Foundation Forum

Air Force Association Symposium
Acquisition Update
Colorado Springs
May 24, 1996
Major General Robert S. Dickman

Let me begin with a hearty thank you to the Air Force Association and the Aerospace Education Foundation for 50 years of support to the Air Force and hopefully many more to come. You have supported not only the Air Force in general, but specifically improved the interface between acquisition and the Air Force such as space operations and space acquisition. We in the DoD Space Architect shop are very pleased to be included in this forum.

As many of you know, our organization is joint, and I'd like to spend a couple of minutes reviewing where we fit into the big picture, then turn to our first architecture, MILSATCOM, and use that as an example for how we are doing business.

Our mission is rather narrowly defined. There are two new space organizations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense mine, the DoD Space Architect, and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Space, Bob Davis' organization. He does policy, acquisition strategy, budget, and programmatics all the stuff that happens inside the Pentagon. We do architectures. It is interesting that you can't do architectures with an office of a few dozen people; it has to be done by the people who are going to use it and are going to acquire it. That has been our biggest challenge. Explicitly in my charter is to collaborate with the intelligence community on architectures. Right now I am very bullish on the process.

Our acquisition cycle is as if we were talking in the 1950s and using that process. First, we would develop a vision of a mission, then write a capabilities-centered requirements document, then proceed through Milestone Zero or Milestone One and so forth. There may be programs for which that will be true in the future. If we get into wide-area surveillance, we'll go down that path.

In reality, we are in the process of replacing, and replenishing existing capabilities with different systems. It is a different way of looking at how an architecture has to fit. The new phrase on our chart is the Capstone Requirements Document, [CRD] that comes between the MNS [Mission Need Statement] and Milestone Zero. That helps us to do an architecture, which then has to be validated. The CRD is probably going to get redone before we enter EMD [Engineering and Manufacturing Design] because each one of those processes, unlike our former acquisition era, really is not to refine the requirement as much as it is to say these are the requirements that I am willing to pay "X" dollars to satisfy. We no longer put a list of requirements on the table and say, "These have to be done in some way, shape or form or don't start the program."

There will always be thresholds, but the CRD is really about, as much as anything else, making the difficult trades. Only the operator and only the customer, can make those trades.

There has been actually very little tweaking of this process with the exception of the introduction of the Joint Space Management Board. They are our decision-making body, a group of senior decision-makers within the intelligence, acquisition and warfighting communities. SLIDE-Structure

We used to describe this chart as being in two categories. The folks on the top part of the chart, those that are shaded, are all the people that think my office works for them. The people on the bottom part of the chart are all the people that we think work for us. There are some people who are in both places. General Ashy fits in both. He probably wouldn't think that he works for me, but in fact, many of his people are actively embedded in our architecture development teams. They are providing the work forces to describe and force the requirements process into the architectures. On the other hand, General Ashy is the only CINC that I am authorized by the Joint Staff to interact with directly in terms of requirements. So in the CRD sense, I work for him. It is a very interactive process.

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Space is my interface with the acquisition community and my interface with the staff. In a practical sense, I work for Mr. Money, the Air Force Acquisition Executive. He writes my report card and provides the money that funds our office even though he has no day-to-day involvement in the actual activity of the architectures. We deal about equally with the Air Force and the other service acquisition executives.

C3I is one of the major unknowns in the process. It has become my sense over the last four or five months that the C4ISR Command and Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance integration process cannot stand independent from the work we are doing, and a major part of our future activity involves working our architectures into that much larger C4ISR architecture business.

Right now, we've built another stovepipe, where space is a stovepipe independent organizationally from a lot of the rest of the C4ISR. That may continue to be the case. C3I and DUSD(S) have different charters, but if the products of those two organizations are not fully integrated, we fail. The same is true for the NRO [National Reconnaissance Office]. If we try to build a "white" space system and series of architectures that are independent from what the NRO does in building space systems and architectures, we will simply not have served our customer well.

SLIDE-Strategy: Develop Range of Alternatives

We are trying to make an "architecture" a fairly deliberate process. We engage with the requirers and the providers early to understand what is involved, both in terms of long-term needs and the technology. We bring that together and roll the threat against it. If you go to DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] for a threat assessment for the period 2000 to 2005, expect a wishy-washy projection, but if you ask them for 2010 to 2025 they just look at you and laugh. We really don't have solid threat documents any more than we have solid budget documents. All we can do is make projections about where those trend lines are going to go.

