Foundation Forum

General John P. Jumper
Commander, USAFE
AFA Orlando Symposium

Feb. 26, 1998

"Expeditionary Air Force: A New Culture for a New Century"

I am going to take just a few minutes today to talk to you about our air expeditionary forces, the role I believe they are going to play in the next century of our Air Force, and the attendant culture I think has to develop in order for us to be effective as an expeditionary aerospace force.

The mid-1950's composite air strike force was a basic package that had a limited capability and built slowly into an extensive follow-on force. The typical force structure in the old air strike force put forth the best array of our complete capabilities from troop carrier aircraft through long-range airplanes, reconnaissance and strike aircraft.

They deployed with about 30 days of sustainment to a variety of crises happening throughout the world during that time period: Turkey, Taiwan, the Berlin Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis. Today, in the modern era, we try to recapture the spirit, if not every detail, of that composite air strike force in the air expeditionary force.

As (Air Force) chief of staff, General Ron Fogleman allowed us to go ahead with developing the air expeditionary force to fit in the joint structure with airpower relevant to today's dynamic world.

Though not my theater of operations, the Pacific is just such an example of the dynamics we face. There is probably no greater example of emerging powers that are shifting financial power structures than in the Pacific. There is the prospect of a united North and South Korea in the future; we should be thinking now about how we will address that world.

This leads us to think about things that we probably haven't thought of in a long time, such as approaching governments to build capabilities with prepositioning, exercise programs and diplomatic initiatives, which can get us into a position to help stabilize whatever dynamics might develop in parts of the world that will be important to us both diplomatically and economically.

Shifting to the European theater, with forward stationing, we can reach out and do better, taking into account the dynamics of a future world which looks more toward humanitarian-type operations, intervention, relief and noncombatant evacuation operations. But how will we cover areas that aren't well covered now?

Our reach from Ramstein Air Base with tactical airlift to, say, Africa, in the situations where we would have to go into limited prepared airfields, or even build our own airfields, needs to expand.

We are even now speaking to countries throughout Africa where we could deploy aircraft, crews and medical, engineering and force-protection specialists into operations where we could build our own capability to resupply and protect ourselves properly during extended operations in an expeditionary mode.

What do we need to be able to do these sorts of things? We need to be postured so that we can respond rapidly in hours, with light, lean and lethal forces tailored to what the commander-in-chief needs. This includes the whole range of conventional airpower the way we normally think about it (with rapidly deploying conventional forces) through tactical airlift that provides needed humanitarian relief. We have demonstrated this airpower so many times from situations in Northern Iraq down through contingencies we have already experienced in Africa. But we need the infrastructure to preposition assets and we need the skills to arrive quickly and to be able to fight on arrival.

We need the right sort of rules, and the right sort of guidance to put this into place -- which we have. We need to be able to practice, through our battlelabs, becoming even lighter and leaner as we get to the technologies that will allow us to deploy even more rapidly. We need doctrine that allows us to fight on arrival. We need airmen with an expeditionary mindset to organize ourselves so that we present airpower forces to a CINC in a way that is understandable. We need to be equipped with the right force protection, the right support, the right communications, the right command and control so that we can get the air tasking order, fit in with a joint force and do our job the way airpower is organized to do.

In USAFE, we are starting to work on this just as Air Combat Command is developing these capabilities. We have the basic elements of conventional force, the basic elements of tactical airlift and, with the help of Air Mobility Command, the strategic mobility forces to get where we need to do that job. But we can do a lot of it from within without overtaxing our precious strategic mobility assets.

In the concept of the AEF (air expeditionary force), one can picture scenarios where we make distinctions between deployment lift, which is light and lean, and sustainment lift, which comes after we have begun operations, after three or four days.

We need a command and control package that is very light and lean, and depends on reachback to a headquarters or command element to generate an air tasking order. That headquarters is generating most of the data; what you get forward is just the results of that data.

