Big Sky - November 1995

Brigadier General Thomas E. Kuenning
Director, On-Site Inspection Agency
Big Sky AFA Symposium
November 1995

A Growing Role for the
On-Site Inspection Agency

It is great to be back in Montana and to be part of this forum and participate with General Parker and the 20th Air Force. Today I'm here to talk about arms control and what is going on in that area. Arms control today is both a story of continuity and change. Continuity involves the process of implementing the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. We use the INF treaty experience as a template for the on-site inspection regimes that these other two treaties have employed successfully. It s a common element. The On-Site Inspection Agency, however, does not do verification judgements. That is reserved for the highest level of our government and something that the government of the United States takes very seriously. We contribute to that process.

President Bush stated our commitment to verification of our treaties when he said in 1990, "Without exception, the United States expects meticulous fulfillment of all existing and future arms control agreements and all obligations that they entail. We cannot and will not accept any lesser standard. Put simply, arms control commitments must be precisely defined and scrupulously observed. Nothing less will do."

The START Treaty, entered into force about a year ago in December 1994. United States along with four nations of the former Soviet Union Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazhikstan accomplished much during this first treaty year. The START baseline period was a 120-day period involving more than 113 inspections. The United States, using OSIA, accomplished 76 of these inspections in those four countries, while Russia and the Ukraine accomplished 37 inspections on United States facilities. The very first was here at Malmstrom on March 5 this year. Six weeks ago I had the opportunity to travel on my first START-related inspection. Let me tell you a bit about that.

On our arms control inspections for START, we enter at only two places in Russia: an east entry point at Ulan- Ude, near Lake Baykal, well inside of Siberia, and it is 3,500 kilometers from Japan. On the western side, we enter at Moscow. On my first trip, I went to Ribatchi, which is a submarine base on the Kamchatka Peninsula. We start from Japan and traveled to Ulan-Ude by C-141. The next morning we told the Russianswhere we are going to inspect, and they had nine hours to get us there.

The U.S. inspection team is 10-man team and is led by a Lieutenant Colonel mission commander. I performed duty as a team member. Lt. Col. Craig Hansen was our team chief. At the Russian military airfield, we got on a Russian Aeroflot AN-24. Even though they had nine hours to get us there, it took 17 hours. That was well-through the day and a violation of the treaty. The mission commander has the option of continuing the inspection or not. He chose to continue the inspection so we went on with it.

We arrived at Ribachi on the Kamchatka Peninsula, a beautiful place, just before sunup and immediately went into the inspection. It was an RV [reentry vehicle] on-site inspection. The purpose is to verify the warheads on a particular missile to make sure there are no more reentry vehicles than allowed. That was the type of inspection we were doing. Once we determined a missile to inspect, a particular tube in that submarine, our inspectors stay with that missile until we see what is on the front end. We began that process, identified the missile tube on a sleek, black, Delta-3 submarine, and then followed that missile as it went from its alert moorings, and very slowly transited to a loading dock where a very professional group of young Russian maintainers, conscripts and officers, unloaded the missile. It was a liquid-fueled SSN-18. They pulled it out using a crane and put it on a truck to haul it to a maintenance bunker where they take the front end off and prepare it for our inspectors.

That process took a good portion of the day. By the evening, we verified what was supposed to be there. The inspection went pretty flawlessly. Then we did the inspection report and finished all this about 11:30 at night. At that point, we were operating 42 hours straight without sleep. For you young guys, that may be no problem, but I was dragging a bit.

These are tough conditions, but the people are very professional in every way. During our return flight, we flew back to Ulan-Ude on an the AN-24, a two-engine prop plane. I found an interesting experience on the way back. We stopped at a bomber base called Ukanka as the Russians have trouble buying fuel at commercial facilities, so they must stop at military bases. The government s credit card for fuel doesn t work at the commercial airports so they have to stop at the military bases. Ukanka is a bomber base so they kept it dark, and we had to get out of the airplane. As my eyes adjusted, I could see all the ominous Bear-D bombers parked all around. Here I was a former Cold War warrior standing in the middle of all these bombers. I contemplated what it meant to stand there among those weapons of war that are now limited by international treaty and subject to my inspection, but nevertheless still are awesome symbols of power and potential destruction. The need for continuing deterrence also hit me hard.

We completed this trip in 110 hours with only about 16 hours of sleep during that time. Team Hansen, we called the teams by the name of the team chief, returned to Japan. I returned to the United States, but the teamcontinued on another inspection just three days later. They went back into Ulan-Ude and on to an ICBM silo base to complete another inspection.