Perhaps more important, we ask the Joint Space Management Board to assess where those trend lines are going to go. As they pick one architecture or another, they select different levels of survivability, protected communications, funding requirements and different abilities to satisfy changing requirements without changing funding very much. That is the big guy's view of the world. It is based more on vision than on a lot of quantitative information.

From that long-term vision, we'll bring forward four or five alternatives to the JSMB. In the case of MILSATCOM, we'll do that on July 25. Our nominal timeline for a major architecture is about nine months. Coming out of that JSMB decision are the kind of things that this audience will focus on much more directly the acquisition strategy, will it fit into an objective architecture, is it going to fit into the overall Space Master Plan and what happens to the budgets.

SLIDE-Architecture Development Team

The team that we use to put this together is hierarchical and the core of the architect team is in our office the people who will do architectures full-time. We have about 30 people who do that. We have three architectures going on right now, and we have about three-quarters of the people on board.

I have people working the MILSATCOM architecture from my shop, and that core development team actually consists of about 35 people. Most of the people who are doing the hard work of putting together the architectural alternatives come from outside our office. That will be the case for every architecture we do.

Our second architecture, Space Control, and third architecture, Satellite Operations, are organized the same way. We are seing that same level of commitment from the acquisition organizations and the operators. In addition to my folks, there are people permanently assigned to the office from U.S. Space Command. We don't have one from DISA [Defense Information Systems Agency], but we expect that may happen. The NRO says they will also provide somebody full-time in the office, so that team process really cuts across the entire space community. The core group works one week in Washington and then returns for one week or two weeks back home while still working on the architecture. That process goes on for about nine months.

Once a month, the Review and Validation Working Group gets together, and we update them on the process and technical results. That group tends to average 70 to 100 folks. A lot of people who don't put people in the architecture development team are still major stake holders and they participate in that R&V Working Group.

The next one up, the Decision Coordinating Group, is our way of providing the JSMB members with an awful lot of information before they meet. For MILSATCOM, it includes the J-6 on the Joint Staff, the J-2, J-3 and J-6s from the various CINCs who may want to participate, certainly from U.S. Space Command and the component commands, OSD staff members, DISA, and NRO. There are 40 or 50 folks we will brief two or three times from the time we start the architecture until we actually deliver it to the JSMB.

It is our hope that all the issues, all the equities and all the problems are on the table before we start so we can go to the JSMB and expect to get a decision out of that meeting.

Who is on the JSMB? It is the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Dr. Paul Kaminski, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joe Ralston as the DoD part of the Executive Committee, Mr. Tenant, the DDCI from the CIA and the community management staff as the other side of the Executive Committee, the three service acquisition executives, the four vice chiefs, the head of the intelligence agencies NSA, DIA, CIO [Central Imagery Office] USCINCSPACE, DUSD(S) and the DNRO are the executive secretaries and myself and my counterpart in the NRO are ex-officio members as is the DARO. The JSMB has yet to meet. They meet for the first time next week. They are going to talk about issues such as about organization and about what our next architectures are. We are anxious to see what happens when that group of people get in a room and are asked to make a decision on something.

SLIDE-Space Architecture-The Product

We don't expect to come out of the JSMB with a selection of a point-solution architecture. When we go to them with MILSATCOM, we are not asking them to decide whether or not we are going to have four or six SHF satellites at any particular altitude. We are asking them to provide a framework by which future acquisitions can take place and provide some vectors on where they think the world is going to go. For example, they may direct that we require a substantial amount of protected communication by going to process EHF systems. Or they may say, "We think the world is going to be relatively benign, and capacity is more important than protection. We will go to a largely commercial-based architecture where we can buy bandwidth on demand." The JSMB will give those kinds of major vectors.

We must go through point designs to do this. We've got to determine what those various architectural alternatives cost, knowing full well that what gets bought isn't going to be what we described in the point design. For one thing, each of the elements of the point design are going to evolve into programs that are going through the milestone process. They will be assessed against the overall architecture. It may be good, and that is good. It may not be, and then we change the program or we change the architecture. If programs go forward that are independent of the architecture or the architecture doesn't change, then we would recommend a shut down of the architect shop.

