Los Angeles - October 18, 1996

The Honorable Rudy de Leon
Under Secretary of the Air Force

Next year is the 50th anniversary of the Air Force and they've been an important 50 years. But now we are looking toward the next 50 years. That is what I'd like to talk about it, the Air Force for the 21st century. You've heard about it in many different forums already this morning.

This is a unique time for the Air Force. It is a time when there is great emphasis on the use of air power. The tactical campaign against Bosnia helped produce the Dayton Accord. Obviously, the no-fly zone is very important -- Southern Watch. These air campaigns have really allowed the Air Force to perfect many capabilities: the use of stealth, how to suppress enemy air defenses, the use of airborne reconnaissance and communications platforms such as Rivet Joint, JSTARS, AWACS, and the U-2. We set up a center like the CAOC [Combined Air Operations Center] that I visited in early August in Vicenza [Italy], where we are monitoring a total air package. We could sit there talking with Lieutenant General Sir Michael Walker in the morning about his missions and how would send a British land force into the field that afternoon.

The Predator [unmanned aerial vehicle] was tracking the Brits as they were preparing to enter a Bosnian Serb arms cache. We could watch them on live TV in the CAOC while the commander of the joint air operation was able to generate sorties as necessary to remind the Bosnia Serbs that we were watching in great detail. This is a time where the air campaign, the air expeditionary force, is truly coming into its own. It is part of this new era, a preview of the 21st century.

At the same time, as we deploy the Air Expeditionary Force, without the Army, its traditional support element in terms of security on the land, we know that the mission is changing. We learn this every day, but most specifically at Khobar Towers where it is not only important for the AEF to perform its mission in terms of its air campaign, but also it is exceedingly critical that we move forward with this mission that we now call "Force Protection."

In 1983, with the Beirut bombing, the lesson was, you had to focus on your perimeter security and on keeping the bad people out. With the release of the Downing Report concerning the Khobar Towers bombing, the message to an Air Force that is increasingly deploying without ground support is that our security police providing force protection have to increasingly focus not only on inside the perimeter, not only on the security of the flight line or the security of the fence, or the security of the water and food supplies, but also outside the fence and outside the base.

These are previews of the 21st century and how air assets are going to be deployed. The world has changed. It is a great credit to General Fogleman that the Air Force and that the planning at CORONA last week is looking long range into the future.

We have a new generation of Air Force leaders who are on the job. You've heard a lot of them this morning, but in addition, you've got Joe Ralston, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Lt. Gen. Dave McCloud, in J-8, a critical job on the Joint Staff for force structure and Lt. Gen. Richard B. Meyers, assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. That job is the bridge between the JCS and the State Department -- between the military and the diplomatic side of the equation. Lt. Gen. John Gordon is assistant to the director of Central Intelligence, making sure that Intel products get into the field and are readily available to the warfighter. Generals Walt Kross and Hal Estes are our unified CINCs. Lt. Gen. Les Lyles, formerly at the Space and Missile Systems Center, is now head of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.

This team, headed on the uniform side by General Fogleman, on the civilian side by Dr. Widnall, is part of a very energetic and resourceful group that is working hard to get the Air Force ready for the future. They are the right people for the 21st century. That is the first point I'd like to leave you with, that we have the right people, the right team in place today.

Second, particularly for those younger members in uniform who are going to be the three and four stars in the 21st century, we also have the right modernization program. We are looking forward to the future.

This is a time of getting smaller, getting leaner. That is what I told the folks during my visit with The Aerospace Corporation this morning: the organization that survives in the future is the organization that is lean and efficient. We've focused on acquisition reform, on getting leaner, on reducing regulation. Faster, better and cheaper are the three themes that Darlene Druyun accents. The work of Art Money and Lt. Gen. George Muellner in the acquisition world on acquisition reform sets the stage for our modernization program.

We have, after many years of struggling, solved the airlift problem. There is a multi-year contract for the C-17 that was signed earlier this year. The process of making that better-faster-cheaper to get the cost down and the performance up -- the DAB [Defense Acquisition Board] process -- saved us $4 billion in terms of greater efficiencies. The multi-year contract came along later and saved another billion. That is $5 billion that can be applied elsewhere towards Air Force modernization.

