Is the Future Really a Priority?

This report has documented a continuous, precipitous decline in Air Force basic research funding, a drop in Air Force applied research investment—the "seed corn" of the future—and a reduction in technology demonstration funding. These trends suggest that R&D has not been treated as an Air Force priority, which leads to a more important question: Is the future a priority of the Air Force?

Despite Air Force protestations to the contrary, and in the face of a profusion of visionary forecast documents, the budgetary and planning actions of the Air Force seem to reflect an intent to carry the past into the future rather than to innovate. Items:

• As documented extensively in this report, R&D has been deliberately used as a funding source, with funds diverted to help fund mature technologies for procurement and Operations & Maintenance (O&M) needs. As a result, the amount of new technology being developed is constantly decreasing—in quality and quantity.

• In the latest episode of programmatic manipulation, the Air Force returned the Space-Based Laser and Discoverer II programs to 6.3 S&T status (they had been moved into engineering development status in FY 1997), creating the impression that research into space was increasing, but requiring at the same time that the existing S&T budget cough up the funding—$94 million in FY 2000, $131 million in FY 2001, and more to follow—to keep the two programs going. Many existing S&T programs—including other space projects—were badly damaged, while nearly $3 billion was freed up for non-R&D expenses over the coming FYDP period.

• In prior fiscal years, the Air Force tried to cut R&D as much as 50% and only restored the funding when it was directed to do so by OSD.

• In FY 1997, the Air Force made a poorly coordinated attempt to eliminate graduate studies at the Air Force Institute of Technology, the training ground each year for some 550 R&D-specialist officers. By doing so, the Air Force in effect decided to shortchange its future ability to initiate or properly manage new technologies. More immediately, it sent a strong message to officers that there is no longer an R&D career track within the Air Force.

Air Force research and development continues to suffer most from a lack of funding. Although the Air Force has an extensive planning infrastructure throughout all levels of the superstructure, it is not protecting the very R&D needs that this planning highlights, partly because of a multi-layered programming process that does not include R&D advocacy at the highest levels. At the same time, the Air Force must have the flexibility to adjust its resources to provide and sustain a robust S&T program.

Air Force R&D organizations have extensive ties to industry's R&D capabilities, but industry takes a market-centric view. The Air Force, therefore, cannot and should not count on industry to make up for its shortfalls in basic research and development.

Air Force R&D is synonymous with the future of the Air Force. By neglecting R&D, the Department of Defense and the Air Force have shortchanged the nation's future military-technological edge. Recovery from this failure to invest cannot be measured in time — it is a mistake that could cost the nation dearly on future battlefields.