Foundation Forum
General Richard E. Hawley
Commander, Air Combat Command
AFA Orlando 98 Symposium
February 26, 1998
"Shaping Tomorrow's Air Force"
Well thank you, John. I can't tell you how great it is to be back
here in Orlando. This is a great forum for the discussion of national
security issues. John said I was going to do a presentation on how good
ACC is, how well it's working for the country, and of course, he's
right! We are great! It is a wonderful command, and a great bunch of
young men and women who are doing wonderful work for the country. You
all know how many of them are over in the Gulf today, more than 6,000.
We ask a lot of them, but I talked a lot about that last year. I talked
a lot about operational tempo, and some of the other stresses on our
force, but I wanted to pick a little different theme this year.
What prompts me to do that is a concern that I pick up as I travel
around ACC and talk to those wonderful young men and women. They want to
know if the leadership is really concerned about the level of resources
that we're getting. The kids see a shortage of parts, a shortage of
trained people and an abundance of work to do. I keep telling them,
"Yeah, I'm concerned about those problems and I talk about them a
lot." So I'm going to talk about that today.
But first, let me remind you that a lot has transpired in the last
year and a lot of it has been very good. The F-22 had a very successful
first flight. Our B-2s at Whiteman achieved initial operational
capability, both nuclear and conventional. We've pursued an initiative
called Distributed Mission Training, where we'll make better use of
simulation in the training of our force. Then, of course, other things
have happened. We had QDR. Applause please for QDR. Of course QDR began
to stumble a little bit, just about the time we started to implement its
vision, and then we had the National Defense Panel. They issued a
report, and many of us are still trying to ponder what they really
meant.
I'm reminded of a story about Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, one of
our most famous Supreme Court justices. He found himself on the train
one day, and the conductor came along and asked for his ticket, but the
Chief Justice couldn't find it. So he's busily looking through all his
pockets, and his briefcase trying to find his ticket. The conductor, of
course, knew exactly who he was and says, "Mr Holmes, don't worry
about it. You don't have to have a ticket. You're an honorable man. I'm
sure the Pennsylvania Railroad trusts that you'll send it in just as
soon as you get home."
And the Justice looked up at the conductor, a little irritated, and
said, "My dear man, that is not the problem at all. The problem is
not where my ticket is. The problem is, where am I going?"
(Laughter)
Maybe that's the primary question that came out of the QDR and
especially the NDP. A lot has changed in the past year, and then again a
lot hasn't. I talked a lot about operational tempo last year and that's
one of the things that hasn't changed. Our forces are still very
pressured by what I perceive as a growing mismatch between the resources
that we apply to this problem of national security and the force
structure that's available to do the work. Budget constraints are
serious, and to give you an illustration of what some of the effects are
of the constraints that we're under, I'd like to show you a few quick
indicators. So if I can have a chart, and I know you can't see these
real well so I've kept them pretty simple.
Some of you who have been around a while will recognize that yellow
line that goes back to 1965 and extends through 1998 because one of my
predecessors in a part of my command, the former Tactical Air Command,
built the first part of that chart. General Creetch built that. He
called it his "Slippery Slope Chart." My only point in showing
it is that we're back on a declining slope in readiness. That yellow
line shows the average mission capable rate of combat fighters in Air
Combat Command, and that slope at the bottom that's trending up is our
non-mission capable for supply rate. I call that one of the caution
flags that's flying. Give me the next chart please.
Retention. Now these don't look very dramatic. What they show is kind
of an eroding trend in the retention of our enlisted force, both first
term, second term and career. But when you peal back that onion and you
look below the averages you see some more alarming things. Next chart.
These are F-16 crew chiefs. Not very healthy. These are some of hose
folks that work pretty hard, spend a lot of time on remote assignments,
come back from that remote assignment, go to the desert, and live in a
tent. Next chart.
This one doesn't look very good either. These are our "B.B.