The fighter of the future, the F-22, is on schedule. We had some issues with weight, but that has been carefully scrutinized. We are moving toward the first flight in the spring. If you asked me the biggest issue facing us now on the F-22, it is to make it affordable. It is to scrub costs out of the F-22 program just as we did on the C-17. That is why we've established the Joint Estimate Process. As we look at dollars going into the program, we are no longer simply scrubbing the budget submission for Fiscal Year 1998. Instead, we are going to look at the EMD [Engineering and Manufacturing Design] program from now to completion to see what costs we can scrub out. We also look at production to see what kind of efficiencies we can find so we can use the same cost estimating process that proved so successful in finding that $5 billion of savings in the C-17 and apply that to the F-22. We met with Norm Augustine and the Lockheed team two weeks ago to start this process.

We have developed with the F-22 an engineering marvel: low observability, propulsion system that will cruise in excess of the speed of sound. Now our challenges is to get the F-22 affordable and into the field.

In mid-November, the Joint Strike Fighter will face a down select from three to two contractors. We will finally work a joint program between the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy. Not that the three services will use identical aircraft, but instead they will draw among the common efficiencies of each -- common propulsion, common avionics, and common software -- to reduce the costs for each and to get the next generation system into the field.

For JSTARS, our acquisition people were so flexible and our operational people so capable that we were able to take a developmental aircraft, deploy it in Desert Storm, bring it home, perfect it further and deploy it into the Bosnian theater to change the way the ground component commanders think about peace keeping mission. General Nash, the American commander, operating out of Tuzla, was able to go to his Bosnian Serb counterpart and say, without putting the soldier in harm's way at night, "I can see every move that you make. I can see every truck that passes over the bridge and I know when you are being honest with me about how you have your forces deployed." Again, the combination of technology and of the Air Expeditionary Force work well. JSTARS is on track.

For the EELV, the next generation of expendable launch vehicle, source selection is coming up early next year. It will reduce the per pound cost of putting satellites into space, something that is critical for the Air Force as it continues its space superiority mission to go along with its air superiority mission.

If my first point was that we have the right leadership in place to guide us into the 21st century, my second point is that we have the right modernization program for the 21st century. We have the right mix of technology and systems that will assure us superiority in air and space in the future. These things are particularly important because in just a few weeks, the Department of Defense is going to start something that is, in short hand, referred to as the QDR, the Quadrennial Defense Review. It will look at our priorities in defense policies for the next four years impact future budgets and set the stage for the 21st century.

Since the break up of the Soviet Union, we've had two major planning changes in how we think about our military forces. The first was the Base Force, which looked at a Soviet Union divorced from the Warsaw Pact, that reduced the threat of a conventional war in Europe. The base force was the bridge between the Cold War and the break up of the Warsaw Pact.

The Bottom-Up Review was the force structure that moved us forward and that was consistent with the break up of the Soviet Union into a group of independent republics with different kinds of security issues. The premise of the Bottom- Up Review was that we needed to have forces sufficient to deal with two simultaneous major regional contingencies. As we start this Quadrennial Defense Review, we're going to further fine-tune that notion of the two MRCs to look at additional issues in terms of how do we do these very complicated peace keeping/peace enforcement missions like Bosnia.

How do we deploy people TDY overseas and have a sufficient rotation base so we can not break the force, so that when we deploy for 90 days or 180 days we can bring them home and not worry about deploying them again. These are the start of the key issues on how the Quadrennial Defense Review will differ and expand upon the thinking that went into the Bottom-Up Review.

The QDR is going to be very important because Base Force and the Bottom-Up Review were transitional policies. We've gone through transitional periods before in our history. Right after World War II, there were lots of things that occurred, but it was probably a five to seven year period between the end of World War II and the start of the policy of containment, which after 40 years, proved to be a very successful policy because it saw our principle adversary break apart at the seams. But when they sat down in 1945, some of their assumptions about the future proved to be different from the assumptions that were there in 1950 and 1952.

What were the assumptions? That the British would remain a pivotal world power. That turned out not to be true. The other assumption was that the United Nations would turn out to be a big player internationally. That turned out to be incorrect. It turned out that the world war divided into a free world led by the United States, and the NATO alliance and a Soviet world and a Warsaw Pact. At the time, there was a view that nuclear weapons were simply larger conventional munitions. The period of 1945 to the break up of the Soviet Union in December 1990 was dominated by this doctrine of containment and deterrence where two nuclear powers in relative balance kept the world much more stable than would have ever been envisioned.

Now that is broken apart. The West was able to prevail, and the Communist world broke apart, creating a whole host of issues of how should we organize our defense forces. Two regional contingencies is the starting point, but the Quadrennial Defense Review will build upon that greatly.

Under Goldwater-Nichols, the 1986 change, many authorities and responsibilities now rest with the chairman and the Joint Staff. Joint Warfare Capability Assessments are turning out to be key components of defining military requirements in the future. As we get ready for the QDR, this JWCA process, under Joint Staff responsibility, is organized packages that are going to be critical when the formal QDR deliberations begin.

