Foundation Forum

General Richard B. Myers
CINC NORAD and US Space Command, and
Commander, Air Force Space Command
AFA Space Symposium (Los Angeles)

November 13, 1998

"Integrating Space In An Uncertain Era"

Good morning. It’s always great to be here at AFA-LA; it’s an honor to be invited to speak. Thanks, General Shaud, for that kind introduction.

We’re going to broaden the scope a bit beyond the excellent partnerships theme of this symposium - I’ll touch on partnerships later - but let me say up front how critical they are. Most of our major space partners are right here in this room with us and you are well aware of the many success stories we share together. You know we cannot achieve the full promise of space without building on the trust and confidence between all segments of government, industry, and allies. Space is simply too expensive, too interdependent, too complex, and too important to go it alone. We are committed to taking our strong partnerships to the next level. To do this right, it helps to share a common vision of the future or at least understand where each partner is coming from. That’s why I’ve entitled my remarks: “Integrating Space In An Uncertain Era.”

Integration is a key task facing everyone in the space business. Integration drives our national efforts to partner, our military efforts to enhance jointness, and our Service efforts to operate in a seamless vertical dimension. Integration acknowledges the growing networks and connections throughout all levels of society as space fuels the evolving Information Age. If we get this integration right, we can make enormous strides toward shaping this uncertain era. That’s an important point. We’re all operating in a common, uncertain environment. It doesn’t help anyone to have divisiveness between air and space, one Service and another, or government and industry. We are all in the same boat and we all need to work on this concept of integration together. My intent this morning is to expand on the space piece of this. The result will give you insight into what we see as our major priorities, those issues that will occupy our attention over the next few years.

Let’s begin with the environment in which we find ourselves. This era is so uncertain, we really don’t have an elegant way to describe it. The QDR said we’re in “a period of strategic opportunity.” Some might call this “a strategic pause.” That’s what’s implied by the Tofflers in their books “The Third Wave” and “War and Anti-War. ” Harvard great Samuel Huntington wrote about the “inter-war years.” And George Modelski framed a theory around “world cycles,” a sort of sine curve of events where great powers clash at the apex in roughly 40 year intervals, pausing to regroup on the downward slope, through the nadir and back up the other side.

The gist of all this appears to be that on a strategic level we aren’t facing - and don’t soon expect to face - a major threat to our existence, or to that of our allies. Sounds great - but somehow it falls flat. The opportunity looks more like a challenge. You’d think that in a pause folks could take time to catch their breath. The reason we have trouble with this notion is that we’re living in a tactically dangerous world. Our ops tempo is high. We’re deployed to far more regional crises. The risk of attack against our homeland by a weapon of mass destruction is arguably greater today. The largest allied airstrikes over Europe since World War Two occurred in Bosnia after the Cold War, not during it. And while our existence seems momentarily secured, there remain fundamental threats that could impact our way and quality of life. Plus, just to make it interesting, we’re excited about something called a revolution in military affairs, about the prospects of a whole new way of operating in future wars even as our troops fight today’s many and varied conflicts.

So we have this uncertain mix going: “strategic pause” versus “violent peace” versus “the promise of tomorrow.” How do we reconcile this? To my thinking, we currently have the military superiority to counter a realistic hostile threat against American interests. Of course, this comes at some level of risk. The margin we have in addressing that risk gives us some latitude. We can chose, for example, to focus exclusively on today’s readiness, on our current force structure. We can also develop future capabilities for a new geopolitical setting. You no doubt recognize this is the same debate that has animated all our defense reviews from the “Bottom Up” to the QDR. Lately, however, there seems to be a growing sense that we need more thought on this uncertain era; that we need to take our discussions to the next level to also talk about tools, strategies, policies, organization, and more. The concern is well- founded. Our track record during other periods that we recognize today as strategic pauses is not very comforting.

