Los Angeles - October 18, 1996

General Richard E. Hawley
Sticking to the Basics: Preparing for the Right Future

As always, it is a pleasure to be invited to share an AFA rostrum, and especially to talk about two of my favorites subjects -- air superiority and precision attack.

First, let's talk about air superiority for a few minutes: why we airmen feel so strongly about this subject -- why all Americans should care deeply about this vital mission -- and why our Air Force plan is the right one for this nation. This nation, and its Air Force, learned some basic lessons about airpower during World War II. We learned about centralized control and decentralized execution; we learned that airpower can have strategic effects independent of any other form of military power; we learned the value of interdiction to isolate the battlefield and control the pace of combat; we learned the importance of being able to apply force with precision, and how the costs of combat mount when precision is not possible; and we learned a lesson that transcends all others: air superiority is a prerequisite for the success of all other military operations -- on land, at sea, and in the air. Or, as Secretary of Defense Perry has put it: "Everything else we do depends on this air dominance."⁽¹⁾

Now as some of you may know, my education was concentrated in the dismal science of economics, not the far more satisfying study of man's history through the ages; but, I need to retrace some history here. So what I'd like to do is borrow a thought from our more historically-minded Chief of Staff, General Ron Fogleman. We began the strategic bombing campaigns of World War II without a shred of air superiority -- we thought massed formations of bombers could overcome any defense. But that theory foundered when per mission losses passed 9 percent in October of 1943. ⁽²⁾

And so we invented the P-51, a fighter that could stay with the bombers all the way to the target, and provide a measure of protection from the German air defenders. Not air dominance, not even air superiority, but enough to let us get the job done.

By June of 1944, we had learned that basic lesson of modern warfare: air superiority must come first. In the skies over Normandy the German Air Forces had been rendered virtually ineffective, and Operation Overlord succeeded -- a success that rested squarely on a foundation called air superiority.⁽³⁾

A few years later, in the cold gray skies of Korea, we found ourselves engaged in a contest for which we were woefully unprepared. But our fledgling Air Force, still struggling to take root as an independent service, had not forgotten the lessons about air superiority that had been learned in World War II. It had persevered with development of a jet fighter called the F-86, and had trained its airmen to be masters of air-to-air combat. There were 40 aces in that war -- 38 Air Force, one Navy, and one Marine -- who was on exchange duty with an Air Force F-86 outfit.⁽⁴⁾

The Naval Services had great aviators, but it was the Air Force that had learned, remembered, and applied the lesson of air superiority from World War II.

But institutions can have short memories too. And in the '50s, our Air Force became so focused on its mission of deterring nuclear war that we failed in our responsibility to guarantee the nation superiority in the skies over any future battle. We built great nuclear strike aircraft, like the venerable F-105, but we neglected Job Number One: to control the air -- to provide air superiority.

And so we fought another Asian war, this time in Vietnam, without a capable air-to-air fighter. We fought without pilots schooled in the fine art of air-to-air combat. And we fought without weapons with which to neutralize the newly emerged threat of surface-to-air missiles -- and we paid a terrible price against a third-rate power.

In the six months from 23 August 1967 to 5 February 1968, Vietnamese MiG-21 pilots racked up a 16 to 1 kill advantage.⁽⁵⁾

Five years later we had turned the tables to achieve a meager 2.55 to one advantage. There were five aces in Vietnam -- three Air Force and two Navy.⁽⁶⁾

How easily we forget.

Now run the clock forward nearly 20 years, and circle half way round the world to yet another military contest, against another aspiring military power called Iraq. In the years after Vietnam, the Air Force had vowed not to be caught short again in the contest for air superiority. We fielded the F-15 at great cost to the nation, and over howls of protest that it was too costly and that we were buying technology for technology's sake. For 15 years the debate simmered on. The pundits doubted that these high tech systems would ever work under combat conditions -- and then came the Gulf War. Forty-one Iraqi aircraft were destroyed in the air -- 35 by Air Force aviators, three by Navy pilots, two by a single Saudi pilot flying an F-15, and one by a Marine -- on exchange duty with the Air Force flying an F-15!⁽⁷⁾

No wonder the Chief enjoys studying history so much -- it sure beats economics.

