of gallons of fuel." And he'd say, "Not a problem." I'd say, "Sir, I'm serious." He looked at me and said, "Me too." [Laughter]. I said, "Okay then, as early as I can get it I need 15 million gallons of open storage at PSAT." He goes, "Tomorrow?" I said, "I can't get it tomorrow, but sometime within the next 72-96 hours." He goes, "Done."

We're drinking tea, and I said, "Your Highness, just out of curiosity, how are you going to move that much fuel? There's only the two big refineries in the eastern province and out west, and we're right in the middle. We're going to need this fuel and we're going to need it quick." He goes, "General, we have a small family company that you may have heard of that is able to deal with fuel like this." I said, "Sir, what's that?" He said, "Aramco. This will not be a problem." I said, "Sir, how are we going to get it there?" He goes, "This is not a problem." [Laughter]. I said, "Okay, I'll quit asking."

Within about two days we have five miles of 8500 gallon tanker trucks parked outside of his fuel dump. Five miles of fuel trucks. It kept up that way until we were done. Never once did Prince Khaled say no. Never once did the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia fail to address the challenges that we were talking about.

I mention that because it goes back to that full-time job of POL/MIL and it goes back to being up front and honest.

Range and payload. Hold that thought.

Timelines that Dr. Grant talked about from October to November is when we collapse the Taliban forces in Mazar-e-Sharif and that's when people start running. That's when they start heading to Kandahar and that's when we start really beginning to do some good work on these guys.

In the middle of all this, in this swirl as we get to the collapse in Kabul and get down to Kandahar and begin to take them apart, and then after the government comes in, at least the first parts of a government come into Afghanistan. There are some things to remember.

The longest bomber mission flown in the history of aviation was flown during this period. Forty-five hours. B-2s out of Whiteman. Forty-five hours.

The longest fighter mission to date flown out of Kuwait, F-15Es, close to 18 hours.

The longest reconnaissance mission flown with a Global Hawk which was then the early versions of the global Hawk, was about 25 hours. Now we're up to over 30 with that airplane.

And oh, by the way, General Jumper who was the Chief at the time, 9th Air Force I kind of had a chain going through ACC to Washington. As the CENTAF Commander I didn't figure I needed to go through anybody other than General Franks and Gene and the guys at Tampa and straight to General Jumper. So I called him and effectively said, "Chief, I've got a big, big favor." He said, "What?" I said give me one of the Global Hawks." We had three Global Hawks, if you remember. We had two flyable and we had one that was in parts and pieces. He goes, "It's in the test program." I said, "Boss, I've got it. We can test the living you know what out of it out here. Bring it out here, bring the test guys out here, and we'll fly it out of al-Dafra with the U-2s. We've got the intel guys in place. We've got lashed up with Tampa. He goes, okay. So we had it for about two weeks and then lost it. We crashed it, lost it.

When it landed at al-Dafra, though, another humorous anecdote. I'm standing out there with the Ambassador and with the UAE leadership and the Global Hawk comes out of the haze, gets down to short final, goes around, leaves. [Laughter]. I said well, you know, it's just normal, it's just checking things out. It will be back. [Laughter]. It comes back around downwind, crosswind, gets on final, gets down to about 50-60 feet, goes around again, leaves. I said it's okay. It's going to figure this out. They're all waiting. It gets dark. I mean it's way dark out there. You hear the thing land, then it taxis off the runway in the dark, and they're all looking at me like did you plan this? I said hey look, this is new technology. It's going to work. It's not going to fall into the city. It's not going to hurt anybody. I'm thinking dude, I hope I'm right with this. [Laughter]. Then two weeks later we lose it.

So I had to go see Sheikh Mohammed and say we lost it; it's out in the desert; we'll get it back; it didn't hurt anybody. I called General Jumper and said Boss, can I have the other one? [Laughter]. He said yeah, but you're really wearing thin. Those were his words. "You're really

wearing thin on me.” I went okay, sir, we’ll be careful. Colonel Poss won’t lose this one. [Laughter].

About three weeks later, right before Anaconda, we lose the second one. So we’ve killed two-thirds of the existing Global Hawks. Had an engine problem on one and a flight control problem.

So that’s the early phase.