Take for instance the era between the Civil War and World War One. You can almost draw a straight line between the failure of Pickett’s Charge at Gettysburg and the “killing fields” at Verdun. We did not, nor did most foreign observers, grasp the changes in technology and firepower that enhanced defensive operations. We failed to modernize. We didn’t update our policies of isolationism in light of world events. The result was attrition, trench warfare where we came late to the game with the wrong equipment, outmoded operational concepts, and where we had to rely on allied handouts. Between World Wars One and Two we had some successes in developing new strategies and innovative policies. But again, we here hobbled by inadequate modernization and increasingly divisive inter- and intra-service squabbles. Needless to say it was “a near thing” in both cases. We were fortunate here in the United States; we were saved by industrial might, vast distances, and strong allies.

But it’s becoming clear that we might not be so lucky in the future. Information-based technological advances have the potential to level the playing field. We can’t depend on adversaries being slow to the mark. They understand our dependencies; isolation is not a realistic option in the Information Age; and in almost all cases, our allies rely much more on us than we do on them.

So, what’s the answer? How can we balance risk in a way that seizes strategic opportunity, handles our current responsibilities, and prepares for a new way of fighting war? I think the answer lies partly in efforts such as Secretary Cohen’s recently chartered 21^st Century National Security Study, which promises to inspire a comprehensive discussion on total integration in an Information Age. Without knowing what this group will conclude, we can guess that they will likely address four key areas that are essential to any era: people, modernization, strategies and policies, and organizations for the future.

That brings us back to our priorities in the space business. We needed a macro view to put our efforts at integrating space into context. Simply put, we see the integrating space piece as critical to this larger process of balancing the competing demands of this uncertain era. So, let me discuss those four key areas from a space perspective. Doing so will also highlight how we’ll spend the majority of our time over the coming years in Colorado Springs.

First, I submit that our first task must be to resolve the pressing concerns of our people. Secretary Peters said it just right. It’s clear that the next war will not allow us to draft or build up our ranks quickly. The need for lots of good people, highly trained, with the right equipment is essential on day one of any future crisis.

You know only too well the challenges we face in recruiting, retention, and morale. The cause of these problems may have less to do with a roaring economy and crushing ops tempo than conventional wisdom might suggest although obviously these are very important influences on our people. The real culprit, I believe, lies in perhaps not fully understanding the era in which we live. For example, we have yet to define it with a sound bite that gives us a unifying sense of purpose - like the “containment” or “Evil Empire” verbiage of the Cold War. This is a by-product of our uncertainty over just what this era is about. Into this void we may also have over-emphasized technology and strategic concepts, perhaps leaving our people with the mistaken feeling that they’re no longer our number one priority, our most essential resource.

Another point to keep in mind is that we’re all competing for the same resources: a knowledge-based military needs the same type of people as a knowledge-based economy. The pay and benefits gap between the commercial and military worlds is real and must be narrowed. In space ops, for instance, we’re already seeing problems retaining our enlisted troops after their first term because the explosion in commercial space makes their skills so highly valued.

We also need to recognize that issues of family and readiness are inextricably linked: problems at home directly impact combat capability. Having the right benefits and quality of life for families is essential. Most important of all, we should provide our people relief from the effects of the drawdown where we’ve continually asked folks to do more with less. Essentially, what we did was bank the savings we anticipated from new concepts like Joint Vision 2010 before we had the supporting structure in place to make that vision a reality. My watch says it’s 1998, not 2010. But we’ve in essence depleted our food supply on the promise of a future harvest.

We’ve tried to compensate where we can: we’re relying heavily on the Total Force, but that’s not a bottom-less well; we’re partnering well with industry to help us operate more efficiently and to off-load non-core tasks; we’re being innovative in how we deploy with concepts like the Aerospace Expeditionary Force. But these concepts can only go so far. The solution is to give our people the breathing space they need, to give them a protective bubble if you will, in which to handle today’s missions as we transition to tomorrow’s vision. That means pay and benefits, quality of life for families, and relief from more force reductions until our 2010 vision is in place.