For almost a year, there have been groups determining the proper force structure for deep strike. Others have been looking at maritime, air and space superiority, and how to handle this mission of presence. Conventional deterrence, traditionally thought of: "Where are we going to move the carrier to?" Now it is being shown to be more flexible to include, "Where are we going to deploy the Air Expeditionary Force?" Last month, we had a real test when we took the F-117 forces at Holliman Air Force Base [N.M.] and moved them in less than a weekend's time to Kuwait.

Another group is looking at strategic mobility, air and sealift. Still others are looking at Intel surveillance, reconnaissance plus command and control and the key area for the future, information warfare. In 20 years, when all of our successors meet here at this convention they will probably find the discussion as dominated by information warfare as the discussions have been dominated by tactical air and air superiority over the last several years because the world is changing and the technology in the world is changing.

Combating terrorism, and force protection are other issues. The Air Expeditionary Force can put bombs on target in Southern Iraq with great precision. You can't take our Air Force on in the sky. The challenge is to make sure that when we are home based at a location, particularly overseas, that the perimeter is secure and we know the threats that are out there against our force.

What was once the strategic mission of nuclear weapons is now really focused on how to deter and how to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In one sense, this period of deterrence, of Superpower balance turns out to be more stable than the potential of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

One of the things all of us should know is that Saddam Hussein is not a rational actor. He puts his force in harms way and is ready to lose his force for questionable means at any times. That is far different from the period when our military debate was dominated by our own command and control process on one hand and the knowledge that even if we had huge ideological differences, there was a rational actor on the other side that was not willing to sacrifice his country. All of this is changing as we deal with potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Finally, how do we deal with joint readiness? We fight as joint units. The deployment to Haiti occurred under the leadership of U.S. Atlantic Command, but with tremendous input from Air Combat Command. It was a seamless operation. How we keep the force ready in a joint way is yet another challenge. All of these things will be the focal point in the Quadrennial Defense Review when it transitions from the Joint Staff to the Secretary of Defense on November 15.

Here are just a final few comments. John White, Deputy Secretary of Defense, spoke to the Defense Science Board earlier this month and outlined what he thought were the four key issues for the Quadrennial Defense Review. Let me quote him because I think he will chair this Review. These are four points that all of us who deal with national security and some form of Defense will be engaged in.

He said, we must take a fresh look at the full spectrum of plausible military operations and associated capabilities given world conditions. We need to include a wider set of potential scenarios. One of the criticisms of the Bottom-Up Review was that it had placed too much emphasis on maintaining the force necessary to fight major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously and too little emphasis on the day-to-day demands of overseas presence and smaller scale contingencies.

The second theme of QDR, one that underlies everything, is resources. What resources will be available to pay for the forces that will execute our strategy? DoD's plans call for a 40 percent increase in funding to modernize our forces over the next five years. Is that enough? How can our funding goals for modernization be assured, particularly in light of our continued emphasis on readiness and quality of life? Should we reexamine our priorities. That is question two. How do we spend$1.7 trillion in the five-year Defense plan as it exists right now?

A third theme of the QDR relates to the revolution in military affairs. We are already doing a lot, but we need to do more to incorporate technological changes in doctrine, tactics and force structure. How do we address the implications of changed capabilities? This was a question that will be an important legacy of Admiral Bill Owens, the previous vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It shows how our thinking has to change because of market place realities.

If we wanted to see the state of the art in command, control and communications a decade ago, we probably would have gone to NORAD, where we were tracking every object in space and had a system to essentially communicate with military forces around the world. If you want to go and look at the model of command and control today, you go to CNN headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, where they are receiving input via very sophisticated satellite network from correspondents around the world on a real-time basis at the same time they are sending out to areas around the world 10 different networks of programming. It is a tremendous capability that they have, one that the military needs to look at and learn from. This is the heart of one of the more interesting aspects of what General Casciano and General Fairfield are doing.

The fourth theme of the QDR relates to making fundamental institutional changes to the Department of Defense. The QDR will be about a lot more than strategy, force structure and modernization programs. It must examine major changes in the way we do our business. Like other institutions in society, DoD has already begun to change. We've reduced our work force and cut our overhead by closing bases. In fact, one of the tasks that Secretary Perry gave to each service was to make sure that we drew down our civilian force structure proportionate to the military force structure in the Bottom-Up Review. We've reduced our work force and cut our overhead by closing bases.

