We have already had a taste of the first of these big events. And you will recall our concern last November over the Leonids meteor shower. Fortunately, it turned out to be something of a non-event. But with the peak storm activity expected this year and in 2000, we cannot be complacent.

The second big event is called Solar Max, a series of solar flares which peak in intensity every eleven years. The next peak occurs in the year 2000. The problem is similar in both cases. Spacecraft exposure to charged particles resulting from the tremendous discharge of energy, either from a comet's debris in the case of Leonids or from flares in the case of Solar Max.

Finally, the year 2000 puts us within the decade when we are supposed to be fully engaged in Joint Vision 2010, our new American way of fighting war. Of course, we have already taken the steps called for by the JV 2010 concept today. So given acquisition time lines, we need to be well on our way in 2000 to getting those space and information systems that will enable Joint Vision 2010, or we have to seriously consider building up our force again. It probably is not going to happen.

So we have Y2K and the other Y2K. It makes you want to ask, “why me?” It also makes folks start to wonder if we are really going to be able to pull of this off. Clearly, there is a lot riding on space for the year 2000, for 2010, for our standard of living, and for our national survival.

From this awareness grows a sense of urgency, a certain natural impatience with the pace of progress. Unfortunately, this also leads to questions about the stewardship of space. Some wonder if the Air Force is stepping up to its responsibilities, and others leap to the conclusion that we need a separate space service. In my view, this mostly stems from a misperception of the inherent conflict between air and space where the air side always gets 51 percent of the vote.

As airmen, this implied criticism really hits us in the gut. Never mind that no nation is better than the United States at exploiting space for national security and economic prosperity. No, it is deeper than that. First, it is in our genetic code to nurture a struggling new medium. From Kitty Hawk to Air Force independence, we have know neglect, inattention, and misunderstanding firsthand. Airmen are not only culturally spring loaded, but also feel it a personal point of honor to avoid repeating the patterns set by the Army when air power first emerged.

Second, we have historical experience of the dangers of stove piping the competing system, mediums, or platforms. We learned our lesson of tactical versus strategic air power, and of fighters versus bombers. In fact, airmen recognized that it is not about the medium or the platform, but it is about the capability that we bring to the fight, the effects that we create on the battlefield. And as a CINC, I could not agree more. Our entire structure of jointness stresses teamwork and effects-based warfare.

So as we contemplate the advancement of space power, I believe that it is helpful to recall the thoughts of Hap Arnold, of course a pioneer and champion of air power. And he said that divisiveness over stewardship and organization did not help the cause. The real obstacles holding back air power were resources and technology. Does that not sound familiar today?

Men and women of the Air Force Association, I submit that it is time that we put the stewardship issue behind us, and focus on the real enemies, funding, technology, and I would add today, policies that hold space power back. It is simply time to get on with it. And continue on, as the Chief said, with superb stewardship of space.

Now given all this writing on space, it is a very fair question of our plans for future stewardship. I think I have made the case for how dependent we are on space. So it is fair to ask what we are doing to preserve, protect, and enhance the capabilities it brings to us.

I believe that we sometimes invite criticism, because our message is not as broad as our topic. Space touches on so many areas, that it is easy to leave something or someone out. For example, we can outline our plans for space to enhance terrestrial operations, and get questioned about our commitment to space as a war fighting medium in its own right.

So really, it is up to us to better explain where we are going and how we expect to get there, or what I call our Main Street action plan for a Rodeo Drive future.

I propose that our strategy for space falls in four areas, integrate, divest, energize, and assess. And I am sure that Larry Henry has already noticed that this forms the acronym of IDEA, which is perfect for a simple soul like me who went to school in Manhattan, Kansas, where you were really talking about Main Street.

It is important to remember up front that these are not consecutive steps. Rather all four areas are worked simultaneously. The first part of this process is to integrate. Here we mean the broader aspect of integrating new concepts, new technologies, and new thought processes as we go along into the future.

It is important that, even as we pursue tomorrow's revolution, that we must bank the margin of today's interim victories. Integration of space to enhance the effectiveness of air, land, and sea powers is the imperative of this age. Anything less would be criminal.

A great historical example comes from the use of radar in the Battle of Britain. Here the Luftwaffa had far superior numbers and assumed that it could attack the RAF in daylight operations. The thought was that they could pierce the thin RAF sector defenses with overwhelming force. What they did not anticipate was the use of a newly found capability, the early warning radar, which made British fighters effective in a way never before imagined.

Radar enabled the RAF to see approaching German formations well enough in advance to pinpoint the response in mass. Rather than spread their resources across a zone of defense, as was necessary before the advent of the radar, they were able to send mass to the point of attack. This compensated for their inferiority in numbers and robbed the Germans of an advantage of surprise in timing and location of attack.