Now let me turn to modernization. After people, modernization is perhaps the most vital piece. As I mentioned earlier, one option is to take some readiness risks for the sake of modernization. One of the first criticisms of this approach is that we’ll end up with a post-Vietnam style “hollow force” or, worse yet, that we already have one. From my point of view, I can assure you that we do not. I was at the Pentagon during those “hollow force” days. We don’t have a “hollow force” now and although we’ve got to watch it closely, I don’t think we’re heading down that path. I’m more concerned with what could be dubbed a dead-end force, a force that’s headed nowhere and could end up being irrelevant. In this case, we focus so much on maintaining a level of current readiness that we allow our forces to slowly become obsolete, irrelevant in a new era of warfighting. One can have the most ready force in the world, but if it’s fighting with yesterday’s tools, it probably won’t win. It’ll probably be stuck in a dead end. Modernization prevents this. Modernization is a difficult task, especially when we’re required to divert attention to so many tactical flare-ups. It takes a concerted effort; it takes some really hard choices.

In the space business, we’re looking at both long- and short-term modernization efforts that are critical for space’s contribution to the next fight. One of those efforts is our number one acquisition priority, the Space-Based Infrared System. SBIRS is number one not because we think it should be, but because the warfighting CINCs tell us it is. SBIRS is a system of systems, each part of which is a “must-have.” It’s the future of our early warning mission and it’s vital to theater and national missile defense.

One of our mission areas, space control, is growing rapidly. It’s critical that we have the freedom to use space and the ability to deny its use to our adversaries when required. We have several research & development projects on the drawing board in the space control area. One example is the XSS-10 project. Perhaps one of the best parts of this program is that it’s an ideal example of our emphasis on partnerships, in this case with NASA.

Force application is another important mission area. As General Estes said many times, it’s in our job jar to think about this, so we are. We have several R&D efforts and demonstrations in the works to help us understand what is possible even as our leaders debate what is desirable. Our goal is to ensure we have options to provide the National Command Authorities when asked.

We’re also looking at programs that will provide capabilities across all of our mission areas, for example, the space operations vehicle. All of this work is critical if we want to have relevant military capabilities in an environment projected to be so different from what we see today.

In the short term, we’re closing in on assuring access to space with the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle - our next generation medium and heavy lifter - and another example of a home run in our partnership with industry. It’ll be a proud day for America at our first launch in 2001. Until then, we’ll do everything we can to help our Boeing and Lockheed Martin partners ensure that happens.

We’re also dedicated to recapturing our lost share of the launch business for the United States. Key to that effort is upgrading our range infrastructure. That’s why I’m dedicated to launch range modernization. If we’re going to be responsive to a growing launch manifest, if we’re going to reduce the dollars we spend getting to space so we can spend more in space, we must fix our ranges. We must update the equipment and procedures that have been operating on our ranges since I was a cadet and John Glenn first went into space.

Finally, we’re committed to modernizing GPS, the system that’s becoming the timing and navigation standard for the world. Critical to this effort is protecting the GPS frequency spectrum here at home and in every country where we anticipate operating in a coalition with our allies. We’re also giving a lot of attention to how we can deny GPS service when directed in a targeted, precise manner to avoid collateral loss of the signal to non-adversaries. We call this NAVWAR and it’s an important part of our GPS modernization plan.

Of course there are countless other programs - Global Broadcast System, Advanced MILSATCOM, and others - that we’re working on, along with those which are part of our long range plan. They’re all important. And they’ll all help us allay the common criticism that militaries are always prepared to fight the next war with the equipment of the last war.