To recap, we are building a team of the requirers, the operators and the technologists who understands how the whole thing fits together, understands what the art of the possible and what is going on in the commercial world. They develop concepts, describe those concepts with point designs, analyze those concepts, and take four to six options to the JSMB. SLIDE-Architecture Development Flow

There are an awful lot of folks who are concerned over what the DoD Space Architect is going to decide, and what our architecture is going to be. We aren't going to decide anything. The JSMB is going to decide the architecture after we bring forward a number of architectures. In the case of MILSATCOM, there are six different architectures that will have been equally and fairly analyzed. If I am asked for a recommendation, I will certainly be prepared to make one. However, if it is obvious which one I would pick, then we haven't done a good job building the architectures because there are lot of solutions.

The requirements have to be our underpinning for what we are doing. For MILSATCOM, capacity, ensured access, interoperability, global coverage, protection, and flexibility are the key areas described in the Capstone Requirements Documents. There are any number of requirements databases for MILSATCOM. DISA maintains them and U.S. Space Command maintains them. One basically says bandwidth on demand.

We can also go to service doctrine to understand more about requirements. If you look at the Army's "Force XXI" and what they expect to provide to the soldier in the field, the current architecture for MILSATCOM won't do that. All of those databases are helpful, but the CRD is the cornerstone. The CRD that we will take to the JSMB is a draft. After the architecture is approved, the CRD gets redone and validated. When we put together an architecture to satisfy these, in the case of MILSATCOM there are six, one has to be the baseline. I am not sure we would ever buy a baseline again that is, continue doing what we are doing without any substantial changes. But the reality is that PA&E [Program Analysis & Evaluation] requires it; it has got to be there as a point of comparison.

SLIDE-Option #1

Here a couple of options being considered but may not go to the JSMB. The first alternative is a major evolution of what we are doing today. It doesn't involve major changes in the philosophical approach but major changes in the technical approaches. For those who have been involved in the planning for MILSTAR III and the advanced EHF, those components are included. For those who have been involved in the follow on to DSCS [Defense Satellite Communications System], a major SHF program, it is in the architecture. We presume a Global Broadcast System or a two-way KaBand system, is involved. We probably would take UHF down out of GEO, or at least we'd look hard at that, for frequency re-use and improved link margins. It is a very robust architecture.

If you believe that the world is going to be as threatening 15 years from now as it was 10 years ago, and you believe that the budgets can rise to accommodate it, this is probably the kind of architecture you would move to. It is a very robust, very capable system and probably pretty expensive.

SLIDE-Option #4

The other side of the coin is to go to a largely commercially based architecture. If the measure of merit for MILSATCOM becomes bandwidth on demand, then a largely commercial based architecture is where you want to be. You can continue to buy capacity as long as you are willing to pay the bill. It helps to give people notice that you are going to want it, but the lead times for putting commercial satellites on orbit are certainly going to get down under two years very soon. You would probably use commercial-based PCS think of UHF in the classic definition of 300 to 3 gigahertz, so anything in L-Band would fall in UHF. We could probably use a different L-Band system for Messaging. We probably use transponded Ka and C-Band for almost all of our long-haul stuff. We would probably use the low altitude systems to provide polar coverage, and probably retain some kind of EHF capability ourselves for protected Comm.

SLIDE-What's Commercial Mean

It is not straight forward to define what "commercial" really means. On one end of the commercial spectrum, it is probably simply a lease. You can go through DISA or go directly and lease the service with no military specifications associated with it. You can turn it on; you can turn it off very quickly.

At the other end of the commercial spectrum is probably something like the UHF Follow-on Program where we specified a military requirement to operate in a military frequency and then allowed it to be built using commercial practices and delivered on orbit through a commercial launch contract. It looks like a military system but with a different kind of acquisition strategy.

When you move to the military end of the spectrum, you are in the MILSTAR class. Virtually everything on it is military unique and built to detailed military specs. Acquisition reform can certainly change how we buy it, but it doesn't change the underlying principle that there is no commercial counterpart in the marketplace. Today, we see mostly transponded capability at GEO. As we look towards the commercial aspects of the architectures, we expect to see far more spacecraft processing, certainly by 2010, switched spacecraft, cross-lines in GEO, various altitudes, and a lot more diversity than only thinking about "commercial" in the sense of 1996 standards.