Now imagine, if before the war, Britain's leaders had decided not to integrate this new technology into their operations, or had not had the time to see how a warning system based on radar could revolutionize their war plans. What if they had said, “let's wait on this radar thing until it can achieve its fullest promise.” Clearly, the Battle of Britain, already a near thing, might have gone another way.

It is imperative that we apply this historical lesson to today's circumstances, if for no other reason than it fits perfectly with the concepts of JV 2010 where we expect more combat punch with fewer resources. It seems that more than fifty years ago the Brits faced the same dilemma that we do today. Let's hope that we are as wise in applying their lessons learned about integration.

And actually, I believe we are. Across all of the Services, we have had tremendous successes in integration. One example comes from our own experiment, EFX-98. Here the Air Force was able to deploy more teeth to the fight by leaving more tail at home. Space forces provided a reach-out that linked the two parts, and allowed us to pull off this new way of fighting today.

We are also working hard on our newest space integration issue, that of information operations. With the tight linkage between space and information, any future battle for space superiority will really be a battle for information superiority. The Battle of Britain shows what happens when one side has better information.

So we had best integrate what advantages we have today into our plans, even as we pursue capabilities at the next level. We have had a good start intellectually and perhaps organizationally. We have a firm grasp, I think, on what is necessary. Now we just need to commit the necessary resources to make it a reality.

So we can speak of huge integration efforts like information operations, and new deployment concepts as we call in EFX-98. Or we can highlight another kind of integration like our Colorado Springs revitalization plan, which calls for a new headquarters building for U.S. Space Command in NORAD. And right next door, will be a new building for Army Space Command that will move fully out there when the project is complete. Either way, we are talking about the full integration of space and military operations today and everyday.

Another part of our larger plan for achieving the full promise of space includes a concerted effort at partnering. We have had great success in this area as well, particularly with other agencies like NASA, the NRO, the National Security Agency, and with industry.

Partnering bridges the first two areas of our IDEA acronym. We use partnerships to better integrate our efforts, because, in a limited resource environment, nobody can really go it alone. And partnering helps identify ways to divest, the second part of our strategy, to the future. Divestiture is especially appropriate in the space business.

Because of its substantial impact on both the military and the economy and with the solid partnerships we have established between the two sectors, we often find the same players in the same room talking the same systems. Understandably, the conversation can easily alternate between warfare and market share. When that happens, those in uniform need to take a hard look at the issue and decide if it still fits into a military core competency.

The key indicator for when to study divesting is when the conversation tends mostly towards market share rather than warfare. One obvious example of the process is our launch ranges. The Air Force owns its launch ranges, but perhaps it is time to think about divestiture.

In 1995, commercial launches just about matched Department of Defense launches off the eastern range. But last year, commercial launches exceeded DoD launches on the East Coast. And that trend, we believe, will continue in the out years.

Now I am not talking of complete divestiture of launch operations. That may not be wise. But some version of shared management under a national space board concept, perhaps where we retain the necessary level of military equity, seems appropriate today.

Retired Lieutenant General Dick Henry's range IPT with industry reached similar conclusions. So we are giving his recommendations a serious hard look both at Air Force Space Command and the Air Staff.

Earlier, I suggested that the four parts of our IDEA strategy constitute a simultaneous process. The concept could not be clearer than with the third part of the strategy. We cannot successfully integrate or divest without efforts to energize. As I see it, and as Hap Arnold suggested, there are three major factors holding us back from achieving the full promise of space, funding, policies, and technology.

We must concentrate hard on energizing each of these. It is unfortunate that the Air Force has so many bills to pay, but we can see fallout from today's operational and tomorrow's modernization, and sustainment of parities. We are forced to make difficult choices like slipping the space-based SBIRs system for two years, and that happens to be our number one space acquisition priority.

Likewise, we are growing increasingly concerned about prospects for our GPS operational and control system in our Minuteman ICBM modernization. At the same time, we must find resources to support our people and their families. We at Space Command have similar retention issues as other commands. Because our space operators being sharp young enlisted folks are in demand with the Teledesics of the world, the Global Stars, and Iridium operators.

As I see it, shortfalls in space have a way of trickling down across our economy and throughout our armed forces. Therefore, we must energize space funding at a national level. It is more than we can do in the Air Force.

The same holds true for space policies. Just as we cannot expect to successfully fight the next war with the equipment of the last war, we surely will not see victory in the next war using the policies of the last war. To best prepare for the future, we have to energize our thinking, too. We need that national debate on existing policies, and we need to discuss questions affecting the future of military capabilities and possibilities in space. And we need resolution of this debate sooner rather than later. Without it, we are never going to be able to fully exploit the promise of emerging technologies that we need to energize.

The third area is the call by many for an acceleration of space-based capabilities, and they do so with the best of intentions. But we can only do what we can do. We can only go as far as mature technology allows us. And in order to facilitate innovation, we have to energize basic research and development, and science and technology. This is vital even in a limited resource environment. This, too, requires a national level effort.