An equally important point to consider in the current era is the possibility that we’ll fight the next war with the policies of the last one. We can modernize our tools, and we should. But to best prepare for the future, we have to modernize our thinking as well. That’s why we need a national debate and resolution of many of the existing policies and open questions affecting future military capabilities. That kind of debate and resolution is particularly important for those of us in the space business because the bulk of those capabilities are based in, or reliant on, space systems. We’ve had a good start in Colorado Springs with our Long-Range Plan and its chapter called “Out Of Our Lane.” But remember, what’s in that chapter is “out of our lane.” We’re limited to advocating. The real action must come from above. We simply must do more and quickly. If you look at the hotwash from any of our recent wargames or exercises, you’ll see the point. We spend so much time in philosophical discussions trying to decide if and how an existing policy applies, that we lose the bubble on fighting the war. Wouldn’t it be better if we had those policy issues resolved at the outset? Such a debate is also important because we’re already underway in implementing the concepts of Joint Vision 2010 and achieving “full spectrum dominance”, the key characteristic of our 21^st Century Armed Forces. So much of Joint Vision 2010 is based on information superiority and most of the information that will give us that superiority will transit through or come from space. So, we not only need to stick with our modernization plan to enable Joint Vision 2010, we also need to review existing policies, our third key task.

There is historical precedent for this. The most interesting has to do with bans on aerial bombing coming out of the Hague Conventions at the turn of the century. In 1899, the European powers accepted a U.S. proposal to impose a five-year ban on “the discharge of projectiles or explosives from balloons or by other new methods of similar nature.” But by 1907, something was in the wind. At the Second Hague Conference, when the moratorium was extended, no major powers except the U.S. and Britain were willing to sign it. Clearly, others foresaw a future capability necessary to their security. The lesson is clear. Do we risk hindering development of future capabilities? For example, space has become a military and economic center of gravity. So much of the world’s standard of living, so much of its commercial wealth depends on space. If we agree with the Toffler’s premise that “the way a nation makes its wealth is the way it makes war,” then it’s easy to see that demands will arise for the U.S. military to protect American space assets and interests. The National Space Policy directs us to think through this question. We don’t want to constrain our options. Perhaps we need a national debate on the best course to take to protect space assets, both military and commercial.

There are other, less controversial, but equally essential policy debates necessary. One that is particularly important to us because it’s so closely linked to space is information operations. We’re just at the beginning of a new era - the Information Age - that will take communications, intelligence, and more to new levels. Walk through any corridor of power - inside or outside the beltway - and you’ll quickly see it: our most senior people are concentrating hard on information operations. It’s important they do. We need to understand fully, and spell out clearly, what our role in this information warfare will be. What does it all mean? What defines an attack? And in what context - tactical, strategic; civil, military? Who has jurisdiction and what agency has the lead in responding? These are vital issues, easily worthy of national dialogue because the stakes are very, very high. Many of us believe that America can translate its superpower status into an era of prolonged deterrence because dominance in information operations is so powerful. If done right, our battlespace awareness will be unparalleled. Most likely, the side with the most awareness will win because key decision-makers will act more quickly than the enemy. We will act within an opponent’s decision loop and seize the initiative.

There are many other policy areas necessary to address, but there’s just one more that I’ll offer today: where do we take the launch business? Our ranges are national, not just Air Force or DoD assets. That’s clear from something as simple as them being part of the major range and test facility base and as complex an agreement enabling billions of dollars in commercial space revenue. Isn’t it time, then, that we address how, as a nation, we’ll operate our ranges? Isn’t it time we consider a spaceport concept to recapture our dominance in the space-launch business? We think so, especially since the current era affords us the opportunity. But the pressure is on as the need for launch slots grows and grows.

Clearly, it’s time to review many of the existing policies affecting our ability to maintain the United States’ military edge. And while the debates unfold we’ll continue preparing options for the changes sure to come. Much of that preparation requires getting organized, the final key task I’ll talk about.

Much of this requires more than eliminating cumbersome stovepipes; it also requires that we don’t replace old stovepipes with new ones. We have to be on guard for this. It has been an allure like a siren’s call that pops up when we least expect it. A small, but significant, example was our recent refusal to create a “brown jacket/black jacket” air force among our operators.

Another insidious type of stovepipe is trying to automatically link platforms and functions. The emphasis, of course, should be to match technology, medium, platform, mission, and cost to achieve the best results. That means being open to migrating missions to space when the time is right. Of course, you are all very aware of the many steps our service has taken to create a truly integrated aerospace force. The key is integration, the opposite of stovepiping. We must ensure space is integrated into every operation.

