Los Angeles - October 27, 1995

General Ronald R. Fogleman
Chief of Staff, USAF
Los Angeles AFA Symposium
October 27, 1995
The Future is Ours -- Today

It's great to be back in Los Angeles! This is the first place I appeared in public after becoming the Chief of Staff last year, and at that time I laid out some themes for the United States Air Force. I talked about building a team within a team. I talked about leadership and quality of life issues, and one of the biggest things the force needed in my mind a period of stability from both external and internal change.

This past September in Washington, D.C., I gave a "report to the stockholders;" my perspective on what we had or had not done so far to meet those objectives. And so with the danger of perhaps setting a precedent here, what I would like to do now is share with you where I see the Air Force going over the next 12 months a period of time, I personally believe that presents the Air Force and the Nation a rare opportunity to look toward the future.

I'll warn you up front, much of what I'll say is not new; but sometimes seemingly mundane events and information can take on new meaning when viewed from a fresh perspective. I believe the unusual circumstances of the coming year present such a case. In my view, this is an unusual time in our history because it has the potential to provide us a period of relative stability, so we can focus on the future.

On the international front, we face no significant direct threats to our national security. On the national level, we have largely completed our post-Cold War demobilization. The American people and the Congress have generally been supportive of the current defense budget levels; that is, we have seen a very strong message that perhaps we have drawn down too far, too fast. So, for at least the foreseeable future, it appears as though we will see a pause in the budget decline.

On the Department of Defense level, the uncertainties of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission are behind us. We now know which bases are affected, and I don't anticipate we ll see any BRAC activity until at least the 21st Century. The Commission on Roles and Missions report was presented in June, and is now behind us. I think Deputy Secretary of Defense John White, who was then Chairman of the Commission, did a superb job. Rather than try to dictate to the Services who should do what, when, where and how; he focused on the process that the department needs to use to determine which capabilities each service should provide to meet the needs of the joint warfighters. And so with the report in hand, the turbulence caused by the uncertainty of the roles and missions outcome is also gone.

For all intents and purposes, our personnel drawdown is behind us. Under the Bottom-Up Review we were given an end strength of 385,000; we finished the fiscal year with an end strength of 400,000. So, that means over the next two years we have to take another 15,000 people out of the Air Force, but the personnel system can do that through normal recruiting, retention, and release programs. You re not going to see big programs like VSI, SSB, or RIFs over the next few years. So, there is a good news story in this area.

If there is a bad news story in the personnel area, it may be in the civilian personnel side of the house. We have gone from 266,000 down to 195,000 civilians. In the course of doing that, we have probably taken all the low hanging fruit and now we are down to a very difficult situation where we have to take another 30,000 people out of the force over the next couple of years. So, the civilian drawdown of our total force will take on increasing importance for our senior leadership during the coming year.

Given that this is the situation on the international, national, and DoD level, we still have potent forces for change on the horizon we must begin to consider. Again in the international arena, there are continuing changes in the political, economic, and military environment. We find growing instability and uncertainty in a world racked by differences over religion, politics, ethnic groups, territory, and a myriad of diverse regional issues.

On the national level, we face a presidential election year in 1996, with all the attendant politics and the impact that will have, particularly on the defense industry. Pressure to reduce the budget deficit through additional defense cuts may emerge towards the end of this discussion. As the American people begin to feel the cuts that are being made in the non-defense portions of the budget, we may experience shifts away from the widespread, strong support for defense that we enjoy in Congress today.

We also see new demands placed on the U.S. military as the American public confronts the challenges of the new world order; we face the very real possibility of deploying ground forces to Bosnia in the not toodistant future. And the opportunities brought to us through advances in technology, especially in the area of information, computing, and space-based operations are out there for us we can seize the initiative or allow it to fly past us.

I like to follow Casey Stengel's advice and not make predictions particularly about the future; however, I feel certain the circumstances I just described will have a significant influence on the Air Force of the 21st Century. For this reason, I offer the following themes to serve as our priorities for the coming year:

First, explore the future identify alternatives and opportunities for national defense, and the role to be played by tomorrow's Air Force.

Second, plan for the future institutionalize long range planning in the Air Force to capitalize on the opportunities and prepare for the challenges of the future.