Stackers," munitions systems folks. People who work very hard. We
ask a lot of these folks. Next chart.
The slopes keep getting steeper in the wrong direction. Aircraft
armament people. First term re-enlistment rates 21 percent. These are
alarming trends. Next chart.
Rated retention. You've heard a lot about this. I've talked about it
a lot the past couple of years. This is what we currently project the
difference will be between our requirement for pilots, that's the red
line, and our projected inventory for pilots from now, through ten years
from now. Not a very happy picture. Next chart.
And as we're struggling to retain those pilots and maintain that very
highly capable force that is over in the Gulf today providing that punch
behind the U.N.'s diplomacy, this is what's happening to the age of some
of our airplanes. What I'm showing you here at the blue line is the
average age of our air superiority forces. The F-15 force that served us
so well back in 1990, at the beginning of that line, was ten years old.
We're now in 1998 and they're a bit over 15 years old, and before they
begin to be replaced by our first IOC F-22 squadron in "06,"
they're going to be over 20 years old that's average airframe
life. And of course our multi-role force follows along the green line.
It's growing old, too, and that's one of the things which causes the
adverse trend on that first chart. Old airplanes are harder to maintain.
They don't deliver FMC rates like new ones did, so we're paying the
price today for our inability to invest robustly in the renewal of this
capability.
Okay. We'll get rid of charts. I'm not going to show you any more.
But perhaps even more alarming than these key indicators is what the
current miss-match between funding and requirements is spawning in the
way of strategic thinking among defense intellectuals and some senior
military leaders, both active and retired.
The prevailing wisdom seems to be that there is not enough money to
keep today's force ready, while also accomplishing the modernization
needed to prepare that force for future challenges. That prevailing
wisdom has driven many very well meaning people to try to pick the
future that we should prepare to meet, since there doesn't appear to be
enough money available to prepare for the full array of futures that we
may face.
One school of thought holds that we should prepare for a future
filled not with Desert Storms, but with "Sons of Chechnya."
Others divine a future filled with urban conflict in the pursuit of drug
lords, or other third world threats. Then there are those enamored of
the asymmetric threat theater ballistic missiles, or suitcases and
vials filled with weapons of mass destruction. Some see a future devoid
of the conventional conflicts that have been so common in this rapidly
waning twentieth century, but rather one in which terrorists roam the
world reaping havoc with our key institutions, values and vital
interests.
There are two things that all of these visionaries have in common,
despite their differing views of which future we should prepare for.
Every one of them is prepared to trade in the programs that are intended
to preserve this nation's ability to wage large scale conventional
conflict, for some yet to be defined capability to counter the threat
that they have decided we will face in the future. Tactical
fighter modernization is the usual offset of choice. Those who believe
in matching threats after they emerge say that there are none to
justify the expense. Those who focus on asymmetry say they won't be able
to operate anyway due to an absence of forward basing, and we should
buy more bombers instead. And those who foresee urban conflict or
"son of Chechnya" in our future see air power in any form as a
costly luxury that we can ill afford. It is boots on the ground that
we'll need, and nothing more. I note that the Assistant Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army was recently quoted as saying that the F-22 and the
Navy's new attack sub should be curtailed to industrial base efforts
just sufficient to keep design teams employed.
The other common theme is the assertion that America's conventional
dominance makes it unlikely that we will face an adversary willing to
take us on in a major conventional conflict. Our very success at the
high end of the conflict spectrum is what drives their interest in
working the low end of the spectrum, and makes them willing to forego
the capabilities that have made us so dominant.
These people of vision have ample historical precedent. There have
always been an abundance of those who thought they could divine the
future, but not many who actually could. Who among them foretold a
cataclysmic world war growing from a royal assassination in the Balkins?