The December to January phase we’re getting into now really finessing down on al-Qaida. We get into the Tora Bora business and we deliver a lot of ordnance in Tora Bora. We tear up a lot of caves and structures in Tora Bora. We used some special stuff. We used everything we’ve got against those cave structures and those openings and those audits in Tora Bora. In the middle of this, if you remember, we have, Dr. Grant talked about this a little bit, we have a wonderful relationship with our non-military intel guys and with our special ops guys. Ambassador Hank Crompton at the time was not an ambassador, but he’s on the ground doing some civilian stuff. What an amazing guy. He’s not an ambassador. He’s now running his own company. But what an amazing partnership between our intel operation direct with those guys and with Tamp, direct with Tampa and on the ground.

You’ve all seen the stories of the guys on horses chasing tanks. You’ve seen all that. Who would have thought in the year 2001 or 2002 we’d be chasing these bad guys across the desert in Afghanistan on horses, chasing armor, and winning out? That says a lot for the flexibility of air power and the delivery on precision and the delivery on ISR and the ability to deliver that.

About June or so, I’m going to come back to another period in February and March, but in about June or so we kind of get wind that there may be another piece of this that’s going to play out. We have a series of meetings, we have a series of discussions, and that’s going to lead us to a longer term plan on delivering of the UN resolutions on Saddam Hussein and Iraq.

I share that with you because while we’re doing Afghanistan, now we’re doing no-fly zones, now we’re doing northern no-fly zones, southern no-fly zone, we’ve got stuff going on in Somalia, we’ve got stuff going on in Afghanistan, we’ve got a portable CAOC at al-Udaid in a hospital warehouse. We’ve got Prince Sultan. We’ve got all of this all moving at once and then we get the little note that says, get ready because there’s going to be another one. Cool. So that’s a whole different story, but that in itself is an adjunct to the existing command and control notion and the template that we set up so you could be adaptable.

Let’s talk a little bit about the February and March timeframe. The program called Anaconda which is still a bit of a touchy subject for some of us that were actually there.

We get a note, actually John Corley is the CAOC director and I’m in Manama talking to our friends in Bahrain and John Corley says, Boss, you need to come back over to Prince Sultan. I said okay, you mean like in the next day or two? He goes no, I mean like now. I turned to the aide and said okay, let’s fire everything up, get everybody back, we’ll go back over to Prince Sultan.

We get back over there and he says, you know, there's something going on here that I wouldn't ask you to come back, but I don't understand it. We're getting indications that there's an operation about to trigger that we don't know much about. I said okay, let's call and find out.

So we get the BCD in, Buddy Wheat is the BCD Commander who is now a Reverend Buddy Wheat living in Pennsylvania. He's got his own church. He's a good guy. I said, Buddy, what the heck's going on here? He goes Boss, I don't know. I said why don't you pulse your Army bubbas, find out what's going on, we'll turn these guys all loose, I'll call Gene, and call the CINC, find out what the heck is going on.

Well it turns out we do have something that's about to trigger and we don't know much about it. We're about to put some U.S. troops and some Northern Alliance guys into harm's way and we don't know much about what this is looking like.

Luckily we had a weather delay, slipped us 24 hours or so, and we were able to kind of figure this out. We were able to wind sprint ourself into something that we engaged with with a lot of assets that would have been nice to have known.

For instance, two weeks or so prior to this we signed the Afghan Airspace Coordination Memorandum with the Afghan leadership in Kabul through the International Civil Aviation Organization that opens up the Afghan airspace to civil traffic. Big deal, because every given period of time, I can't remember if it was a week or two weeks, they get three or four million dollars for overflight over the top of Afghanistan. That's good. What makes it interesting, though, is those airline corridors are below the bomber altitudes and slightly above the striking altitudes, and amongst everything else.

So when we figure out that we're going to have to do this business over this Operation Anaconda, we put the bombers at the top and we have to figure out a way to deconflict the airline traffic coming through as we drop 2000 pounders through the airline routes. I'm not sure you'll find that written anywhere in the ICAO manuals. [Laughter].

The AC-130 guys got a little tense because we were dropping 2000 pounders through their orbits. But when you've got people now engaged and you've got troops in contact then the command and control system responds I think in the proper way.

One other little vignette in this. We're flying the F-15Es out of Kuwait. I gave two guys two Silver Stars for a mission that they flew that was about 16.5-17 hours. They cleaned off every piece of ordnance they had, in and out of weather and in and out of mountains to support coalition forces engaged on the top of a mountain. They ended up using 20mm in close and strafing, so I figure that's about as good as it gets, so we gave them two Silver Stars.