The third point follows naturally, we must prepare for the future establish strong foundations to ensure our people and infrastructure can support the changes we expect in tomorrow s Air Force, and the Air Force after that.

Fourth, I think we must tell the Air Force story as we look to the future, we must ensure the Nation understands the capabilities and the limitations of air and space power.

And finally, we must continue to give the force some stability for without stability, it will be very difficult to work on the other priorities. We will be captured by near-term priorities, by individual concerns and issues. So, we must redouble our efforts to give the institution and our people stability.

The themes I expressed last year are still valid perhaps even more so for each theme underpins some aspect of our priorities for the coming year. I firmly believe continued emphasis on these themes is critical to our institutional stability during this period.

First, we will maintain a stable environment within our span of control so our people, and the Nation, know where the Air Force is headed. Before we embark on the next segment of our journey, we intend to take some bearings to ensure we accurately know our current position, so that we can maintain a steady course and avoid unnecessary turbulence.

We will maintain our force structure and organization on a constant path so that we can assess where to apply course corrections in the future. This doesn t mean the Air Force will stagnate as problems and issues are identified, we will face them head on. We will continue to improve our capabilities, concepts, and business practices. But, we will avoid change for the sake of change because near-term turbulence associated with such change will impair our ability to take a long view toward the future.

We will continue to work as one Air Force team, on the larger joint team. We must be inclusive, not exclusive, and we must become familiar with all the components on our warfighting team the Air Force total force team. We depend on every member of the total Air Force team civilians, guardsmen, reservists, retirees, industry, families everyone who, like you, supports air and space power for our national security. We have a great team. I m proud of every member, but there are still openings available I hope you can help us "recruit" new members in your community for the total force, Air Force team.

We will also continue to fight to improve quality of life for our people. It s our people who make the Air Force great, and we must shepherd this most important resource for the good of the country! OPTEMPO will continue to be a concern, so we will continue to pursue innovative ways to meet our 120-day maximum TDY goal across the force. We have made great progress in this area during the past year. In 1994, we had 13 out of 20 mission areas exceed our goal. In 1995, only 8 out of 20 exceeded that goal. This did not happen by accident. It happened because of hard work on the part of Air Force commanders. OPTEMPO will remain a big issue, but at the same time it s clear that our people understand that this is the nature of our business, and they will always respond when our nation calls.

Every team needs a great leader and we are blessed with a Secretary of Defense who understands and supports the members of the armed services. Dr. Perry is leading the charge for compensation and benefits, housing, and services to meet the needs of our people. For our part, within the Air Force, the senior leadership must ensure what our people do is important; that they receive appropriate recognition; and wemust take care of them and their families while they are deployed.

Leadership holds the key to our future. We will continue to foster leaders who are prepared to function as joint warfighters, and who cultivate an environment of trust and teamwork throughout our Air Force. We recently held an Air Force Quality Council meeting at Maxwell Air Force Base where the senior leadership decided that it is time on our quality journey to refocus the program from one of discussion and education to greater emphasis on application. We will work aggressively toward our concept of a quality Air Force one where each and every one of our people in the Air Force is provided an environment where they are able to achieve their full potential. "Leadership holds the key to our future. We will continue to foster leaders who are prepared to function as joint warfighters, and who cultivate an environment of trust and teamwork throughout our Air Force."

And finally, we must hold the course on today s modernization plan, because this modernization plan is the foundation for tomorrow s Air Force, and the Air Force after next. We will continue to look to the Air Force s vision of Global Reach Global Power to guide our decisions. Our current modernization plan provides a stable, balanced, time-phased approach to meet the needs of the nation as we enter the 21st century. It is affordable. It will meet the joint warfighter s needs as long as it stays time-phased, and focused on all aspects of airpower to include strategic mobility, bomber upgrades, fighter modernization, and space systems. We need stability across these programs to give us a solid starting point to launch into the future. Those on the Air Force team can help this effort by understanding and articulating these programs at the local, national, and international level.

As I travel around the world and meet the air chiefs from other countries and as they come to visit us it is very clear that the United States Air Force is the world s most respected air and space force, today. But, I know there is more that we can do to contribute to national defense in the post-Cold War era. I believe our Air Force provides a unique economy of force capability to the joint force commander a capability not yet fully understood, appreciated, or exploited.