Who can forget Nevil Chamberlain's triumphal return to England with the
words "Peace in our time" on his lips? And how firm were Dean
Acheson's beliefs when he drew a line that excluded Korea from that part
of the world of importance to the United States. How many of us still
recall LBJ telling us that "We are not about to send American boys
9 or 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing
for themselves." And how about those reports from the Middle East
in 1990 asserting confidently that Iraq would never invade Kuwait,
despite the massing of troops within a stone's throw of the border.
Forgive me if I question the clarity of vision that calls for us to
discard the tools that have served us so well, in favor of a course that
they chart so dimly. I, for one, would prefer to recall the words of
George C. Marshall, who noted in 1945 that, "If man does find the
solution for world peace, it will be the most revolutionary reversal of
his record we have ever known." The fact is that we have never been
very good at predicting the place or nature of our next military
engagement. And I doubt that our record is going to improve any time
soon.
It is for that reason that I urge a course that honors the advice
given to wing walkers of old, "Never let go of the last wire before
you have a firm grip on the new." In our case, the last wire can be
described as the concept of deterrence. It served us well for nearly 40
years, as airmen and sailors stood at the bulwarks to prevent the one
war that had to be prevented. The horrific potential of nuclear war
encouraged us to spare no expense in our efforts to deter such a
conflict. And to date we have been successful. Now, we find ourselves in
the enviable position of being so dominant in the realm of large-scale
conventional conflict that no potential adversary is thought willing to
take us on. In essence, we have extended the concept of deterrence
another big step down the conflict spectrum.
What an enviable situation that is. We can go to bed each night
secure in the knowledge that there will be no nuclear attack on our
nation while we sleep. And we can go about our daily business with
reasonable assurance that no major regional conflict looms on the
horizon to consume the lives of our children or grand children. In fact,
most serious defense intellectuals spend most of their time these days
worrying about threats to what most would consider less than vital
interests. Isn't that a wonderful state of affairs? What a wonderful
return on the investment that our nation has made in its security over
so many years.
But would it really be wise to turn our backs on the concepts and
tools that brought us to these dizzying heights, and reach instead for
an ill defined set of capabilities designed primarily to deal with less
than vital threats to our nation? Surely, we do need to pursue
capabilities to deal with terrorists and other asymmetric threats to our
well being. But must it come at the expense of those forces that have
deterred nuclear war for nearly fifty years, and those that have made
large scale conventional conflict with the United States unthinkable?
Remember the "Doomsday Clock" and the air raid drills that
sent us scrambling under our school desks in the fifties? Well, the
Doomsday Clock still exists, and it hasn't been reset to zero it's at
14 minutes before midnight. The threat of nuclear war has not yet been
banished from the earth, and we would be well advised to hold on to that
deterrent that has served us so well for so long. It need not be large,
but it should not be zero! Because if we take our eye off the ball of
nuclear deterrence, we may well find that the threat to that most vital
of our interests will reemerge we may find the "Doomsday
Clock" moving back toward mid-night.
And if we want to feel secure that our children or grand children
will not be called on to fight a major conventional conflict in the
future, then we should not be too quick to cast off the capabilities
that have earned us such widespread respect. Let's not rush to define as
irrelevant the capabilities that allow so many to speculate on a future
devoid of the threat of another global war, or even of another Korea or
Vietnam. Those conflicts cost this nation hundreds of thousands of lives
in this century, and others paid an even higher price. Are we so sure of
our vision of the future that we would risk revisiting that fate on our
children? Based on our rather dismal record in the business of
predicting future conflict, that may be a bad bet.
What we need to do is maintain our nuclear deterrent, as well as the
balanced set of capabilities on land, sea and aerospace that have made
us so dominant in conventional warfare. We have extended deterrence down
the conflict spectrum to the level of major theater war. Now is not the
time to slacken our efforts. Our world is one in which every action
provokes a reaction, and our failure to maintain the dominant
capabilities that serve us so well today, could easily tempt some future
tyrant to challenge us at a level where the costs are high indeed.