Now we stand staring into a future lit dimly. We can no more guess what kind of challenge our nation will face in the year 2020, than those who fought to field the F-15 in 1975 could predict an operation called Desert Storm in 1991 -- just about at the mid point of the F-15's expected 30-year life. Our Air Force is fighting doggedly to field the fighter that will guarantee this nation superiority in the skies over that unknown battlefield, in that unknowable future that is lit so dimly. The pundits decry our efforts. They say there is no threat. They say we are buying technology for technology's sake. They say we simply can't afford it -- not if we are to have all those other things -- things that in their near perfect vision of the future will be so much more appreciated than air superiority.

Well, the pundits are wrong! We can afford this machine that will guarantee air superiority for our nation through the third decade of the next century, as well as most of the other things that seem so appealing as we contemplate the future from our current, but perhaps temporary, vantage point as the world's only super power.

And this "air superiority" machine will do so much more for those future peacemakers and warriors. It will suppress enemy surface-to-air missile defenses to open the way for other, less capable aircraft. And it will deliver bombs from eight miles high, with accuracy that would make our early air power pioneers drool with envy.

And that gets me to the second subject for today -- precision attack. Now, we could trace a lot of history -- from our early efforts at daylight precision bombing in World War II, to those incredible videos of bombs going down elevator shafts that we all witnessed during the Gulf War. We could recall that day in the Spring of 1944 when more than 700 bombers and 800 fighter escorts -- 8,000 airmen -- set out to attack Berlin with over 1,600 tons of bombs. Seven hundred airmen were killed or captured on that mission. Seventy-five bombers were lost and another 350 damaged. Tooey Spaatz's report on the mission to General Arnold said: "Generally poor results obtained. Hit none of the primary targets."⁽⁸⁾

It was during the Vietnam conflict that technology began to catch up with the promise of airpower. The march to today's very impressive capabilities began with frustrations over our inability to take out targets like the Thanh Hoa Bridge -- targets that had consumed hundreds of sorties with "Generally poor results obtained." Then came the first laser guided bombs, and the Thanh Hoa Bridge that had defied hundreds of attacks, yielded to a single flight of four.⁽⁹⁾

But LGBs, and the equipment needed to employ them, are expensive. And by the Gulf War, nearly two decades after Vietnam, only a small fraction of the force could use them. On 19 January of 1991, we attacked a key industrial complex near Baghdad with 72 F-16s, supported by 18 F-15s, F-4Gs, and EF-111s. We lost two F-16s that day.⁽¹⁰⁾

Captain Mike Roberts and Major Jeff Tice were captured. Tooey Spaatz might have written the mission report -- "minimal target effects."

Four years later, during Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, the campaign that brought the warring factions to the peace table in Dayton, more than 60 percent of the weapons we used were PGMs. Now, there are still pundits who belie the significance of this revolution in air and space power. They compile data in ways that make it seem we have gained little from our investments in these capabilities. They argue that the old ways are much less expensive, and just as effective -- and they build spread sheets to prove the point. Too bad they can't roll in off base into a hail of triple A fire -- it can be very enlightening. Maybe they should talk to Mike Roberts and Jeff Tice.

And the next stage in this revolution is now upon us, as we integrate air and space power to produce even more magical results. A new generation of very accurate munitions is taking to the field -- bombs that exploit the power of satellite navigation to find their way to within feet of any target. The first of these are now in the hands of our B-2 operators at Whiteman AFB in Missouri, and on 8 October they attacked an array of 16 targets on the Nellis ranges. The B-2 crew, call sign "Spirit 09," delivered eight, 2,000-pound GPS-Aided Munitions, or GAMs, from 40,000 feet high and six miles from the targets -- targets that were spread over an area of more than two square kilometers.