I like to think that airmen are fast learners, but, I recently ran across an essay on airpower written in 1949 by the noted British airman and thinker Air Chief Marshall Sir John Slessor; one of the real architects of airpower in the second world war. He wrote, "Our actual practical experience of air power is infinitesimal compared to our knowledge of sea and land warfare . . . we have been fighting at sea and on land for thousands of years." I believe there is plenty of fertile ground to grow and develop airpower. So, during the next year, we will have people hard at work identifying alternatives and exploring opportunities as we enter the 21st century, and turn over our first hundred years of experience in the air.

Thirty years ago, one of my predecessors, General McConnell, wrote about the future based on what he d seen in the past. His writings give me confidence today that exploring alternatives and opportunities is not only possible, but a potentially rewarding exercise.

He observed first that "political developments may continue to bring about radical changes in the international power balance and the alignment of nations. Today s bitter enemy may be tomorrow s close ally, and vice versa." I think he did a superb job, back in 1966, of forecasting the fll of the Soviet Union almost 30 years later.

Second, "military developments for example, nuclear proliferation and hostile aggression in space may pose problems in the future." General McConnell s future is today!

Third, "technological developments can have a revolutionary impact on the means and techniques of warfare." I believe he would recognize stealth, precision weapons, microchips, and directed energy in this category.

Finally, General McConnell reminded us that "catastrophic events such as earthquakes and other disasters" can have far-reaching consequences. Could he have possibly imagined the unprecedented environmental concerns we face today as we develop our warfighting strategies? Or perhaps he was thinking of a Mount Pinatubo and its impact on our strategic basing posture in the Pacific.

It was this kind of forward thinking, agility and willingness to embrace new ideas, constructs, and technology that sowed the seeds for our overwhelming victory in Desert Storm. Today, we have a varietyof ongoing initiatives to continue the quest for capabilities required in the 21st century.

We have a study that s being conducted at Air University called Air Force 2025. Study participants are considering alternative futures, identifying possible "historical discontinuities," and exploring changes to our organizations and doctrine. My charge to this group is to conduct "maverick" out-of-the-box thinking.

In December of this year the Scientific Advisory Board will give us its New World Vistas report. Secretary Widnall and I chartered this group to give us a truly independent, futuristic view of how the exponential rate of technological change will shape the 21st Century Air Force.

We plan to conduct a revitalized Air and Space Symposium this year at Maxwell Air Force Base; but under a different name. I want to see us build for the first time a credible, Air University-led, joint wargame that looks at the changing nature of warfare in the 21st century. I d also like to see participation from the CINCs, Congressional staff, journalists, and academia.

And there s more, of course, because we re going to go back and take advantage of last year s SPACECAST 2020 study and various special study efforts sponsored by the Air Staff, major commands, and Air Force agencies to round out our look to the future. In this effort, we are throwing as large a net as we possibly can. For example, Air University has established a Worldwide Web site on the Internet to capture ideas for 2025 from around the globe. It has also invited speakers from all walks of life to challenge the traditional perspectives of our 2025 study participants.

We know we cannot assume a future that looks like today; in fact, we can almost guarantee it will be different, possibly radically different. So, we must avoid attempts to package airpower into neat, little stovepipes based on yesterday s thinking strategic air, tactical air, mobility, special operations, space all these attempts to put airpower into a box limit the inherent flexibility of airpower to operate across an entire theater, or across the globe. We ve made this mistake before, and I m determined we won t repeat it again on my watch!

Even though 50 years have passed since Sir John Slessor made his observations, I still don t believe we can claim to know all there is to know about airpower, or the possibilities it offers. We have much to learn. That s what makes this such a great time to be in the United States Air Force! It also puts a premium on the requirement to plan for the future.

We will take the time and effort to explore the future; however, our studies and investigations, as interesting as they may be, will not be useful unless the Air Force develops a process to act on them. So, I ve tasked a new office under Major General John Gordon to institutionalize long-range planning in the Air Force and integrate all of the great work underway that I ve just described.