By concentrating on the first three parts of our process, integrate, divest, and energize, I am certain that we can achieve the full promise of space. But to complete the idea though, we have to make sure along the way that we are on the right track, that we have a way and an ability to assess our progress.

We talked before about one method of assessment, the OPEVALs that we are using to verify our success of Y2K. We have many other areas, like exercises, that I mentioned before. We also have a number of demonstrations like the Joint Warfare Interoperability Demonstration, or JWID-99. And we have advanced concept technology demonstrations such as the one planned for the space-based laser.

All are intended to show if we are on the right track, and all will help us determine if our efforts to integrate, divest, and energize have paid off. Of course, in the U.S. Space Command, we have the added advantage of bumping all of this up against our long-range plan. It is the perfect tool for providing a unit of effort in achieving the full promise of space.

SPACECOM's priorities and future requirements are all based on the long range plan. And using it, we have begun to synchronize our strategic planning process with those of our components. And that falls right in line with the larger strategy to integrate, divest, and energize.

We will close this loop with assessment, and gauge our progress against what is outlined in the long-range plan. We need to hit on all four cylinders, to integrate, divest, energize, and assess, in order to achieve the full promise of space. And this all adds to our action plan.

Now the pressure is on. If we continue to work these issues that I mentioned earlier, and do so in the context of our four-phased IDEA, we will fly right up Main Street and reach that Rodeo Drive plateau. Our future in space depends on it. Our future military successes depend on it. And the well-being of our entire nation depends on it.

Personally, I am optimistic about our prospects for that future. And just as Dr. Edward Teller advised three decades ago when he said, "I think that it is my duty and your duty to be optimistic. Because only with optimism can we create out of all of the uncertainty the kind of future in which it will be worthwhile to live." I am confident that our optimistic plan will make that future worthwhile.

So that is it. I hope I have shown how we in Colorado Springs, and for that matter at headquarters in Washington, have shown how engaged we are in taking space to the next level.

General Shaud and the gracious hosts here of the Central Coast AFA, many thanks for yet another wonderful opportunity. God bless.

Gen. Shaud: Sir, not to take you by surprise. But we have the obligatory Y2K question, but it comes at it a little differently. It says this: How concerned should we be about the recently published Russian need for $3 billion for Y2K problems?

Gen. Myers: I think that our central concern there is probably from the strategic viewpoint, that their warning systems for missile attack will be blind, and therefore not give the picture that they need to determine an actual attack from other events. And in that regard, as some probably know, our two presidents have agreed to share our early warning data between Russia and the United States.

We have folks, I think, in Russia later this month to keep ironing out those details. The level of enthusiasm in Moscow is probably something less than desired, but we need to work through that. So we are trying to come at that, and that is the one way that I am specifically familiar with. And that is to share our early warning data with them, at first strategically, and later, on tactical missile warning.

Gen. Shaud: Thank you, Dick. The second question: Given the resources and problems involved with national space power, how does the U.S. Space Command assess the level of “threat” out there; who provides the challenge or the threat in a similar, national space power role; who is challenging us?

Gen. Myers: I think that is a very good question. When I came to U.S. Space Command, that was one of the first questions I asked the intelligence community. “What is the threat?” And I think that the facts are, and some of you in the intel business probably will dispute this, but I would like to debate this if you wish off line, the facts are that our intelligence community since the Cold War, where they were very focused on threats of that sort, has, over time, migrated to other issues. And it leaves us a little bit naked in knowing exactly what the threat is. I do not think we have focused on that enough.

But I will tell you that we have seen instances of jamming satellites by countries like Indonesia, Turkey, and Iran. We know countries are working on directed energy, threats to satellites. And we need to know more about these threats, and when we think they are going to appear. Because if we are going to fulfill our promise of space and be able to protect our assets in space, that is fundamental.

I personally do not think that we have enough assets in the intelligence community at large to properly assess that, and that is something that I am pushing on.

Gen. Shaud: The next question is probably the understatement of the afternoon. Resources are a major issue for space forces. What is your opinion of having a major force program for space similar, for example, to special operations?

Gen. Myers: Some people are suggesting that that is the way to go. I guess my view is, if you thought that the Air Force's commitment to space was not sincere, then you might want to move that way. But as I spoke out, that is not the issue. The Air Force is committed. It is not a commitment issue at all.

And we have been committed, by the way, ever since we have been an Air Force. And we are the greatest space faring nation in the world. So it is not like we have not done our job very well. We have done our job damn well. It is the resource, technology, and policy issue. Well before we can put weapons in space, somebody has to say at the political level that it is okay. And so far, they have not said that.