The 120-day baseline inspection period is now complete. During this period, the United States inspected all of the possible sites in Russia, the declared facilities except the one base at Mosdock, a strategic bomber base that is down in southern Russia near Chechnya. The problem there was the Russians didn t want to let us there for our own safety. They moved their bombers out of there. But we have the right and we will go back and inspect that base when the situation allows for it.

Our inspectors did have some questions during this inspection period. During the START treaty baseline, these inspections may involve ambiguities or questions of access to thing we were supposed to under the treaty. If our team chiefs aren t satisfied with an issues, these things have to be resolved at the political level by the Joint Compliance Inspection Commission that meets in Geneva.

The other side of the coin has occurred, too. Inspections have occurred here in the United States. OSIA had a big part in preparing for these inspections under the leadership of General Parker. He started that. There were five rounds of START mock inspections to prepare our people. You have done an outstanding job in presenting your weapons systems for Russian inspection.

Let me move to another front, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. The CFE treaty has now concluded its three years of reductions. The treaty states must be in compliances with the treaty-prescribed levels by the 17th of November 1995. Not all are in compliance, but nevertheless a tremendous amount has been accomplished with the CFE treaty. Some 47,000 pieces of conventional armament have been eliminated through this treaty. That translates to 18,000 tanks, 8,900 artillery pieces, 17,500 armored combat vehicles, 280 aircraft and 2,100 attack helicopters. Beginning in three days, there will be a period of increased CFE operational activity. That will be the residual level validation or a second-baseline period.

During this period, we will inspect 20 percent of the declared objects of verification. This will give us a way of confirming that the CFE treaty reductions have indeed been met. During the CFE Treaty baseline reduction phase, the treaty nations, the allies and the Warsaw Pact countries, did a great deal of cooperation. However, then the environment totally changed on us. The treaty is still based on a "block-to-block" scenario, but the alliances and allegiances of the nations shifted during that period of time. It was a great period of growth and working together.

Let s review just for a moment how grueling and challenging the inspections can be. I discovered that on my inspection to the submarine base. As a model, the INF Treaty set precedents and standards that provided for significant continuity in implementing today s newer treaties. As we have seen, in the changing world with lots of surprises and uncertainties, people on the scene can make a difference in building trust and confidence. Let me tell you a little bit about the On-Site Inspection Agency and the people that make up the On-Site Inspection Agency.

President Reagan established the On-Site Inspection Agency in January 1988 to carry out the INF Treaty inspection, and to escort and monitor as well. Since then, the scope has broadened and inspection activities for the United States include new treaties, treaties that we are preparing for and other treaty-like agreements. The growth in OSIA has been due to these new treaties. Currently in force are the INF Treaty, the START Treaty, and the CFE Treaty. Other U.S. obligations awaiting implementation include the Open Skies Treaty Malmstrom is a refueling base for the Open Skies Treaty, so there will be a day in the near term where you will have aircraft from other nations landing here. Other obligations include the bilateral and multilateral chemical weapons agreements and potentially the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which is being negotiated now, as well as security and cooperation measures in Europe. OSA has added a new mission in the cooperative threat reduction program. We are involved with DNA [Defense Nuclear Agency] in cooperation with this. We do audits and examinations that are similar to inspections, but have a lot less structured mandate.

Currently, there are about 800 people at OSIA, two-thirds are military, and one-third are civilian. They are truly a national resource. OSIA has over 10 percent of the U.S. military s Russian linguists, about 15 percent of all U.S. Army foreign area officers that specialize in Russia and about 10 percent of the Army s field grade officers that have chemical weapons expertise. My predecessor was fond of saying that OSIA was a schoolhouse for the future of the military. When our military officers return to their respective services, their duty with OSIA gives them a good deal of experience with application in a joint environment. They will have worked with international agencies, such as NATO and United Nations, and worked with officers of many different services. This will certainly be valuable as we move into the 21st Century and our officers must have the background to handle a variety of tasks.

Who are these men and women who implement these on-site inspections? What is their character? Each inspection team and escort mission is led by a mission commander, a guy like Lt. Col. Hansen that led the mission I was on. These folks are field grade officers with about 15 years of service, and all of them have one or more advanced degrees. Some of them have Russian language proficiency and most have command experience.

They are held accountable for establishing and maintaining a professional, business-like tone with their treaty counterparts as they go about, either inspecting or escorting. They are also responsible for team discipline and professionalism and, to a degree, team training.