We need information operations to protect ourselves so we can communicate with whatever elements or detachments we have out from the base of operation, with the other Services and with our command chain, both up and laterally. In the future, elements of tactical- and operational-level information warfare will allow the commander to handle threats at those levels with tools designed to be deployed forward.

We need language skills so that people can spend time in these parts of the world, learn cultures and become culturally relevant when a crisis does occur. We need engineering skills, where we practice repairing or improving runways on short notice, and force-protection skills that make us culturally relevant in parts of the world where we do not have much experience. The chief (of staff) has put emphasis on this as we begin to build the sorts of programs that will give us the language skills and diplomatic exposure around the world that we need for these expeditionary forces.

I am going to talk a little bit about the expeditionary nature of forces as they relate to an expanding NATO. The command structure within NATO will look profoundly different than it does today. We will shift to two large commands and two large air components within the theater and try to reconcile that with notions of out-of-area and out-of-region operations characteristic of an expeditionary airpower-related force.

Initially, within this new NATO command structure, and with the new nations that are coming aboard -- the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary -- in April of 1999, the initial emphasis is on the ability to defend yourself at the very basic level. But the larger mission of NATO looks beyond its own borders, beyond its own region. The attractiveness of humanitarian-like expeditionary forces is that they are something that nations can say yes to very easily, as we respond to various humanitarian-related crises throughout that area.

I am going to take just a brief detour here to show you a bit of the problem I am dealing with as I try to explain these elements of air power in my environment within NATO. The new organization, although certainly not decided upon completely yet, has a regional command north and south, components below that, and a new phenomenon called joint sub-regional commands. As this command structure develops, the danger for airpower is that these joint sub-regional commands tend to want their own airpower parceled out to them to work in specific contingencies. We have to guard against nationalization and regionalization of airpower in a way that sub-optimizes airpower. We must make sure that as the component command, we have (area of responsibility) AOR-wide responsibilities between regional command north and regional command south. We have been able thus far to sell the notion that airpower works for the regional joint commander as a component. This notion is getting wider and wider acceptance and I am convinced that in the long run, our opinion will prevail on this.

But the other troublesome part is that you have to go to the third layer down, the component layer, before you find your senior airman in the theater. At the SHAPE level, there is no senior airman representation at this time and it is something that we have to continue to work on, as well as these lash-ups with the joint sub-regional command.

Also within this structure, you can see our share of representation -- with nine Army four-stars, three Navy four-stars, and one Air Force four-star in this lineup.

NATO has embraced this notion of out-of-area and out-of-region. It has embraced the notion of a joint force air component commander and the notion of light and lean deployment capability. We will continue to push these within NATO with the US Air Force in the lead because we cannot mobilize anywhere within NATO or outside NATO without the use of our very valuable strategic lift forces and Walt Kross' help from his TACC (Tanker Airlift Control Center), the TALCE (Tactical Airlift Control Element), the AMOCC (Air Mobility Operations Control Center) -- and his infrastructure.

General Ryan talked about the expeditionary air force, its mentality and its seamlessness with other Air Force operations, which leads to a discussion of our culture. We are developing a new generation of air and space warriors. What does that mean?

This new generation of air and space warriors has to be tougher minded. It has to get back to the mentality of the old composite air strike force, where they used to live under the wing -- they fly in, set up the tent city and live off of Meals Ready to Eat for a week or so before sustainment airlift starts. When they fly in, they may have some prepositioned assets available to start the war, but they are very light and very lean. They have the ability to protect themselves with information warfare, with the people who understand how to operate these systems. The command structure is very small but with good reachback capability.

In this culture, you have to get back to some basic institutional values: every airman is a warrior, every airman is a sensor. These basic institutional values say we will be qualified on a weapon. We will be able to keep up and maintain mobility bags; we will understand force protection, right down to the task level; we will have in our wallets the card showing the specific things that are expected of each of us in peace and in a crisis. And we will provide the continuity and training that makes each and every airman understand the basics of air and space planning and employment, from basic training at Lackland Air Force Base up through the officers and airmen's professional military education and throughout the Air Force.