Also I wanted the A-10s involved in this, so on about day two I took a little bit of a chance and launched the A-10s out of Kuwait and said you guys go, here's your targets, and while they were airborne I picked up the phone and got the Pakistan Air Chief on the phone, Mushaff Ali Mir, and I said Brother, I've got a really, really, really big favor. He said what? He said, it sounds like you all are a little busy over there. I said well, we're holding our own, but it's a little busy. He said what can I do for you? I said I want to park some A-10s in Pakistan. He said whoo, that's a

big question. But it's only going to be four or five of them. It will only be for, I don't know, let's say a week. He said, let's say four days and four or five. I said okay. He said, but before you do anything, let me make a phone call. Call me back in about ten minutes. I gave him about 15 minutes, called him back, and he said the answer is yes. I had to call a friend. Well, the friend he called was obviously the President. The President said okay. He goes, here's the deal. You've got three or four days, four or five airplanes. By the way, just for my benefit, are they airborne? I said yeah, they're airborne and actually they're over the targets and I was hoping you'd do this because we're going to recover them into Jacobabad. He goes okay, you've got it.

Now that POL/MIL piece, again, is something along the way that really really matters because those A-10s with everything they could bring to bear made a major major difference in keeping people alive.

So let's talk a little bit about some more observations. The no-fly zone, transition from no-fly zone business to theater fight was an interesting thing to do even amongst friends. It's not something that is intuitively clean to transition from the rules and the spins of a no-fly zone to conducting a theater operation at this level. And to be able to transmit the rules of engagement and the spins down to people distributed across an entire battlefield from terminal air controllers to combat search and rescue to strike to bombers to cargo to tankers, to be able to get all that done is not as quick and not as clean as you would think. It's not something that I figured would be hard, but as it turns out it wasn't as hard as it was just complicated to try to get all of that transitioned in the right place.

We went through the obligatory helicopter hunt. Almost every single time we conduct operations at this level, somebody wants to know how many helicopters are left and they have a board somewhere where they're marking them off. I resisted that. Gene knows. Gene resisted that. We all resisted that because the fallacy in that is first off, you don't know how many there really are to begin with, so keeping an accounting of that seemed to me to be a waste of time, but there were people that wanted to know every day how many helicopters were left. The answer, hell, I don't know. 23. [Laughter]. Best we know there's 23. There you go.

We talked about the horses, we talked about the bombers, we talked about the longest bomber mission, the longest fighter mission, the longest reconnaissance mission, but remember also in the western part of Afghanistan we conducted the largest humanitarian airdrop in the history of combat aviation. C-17s operating out of Ramstein, all the way from Ramstein. The first night or two with F-15 escort and then after that just C-17s. We dropped a lot of MREs, humanitarian supplies into that area because those people hadn't had a chance to deal with anything of sustaining value.

Lesson learned in this. The ham steaks are not at the top of the menu for folks in western Afghanistan. [Laughter]. The ham steaks may be popular in South Carolina, but they are not at the top of the menu items in western Afghanistan. You would have thought that a CFAC wouldn't have to get involved in the menu items. We had some issues come up about why are you guys dropping pork products, even though I would admit quality pork products. [Laughter]. So we had to begin to rewicker the pallets to make sure there was no ham steaks being dropped. I wouldn't have thought that, by the way. That one got by me.

We talked about ICAO, we've talked about Global Hawks, UAVs, unbelievable utilization of the UAVs. One lesson learned in this when you guys do this next time, the video feed for the UAVs is like crack cocaine. Anybody that's got a TV is going to want to see what that UAV is seeing, and everybody that sees it is going to want to call you and tell you move it 100 yards east. [Laughter].

What we found after a few of those phone calls is the central feed and the central line for all that UAV feed that goes into Washington goes through Sigonella. There are some good people at Sigonella that at the right time were able to terminate that line so all of our friends in Washington that were watching that feed had problems in transmission. So I didn't get too many calls after that that said move it 100 yards east. We were able — Gene's laughing. He and I both went through this. Everybody in Washington wanted a TV on their desk to be able to watch that 24 hours a day. Lesson.

Our coalition partners, indispensable. Indispensable in doing this business. From the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman, indispensable. Pakistan, France, UK, Spain, Italy, Jordan, the Stans unbelievable cooperation.