Tooey Spaatz would have been proud to submit this mission report: eight targets destroyed! "Spirit 14" followed with seven more bombs from 43,000 feet -- four targets destroyed, two severely damaged, and one moderately damaged. One target had eluded attack because it could not be identified on radar with sufficient certainty to meet the stringent rules of engagement that were applied to this simulated combat mission -- avoiding collateral damage was a high priority. That's where "Spirit 33" came in, the clean up hitter. That third B-2 achieved the needed radar clarity, delivered a single bomb from 40,000 feet and shacked the target. Overall results -- 13 targets destroyed, 2 severely damaged and one moderately damaged. The widest miss was thirty feet.⁽¹¹⁾

No collateral damage.

This revolution in air and space power is upon us now. Our investments in air superiority and precision attack will yield enormous benefits in the twenty-first century -- if we can just see them through to the finish.

GEN. SHAUD: The first question has to do with reconnaissance. What do you have in mind to enhance reconnaissance, both strategic and tactical?

GEN. HAWLEY: There is a lot going on in this area; some of it is our traditional fighter-oriented reconnaissance. For instance, we've got the Richmond, Virginia, Air National Guard flying to give us a low-altitude capability and under-the-weather reconnaissance that no other system can really give us today.

The big effort is in UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles]. Air Combat Command's 11th Reconnaissance Squadron today is operating the first unit of Predator aircraft out of Taszar airfield in Hungary. They've been flying those in support of our IFOR operations in Bosnia. They are capable of providing both electro-optical, infrared and synthetic aperture radar reconnaissance. They can fly for three to five hundred miles, orbit for six to eight hours overhead at a crack. The feed has been going via satellite to lots of customers in the theater via the Joint Broadcast System, a wide-band communications facility that allows commanders on the ground to observe the Predator information in real time. At the same time, that information, particularly synthetic aperture data, is going back for analysis. It can receive a cursory analysis, be tagged, and sent back to the customer within about 15 minutes. That is the future of reconnaissance: the timeliness of it.

That is where space is going. Our space assets are going to give us the capability to maintain real time surveillance with quick feedback to the customer. A lot of people are fans of the SR-71. In fact, we have got $70 million popped into our budget to keep it alive. You can't see the SR-71, and not fall in love with it. But, the typical timeline from the time the customer said, "I need target info" until the SR-71 could get something to them was about 36 hours. That is a long time and we don't have the luxury of time in the reconnaissance business anymore.

We've got to be able to be over the targets, get the information, and get it into the hands of the user in near real time. That is where we are going and this whole family of UAVs that is emerging -- such as the Predator, Darkstar, and tactical UAVs for the Army and Marine Corps. We will all be moving in that direction.

GEN. SHAUD: Concerning the logistics tail for the Joint Strike Fighter, will it be joint also and does the Air Force have an idea on how the Joint Fighter logistics system will actually work?

GEN. HAWLEY: It will be joint. We think that depending on which variation of this airplane that everybody winds up buying, it will be on the order of 80 percent common in terms of the 10,000 pieces flying in formation that we call an airplane. With 80 percent commonality, that means we will be able to have joint logistics support, just as we do today, only more so. Probably, the more pertinent question will be, "What kind of logistics support will we buy for the Air Force?" There is every possibility that we will have contractor-provided support right from the beginning. We are moving in that direction in our logistics community.

By the time we field JSF, in about 2010 or thereabouts, my guess is we will have moved a significant direction along the path toward contractor logistics support to these systems for the lifetime of the system and it will be a jointly managed logistics system.

GEN. SHAUD: General Hawley, as time goes on, what are your thoughts about the composite wing and do you see any changes in that approach?