We are overhauling the defense acquisition system so we buy more commercial products because commercial products, commercial R&D, is out pacing military R&D. We have begun to outsource to the private sector and privatize portions of our civilian activities, but we need to do a great deal more. We are also looking at efficiencies through privatization. As I said, the organization that is successful in the future is the organization that can get leaner and more efficient so the dollars can go into military modernization, quality of life for military personnel and to maintain our current force structure.

There are three points I want to leave you with. First is that we have the right team to lead us into the 21st century. I give tremendous credit to General Fogleman for the long-range planning effort, which I think is unique to the Air Force. We have the right people for this incredibly big job. Second, we have the right modernization program for the 21st century. We are on track and it is pointing out that acquisition reform is working. Third, we are framing the right questions as we no longer transition from a world that was threatened by a Soviet Empire, but instead, into a time when we are dealing with much more complicated threats. We must respond to them, and they are important to the role that we play internationally in leading the free world and ensuring that democracy remains the dominant form of government for the 21st century.

I appreciate this chance to be here before the Air Force Association today. On behalf of Air Force Secretary Sheila Widnall, I appreciate the chance to speak to you. I hope that you will use this opportunity to ask your hardest and most demanding questions because this is a chance for me to know what you think. We live in a very interesting time. The world is reinventing itself and the Air Force for the 21st century is going to be one that we will all be very proud of.

GEN. SHAUD: With all the linkages that we have, one that is most important is with our congressional representatives on the Hill. How are we doing? How is the credibility of the U.S. Air Force on the Hill?

MR. DE LEON: I think that the credibility of the Air Force is the highest that it has ever been. That is credit to lots of people. There is the old cliche that victory knows a thousand fathers and defeat is an orphan. I think we have a lot of successes out there. It starts with Dr. Widnall and the Chief, where the core value is integrity. You have to back up what you say. That has become the hallmark of the Air Force on Capitol Hill. We are not afraid to take a punch if we fail. That is important. You can only lose your credibility if you give it up, and you don't get a second chance at it.

The Air Force is doing very well with the Congress and with the public at large.

QUESTION: Could you please discuss forward deployed units?

MR. DE LEON: That is a very good question. It used to be that on the diplomatic side you could sidestep many of the issues of having military units in a friendly country by calling in a carrier and having that carrier off shore. With the Air Expeditionary Force, we've found that our allies will invite us in. That it is a different dynamic to invite in an Air Force whose mission is essentially in the sky with air superiority and strike, rather than the sensitivities with a ground component whose mission may be occupation. In these last four years, the Air Force has shown it can do the presence mission as well as can the sea-based component. We can generate more sorties, and we are more efficient.

The challenge now is the issue of force protection. We will probably not have the land component dealing with security outside the perimeter, therefore, wing commanders have to worry more about the protection of people at their bases. That is one of the reasons for Secretary Perry's initiative to relocate the U.S. Air Force out of Daharan and into Al Karhage, where we had much greater flexibility in the security outside the fence.

We have seen places where the Air Expeditionary Force will be invited in and that it confirms that the Air Force is very capable and adept at doing this mission of presence.

QUESTION: What is the Air Force doing in the area of missile defense?

MR. DE LEON: There is a substantial effort going into theater area defense and then missile defense more broadly. There are parallels between ballistic missile defense and theater area defense in terms of command and control and tracking. A cruise missile is different. It is an airborne threat. The first challenge is to set up a joint program, and Lt. Gen. Les Lyles now heads the Ballistic Missile Defense Office. There is a charter from the Congress that he has responsibility for all the programs -- in essence missile defense becomes a joint area. There is some resistance elsewhere because Huntsville has traditionally viewed itself as responsible for missile defense.

This is one of the major areas that we need to concentrate on because missile defense is very much part of how to deal with and how to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction if they reach a rogue party. But this is an area I know that is a key focus of both the Air Force and General Lyles in his capacity at the BMD office. It is also a key concern of the Joint Staff and another legacies of Admiral Owens.

If we are going to be serious about deploying a missile defense system, then we can't afford to have three parallel programs, we've got to decide the basic architecture and then spend the dollars. One Air Force contribution to this process, among many, is the Minuteman Homing proposal. The airborne laser is another. The priority is to solve the theater defense problem first because our troops are more likely to be vulnerable to a Scud or a Silkworm than they are from a ballistic missile aimed against CONUS. The focus has been to put missile defense emphasis in the theater. This is a major focus that will be a key part of our defense for the 21st century. If the Air Force is asked to provide its part, we are ready with the Minuteman option, with the airborne laser option and others.

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