SLIDE-Commercial Market Demand

Regardless of which architecture we pick, it is fair to say there is going to be a major role for the commercial world. But the commercial market tends to have its own share of holes. We see very little interest on the part of the commercial SATCOM builders to provide protected or survivable services for anybody other than us. The technology is in place, the same is probably true for mobile nets and for interactive communications in real time, but we are the only big customer for that today. Right now, there are niches where we probably will not be able to rely on commercial operations. Other than that, we can probably turn to almost commercial-like systems. While the matrix isn't complete and may be more binary that it really is, the trend lines are pretty accurate.

Once we have a feel for what we might want to do in the commercial world, then the next step is the cost consideration.

It is something we are doing for virtually every aspect of the architecture.

SLIDE-SATCOM Cost Considerations

The reason for commercial use has to be lower costs. There are other things that will come from it better participation in the technology chase and diversity of sources. But all things being equal, cost is a major driver.

There is another major tradeoff. If we acquire a system ourselves, it is with investment dollars. If we buy it commercial, we are probably going to use O&M funds. That is a very significant difference for the Department of Defense. It has to do with Congressional oversight, the budget process and the way the end customer, be it the CINC or the service, has to budget for communications. For some of the biggest users of military-owned bandwidth such as the intelligence community and the Air Force Satellite Control Network, instead of using a MILSATCOM for free, they may simply have a bill to pay. During a contingency like Desert Storm, the customer could face a large O&M bill which traditionally are handled by different processes inside DoD and the Hill than investment accounts.

Once we get over those decision hurdles, we need to decide how we buy commercial capabilities. Would it be through DISA or would we let the services do it directly? There don't appear to be any show stoppers for the process so we may let the acquisition community decide.

For MILSATCOM and for commercial systems within MILSATCOM, the major part of our work is not coming up with that initial concept, but doing the trade spaces internal to the concept how much commercial is appropriate in every architecture?

We are doing the same kind of trade analysis on the role of high flying aircraft, not UAVs as we understand them today, but a long-endurance aircraft at high altitude. If I use the Army's description of the phases of an employment, first I've got to project the force and during this phase I probably need SATCOM because there is nothing else around. Once I project the force and I reach the point where I have air superiority, I can probably put UAVs over a theater and provide communications with a lot faster technology replenishment, and perhaps a lot greater ability to respond to changes in capacity. That whole process is ongoing.

One technique we think is pretty exciting is called the Warfare Analysis Laboratory Exercise, WALEX, housed at the Applied Physics Lab at Johns Hopkins University. It is a non-quantitative process where we are bringing in stakeholders and asking them to look at specific scenarios such as contingencies in Korea, the desert or peacekeeping missions. They look at various aspects of SATCOM and see how well they fit together and how well they work. We tried it at the action officer level a week before last, and it crashed. We found that we were asking the wrong questions, in the wrong way, about the wrong things. We learned enough to do it at the O-6 level next week and we have a flag officer session planned for June 20.

SLIDE-Post JSMB Actions

In any case, the end result of all that effort is to provide architectures to the JSMB for their decision. From that, comes the standard acquisition flow decisions on who is going to be the lead agents, changes to the POM, and as programs evolve, we go back and determine whether they fit. After that JSMB decision, you should be dealing with your operator community and your acquisition community to make the process work.

SLIDE-Architectural Goal

Our goal is to look across all space mission areas: communications, remote sensing, tactical, and intelligence. We are not a single architect even though there is not a national security space architect. I'm not sure there ever will be. I am absolutely comfortable that we can build integrated architectures across four segments of the U.S. space program DoD, the intelligence community, the civil and the commercial without having to force that organizational alignment. We can do so by working the integrated approach, by working as teams, by making it all come together and keeping in mind our end result is support to the warfighter.

SLIDE-Space Architect Schedule

We've got two months to go on the first architecture, and most of our time is spent on consensus building from now on. We are probably within the last three weeks of the analytical work. We kicked off Space Control fairly shortly after the first of the year. That is coming along pretty well. We just started the third, which is Satellite Operations, TT&C is the simple way of talking it, but it is actually a lot broader than that.