We have always conducted some form of long-range planning in the Air Force, but today we lack an institutionalized process to ensure it receives the attention and priority it deserves. I envision John Gordon s role as one in which he addresses deficiencies in our long range planning process. For example, the Air Force needs a shared, long-range vision of its future role in joint warfighting. If we view and define our capabilities only through the lenses of our individual stovepipes, then we will never be able to produce a comprehensive vision.

Another concern is that we have generally taken an incremental approach to our planning processes over the last few years. And we have not always spoken with one voice about the importance of airpower. As a result, we have not been as articulate as we ought to be in the joint arena, to the Congress, even among ourselves! Finally, our long-term modernization plans assume relatively constant funding levels and mission priorities, when our own historical experience suggests otherwise.

I ve given this new office an 18-month sundown clause, but not the long-range planning function itself. My ultimate goal is to institutionalize this process in the corporate Air Force, so it will endure well after General Gordon and I, and the other senior leaders who have supported this initiative, depart the scene. However, the 18-month timeline was not selected in a random fashion. It was designed to ensure the Air Force would be prepared for coming events. In short, it provides a sufficient period of time to get throughthe "quadrennial strategy review" that I expect will occur based on the recommendations of the Commission on Roles and Missions in their recent report. If my dates are correct, then such a revision would occur in the spring of 1997.

We want our vision of the future to be an institutional Air Force vision not my vision, nor the long-range planner s vision, but an institutional vision. So, Secretary Widnall and I have established a long-range planning board of directors with MAJCOM, Air Staff, and Secretariat participation to help guide the process and ensure broad, Air Force-wide ownership of our long-range vision. We see this board of directors composed primarily of the vice commanders of the MAJCOMs and chaired by the Vice-Chief, with participation by key staff members.

Its okay to plan for the future, but the future can come upon us suddenly, so we must prepare for the future as well. Although we look forward to the fruits and efforts of John Gordon s team, there are already a number of steps we know we should take now to lay the groundwork for tomorrow s Air Force. I ll highlight a few examples in the areas of information, training, technology and concep demonstrators, and organization.

In my view, information has both an ascending and transcending influence on our warfighting capabilities today and its importance is growing almost exponentially! We must look for ways to improve the flow of information to every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine whether that person is in the headquarters or the field and use this information to improve the capabilities of our weapons, platforms, and systems; we must protect this information and our means of communicating it against attack; and we must advance our techniques to deny information to the enemy. In short, we will invest in the entire spectrum of capabilities we ve grouped under the rubric "information warfare."

Training is an overarching term for all the steps we will take to prepare our people for the challenges of the 21st century. For example, we will work to expand early joint experience opportunities, improve leadership training and specialized technical education, and revise our programs to develop air and space power professionals. We have a variety of initiatives in place to address this last concern examples include the new Air Force intern program; mandatory commander training for squadron, group, and wing commanders; and revised professional military education programs that among other things will ensure 100 percent of our company grade officers attend Squadron Officer School.

We will continue work on high payoff technology and concept demonstrators. The Airborne Laser, "Tier II+" and "Tier III-" UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle], depot privatization, and the airpower expeditionary force are some good examples. The airborne laser is perhaps the most revolutionary technology we ve seen in the last 40 years. It will provide us a robust capability against one of our most challenging threats the theater ballistic missile. UAV capabilities provide exciting opportunities to exploit the range and flexibility of airpower in new ways including reconnaissance, strike, communications relay, and battle management.

The air expeditionary force offers the theater CINC an innovative means to provide forward presence quickly and efficiently. And privatization offers cost effective alternatives for a variety of non-combat tasks across the force. Finally, while I anticipate no substantive organizational changes, we are implementing an integrated process team concept on the Air Staff in an effort to improve internal communications and achieve process efficiencies.

The last priorityis a logical extension of the ones I ve already discussed. We all need to get out and tell the Air Force story. Our long-range plans and initiatives will not be supported unless we understand them, we articulate them, and we carry them to the people that need to support them. This is an area where every member of the Air Force team plays an important role. We need to correct widely held misperceptions concerning airpower, and help educate decision-makers, and the public, on its proper use.

We ve got to start by helping people recognize that airpower has fundamentally changed the nature of warfare. Airpower s impact is felt throughout the entire spectrum of warfare. Airpower can be used to indicate concern, to threaten, and to deter. It can construct a defense to confuse an adversary. It can deployforces and give them mobility. It can support other forces, both operationally and tactically. And if needed, airpower can penetrate and strike unilaterally. In this manner, airpower has truly changed the essence of warfare.