Two quick vignettes for future CFACs. Some a bit humorous, some not. In the no-fly zone business the French Air Force was there, but were restricted in what they could participate in. When we went into Afghanistan the French Air Force and the French government were there from minute one, day one. So it was a completely different dynamic. We were able to open back up the relationships with the French Air Force that were so valuable for us for a long time.

The Vice Commander at Bishkek, at Manas, from minute one on 16 December 2001 when we went up to do a site survey, the Vice Commander up there was a French colonel. My guidance to these guys was find a way to include those guys in command positions as much as we can with the British as well as the French.

India, Pakistan. In the middle of this, in the middle of Tora Bora with everything going on, the hunt for one guy and the counting of helicopters, with all of that going on and the business with Anaconda, there was a terrorist attack on the parliament in New Delhi allegedly conducted by Pakistani terrorists, which then mobilized India and mobilized Pakistan. And they began to not only mobilize, they began to move forces.

One night, 1:30, 2:00, 2:30 in the morning we get a call, Jim says you need to take this call. Sure. Hello. You're about to find yourself in an interesting position. The Indian government has decided to attack Pakistan in the next 30-45 minutes. Deal with it. Cool. Cool. Get the staff in, sit down with these guys and say dude, we've got like 20 minutes. India's going to attack Pakistan. We've got guys at Jacobabad, we've got guys flying around out there, we've got people all over, what do you all think? Well, Boss, can you stop it? Yeah, I guess I can call the President of India and ask him to knock it off.

As it turns out, the Paki Air Chief calls the return favor for the A-10s and says I'm deploying my airplanes into Jacobabad. I said which ones? Well, the special ones. Oh, well we're there. Yep. I said if you deploy those airplanes there if the Indians actually attack, we're in the middle of

that. He goes that's right, and I know you'll defend yourself and so you'll end up defending my airplanes. [Laughter]. I said really, is that how we get into these things. [Laughter].

Then we had a coalition AWACS over the top of this. I call those guys in and say I'd like to keep that airplane up there so we know what's going on. They said we've got to make a call. They called and said no, we can't do it. We've got to withdraw the airplane because we can't be involved in this. I said man, you guys are making my life really hard. I'll tell you what I'll do. I buy that and I appreciate that, but if you withdraw the airplane could you withdraw the airplane at minimum controlled air speed so we can at least continue to look at this? They said sure, we can do that. It didn't happen. But that is one of those Harvard leadership seminar scenarios gone bad. [Laughter]. And only through the relationships you have with a variety of people can you pick up the phone and get an idea about what's possible and what needs to be done, so I share that with you.

When the Marines went into southern Afghanistan we had a long chat at a session before that happened. General Franks, Gene, myself, Jim Maddis, and we agreed that Jim Maddis when he went in there would not take any aviation assets, nor would he take artillery. Because his mission was to go in as light as he possibly could and block and control that part of Afghanistan and anything heavy or anything complicated would be a sustainment challenge for all of us.

So we all shook hands and agreed. You're not taking artillery, you're not taking aviation assets, the CAOC will deal with that. From the moment Jim Maddis and his unit hit the ground they had no issues on aviation issues or strike. We had fighters over the top of them, we had bombers over the top of them, we had UAVs, the ISR assets, JSTARS, et cetera, over the top of the Marine element. From the moment they got there until the moment they left.

So the notion of jointness inside the notion of a coalition thing inside the notion of cascading command structures, if you think this thing through, it's going to be okay. For all of you all that knew Moody Suiter, remember one of the things he taught me and taught a lot of us in this room is you're only going to be surprised by the things you don't think about. That one is one that between Gene and I and these guys, we actually thought about. That one worked okay.

The last thing I will share with you about Afghanistan and the business of Afghanistan is this is really an excellent lesson on range and payload. The sustainment piece, fuel, munitions, et cetera, big deal. The intel piece, big deal. The com piece, big deal. Building CAOCs, big deal. All of that, big deal. But at the end of it all of that is about projecting the capability over the right place at the right time which means range and payload.

No different than Mitchell was challenged at Sam Miguel; no different than Kenny was challenged with 5th Air Force, or Vandenberg challenged with 9th Air Force or Aker or Doolittle challenged with 8th Air Force. No different.

So I would offer to you some thoughts as we look ahead. Whether we call them themes or tomorrow's challenges or whatever, there is a new set of rules of the road that are developing in the international community. I just got back from East/West Institute Board meeting. We spent a lot of time talking about the collapse and deterioration of existing economic and political international structures. The historic international community is not as trusted as it used to be.