I don't know what we are going to do next. The JSMB will probably give us some guidance on that. We have other tasked areas that we have worked on: Global Broadcast, the DSCS satellites that are still on the ground, and a Relay Study we are taking to the JSMB. There is enough stuff to keep us busy.

From my perspective, I would not centralize the oversight of the space program within the OSD staff. Unfortunately, that isn't a choice. For a lot of reasons, the decision was made to have that integration, so I think we can make it work. Certainly there are difficult challenges, but it is just a matter of working with people, sitting down around the table, talking about common problems and trying to find common solutions. We've got good support from management, both on the acquisition side and on the operators side. General Ashy has asked that we show up at least once a month to keep him and his staff current. We are glad to do that.

For two of our next two architectures, the major panels are run by people from USSPACECOM, so we are confident we have the right kind of support. If we get it all done, we can satisfy that task of assured warfighter support.

I am glad to be here and again thank you so much for continuing these forums where we can talk about where we are, where we are going and what we need to do in the future. Thank you and God bless.

MS. LANTZY: First question, what will be on the agenda of the first JSMB meeting? Will you brief MILSATCOM?

MAJ. GEN. DICKMAN: The first meeting is next week. The first thing on the agenda is the results of the Relay Study that we did looking at future considerations for a national relay. Then we will brief the current status of our architecture work.

We will give them insight on what is going on in MILSATCOM in terms of the issues to prepare them for the meeting on the 25th. We will then cover the status of forming IPTs to look at both the "white" and the "black" space programs, the results of the Jeremiah Panel, and a number of other study efforts going on inside the NRO and inside the "white" world.

It is to try to get everybody socialized to the process of working together. It is going to be a very interesting session.

MS. LANTZY: Also, what is the status of creating a National Security Space Architect?

MAJ. GEN. DICKMAN: At the risk of prejudging the JSMB, I think the two Architects, the NRO and myself, will be asked to look at the whole spectrum of alternatives ranging from not doing it to a full integration and co-location. As I said, wait until we get done with the Comm Architecture, the Satellite Ops Architecture, and the Space Control Architecture to see if we can do an integrated architecture. If not, then we have a problem to fix. But, I think we can make this thing work.

MS. LANTZY: How does industry participate in the architect development process, should they provide systems, element cost estimates and technology assessments?

MAJ. GEN. DICKMAN: Let me answer for MILSATCOM because it differs with other programs. For MILSATCOM, the first thing that we did as we stood up the Architect Team was go to MilComm 96 through a Commerce Business Daily announcement and ask industry to tell us where they thought industry was going to be, what they thought would be important, and what technologies were going to be on the table in 2010.

It was an absolutely fascinating session for us and took three days. We had more than a dozen companies participate. We've gone back and discussed some of that stuff with the companies. But in the day-to-day building of the architectures, we are not actively engaged with industry simply because we couldn't figure out how to avoid getting into proprietary and other acquisition-related issues.

As an alternative, the MILSATCOM Joint Program Office went through a number of perturbations with industry in a larger sense, a competitive process, to cost out architectures for us and to give us vectors on technology. We are getting pretty good inputs from industry. My door is still open. If anyone wants to come and talk to me, we still do that.

I don't activate a dialogue between my ADT team and a specific industry unless there is a specific question to be answered.

The unspoken part of this question is, "What happens we get done with an architecture?" It is our intent to have a major session at MilComm 96 where we will out brief the Architectures and then we may hold a briefing in our own office at a classified level where we will go through all the alternatives we looked at and discuss why some were discarded so you can see our thought process as well. Hopefully, that will help industry understand both how we think and where they might be headed in the future as well. If we are off the rails on the details of something, it can get fixed in the acquisition process. If we are off the rail in the architecture process, then we must go back and take that on at a much higher level.

MS. LANTZY: Will it be necessary to include Commercial Space in your process? If so, how?

MAJ. GEN. DICKMAN: Yes, Commercial Space is going to be integral to every architecture that we do. For example, in the Space Control Architecture, Space Protection sub-element, we are going to industry and asking what they are worrying about in terms of protecting commercial space assets in space and on the ground.

In Satellite Operations, we trying to understand how industry does TT&C and at the other end of the spectrum looking at our satellite capability the same way as we look at a launch range. Is it a national asset that should be available to industry if industry wants to use it? If so, the Satellite Control Network would be available for a per/use fee. Did I understand the question correctly?

