Troubling Trends

Since the end of the Cold War, funding for Science and Technology (S&T) has steadily declined. For instance, in constant Fiscal Year 2000 dollars, Air Force S&T funding has dropped from $1.77 billion in Fiscal Year 1990 to a projected level of $1.183 billion by FY 2000.

As a percentage of Air Force Total Obligational Authority (TOA), the S&T budget has been as high as 2.3% in FY 1993, but it will only be 1.81% for FY 2000, decreasing further to 1.65% by FY 2005 (the last year of the FY 2000 Future Years Defense Program [FYDP]).

The Air Force is not alone. The Department of Defense as a whole has also consciously reduced S&T funding in the mistaken belief that industry would fill in the gap. To make things even worse, both the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are also stepping away from applied research.

Of all the services, the Air Force has a unique legacy of high technology vision and exploration. Army Air Forces General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold and Dr. Theodore Von Karman set the course at the end of World War II. Their challenge created structural changes in the Air Force Research and Development (R&D) community that gave impetus to exploring the technologies that led to ballistic missiles, launch vehicles, satellites, supersonic flight, night vision, stealth, precision weapons, the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and the Airborne Laser.

Success in technology development can take up to 20 years. Without a robust Air Force R&D program today, there will be no way to catch up 20 years from now. What's in the pipeline now is what our air men will have to depend on to face threats not yet imagined.

Unfortunately, in today's budget environment, it is clear that the institutional advocacy and planning required to produce a balanced R&D program are sorely lacking. The R&D community is no longer well positioned to prevail at the highest decision levels. Unfortunately, the planning and program development process does not support basic research and development at the critical funding junctures within the Air Force. And the logic of future payoff has not prevailed against near-term readiness and modernization priorities.

A critical capability and a real strength of the Air Force R&D community used to be development planning. This was a strong analytical function that looked at embryonic technologies and created compelling technology roadmaps tied to national security projections. These roadmaps provided a weapons systems acquisition rationale and brought technologies like AWACS and JSTARS to reality. The Air Force must recreate that development planning function as soon as possible.

Of equally critical importance is the need to educate and nurture a skilled cadre of Air Force officers in the R&D and the S&T community.¹ The evolution of Air Force leaders, from their entry into the service through graduation from the Air Force Institute of Technology, and then on to increasing S&T and R&D experience, including program management, is the crucial factor in rebuilding and maintaining Air Force R&D. The slowly diminishing number of highly qualified acquisition officers is of great concern.

To begin to reverse these trends, the Air Force should consider creating a high-level annual review of Air Force R&D programs so that critical issues can be identified and debated at the highest levels during the decision-making process.

Among the findings of the Air Force Association Science and Technology Committee are the following:

1. Air Force funding of the R&D budget has declined too far over the past decade and is projected to decrease even more in real terms over the FY 2000 Future Years Defense Program. As Air Force investment shrinks, it will be more and more difficult to attract industry investment dollars.
   
   
2. S&T spending by agencies such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is no substitute for a robust Air Force S&T budget. To the extent the Air Force accepts outside funding, this should be done to complement its own spending on the Air Force's highest priority programs.
   
   There has been a severe reduction in Air Force-initiated and research-oriented Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) projects. The FY 1999 budget has $130 million to cover 80 ATDs. With the creation of the more user-focused Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) process in DARPA, it is easy to argue that major ATDs should be proposed and funded by that agency. Although Air Force participation in S&T programs with the other services, as well as with DARPA and NASA, is vital to the overall health of the national aerospace technology base, the Air Force should also undertake some major ATDs on its own.
   
   
3. The Desert Storm Air Force systems (AWACS, JSTARS, Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night [LANTIRN], Infrared Maverick, Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile [AMRAAM], and the F-117 stealth fighter) produced from 1960s' R&D projects were guided through annual congressional budget reviews with strong Air Force commitment and advocacy. Programs like the Global Positioning System (GPS) and improved space satellites had to be vigorously defended in the congressional arena.
   
   
4. Given a decade of declining S&T budgets, the most promising technologies, such as directed energy, miniaturized munitions, new electronics countermeasures (ECM) techniques, unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV), and improved materials for space power, may not be ready to be incorporated into Air Force systems to be fielded through 2020.
   
   
5. In examining the technology base, particularly in times of scarce funding, the argument for "relevance" of the S&T budget has tended to couple S&T projects to emerging weapons system programs. This philosophy may weed out promising technologies not directly coupled to existing or emerging systems. Senior Air Force leaders need to reverse the S&T funding decline and invest in a stable, robust, balanced R&D base that is not necessarily tied to emerging weapon system programs but that does include long-term S&T investment.
   Important technologies, such as hypersonics, have already been eliminated for lack of direct weapon system application. Hypersonics briefly flourished under the "National Aerospace Plane (NASP)" program, but was immediately dropped upon NASP cancellation. When the Air Force or DoD eliminates crucial technology like hypersonics, industry immediately does likewise. Such technology base funding focused on the future must be protected from arbitrary budget cuts.
   
   
6. In the last decade, the paucity of S&T funding has helped erode traditional Air Force technology strengths such as electronic warfare. Where once the Air Force was the leader in this area, the Air Force now depends on the other services.
   
   
7. Senior Air Force leadership must tolerate and even embrace failure as an integral part of the technology development process. Alongside the successes, like AWACS, JSTARS, LANTIRN, AMRAAM, IR Maverick, and F-117, that emerged from 1960s' R&D were many technology projects that failed. This is akin to the bid and proposal process, where 50% is a pretty good win rate.
   
   
8. The Air Force needs to strengthen institutionally the role of technology advocacy within the service. There are too many bureaucratic processes between the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), the major commands (MAJCOMs), Air Force headquarters, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress that continually dissect and ruminate on the Air Force S&T program submission.
   
   
9. The AFRL strategic plan must reflect a balance of MAJCOM interests, as well as promising exploratory technology and significant Advanced Technology Demonstrators (ATDs) not directly tied to current weapon systems. The strategic plan should also take into account foreign technology activities, particularly those of our allies.