GEN. HAWLEY: The composite wing at Mountain Home [AFB, Idaho], in my view, is a great experiment. We are learning incredible amounts from that operation -- the ability of people in each of those mission areas and disciplines to work together day in and day out, to go exercise together, to deploy together. That wing supported our most recent Provide Comfort commitment in Turkey. The results are apparent to everybody. They really do achieve a cohesion to exploit the synergy between their weapon systems better than we can when we've got them spread out.

Does that mean we are going to have a full composite wing Air Force? No. It is a great place to learn things that we can then migrate to all the rest of the force. But frankly, I don't think we can afford the program every place. But we are going to keep the wing at Mountain Home in its current form. In fact, we are going to expand its potential by getting them to focus on developing ways to make our Air Expeditionary Force lighter, more agile and more responsive. They are the perfect force to figure out how to do that for us. Then we can take what we learned from that and spread it all over the rest of the Air Force. They are going to be a key part of making our Air Force more agile, more flexible and more responsive.

GEN. SHAUD: The last question has to do with tactical airlift. How does it fit in with your command?

GEN. HAWLEY: Theater airlift is obviously a key part of making everything work. I don't have to tell you how important theater airlift has been to us in every operation we've ever conducted. You can go back to World War II and find the roots of today's theater airlift force. Perhaps the best demonstration of airlift is in all of these operations other than war that we've been involved in for the past five years where frequently airlift is air power. It is what represents air power in many of these cases because there is no call for fighters or bombers, but there is plenty of call for airlift.

In Bosnia, when I was commander of USAFE, our airlift forces were absolutely critical to the operation. As we got through Deliberate Force and the peace agreement in Dayton, we had compelling pressure for our national command authorities to get our force deployed quickly into Bosnia. Time was of the essence. It was theater airlift that pulled it off in the midst of some of the worst weather that we ever had in that place called Bosnia. Theater airlift, with its ability to go in using its own on-board radar to complete the approach, was able to get the airfield established, get that initial flow going, stand the airfield up ahead of the airplanes that couldn't get in there, and get our forces deployed quickly.

The Army started out with the concept of the whole deployment going in by train. They then figured out they had to get six different people's permission to drive trains across Europe. Pretty soon, it became an airlift operation. Airlift is what saved the day and allowed us to implement our national policies in Bosnia. It was theater airlift that opened the door for all the rest of our airlift forces. I am very proud of them; they are doing great work in every one of our many ongoing contingencies.

1. "Perry defends tacair emphasis in new budget," Aerospace Daily, 5 Mar 96.

2. Cooling, Benjamin Franklin, Air Superiority, p. 283. (Cooling's footnote references AFHRC A 5871, fr 0855, p. 316); Roger Freeman, The Mighty Eighth, p. 139.

3. Craven, Wesley and Cate, James, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. III: Europe: Argument to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1995, pp. 185-225.

4. Haulman, Daniel L. and Stancik, William, Ed., Air Force Aerial Victory Credits: World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, pp. 749-766; Futrell, Robert, The United States Air Force in Korea: 1950-1953, rev ed., pp. 657, 665.

5. Aces and Aerial Victories, pp. 76, 121, 122; Young, Robert, "Fishbed Hit and Run," Air Power History (Winter 95, Vol. 42, #4), pp. 57-69.

6. Haulman and Stancik, Air Force Aerial Victories, pp. 787-790. Aces and Aerial Victories, p. iv.

7. Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. V - A Statistical Compendium and Chronology, Table 219 "Coalition Air-to-Air Kill Matrix."

8. Davis, Richard G., Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, p. 373. Date of operation: 6 Mar 44.

9. Berger, Carl, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, p. 95.

10. Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. II, pp. 164-171; Vol. V, p. 164.

11. Memo, ACC/PAE to acc-pa@info.acc.af.mil, [B-2 GATS/GAM Demonstration], 9 Oct 96; "B-2s scored 13 hits, damaged three targets in GATS/GAM drop," Aerospace Daily, 21 Oct 96.

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