Now is not the time to "divest" ourselves of those
capabilities that have made us so dominant. We are a wealthy nation in
large part because we are a secure nation. What we need to do now is
find the resources to extend our military dominance farther down the
conflict spectrum. You might think of this as "Tiered
Deterrence." As we identify new threats to our security; such as
theater ballistic missiles, state sponsored terrorism, and the
international drug cartels, we need to develop concepts to counter those
threats. Then we need to develop the mission need statements and
requirements documents, and do the analyses of alternatives needed to
support acquisition of the tools that our forces will need to defend
against, counter and eventually deter those threats.
Despite the critics who accuse us of preparing for the last war, we
are doing exactly what I have just suggested. The threat that seems to
cause the most hand wringing among defense analysts is the theater
ballistic missile armed with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads.
To defend against that threat we are developing a family of missile
defenses that include THAAD, Navy Upper Tier and the Airborne Laser.
This is probably the most expensive of the so called
"asymmetric" threats to counter, and we are funding these
programs from within the currently projected DoD budget top line.
Another is the similarly armed cruise missile. Not an easy threat to
counter, but many elements of a defense are already in the investment
pipeline. The F-22 and advanced surveillance systems, complemented by
THAAD and Navy Upper Tier, will form the nucleus of our defense against
this threat, again, funded from within the currently projected DoD
budget.
So what is it that the critics would do with the $10 billion dollars
that they propose to divert from current forces and their modernization?
What are the programs that they would have us pursue to achieve the
revolution in military affairs that they seek? We hear talk of increased
experimentation and scientific research, yet all of the Services, as
well as the Joint CINCs, are pursuing experimentation and advanced
concept development through their battle labs, exercises and technology
demonstrations. And as to scientific research, DoD is now spending more
than $8 billion a year on S&T, more than half of that on basic and
applied research. This does not include the more than $28 billion being
spent on formal engineering, manufacturing and development programs.
Just how much is enough? And at what point would the critics propose we
begin to capitalize on this enormous investment by actually fielding
some advanced weaponry?
Another favorite of the military reformers is the subject of
information ops. The thinking is that we must increase investment in the
so called digital battlefield, and in ways to defend the information
systems on which we are growing increasingly dependent. But once again,
the current estimate of our investment in C4ISR is $42 billion a year,
or 16% of the entire DoD budget. How much is enough? Must we continue
down this road until we know everything, but can kill nothing?
My point is that we are already investing large sums in the very
kinds of capabilities that defense intellectuals, reformers and those
with such a clear view of the future would have us pursue. We are not
neglecting the asymmetric threats to which our adversaries are forced to
resort by our conventional dominance. We are, in fact, pursuing a rather
well balanced program of force modernization, while at the same time
sustaining the readiness of the force that is so heavily engaged around
the world today. AND, we are supporting a very healthy program of
research, experimentation, and concept development in support of the
revolution in military affairs.
No, from where I sit at Air Combat Command, and I understand that
where you stand depends a great deal on where you sit, there is no
compelling need to pour additional billions into these ill defined
visions of a future threat. But there is a need for additional billions
to sustain the forces that are in the field today. We are getting the
job done, but the heavy commitment of our forces to deal with today's
threats in Korea, Iraq, the Balkans, Africa and Latin America is
taking a heavy toll on our people. Their pain is a pain born of
frustration, and that frustration is aggravated by our failure to
provide the spare parts and tech data they need to fix their equipment.
It is aggravated by shortfalls in manning, and by our inability to
modernize their aging weapon systems with capabilities that they need to
be successful in combat, and perhaps to survive that combat.
We do in fact need more billions to make our Air Force whole again,
and I'm sure that the other Services need more billions as well. What
else would explain the unprecedented willingness of senior Service
leaders to take pot shots at one another's core programs? What this
country needs is a very healthy and balanced set of land, sea and
aerospace forces. We have a reasonable balance today, but their health
is in question. I'd guess that we need another four or five billion
dollars a year to fix the major shortfalls that plague our Air Force. If
the other Services problems are of a similar magnitude, that's $10 to
$15 billion for all of DoD.