They must know the entire process of the inspection business, including the treaties, inside and out. These treaties are complex with multiple documents and protocols to them. There are general guidelines in the treaties, but a lot of the decision is left to the on-site mission commander. They are the United States government s representative during the inspection period, bearing all the responsibilities and exercising the authority delegated by the President.

There are others on the team such as our linguists, enlisted men and women from each of our armed services. OSIA has 10 percent of all U.S. military Russian linguists a wealth of language skill and experience. Routinely, two mid-level sergeants and petty officers, each with a significant amount of language capability, are assigned to an inspection team along with another two enlisted folks who are weapons system experts. These people must also be experts on the treaties, which are a maze of legal and technical terminology in any language. For example, the START Treaty has 685 pages and 12 protocol. Our linguists not only have to know these treaties in English, they have to know them in Russian as well, a tough job.

The on-site inspection process is not always one that is carried out under ideal conditions. Mother Nature and the forces of time and tension and geography put pressure on the team, especially the linguists who must translate technical terms and keep emotions out of the process. They must accurately translate all those legal and technical information and make sure that the treaty rights are protected. This is tough.

Our people are not daylight and fair weather inspectors. They regularly are about their mission under very rugged conditions. I want to add also that this is not a characteristic just of the U.S. inspectors, the Russians and our treaty partners in other treaties have held themselves to this same standard.

Let me talk about some of the emerging missions in OSIA. The chemical weapons control regime is another area where the traditional nation-to-nation arms control provisions my not apply. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, an international inspection directorate, not national verification agencies, will conduct on-site inspections. A similar regime is anticipated for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which is being negotiated in Geneva and the President has a goal to sign that treaty by April. The Chemical Weapons and Open Skies Treaty are awaiting verification before they can enter into force. More precisely, the Chemical Weapons Treaty needs 65 countries to ratify it out of 130 nations that have signed the treaty. The United States has not yet ratified that treaty. The Open Skies Treaty needs three more countries to ratify it Belarus, Ukraine and Russia before these treaties can enter into force.

Another new area where the United States and OSIA is involved is in the Defense Department s CTR program. The changing political, social and economic conditions in countries that make up former Soviet Union have made it difficult for them to provide safe and secure storage and transportation and dismantling of these nuclear weapons. The CTR program exists to reduce the weapons of mass destruction in these countries, warhead by warhead, missile by missile and factory by factory. OSIA teams perform audits and examinations [A&E] and inspections under the CTR program to ensure that the Nunn-Lugar initiative money is being spent appropriately. Secretary of Defense Perry has called this program "defense by other means."

What skills are necessary to carry out this new mission? Professionalism and good judgement. Let me introduce you to another one of the mission commanders who does this A&E work. That is Commander Paul Petersen. Paul is assigned to OSIA s CTR office and is a fully qualified treaty inspector mission commander as well. He regularly and routinely conducts these CTR audits and examinations. When I asked him to describe what new lessons he has learned in this program, Commander Petersen explained there were no new lessons, rather he restated the lessons learned by so many of his predecessors and his colleagues in other aspects of the inspection business: He said, "One, know the mission; two, know your team; three, maintain OSIA standards, that is, uncompromising integrity, teamwork and professionalism." Commander Petersen routinely calls upon our motto in OSIA, Trust and Verify, with the emphasis on the trust, to trust his instincts, trust his training, trust his experiences, trust his teammates and trust his counterparts as he carries out this mission.

This attitude is not unusual from an officer who has sharpened his teeth in strategic weapons inspection, an uncompromising treaty that has giving us experience leading to this audit and examination activity under a bilateral relationship with the Russians. The men and women of the On-Site Inspection Agency have taken the difficult and forged it into the routine, taken the unknown and made it understandable, all the while maintaining a professionalism that I am extremely proud of. The On-Site Inspection Agency has proven its value to the implementation of arms control treaties and agreements, and the On-Site Inspection Agency and its counterpart national verification organizations face a busy and bright future.

Former adversaries have achieved a level of confidence unexpected just a decade ago. Collectively, we have increased the levels of transparency and security for all of our treaty partners. The On-Site Inspection Agency has been meticulous in its implementation of existing and future arms control agreements. The changes taking place demand the same professionalism and attitude and attention to detail that we have always applied to our mission. That is the same kind of attitude and professionalism and dedication to detail that missileers have applied to their mission. In that sense, an arms control inspector and missileer share a common standard and a common task to make the United States a far more secure and safe plce to live. I feel that as a missileer and as a person in the arms control inspection business, nothing less than that standard will do.