We’ve taken other steps as well. One of the most promising comes from our understanding that we cannot achieve the full promise of space alone. Partnering - with other DoD and civil organizations, and with commercial industries - is crucial. I’ve given you some examples of how we’ve done so far. I should also mention the Commercial Space Operations Support Agreement we recently signed in Colorado Springs with some of our largest partners in the lift business. It clearly outlines the responsibilities, levels the playing field among commercial enterprises, and gives us a game plan for military and commercial efforts in the launch business. These are all great examples, but we must do more. It’s so important I’ve set up a shop at U.S. Space Command devoted exclusively to partnering. I’ve asked my staffs from all three of my commands to work with this office in ensuring we explore every possible opportunity to further the concept of partnering in our daily efforts. And I’m depending on our service components to make this process a reality. We won’t achieve our goals without it.

Of course, effective partnering is key to working information operations. I’m sure our commercial partners especially have an interest in what we’re doing in that arena. So I’ll offer information operations as the final example of where we need to ensure we’re correctly organized for the future. There’s probably no more critical organizational issue for the aerospace force to attend to today. We should, I think, organize ourselves to “operationalize” information. It’s been clear in recent exercises, wargames, and discussions that we must consider assigning a single operational CINC the task of focusing on information network operations for the warfighter. Given the clear linkage between space and information networks there is a strong case to be made that those responsibilities should fall to us at U.S. Space Command.

Whatever is decided and wherever information operations resides, it’s going to take cultural change on all our parts. We’ll need comm warriors to fully integrate with our operators to the point where the distinction between the two disappears. Our comm folks will have to realize that their job is not done when they provide the bandwidth and the link. And our operators will have to realize that they’ll have to become experts in a whole new “information” weapon system. Full, seamless integration of communications, intelligence, information, and operations is just as necessary as full integration of air and space.

So there’s my pitch, my idea of what we’re supposed to do in this era to prepare best for the challenges today and ahead. If we do it well, if we support our people, modernize, establish relevant policies, and get ourselves organized and integrated, we’ll go a long way toward seizing this strategic opportunity. And we’ll be able to fight today’s battles and achieve tomorrow’s promise. In closing, perhaps we would do well to remind ourselves of one other important lesson from past eras similar to this. In most cases, the ones who got it wrong, the ones who squandered the opportunities a situation at a time like this affords, were the victors in the previous war. It’s the vanquished who usually got it right. We did not fall victim to this trend coming out of the Cold War and into Desert Storm, and Saddam Hussein was mistaken when he thought we hadn’t learned the lessons of Vietnam.

Now the pressure is on us to not rest on our Gulf War laurels. If we work on those four key tasks - people, modernization, policies, and organization - we will have set ourselves up to ensure that when the time comes, we’re prepared to fight well, and win decisively. I know you all are counting on it and so is our nation.

I hope these few minutes have shown you how engaged our space warriors are in making the future a reality. To you General Shaud and the entire Los Angeles AFA, thank you very much for this wonderful opportunity and God bless you.

Gen. Shaud: You talked about people. Please discuss how you might make more and better use Guard and Reserve force in space in a manner that creates a total force capability such as we have for some flying combat units?

Gen. Myers: That process, thanks to Howell Estes, is already well down the path. Let me tell you, the enthusiasm any time you meet with Air National Guard or Air Force Reserve or for that matter, the Army Guard and Reserve or the Navy Reserve is absolutely ecstatic when you walk in an audience and you say, listen, here's what we can offer you in space. They are looking for new and relevant missions because some of their mission areas are starting to atrophy. We can do lots of things with them. We are going to have them fly satellites. We are going to have them work some of our range business. There is a multitude We are going to have them on the staff. We think this is one way to turn lead into gold at US Space Command. We are in the business of creating a lot of our Guard and Reserve partners and they are enthusiastic about it. We've already got commitments from four states and we'll have more as fast as we can sign them on to participate in this space mission. They know where the future is.