But we are doing the sorts of things so that someday, if asked, we will be ready. And I think that we are doing those things that are prudent. So my view of other constructs at this time is that I think that we have it about right. I think that we have been good stewards of space. It is a resource issue. It is not an issue that the Air Force can solve all by itself. The Air Force has to pay many, many bills. A lot of them support lots of other folks besides Air Force people, as we do in GPS. My goodness, we have a global utility that the Air Force is funding.

And when we talk about divestiture, there is another thing you might want to look at, divesting part of your responsibility in that area. So you can put those resources to other use.

But that would be my answer to that. I personally do not think it is time. I think we have it right. And it is not a commitment issue, but it is a resource and technology policy issue.

Gen. Shaud: The next question has to do with a major effort of your command, developing a long range plan. And as a planner, I think this is a super question. Once you have made the plan, what is going to happen. The question is: How do you foresee the U.S. Space Command’s long-range plan evolving to lead the DoD space effort and perhaps integrating information warfare?

Gen. Myers: I think that the long range plan is the perfect vehicle. And what we are doing now at U.S. Space Command is fleshing it out. We know the vision and the goal, and we also know the steps to get there. And what we are doing now is breaking down the details of those steps, and establishing milestones for each of those things that we want to accomplish. And then we are going to measure to see how well we are doing.

I think the plan is the perfect vehicle. I think that we tend to thing of plans as static things that are on the shelf. This is going to be on line, and it is going to involve our components. I think that it is going to lead the way to the future. And shortly, we will be able to measure how well we are doing. We will know if we are getting ahead or behind. We will also identify those critical points where we need a policy change or we need technology developed, and we can back that up to see where we need to start.

I think that it is going to be a great vehicle. And it is, this is an overused word, but it is a living document. It will be on line, and it will change every day.

Gen. Shaud: One of the good news stories for our United States Air Force is our total force, and our ability to operate that way. I would like to relate that to the space mission. Could you please comment on increasing future roles of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard in the space mission?

Gen. Myers: They are already involved in areas that you probably would not believe. They fly satellites for us. In fact, they are the back-up for us for one of our satellites, and the Reserve are the primary people. Guard and Reserve representatives are lined outside the gate at Peterson waiting to get on to talk about how to get in the space business.

I think that there are units that have been associated with older systems that want to go to the future, and they will go to the future with space. We have lots of room for them. We have lots of ideas. We have four states that have already told us that they have Guard units to do certain things. We have been moving out. It is like Baskin Robbins. They all have got a number just waiting to get in, so they can get a piece of it. There is a lot of enthusiasm there.

Gen. Shaud: The next question is kind of a follow-on to where we were in Los Angeles. And I know you mentioned this during your talk, and perhaps you would comment further on the role that commercial space will play in meeting DoD requirements for space assets?

Gen. Myers: There are a couple of areas where they are already meeting our space requirements, and that is in commercial communications. They are already meeting our requirements on commercial imagery as well. The Air Force is one of the larger purchasers of spot imagery for some of our applications. I think that will only continue.

I think that we are going to get, as the commercial sector develops, remote sensing capabilities that could probably meet some of our needs if it were timely enough. And that is probably a better question for Keith Hall and those folks, but that is where we are headed. So I think that there is great potential.

One of the things you worry about though, and it goes back to what is a threat, is the Galaxy 4 malfunction we saw and we did not know why. We know that there are instances of jamming. We know that there are people out there who will attack us asymmetrically. They are not going to take on our conventional forces head to head, if they can find a way around it.

And our commercial assets for the most part are not hardened. And there is no business case to spur them on in this area. We just had a little study done, and there is not much enthusiasm at this point. That’s another reason why we have to better define the threat, so we know what requirements to put on those birds.

Gen. Shaud: Dick, this is a follow-up probably figured out by a mobility officer. Is there a program to use commercial satellites in an emergency similar to the way that Air Mobility Command uses the civil reserve air fleet?

Gen. Myers: Absolutely, and that is one of the ways that we use it today, because of the capacity that it has. And we can take more advantage of that in the future. But I think that a spacecraft force is essentially the way that we handle some of our business.

Gen. Shaud: And, sir, the final question is this: With the elimination of selective availability proposed, what are our plans to prevent exploitation of full GPS capabilities?

Gen. Myers: As most of you probably know, selective availability goes away by presidential policy in 2006. My view is that the NAVAIR effort that we have going along for GPS is going to assure our access and be able to deny an adversary's, access. So if the airliners need it to go on the jet routes, they have it. We have seen North Korean subs use it for instance. You can deny them GPS capability. NAVAIR is going to solve that problem.

I think that if we wait until 2006 to turn off GPS selective availability, it is my view that that is just going to encourage ways around selective availability. And differential GPS is here today, but there are other systems. I think that we need to think seriously about turning that off a lot quicker.

Gen. Shaud: Thank you very much, sir.

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