We can get that money in one of two ways. Either allow us to become
efficient, or raise the DoD top line in the Federal budget. Either
approach will require some political courage. As a military man, I am
indifferent as to which approach we choose. I simply ask that we give
those wonderful young men and women who serve us so well, the resources
that they need to do the very difficult work that we ask of them. As a
taxpayer, I would prefer that we be allowed to become efficient. That
means releasing the political constraints that have grown more severe
with each passing year, and that make it impossible to consolidate
forces and reduce infrastructure commensurate with our needs. It means
putting an end to industrial and civic welfare programs funded through
the defense budget. It means stable funding for major development
programs so that we have some chance of completing them on time and
within budget. It means procuring weapons and weapon systems at economic
rates. It means making tough choices between redundant capabilities. And
yes, it means closing some more bases.
Our acceptance of a DoD budget top line that is too low to both
sustain today's force, and modernize for tomorrow, puts in jeopardy the
finest military force that this country has ever known. It pits military
leaders against one another in a fight for dollars; leaders who should
be working arm in arm to find better ways to defeat this nation's
adversaries. It deprives our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines of
the tools and training that they need to be effective when they are sent
in harm's way. And it deprives their families of the support that they
need to endure the hardships of a military lifestyle. The caution flags
are flying. When the current cap on defense spending was set, did anyone
envision the extent to which our armed forces would be engaged as
instruments of diplomacy around the globe? It is time to adjust our
investment objectives to the reality of the world in which we find
ourselves. Ten or fifteen billion dollars may be "real money"
as Ev Dirkson might have said, but it really isn't that much in
the context of the whole federal budget. If it is too much to ask to be
allowed to become efficient, is it too much to ask that we make a
commitment in dollars equal to the commitment that our men and women in
uniform make to the preservation of our freedoms? I don't think so.
The debate about the future course of our nation's military will
continue for many days to come. There will be more advisory boards, and
more defense panels. Well meaning people will peer into crystal balls
and attempt to divine the nature of the world in which our children will
find themselves twenty or more years hence. They will offer
prescriptions based on what they see. But just as sure as the sun will
rise in the east tomorrow morning, they will be wrong. We have never
accurately guessed the nature or the place of our next military
challenge, and we are unlikely to improve on that record. So if we want
to be prepared for whatever lies around the next corner, we'd be well
served to keep balance first and foremost in our minds. A balanced set
of military capabilities on land, at sea and in aerospace. A balanced
set of capabilities that can preserve our deterrence of nuclear war,
that can remain dominant so as to deter large scale conventional war,
and that can evolve gracefully to deal with those asymmetric but lesser
threats to our nation's interests that are sure to arise. Can we afford
less?
Gen. Shaud: I have several variations of this
question. It has to do with air expeditionary forces and the question
is, what is the long-range variant of the AEF and how are bombers
considered in terms of, for example, the recent deployments to the Gulf?
Gen. Hawley: First of all, the AEF is a concept that
is very flexible. The AEF is not a canned package of 12 of this and 12
of that and 6 of those. The AEF is a tailorable force that we can
provide in very short notice to respond to a CINCs requirement for
combat air power, any time, any place in the world. We've demonstrated
that. You asked about long-range air, our bomber force. I would say that
the bomber AEF, the first AEF that we tailored as a bomber force, was
Desert Strike, about a year and a quarter ago because Desert Strike,
with the integrated support from Air Mobility Command -- Walt's air
lifters and tankers, we put those B-52s into Guam, positioned them and
then responded with calcums on target in less than 24 hours from the
call. More recently, as we deployed this past November in response to
the current crisis in the Middle East, we deployed the 347th
AEF, that went over into Bahrain. It was under that AEF was the F-117s,
which joined the ops group in Kuwait and the B-52s set up an air
expeditionary group in Diego Garcia. We have become very flexible in
this business of projecting air power.