Through the years, our lack of a coherent airpower doctrine, and our tendency to allow concepts to race ahead of technology, have produced legitimate skepticism among our comrades-in-arms and political leaders. And unfortunately, for all of airpower s value, we can t seem to model it for wargames and simulations with good fidelity. The models in use measure only a portion of airpower s contributions the portion dedicated to support for the land campaign; and even that portion of the model is done imperfectly.

One action officer recently captured the problem for me very succinctly. "Sir," he said, "if you can t simulate it, it s not real." Unfortunately, I think this attitude is becoming all too prevalent in the minds of many people. So, we clearly need to address the concerns of airpower skeptics, and expand the capabilities of our joint campaign models so that they accurately represent the contributions of airpower.

I have another, less obvious concern that is, a widely held belief that airpower is a panacea; that it s a tool to be called upon regardless of the objectives. I will tell you that airpower, like any other form of combat, has its limitations, and no form of combat can be effective in the absence of coherent political and military objectives.

In general, though, I believe we have a great story to tell the American people. It includes the deterrent value of our ICBMs and bomber force during the Cold War; the many humanitarian efforts starting with Berlin Airlift; the combined efforts that achieved success in Desert Storm, Vigilant Warrior, and Deliberate Force; and the on-going, four-year air occupation of Iraq. These are just a few of the more notable examples. With these success stories as a backdrop, I d like to leave you with a few closing thoughts concerning the future of airpower. I hope they put our priorities in perspective.

The Air Force is the service of the future. Throughout history, every empire, every major nation that has dominated the world stage has had a military structure to sustain that empire. Rome was defined by its infantry. Its legions marched across and conquered the then-known world. The Pax Romana they brought with them allowed trade and commerce for centuries. The British Isles created and held together an empire dominated by a great fleet that secured trade and commercewell into the modern era.

I sincerely believe that the United States will be judged historically by our pioneering role in air and space as the first "modern" nation the nation that brought commercial and military aviation from Kitty Hawk to the moon. The Roman Phalanx and the British Dreadnought all dominated some element of warfare for decades or centuries. How long airpower will dominate is unpredictable; that it now plays a dominant role is undeniable.

When America s power is challenged, your Air Force is the first to arrive and the first to fight. We can employ while others deploy, and we are ready to fight on arrival. We bring the land force components to the fight, and control the air to provide them freedom of maneuver. We sustain military operations during the fight; and we contribute the decisive air and space assets across the theater and the globe that ultimately win the Nation s wars.

Air and space power is the force of the future and the Air Force the Nation s Air Force is dedicated to provide air and space power as the sole purpose of its existence. It is the one instrument in our national arsenal with the ability to project the full weight of America s military might to any corner of the globe at any time our national command authorities choose. It is an economy of force service that provides a broad spectrum of capabilities. These capabilities allow us to minimize the risk to our most precious national resource America s young men and women. This is what Global Reach, Global Power, and Global Presence mean today, and in the 21st century!

I anticipate that air and space power will be increasingly seen as the great enabler that allows all services to optimize their contributions to America s national security. Hopefully, our efforts during the coming year will ensure we have considered every likely alternative; explored every known opportunity; laid the long- term foundation for tomorrow s new requirements; and developed a comprehensive and systematic plan to provide the right force for the future. This force will be the kind Deputy Secretary of Defense John White described as ".... a force that, in fact, has enhanced combat capability; that operates efficiently; and most importantly, is innovative so it is flexible and able to meet new requirements."

Secretary White s description sounds like our Air Force today the Air Force General "Hap" Arnold demanded of us almost 50 years ago. But, I m even more excited by our prospects for the future! I look forward to working with all of you as we move this great Air Force forward into the 21st century.

GENERAL SHAUD: Chief, thank you for being available to take questions. You have spoken often of revolutionary planning and the new aspects of information warfare. Do you foresee further changes in the Air Force organization as concept and doctrine evolve in these areas? GENERAL FOGLEMAN: I don t see great changes in this area. As you know, we ve stood up an information warfare squadron down at Ninth Air Force.