Look at what's happening to some of our classic European countries and economies. The defense budgets are shrinking. Not just ours, but the UK and France. Within NATO, UK and France are the only ones that are trying to hold onto something that looks like a little bit above one percent of GDP. Look at the challenges that our friends in East Asia are facing right now. Our Japanese friends. Our Korean friends. Having spent two years as the senior DD negotiator with the North Koreans, I can tell you, the Northeast Asia scenario is a very challenging scenario. It was a four-party talk then, and our suggestions was we include Russia and Japan to make it a six-party talk because the neighborhood needs to have an open dialogue about North Korea and what that's about.

Regional tensions. Who would have imagined ten days ago that we would have a threat to a credentialed diplomat in our capital city by potentially an international terrorist organization? Nobody would have filled that part out in the essay test. No one would have said that an element within the Iranian government would choose transfer money, conduct conversations on killing the Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Washington. None of us would have said that. That tells you how the world is changing and how this deterioration of existing systems are playing out.

Who would have thought a year ago or a year and a half ago that North Korea would have sunk a South Korean warship and exchanged in large artillery barrages in exchanges on those islands? Who would have predicted that?

So you've got this notion of Tehran. A piece of this threatens one of our closest allies, a credentialed diplomat in our capital city. I'll tell you from a land grant college guy, that's just wrong. Not right. Sinking warships. Wrong, not right. These are acts of war.

Hezbollah. What does Hezbollah, how is that working through Syria, through Lebanon? How is that working in North Africa? We've got a lot of international experience here that knows a lot more about this than I do, but what does that mean for us?

What does the international community look at now when it comes to strategic priorities? My last visit in Beijing with the senior leadership, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and the Central Planning Committee of the party. I asked the same question to every one of the senior leaders in China, in Beijing. What are your three top priorities? Over the next 10 or 15 years? Without hesitation every single one of them said the exact same thing. Energy, water, food. Okay. What does that mean to us in a sense of strategic competitive notions out there on energy resources, on minerals, on metals, on POL? What does it mean for water? What does it mean for food? What are the things that drive a nation state to take actions against other nation states that may or may not involve us but will certainly involve our friends in the global community?

The resource scarcity is not something to be taken lightly. Our friends from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have a neighbor to their south in Yemen. Projections now are the capital city of Yemen, Sana'a, will be out of water sometime within the next five or six years. A capital city out of water. What does that mean? What does that mean to Oman, to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, what does that mean? What does that mean to all of us?

How does a country, how does a capital city and a country run out of water? How does it sustain itself without transitioning into something that looks kinetic? I don't know.

Let me close by saying what does all of that mean for the United States Air Force? What is the mission of the United States Air Force or any air force or any military in this world that we're looking at? Is it access? Is it being able to persuade, to influence? Is it able to deter, dissuade? I would say yes.

Is the historic perspective of all of this on range and payload and lethality and survivability, has that changed? No.

Are there dislocating potholes out there along the way? I would say yes. And I would say if we take our eye off the ball on prioritization or on priorities of resources that are not core capabilities and core competencies of what we do, that is a strategic pothole.

I don't know that light counter-insurgency aircraft and light intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft are a deterring or a dissuading capability. When it comes to this notion of nation states that will eventually have to make decisions on competition, competing resources, especially with challenges on water and food.

I would also offer to you as a guy that used to be responsible for organizing, training and equipping, that this is really about understanding what the mission is and it's understanding what the resources should be placed against the mission, and it's understanding what the organization should look like. Is the organization combat focused? If the organization is not combat focused, what good is it? Why does it exist if it is not focused on combat? Is it to do what? Because when you move the 20th Wing from Shaw into a combat location and somehow over the Atlantic or the Pacific you have to change the organizational template from where you were to where you are, is that a good thing? Is that a confusing thing? Is that value added? Is that combat added? No.

So I would tell you the organization should be focused on combat. The training should be focused on combat. When Moody Suiter and those guys in the early '70s took a risk on things that we now take for granted like aggressors, Red Flag, when they took a risk on that and when General Bob Dixon took a risk on that from Langley and said we'll do that, that changed the game post Southeast Asia. For us. For the American Air Force. It provided an environment for us to go explore what worked and what didn't work, and to understand why it didn't work in Southeast Asia and what we have to do to keep that from ever happening again.