We must get to the situation, eventually, where instead of saying "HUA" [Heard, Understood, Acknowledged], we say "Airpower!" when we salute one another. It becomes a basic part of our everyday, back-to-basics way of life. When you look at what's happening at Air Force bases today, I think we are on the track to a good back-to-basics program. In USAFE, we started a program where we have a retreat ceremony once a month. We do a pass in review. The troops get out and march. They remember how to be a close part of an integrated team. They practice being part of that team. It takes their minds off how many ear-piercings and body tattoos they have and makes them want to be a part of my team -- not the hole-in-the-lip team. Our young people are yearning for this leadership. They want this leadership. We have the leadership in the Air Force today to give it to them.

In developing this expeditionary force culture, force protection is a key issue. The traditional mindset that has developed over the years is an inside-the-fence mentality about force protection. This inside-the-fence mentality said it was the Air Force's business to watch inside the fence -- it was up to us to coordinate with or depend on others for whatever was to happen outside the fence. We had joint agreements that said the Army would watch us outside the wire, and that they would help train our people to have the capability inside the wire. But these agreements, as it turns out, were only valid during times of declared war. It has become apparent that are we are going to have to take on some of this capability ourselves.

What we have learned and what we have to get is an idea of force protection that melds itself with the notions of air-based defense, so that we can protect ourselves both inside and reasonably outside the fence, with a new generation of technologies and doctrine that puts security forces at the forefront of our force protection resources. The Air Force has done this with a unit at Lackland Air Force Base that is developing the technology through battle labs and experimentation to get us into this business.

At Lackland, they are also breeding a new generation of warriors -- graduates of the Ranger School. They have skills as snipers. They have skills in air-base defense, bringing in Stinger missiles and technologies of imaging infra-red and other sensors around and outside the gate to protect our forces when they are deployed.

Then, finally, part of the culture is the understanding of the basic elements of air and space planning and execution. When the whistle blows, we are responding to a critical timeline, a timeline that can deploy forces into harm's way inside the decision cycle of an enemy. We have strategic mobility forces that can get us there quickly. We can respond quickly. We have the doctrine and the techniques to fight immediately when we arrive. At an airfield anywhere in the world, that first leading airlifter can get in there no matter how bad the weather is, and can set up whatever sort of technology is required to bring the follow-on airlift in there. We have the mobility assets and the willingness to live in tents over an extended period of time if we have to. Put air power where the problem is!

Let me say a word about the bombers. The first airplanes to drop bombs in anger under the air expeditionary concept were the B-52s that took off from Guam, flew for 36 hours a total of 17,000 miles, and shot CALCMs (Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missiles) into Southwest Asia. The fighter part of that same air expeditionary force was leaning forward and ready to go but it was not called forward. Not only did the bombers fly that mission as part of the air expeditionary force, but they had to change their plan from going east to going west. Not only did they have to change their plan, but the whole mobility machine had to change with it: tankers had to be redeployed, put elsewhere, to make that mission happen. So, are the bombers a part of the air expeditionary force? You bet. Are they going to continue to be a part of the expeditionary force? You bet. We can't do it without them.

As we look forward to this next century, I am excited. We have the tools, we have the people, we have the mission. The challenge of this generation of leadership is going to make sure that we keep that mission squarely in front of the people we need to do the job. General Kross was right -- we depend on our NCOs. The thing that sets us apart as an Air Force from every one else is the quality of those NCOs. They understand that just by living in the tent city in Bosnia, they are probably saving a thousand lives a week. Just by being in Southwest Asia, they have probably stopped Saddam Hussein from developing a generation of weapons of mass destruction. It is an important mission. If we keep it in front of their faces, it will be important to them. And if it is important to them, there is no alternative in the world that can offer them the sense of mission, sense of accomplishment, sense of fulfillment they will achieve by serving their nation in that capacity. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. I look forward to taking your questions.

Gen. Shaud: You have hit at least two home runs, with AEF and NATO. First one, AEF. What are some of the initiatives coming out of the AEF battle labs that you see as most useful to AEF operations?