Last year, not too long after I left this symposium, I went back to the Air Staff and I asked to see the smartest people we had who were engaged in the information warfare business. They sent me Bob Linhard [Maj. Gen. Robert E. Linhard, Director of Plans, DCS Plans & Operations] and Ken Minihan [Maj. Gen. Kenneth A Minihan, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence]. So I sat down and asked them to prepare a presentation for me that addresses information warfare from a doctrinal standpoint. This is a subject we can continue to jawbone about forever, but we ve got to get started. So I wanted to understand doctrinally how information warfare fits within the Air Force.

Some months before, we had a four-star summit on information warfare, and quite frankly I didn t come away from the summit with a very good feeling. So, Bob Linhard and Ken Minihan put together a great pitch. They said information warfare needs to be viewed on one-level like the application of traditional air power. That is, it has a dimension that is defensive; it also has a dimension that is offensive; and it has a dimension that is in the support realm. If you go look at our current doctrine, we have at thing called counter defensive air. Why don t we have counter defensive information applications? We have offensive air. Why don t we have offensive information operations? We already have support functions.

That seemed to strike a chord with those who have viewed this briefing. But, what was important from my perspective, having come from being a CINC, was that unless you coordinate with the CINCs, you will continue to jawbone and nothing is going to happen. So we sent these guys on the road to visit every CINC, and they briefed Bill Owens [Admiral William A. Owens, Vice Chairman, JCS] and other groups around Washington. Everywhere they went they were greeted with great excitment because they put meat on the bones of information warfare. When it was all over, we asked, "What is the next step?"

Clearly the CINCs want this capability. How do you give them this capability? Within our current organization and structure, we have an air operations center. That air operations center is in charge of defensive, offensive air, and support air, so why wouldn you somehow integrate information warfare into that air operations center? That was the genesis of establishing an information warfare squadron.

It violates every principle of organization. We have invented a squadron that doesn t have a unit manning document, and doesn t have an equipment list. We told them to figure out what it is they need and come back and tell us. But we have a squadron, and we have people who are focusing on it and thinking about it, and we know how we will employ it.

The CINCs know how the Air Force will employ information warfare. They can go to their air component commander who will have the capability to support information warfare within his bag of tricks.

GENERAL SHAUD: Thank you sir. First, should the Air Force's Global Reach and Global Power concept be updated to include Global Presence? Second, Air Force Doctrine 1-1 has served us well, however, it fails to meet the needs of future Air Force Global Reach and Global Power. When will the doctrine be rewritten to reflect what the Air Force does and should do to meet future needs?

GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Let me take the second question. The doctrine is undergoing a rewrite right now. But in all candor, I will probably hold off making decisions. I hesitate to rush the publication of a new doctrine manual before we complete our long-range planning initiative. I see these as concurrent efforts that are ongoing. When we are done with our long-range planning effort, I anticipate we will have a corporate buy-in so we can then publish a new doctrinal manual. Hopefully, it will support our move to the future.

Your first question addresses the rewrite of Global Reach and Global Power. In fact, the staff has already rewritten Global Reach and Global Power to incorporate the idea of Global Presence. I am reluctant to publish it. Before we publish a new Global Reach and Global Power, I am trying to get people to read the old one. The Air Force was the first of the services to produce a post-Cold War strategic vision and architecture. It was produced in an environment that was pretty amazing to me. I can brag on this document because I had nothing to do with it. I was an observer on the Air Staff, and I got to read some early versions. In the post-Cold War environment when the Berlin Wall came down and the Warsaw Pact came apart, it wasn t the military that sensed that the situation had changed. It was in fact the politicians who saw it. It was led by President Bush who on August, 2, 1990, announced a new national security strategy, a post-Cold War strategy, for this country.

The very same day Bush was saying, we are going to bring our forces back from overseas Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait. He said we are going to just leave enough forces forward to provide a presence that will facilitate the reintroduction of troops from the United States if they have to go to the aid of allies, provide humanitarian assistance, or unilaterally support some U.S. interest. President Bush implied we should bring forces back and if the mission is no longer relevant in this post-Cold War world, we are going to disband the forces. He said, if the mission is relevant but due to the post-Cold War environment we are on a longer mobilization timeline, put those missions in the Guard and Reserve. What is left will go in the active force. Essentially, he said we will have a CONUS based contingency force that is going to be the core of the U.S. military structure, and we will respond to crisis from the continental United States.