MS. LANTZY: Will your organization develop a Space Lift Architect?

MAJ. GEN. DICKMAN: We will develop any architecture that anybody asks us to do. There have been more studies on Space Lift than probably any other subject in the history of the space business. I don't think there is anything new we could add to Space Lift right now.

I firmly believe we will be flying RLVs [Reusable Launch Vehicle] to get into space. It is not a question of whether, it is a question of when. We've offered to figure out what criteria the Department of Defense might use to decide when and how to go to an RLV as a primary launch vehicle. We don't want to end up as we did with the 1978 shuttle decision where before something had flown, we committed everything to fly on it, and when there was a problem, we had no access to space.

So, what specific criteria would we put in place? It should fly "X" many times, and be able to do these kinds of things, before we are ready to commit to putting a satellite on it. At sometime, I suspect we are going to do a Space Lift Architecture, but I wouldn't think it is very high on the list.

MS. LANTZY: There is a current move to establish a National Satellite Controls System. How does the Space Architect fit into this process?

MAJ. GEN. DICKMAN: I hope we will be right in the middle of it. If not, then we are not doing our job. There are four classes of folks who do satellite operations today: the NASA world, NRO, ourselves and the commercial world. We all need to come together, though I'm not convinced the best place to come together is at the White House. I think we might be able to take those four communities and come up with a national approach to satellite operations short of the White House telling us how to do it. We have NASA involved as a major panel head in our Space Operations Architecture and the same is true for the NRO.

MS. LANTZY: How is the insatiable appetite for bandwidth being accommodated in the MILSATCOM architecture development process?

MAJ. GEN. DICKMAN: If I were a betting person about the final outcome for this, I see there will be a core military capability that isn't going to be all that flexible. If you want increased capacity, buying more MILSTARs isn't the solution. Looking to both commercial and UAV-based systems to provide the non-linear and non-predictable growth and capacity is a better answer. In early 1990 if you had predicted how much SATCOM we'd be using in 1991, you'd have been wrong by an order of magnitude certainly by factors of two to five for Desert Storm if nothing else. If you predicted in 1990 what we were using in 1995 without a Desert Storm, you'd be wrong by an order of magnitude.

So, it is virtually impossible to predict that trend line. PA&E finds that incomprehensible that you don't know the requirement. I'm afraid their answer is, "Since you don't know what the requirement is, don't build anything."

As most of that capacity growth isn't going to be in Protected Comm, the real answer lies with something like UAVs. We can do Protected Comm with UAVs. But UAVs are commercial.

MS. LANTZY: Please describe in more detail how you develop and coordinate your Joint 20-Year Vision?

MAJ. GEN. DICKMAN: We don't have a Joint 20-year vision. We try to do a vision for that particular functional area by bringing together all the members of the Architecture Development Team. We will brief our sense of that vision based on our assumptions. For Comm, our vision is that we have to be unbounded at the top end for capacity; that all Comm has to be part of the DISN, the Defense Information Systems Network; and there should not be a stovepipe communication system. The customer really shouldn't know or care whether the Comm is being carried on satellite or not. The end equipment, other than the displays perhaps have to be part of GCCS. So it is a vision that talks about interoperability and capacity. Then we take the various service views of where they are going in command and control FORCE XXI, Forward from the Sea, Copernicus Forward or Horizons and wrap those together in our vision. We coordinate the vision with the R&D Group and by using those same assumption charts with the Decision Coordinating Board. We took them to the MCEB, Military Communication Electronics Board, to make sure we are on common ground with this view of the future. We will do that function by function, but the overall vision for space is the Space Master Plan. That is the purview of Bob Davis, not my office.

MS. LANTZY: Can you provide some further insight into the schedule for the Satellite Operation Architecture? What are the key capabilities you are evaluating in this architecture?

MAJ. GEN. DICKMAN: Let me try to answer the first part. Nominally, it would be a nine-month architecture that just kicked off. There are program offices that need decisions on frequency and capability earlier than that. We are probably going to target the end of November to finish that up. It will be a seven-month architecture rather than nine. As we just kicked it off, I wouldn't even begin to speculate now on what major technologies that we are going to look at. Give me another couple of months, and then I'll try to do that for you.

MS. LANTZY: Thank you very much for speaking to our Forum.

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