The longest Air Force POW is a guy named Hayden Lockhart. I was blessed to have him as an ops officer in the 7th Squadron, 49th Wing at Holloman. He got shot down in 1964 in an F-100 out of a box pattern against a gun pit. A box pattern. Not a tactical delivery. Flight of four F-100s come in, break out, line up, enter a box pattern to attack a gun pit. He's shot down, spends eight years in a cage. What makes that even more criminal is the day before that they lost their weapons officer out of the same box pattern against the same gun pit.

Suiter and those guys said no. A guy named Gil Peck who was a big part of the aggressor program, General Esmond is here, commanded the 65th Aggressor Squadron. Those guys that

took a chance on the aggressors and those guys that took a chance on Red Flag and those guys that took a chance on building that scenario at Nellis, they understood the notion of a combat organization and combat training and combat equipment. That lessons learned in Southeast Asia, guys, were not good.

Half of every F-105 ever built by Fairchild Republic we lost over North Vietnam. Half of the production we lost. If this were an F-105 squadron every day you flew you had a 50/50 chance of being shot down. You had a 50/50 chance of being shot down on every sortie. And of those shot down, a third were killed, a third were captured, and only a third rescued. That's just in the F-105 world alone.

So combat organization, combat training, combat equipment. If it doesn't contribute to that, if it doesn't contribute to the strategic mission of dissuasion, deterrence, influence, then guys in this world of limited resources, we've got to be very careful. We've got to be very very focused and very very careful.

Let me close with some questions for you guys and then we'll open this up. What does the United States Air Force contribute to global stability? What does the United States Air Force in partner with joint players contribute to joint stability? What does the United States Air Force in partnership with other coalition partners contribute to global stability? You could include influence, dissuasion, deterrence.

What do we see as the strategic and global dislocators? I've got to tell you, if we've got nation states fighting over water, that gets personal real quick. When your family or your extended family is dying because they can't eat or there's no potable water, this is going to get personal. So what does the United States see as strategic and global dislocators over the next 10 or 15 years? What do we have to accomplish to provide the President, our coalition partners, and the joint team the required capabilities and required capacities to meet those challenges? What other Air Force could have delivered humanitarian relief assets at that level other than the C-17 and the guys out of Ramstein and the guys out of Charleston and McCord, et cetera, et cetera? What should we be thinking and prioritizing to meet an uncertain future not just for us, but for our coalition partners and our friends?

The last question is, are we headed in the right direction? Do we have the right vector based on what we know? Or a more interesting question is, what is it that we don't know?

Let me close by saying from my perspective, after World War II, the United States has a 100 percent fail rate in predicting where we're going to go and where we're going to fight next. One hundred percent fail rate. Or said another way, zero percent success rate.

We didn't see Korea coming. June 1950. Didn't see that coming. We didn't see Southeast Asia coming to the level that it occurred. We didn't see Grenada. We didn't see Panama coming. We sure didn't see Saddam invading Kuwait and terrorizing and brutalizing that country. We didn't see that coming. We didn't see 12 years of no-fly zones. We didn't see Mogadishu, Bosnia, Kosovo inside the 12 years of no-fly zones. We sure didn't see the airplanes hitting the buildings in Afghanistan, hell we couldn't even find a map of the place. We didn't see the second Iraq

piece of this coming and we didn't see ten years of combat following the initiation of hostilities in Afghanistan.

So what is it that's out there that we don't know that is going to be strategically dislocating for us and are we on the right vector? That to me is the essential question for the Mitchell Institute and the collection of professionals like yourselves. Knowing what we have done and what we have seen and projecting out from a very uncertain future do we have this right. Do we have the highest percentage bet on being able to deliver for our President, for our people, and alongside our coalition partners, many of whom are in here tonight.

So that's the essential question.

Let me close and Dr. Grant, let me turn this back over to you.

[Applause].

**Dr. Grant:** Thank you very much, General Moseley.

I thought that was absolutely terrific and in a few minutes we're going to invite everyone to stay and have a drink at our approximately of a fighter bar in the back. But first, would you just take one or two questions from the floor if we have any?

**General Moseley:** Absolutely. Questions or comments, and tell me if I've got this wrong. I pray every day I'm wrong. I pray every day that the people in Sana'a, Yemen are not going to run out of water. And I pray every day that we won't have another earthquake or another volcano or another tsunami or another dislocating flood or series of typhoons or tsunamis that hit our dear friends in Japan and the Philippines and in mainland China.