Gen. Jumper: General Hawley would be better equipped to answer the specifics of that question, but there are concepts that take a look at how to package ourselves smaller and lighter, how to take better advantage of the strategic airlift that we have, how to do things like separate deployment lift from sustainment lift. How to preposition, where it pays -- and where it doesn't pay -- to preposition assets. It's the concept of going into a place where you know you might be called, such as Southwest Asia, and on the four or five expeditionary bases that you have there, you put in one or two case bands of about 17,000 square feet each. In there, what do you put that will give you the maximum payoff?

It is the notion of language skills. It is the idea that maybe instead of master's degree we ought to give more credit for a second language to our officers as they grow up, something that we as Americans don't do very well. It is the technologies I talked about that are going on down in the force protection battlelab that have to do with guarding our bases in a deployed status. It is a range of things.

Gen. Shaud: The next question is also expeditionary-force oriented. Please comment on your perception of the feasibility and usefulness of an all-Reserve component expeditionary force. For example, Air Force Reserve Command owns all non-stealth air frame components represented in the combat air forces. Do you foresee a bite-size-chunk mission for such a force?

Gen. Jumper: We can't move a thing without the participation of our Reserve forces. When you translate that into a rapid response, you have to be careful about which skills you parse out. However, in the humanitarian relief operation, I can see us rapidly deploying with an active force, but very quickly being relieved with forces from the Guard and Reserve that would sustain the mission for however long it had to go. Is there a part to play? You bet.

Gen. Shaud: Next question has to do with NATO and NATO expansion. There are a lot of us here who worked interoperability in NATO for a great many years. How do you see the challenge to interoperability in an expanded NATO, and are there great doctrine discussions?

Gen. Jumper: Yes. As a matter of fact, just last week I had the air chiefs from Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland at my headquarters. We stood out there for one of the parades that I talked to you about, in front of a very sharp formation of airmen with rifles who marched by. The Hungarian air chief said to me, "Never in my wildest dreams did I ever imagine I would stand in front of a NATO headquarters and hear my national anthem being played." It makes us want to do the right thing to make this happen for NATO. But are the challenges there? Yes, sir, they are. We have to start off in very small steps. In April of 1999, the new nations will not be able to carry out their full Article V responsibilities. Right now, we have to decide where it is they need help and what we need to do for them to carry out those responsibilities. They are willing and eager to modernize themselves with new radars, new aircraft and new weapons in a way that harmonizes and integrates with NATO standards and equipment. In many cases, they will buy Western gear to do that job.

Gen. Shaud: Final question. The access to overseas basing is really key to the use of Air Force air power. How large an issue is this and what is on the horizon to deal with this issue?

Gen. Jumper: Access is an issue until you begin to involve the vital interests of the nation that you want and need as a host. Then access is rarely an issue. Still, we have to prepare ourselves in ways that I discussed before. If you are engaged with these countries in an aggressive exercise program instead of a prolonged rotational presence, if your maintenance people are involved at the grass-roots level teaching them how to maintain airplanes, if you make yourself valuable as a training asset to these countries in ways that are definable and measurable, then you add a dynamic of regional stability that otherwise would not be there, of familiarity, of comfort that makes those decisions easier when you have to ask to deploy in a real situation. This is where cultural, diplomatic and language skills help you out. But it is consistent engagement without consistent presence that helps us in this new age of cultural warfare.

Gen. Shaud: Let me ask you one more that I hadn't thought about until recently. The protection from theater missiles has been an ancient and honorable issue within Europe for a long time. I wonder about the defense from theater missiles, how is that coming? Anything new on that front?

Gen. Jumper: Discussing theater missile defense in Europe is no different than it is when we discuss it with all our coalitions around the world. It is a capability that the United States largely brings to the game. Our capability today is profoundly improved from what we saw in Desert Storm and will continue to get better. That theater missile defense problem right now is in many ways handled by the United States. It has to do with a real-time nature of action and reaction that comes through our air operation centers and our rapid reaction capabilities.

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