Assessing Competing Priorities

Based on budget results, there seems to be a lack of committment on the part of the Air Force concerning the need to invest in a stable, robust S&T and R&D base, not necessarily tied to emerging weapons systems programs. The S&T base in the 1960s that produced AWACS, JSTARS, LANTIRN, AMRAAM, IR Maverick, and the F-117 was founded on many technological projects and on a great deal of risk—including some projects that did not succeed.

The focus of the major commands, and that of Air Force headquarters, is apparently now on near-term payoff and relevance to the existing mission. There is no countervailing Air Force entity arguing for long-term investment and long-term payoff. The reorganized R&D system seems to provide admirable connectivity between customer needs and the requisite technology, although there continues to be criticism indicating that this may be unevenly applied.

		TOTAL U.S. R&D
Although total U.S. research and development investment continues to increase, little of this is of military use. (These figures are shown in 1992 dollars. Source: Aerospace Industries Association.)

But as General Marsh has declared, the conventional requirements process "tends mainly to seek improved variations on existing systems." Without "zealous advocates" "frequently" operating "in the face of a `show-me' attitude, or even a negative attitude on the part of the operational community and approval authorities," the Air Force risks becoming trapped in a process where needs "pull" technologies into use, unlike the former "push" process, with the result that "we will become trapped in incrementalism and fail to achieve important outflanking capabilities."⁴⁷

There is now a perception that important technologies, such as hypersonics, are being ignored for lack of direct weapon system application. The AFOSR director has himself indicated that even basic research is only initiated if it is considered to have military relevance.⁴⁸ Others have warned that the argument for relevance, which is particularly prevalent in times of scarce funding, tends to weed out promising technology not directly coupled to existing or emerging systems.⁴⁹ Then-Secretary of the Air Force Edward C. Aldridge said in 1988: "We're on the road to destroying our industrial base" through policies that tend to discourage the risky innovations "necessary to move our technology forward."⁵⁰ These admonitions all stress the need for a balance between short-term relevance and the longer-term technology needs identified in the Air Force's own forecast documents.

Some technologies which have been pushed aside recently:

• Hypersonics. In 1983, the Advanced Military Spacelift Capability program looked at a hypersonic aerospace plane. Then in 1986 the National Aerospace Plane became a major program. Hypersonic interceptor and hypervelocity weapons were on the 1986 Forecast II list of needs, but were immediately dropped upon cancellation of NASP, despite the views of those like John J. Welch, Jr., then assistant secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, who said about the National Aerospace Plane and X-30: "We know that the Air Force must be out in front in getting an industrial base for hypersonic technology so that we can be confident of being able to operate in the hypervelocity regime." Welch continued: "Our job is to manage the risks, not to avoid them …we're not in a risk-free business." The bottom line: "If you want us to be free of risk," he said, "you will not have programs that will keep us the most admired and respected defense capability in the free world."⁵¹

• Scramjets. Supersonic combustion ramjets (scramjets) are a central part of efforts to develop hypersonic airbreathing propulsion. By using deceleration of the oncoming airstream instead of rotating machinery to compress the flow, they simplify the structure of aircraft engines and provide thrust over an extremely wide range of flight Mach numbers.⁵² AFRL continues joint research in this area, but it is not a priority, and recent severe funding cuts have demanded force reductions which are affecting many space-centered programs.

• Ultralight, ultrastrength materials. Under its Future-X program, NASA is investigating reducing the weight of reusable launch vehicles, but the Air Force share of funding for this research is low, and the priority is low.

• Advanced directed energy. Most Air Force directed energy research is now centered on ABL.

• Spacecraft defender. Orbital vehicle research is poorly funded, since most of the 6.2-6.3 money for space is now being taken up by the SBL and Discoverer II programs.

AEROSPACE R&D FUNDING
		Overall U.S. research and development investment in aerospace has dropped — most dramatically in government funding. Source: Aerospace Industries Association.