If I'm wrong, tell me. That means I'll get a little sleep.

**Dr. Grant:** Actually I'm going to take the moderator's privilege here and ask you. Obviously the most recent thing we didn't predict was Libya. And tracking along with what you said about our hundred percent failure rate. But I want to ask you, to what extent do you think that some of the experiences that started with Afghanistan and Iraq helped build up our coalition air powers that we were able to do Libya in a different way? Can you draw some of those lines for us?

**General Moseley:** I think alongside our NATO friends who participated with us in the no-fly zone, particularly the British and the French, and the Italians and the Spanish with the British and the French that played with us alongside our other coalition partners in Afghanistan probably helped set the stage for as painless as it could be initial orchestration for Libya.

It appears to me from the outside that the command and control system was not as clean, but again, the fight comes to you. That's another lesson you learn on the ranges at Nellis. The people that will hurt you are the people you never see. So I don't think the leadership got this command and control system up and running very quick and adapted on the fly relative to the circumstances they faced.

I will also tell you one of the long poles in that tent were tankers. Just like the long pole in the Afghanistan tent, tankers. The long ole in the Iraqi tent, tankers. If you've got them, all things are possible. If you don't have them, not much is doable.

I would also offer, I believe, Grennin's here so he can jump in on this NATO thing, but I believe the NATO Template in the no-fly zone and the Afghanistan piece made it a little easier in the orchestration amongst the group of folks. But I'll tell you, the pothole in that business would have been had Gadhafi and the Libyans decided to fire the SA-5. If they had decided to engage with their surface-to-air missile systems, and they had popped a tanker or an AWACS or a Rivet Joint at the ranges that the SA-5 could reach, this would have been a different game.

If Saddam Hussein had put an SA-5 on Saddam Dam in the northern no-fly zone, this would have been a different game.

And remember as we get into this for the Iraqi piece, we spent a lot of time looking at what the Iraqis had gone to school with and their dealing with our Serb friends on air defense.

We could take up a collection here tonight — well, they've got more money than anybody else so they could cough up more, but you could go out and buy an S-300 tonight. You don't have to have hundreds of guys in lab coats building these things. You can just go buy one. You can buy an S-20. You can buy an SA-20, an SA-21. That piece of hardware changes the game. That piece of hardware drives you to high speed, high altitude, stealthy engagement. Low signature against those systems.

If you think you're going to wade into an SA-5 or an SA-10 or an SA-20 with a legacy airplane and do anything other than gracefully die, you don't understand the game.

So two answers to your question. I think the experience of the coalition helps when you do the next event because you know the players. I don't know that the command and control system was as clear as it could be, but it never is.

The other reality is should people combat or resist those sorts of things with the existing systems that are available on the market to include PAC-3, to include THAAD, to include I-Hawk, to include the things that you can get your hands on just by buying them, this begins to change the game relative to legacy systems.

That them, you step back and you fall in on how do you take the IADS, the integrated air defense system, apart before you do the humanitarian relief or before you move the big airplanes up or before you move the big sensors up. You've got to clean this out.

Does the civilian leadership understand what that means? Does the civilian leadership offer an opportunity for dialogue that basically says Boss, give us three or four days before we do this so we can go clean this place out? Because the rest of the coalition's legacy airplanes are not survivable in those environments. That's where as a CFAC you've got to step back and say stop. We need to think about this a little bit. And we need to leverage this, we need to shape this, we need to deal with this.

**Dr. Grant:** Let me say thank you again, and let's all go and have a drink. Thank you.

[Applause].

**General Moseley:** Let me offer a couple more thank you's.

For our coalition partners that are here, guys, thank you for a lifetime of being able to work with some of the finest men and women outside the United States military that could possibly be. Thank you for everything that we have been able to do together. Thank you for the openness and the honesty.

For my Japanese friends, thank you for allowing me and my family to live in your country for four years and my daughter and her husband to live in your country for three more years. She spent seven years in your country.

For our friends from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, thank you for being who you are to make this Afghanistan and Iraq thing a reality, because it could not have been done without the Kingdom.

The other GCC countries, the same.

So guys, thank you for what you've done for global stability and global piece because it cannot be done without a global partnership. And for the guys around that I've been blessed to operate and fly with for 35 or 40 years, it's always good to see you guys out.

Rebecca, thanks again for the opportunity.

[Applause.]

# # # #

[General Billy Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies Web Site](#)

[Additional Mitchell Papers](#)