While that was being developed within the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Air Force was Don Rice and the Chief of Staff was Larry Welch. They were pretty well wired into what as going on in town. They knew that the strategy was going to change on a national level. They put the Air Staff and the Secretariat together to address what the Air Force should look like in a post-Cold War environment. The product was called Global Reach and Global Power. It had one glaring deficiency. The name rolls off your tongue. Global Reach/Global Power so it became a bumper sticker. Nobody read the document. Everybody said, "What does the Air Force do for the nation?" We replied, "Global Reach and Global Power," but what does it mean? Beats the hell out of me. Global Reach and Global Power, that is what we do.

If you read the document, there were five specific things that we do for the nation in a post-Cold War environment. Those five things drove the reorganization that occurred a year or so later, and they have driven our modernization priorities ever since. A lot of the Air Force has never read the document. We updated the document in 1992, in the post-Desert Storm time frame, and it was a good update, but it didn t change the basic document very much.

Interestingly enough, in both the basic document and in the 1992 version, there is absolutely no mention of information warfare, which shows how rapidly this has burst onto the scene.

This a long answer to a short question. The staff has rewritten Global Reach and Global Power, but I am reluctant at this time to have that rewrite published because I would like to get us focused on those core capabilities that were laid out in Global Reach and Global Power, augmented by information warfare. It will allow us to continue to focus on those key areas as we go forward and not get confused by a new document, and a new title. We are struggling with that.

GENERAL SHAUD: Chief, let me ask you a question that is a hot topic in Washington. Do you expect a Bottom Up Review II and do you think that 20 wings will remain in the force structure?

GENERAL FOGLEMAN: I think I answered that somewhat in my speech. In the Roles and Missions Commission Report, one of the recommendations was for a quadrennial national security strategy review. As you know, the commission delivered the report to Secretary Perry. Secretary Perry was required by law to comment on all the recommendations and then forward it to the Congress. On the recommendation for the quadrennial military security strategy review, essentially he said I think this is a good idea, but I cannot commit the Department to do such a review because it will occur in a new administration. Whether that is a new Clinton Administration or a new president s administration is irrelevant. It will occur in a new administration. And he went on to say, however, he would generally recommend that such a review be conducted by his successor.

The last time we did such a review, it was called the Bottom Up Review and it was done in the spring of 1993. If this recommendation of the commission is accepted, then we would do another review, and it would be in the spring of 1997. Not that I have any great insight or took a walk last week and came across a burning bush, but this is already in motion, and so I think there is a high degree of probability that such areview will occur and that is really the impetus behind a lot of the actions that we are taking now in the Air Force to prepare ourselves to be corporately and institutionally ready to enter that fray.

The second part of the question asked if such a review takes place, will we still have 20 tactical fighter wings? I don t know. If you review the current two MRC [Major Regional Contingency] strategy, the United States Air Force swings more of its force structure than any other service, which means we got pretty small during the first go round. It is appropriate that we swing most of our force structure because we are the most flexible, and the most agile of the services. We swing a large percentage of our bomber force and a good percentage of our fighter force from one contingency to the other. Depending on what kind of a strategy we come with, it will be very difficult in my view to take us down much further.

GENERAL SHAUD: Chief, let me ask you one more question. I have a lot of questions here about B-2s, B-2 procurement and all the rest of the force structure. Has any progress been made in delineating our service roles in deep strike mission and how will that relate to the B-2?

GENERAL FOGLEMAN: There is an ongoing effort, but we are not anticipating a lot of progress until March of 1996 when a Deep Battle Study, which is being conducted under the auspices of Ted Warner [Edward L. Warner, III, ASD for Strategy & Requirements] reports to the Secretary. Again, this was one of those taskings that came out of the Roles and Missions report. That is an ongoing debate, and we are engaged in it. I have no real feel for how that is going as we go, but we should have some resolution on that.

GENERAL SHAUD: Thank you very much, Sir, it is great having you with us. Thanks for what you do for our nation.

GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Thank you all.

Return to Los Angeles '95 Foundation Forum