The key to its success has been the integration of the capabilities
of Air Mobility Command and ACC. We have learned to achieve the kinds of
synergies from our capabilities that allow air power in its broadest
sense and its most flexible sense to truly be responsive and deploy in
response to CINCs requirements anywhere on the globe. You can have an
AEF that involved nothing but humanitarian airlift. And that can happen
tomorrow. This is a very flexible concept. We have brought it along, it
is very mature. This last deployment to the Middle East was a textbook
example of how to deploy air power. It was well planned. The people
executed the plan the way they planned it. They didn't throw the kitchen
sink in to tax Walt's air lift system. We learned a lot and by doing
that very tough work, having our staffs get together to plan those loads
and all that tanker bridge that has to be put together and learn how to
get that in place quickly and responsively. We've done a lot.
The next piece that we have to do and the one that is always a
stickler in this business is figure out how to work the process that our
country uses to work overflight and diplomatic clearances so that can be
as timely as all the things that we do with an AEF.
Gen. Shaud: As you would tailor a long-range air
expeditionary force, does the 509th, the B-2 wing at Whiteman,
play in that force?
Gen. Hawley: We've just begun to acquire the block
30 at Whiteman. Many of you have read the GAO report and assume that
this aircraft melts in the rain, I suppose. It doesn't. But the block 20
is not a ready that we are ready to deploy forward. More than half of
that small force at Whiteman at block 20s today. If I were to use the
B-2 today, my recommendation to a CINC would be to employ them in a
global power way, out of Whiteman and then bring them back. But very
shortly, we will be able to deploy the B-2 in the block 30
configuration. We will have the temporary shelters to take with it, so
we can maintain its signature in a deployed environment. It, too, will
be an option for a tailored AEF. In fact, before very long we plan on
testing this concept with a B-2 deployment that will last for a
reasonable period of time, fly sorties at their planned wartime
utilization rate so we can demonstrate its capability and learn the
lessons that we have to learn as the operating command -- how to
maintain and operate this airplane in a deployed environment. Yes, it
too will be a candidate for future AEFs.
Gen. Shaud: The last question. As you know the Guard
and Reserve are certainly represented here in the total force. What
needs to be done to give precision-guided munitions capability in the
Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve and can we accelerate our
efforts?
Gen. Hawley: First of all, every one should
understand what a huge contribution the Air National Guard and the Air
Force Reserve make to our operations every day. We have Air National
Guard and Air Force Reserve forces all over the world. They are down in
Latin America. They are over in the desert. They are in Europe. Every
place that you see us, you see the total force. That is a great success
story and one that we should all be proud of. One of the limitations
that the fighter part of that Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve
force face today is their inability, for many of those units, to deliver
precision munitions. There is a couple things going. One, the National
Guard has initiated some programs to procure some lantern pods. That
will give them an ability to deliver LGBs in some units. I know they are
not going as fast as they'd like, but they are going about as fast as
that overly constrained budget I talked about will allow.
Second, this new family of GPS-aided munitions, JDAM, JSOW and JASSM,
and Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispensers will be available for delivery
by Air National Guard airplanes. Initially they are going to have to be
programmed on the ground. The majority of our GPS-aided munitions and
WCMD require the 1760 data bus and software modifications. Proposed
non-1760 variants of these weapons are not funded. They cannot be
preprogrammed for release from non-1760 equipped aircraft. Required 1760
mods are currently funded for all aircraft except the A-10. The enhanced
LGB (GBU-27) does not require 1760 interface. Mission data can be loaded
on the ground during preflight, then the weapon can use its own GPS
receiver to align its guidance INS. We are pursuing that just as rapidly
as we can as we need the whole Air Force to be able to deliver precision
and near-precision weapons if we are all going to play in the future. We
are going to need the whole force to play.
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