Thanks, it has been good to be with you this morning. It would be my pleasure to field your questions at this time.

QUESTION: You mentioned earlier about the INF Treaty that started last December and CFE that is about to be completed. How long will you be involved in this process of conducting these compliance inspections for the Open Skies Treat.

BRIG. GEN. KUENNING: First, it must enter into force. Is it indefinite? My predecessor tells me it is indefinite.

QUESTION: Do you have a time frame we would expect the treaty to be ratified and be implemented?

BRIG. GEN. KUENNING: The Russians have some concerns that they have to bear more responsibility in hosting inspections. It seems like everybody wants to fly over Russia and nobody wants to fly over the United States. It is a treaty where the data gained on these flights is shared. There are four means of collection on the aircraft. There are only four or five missions currently reserved for flights over the United States because the allies have agreed not to fly over each other and a lot of the former Warsaw Pact countries can t afford to fly over the United States. So, the Russians are feeling a bit put upon that everybody wants to be flying over them and they are not going to get any data out of the United States. So it will be some time before it enters into force.

We are in the process of preparing the aircraft and working with allies and working with former adversaries to figure out how to go about this. But I don t expect that first aircraft to land here at Malmstrom except perhaps as a training mission for a number of years.

QUESTION: Can you describe their warhead accounting system, how do they keep track of what they have produced, what they have destroyed and what is available? Are you fairly confident that we and they have a fairly good grip on where their warheads are?

BRIG. GEN. KUENNING: The actual warhead accounting is more a function in the START II Treaty and also an activity that those who are involved in the threat reduction business keep track of. We primarily ensure the missiles declared to be deployed don t have more warheads on than are supposed to be on them. We don t track those warheads in the On-Site Inspection Agency other than when they are deployed on operational birds. We don t have access to their warhead storage areas in an open way although that is part of the CTR program. The level of confidence builds greater and greater day by day. Our audits and examinations make sure that things that are supposed to be used to take these things apart and protect these warheads are actually being used to do that. When we do that and see that happening, then our confidence grows that those warheads are being secured and are being reduced in the proper way in Russia.

We have a little bit more confidence in some of the non-Russian parts of the former Soviet Union, where for instance, we participated in the removal of some of the nuclear materials back into the United States. OSIA people did that mission. I don t have a really solid answer for you, but the process, and being close to what they are doing can help us, and it much better than staying at arms length.

QUESTION: What is the goal of the Russian missile force once they reach their reductions?

BRIG. GEN. KUENNING: I don t think this is totally clear yet because the Russians continue to produce new missiles. Where we have a portal monitoring facility at Bot Kinsk, which is about 600 miles east of Moscow, we have that facility that initially existed because that is where they made the SS-20, but it also has a reason to exist in START now. What we do is make sure no SS-20s are coming out of the plant, but we lso count and track the SS-25s that come out of that plant. The Russians continue to produce SS-25s and continue to modernize their force. They have a new missile which is a variant of the SS-25. We are calling it the SSX-27. They still seem to find resources to modernize their forces. The Russians draw a lot of their legitimacy as a super power from those nuclear forces and the generals are not letting people forget that. They are still applying resources to their strategic missile force.

There is an important mission for the missileer to do yet and we must maintain our vigilance while we pursue arms control. We should look at it as a two-pronged spear that helps protect us. At one end, are people engaged in the arms control process and doing that very professionally. At other pointy end are strategic forces which must maintain that professionalism. When those Russian inspectors, a lot of them are strategic rocket forces people, come here and see the professionalism that you show to them here at Malmstrom and at our other missile bases, it adds to the deterrent equation out there. Don t ever lose sight of that.

QUESTION: When you say they are modernizing their missiles, what aspect of their missiles are they modernizing?

BRIG. GEN. KUENNING: There are some performance aspects to their modernization efforts. They are not like us. They are not making their missile stages more environmentally friendly. But they are doing basic improvements to them improving the solid fuel characteristics and propulsion as well as the guidance. There are subtle changes to these things because there are limits as to the numbers and there can be no new types, but they can have modernizations. That is what they are doing. They are staying within the treaty limits on what defines new types of missiles. They are dedicated to keeping the strategic rocket forces a professional and capable force with what is left after START II. It will be a force without MIRV d ICBMs. There is a lot of opposition in the military about that right now. We ll see how that works out because as you know START II has not been ratified in either Russia or the United States.

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