Gen. Shaud: The next question puts a finer point on talking about what trees have to do with what we do in space. This flows from our national convention in Washington where this same subject came up. The question is this: How does the ABM treaty limit the Air Force's ability to do planning for threats to space commerce in the future?

Gen. Myers: This audience is pretty well informed on that issue, but the treaty doesn't hurt us in terms of developing for these kinds of capabilities. My view is, in 1999 there is going to be a major debate in our country on the ABM Treaty and its relevance to our national security. That will be a political debate, our civilian masters, it won't be one the military will join in much, however, we will provide facts and information. That debate will be very vigorous and it is time it takes place. At some point in the future, treaties and policy, that's why I talked about out of our lane. There are a lot of things that we need to talk about, have a national dialog on so we can find out where we are going. But it is absolutely essential that we have that debate for national missile defense. We can't have it. In fact, we are almost late to need, my view. The second thing is for space control. There are a lot of issues there. If we think these billions and billions and billions of dollars of assets are going to sit there with somebody being asked to protect them, I think we are absolutely wrong. Lots of debate needs to go on. I hope that answers your question.

Gen. Shaud: You deserve this question, having worked on the Joint Staff. Can you talk about how USSPACECOM sees the future management and control of SATCOM changing, evolving in the light of a new CJCS 16250.01? Where in USSPACECOM is the system of systems operational manager? How do you work interface with the JCS J-6, DISA and the MILDEPS?

Gen. Myers: We'll have a seminar on that this afternoon starting at 5:30 in this room. Be here and I'll be here. In simple terms, we just want to take over all the comm in the world. No. That was too simple. USSPACE Command has just been given some responsibility for operational space comm. It just flowed to us from DISA and just be signed out. That is an important step. What you want to do in space is provide one face to the warfighter. That is what frustrates the folks in the Pacific. That is what frustrating General Zinni right now in CENTCOM. That is what frustrates all the theater warfighters is that they want to go to one place and get their space assets. That is what we are trying to do with the communications business. I think the warfighters feel very comfortable that that reside with another warfighting CINC as opposed to in an agency. That is where the migration is going and we are setting up the organizational force out there in Colorado Springs to handle all that. It is a big task. The one criticism if I do have of our folks in Washington is they are very fond of giving us more tasks. But they don't give us the resources sometimes to do it properly. As an unpaid political announcement, we will be coming to Washington for some bodies.

Gen. Shaud: The next question has to do with the program called Rideshare. It looks at commercial launches to see if extra space exists for military launches. With the commercial business really going well, is there much room for military systems?

Gen. Myers: I don't have a specific view other than that is exactly what we need to be trying to do. There is a lot of sharing that can go on. We have done that in the past and we will continue to do that in the future.

Gen. Shaud: Part of your challenge out there is to keep track of traffic in space. With Iridium and others with large numbers of satellites, is that an increasing problem for you CINC or are you tracking all that?

Gen. Myers: That is an increasing problem because there is more and more things in space. There are those that advocate that we be able to track much smaller objects than we can track today. Amazingly enough, it is getting crowded up there. You might be interested to note that one of our responsibilities is to track that and provide NASA when they are getting ready for a shuttle launch with a warning of any conjunctions that might happen. On the last launch for Senator Glenn we actually had to tell NASA there was going to be a conjunction with very sizable space objects to avoid it. And the same thing for MIR. When the space station goes up, it will become even more important. One thing I might say in that regard. We do that pretty well now with our military and civil partners, but not so much for commercial world and there is interest there and with Iridium and other constellations going up, one of the things we are looking at and we are far from standing this up, but you can envision some day probably a civil-military cell at Schriever that works this, not only for the military, but for our commercial partners as well.

Gen. Shaud: Last question, has to do with the vulnerability of US military s atellites. What has recently been in the news, how vulnerable are they to natural phenomenon, such as a meteor shower that is going on this week?

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