Foundation Forum
General Richard B. Myers
Commander, Pacific Air Forces
Feb. 26, 1998
"Ensuring Stability During a Time of
Change in the Asia Pacific"
I am sure you are all aware of the recent economic crisis that we've
been going through in the Asia Pacific region. The media have been
pretty good about covering the impact on our economy here in the United
States and on American markets. What you may not be as aware of, though,
are the impacts of the crisis, both real and potential, on the Asia
Pacific militaries as well as America's military posture in the region.
In the few moments that I'm going to spend with you, I'd like to give
you my perspective on what is happening in the region and how we in
PACAF are responding. Hopefully we can help in our small way to set the
stage for resumed economic growth and prosperity. Lastly, I would like
to discuss some of the things we are working on to achieve airpowers'
true potential in that theater where airpower is very essential to
meeting our CINC's needs.
Until recently, the Asia Pacific region has been touted as an
economic miracle. In the past 25 years, the number of people in the Asia
Pacific who live in poverty has been cut in half despite a substantial
increase in population. All you have to do is walk the streets of any
city over there and you see that Mercedes have indeed replaced most
rickshaws. Times have been good. That is, until recently. How did this
economic miracle happen? There are many ingredients, but I would submit
that one of the most important was the U.S. military presence. I was
reminded, when General Jumper was talking, that in Europe you have the
NATO structure for security. In Asia Pacific, there is no structure such
as NATO. We rely on the U.S. presence over there and I think most
countries in the region would tell you the same thing.
It would have been easy after the Vietnam War to fold up our tent and
go back to our shores, but we didn't take the easy way out. The United
States had a very good vision. We kept our troops forward based in the
Pacific as a deterrent force, ensuring our ability to act quickly should
the need arise. With democracy firmly entrenched in most Asia-Pacific
countries and no immediate threats to security, some journalists and
politicians have begun to ask why we still need airmen, sailors,
soldiers, Marines in the region. Why don't we just bring them on home
and take that money and put it to better use somewhere else?
I believe it would be a grave mistake to pat ourselves on the back,
assume Asia-Pacific will be free of conflict and scale down our forces.
The current Asian economic crisis and the potential unrest merely
reinforce the argument that for peace and prosperity to continue, it is
vital that the United States and the United States Air Force remain
engaged in Asia Pacific well into the 21st century. Our
stabilizing presence allows Asia Pacific countries to focus on the
business of political and social restructuring and to support economic
development. Our presence has probably never been needed more than right
now.
To illustrate my point, let me elaborate on some of the problems and
challenges being faced by our partners in the Pacific today as a result
of the economic crisis. As you know, there has been severe economic
upheaval since last July. General Hawley talked about predictions, but
there weren't many predictions about this upheaval, particularly in
South Korea. That caught everybody by surprise. It lends a lot of
credibility to what General Hawley was talking about. We don't know
exactly what will happen in the future, so we've got to be ready.
It is beyond the ability of this fighter pilot, even though I've had
a couple of economic courses, to give you a graduate-level course in
economics to explain what is happening. But I can give you some of the
facts so you can begin to understand the turmoil that has affected the
region. As you probably know well, the stock markets, property values
and currencies of most countries in Asia Pacific have all fallen
sharply. Currencies in Korea and Thailand have plunged in value by more
than 50 percent. Indonesia's currency plunged 66 percent. The stock
markets in all three of these countries have also plunged by at least 50
percent. Just imagine if the U.S. stock market went down to 4000 in a
matter of months and you get the idea of how severe the situation is on
their economies.
We had an economist talk to one of our commanders' conferences
recently and he said, "Imagine if you will, in Korea, the impact of
the crisis. It's like having Chrysler, Texaco, Lockheed-Martin, Coca
Cola, K-Mart and a few other major corporations all going bankrupt in
the United States in less than one year. Layoffs and uncertainty about
the future abound. I don't think we've seen the worst of that yet. A
quote from a pawnshop owner in Indonesia in the Far East Economic Review
sums it up rather starkly. He stated, "my customers have improved
in terms of quality. Many of them are now upper class businessmen."
This crisis has left no segment of society untouched.
This has had a very severe impact on the Asia Pacific military and
relations with the United States. First of all, most Asia Pacific
countries have had to make significant and painful cutbacks in their
military modernization programs. Most of you in the room know that all
too well. This is a result of large budget reductions coupled with a
devaluation of their currencies in relation to the dollar. In the last
six months, we've seen a number of major weapon systems purchases
canceled or postponed indefinitely. I visited Malaysia right before
Christmas. Officials there complained that they've taken a 30 percent
budget cut and their currency has gone down 50 percent in relation to
the dollar. With that kind of cut, how, they asked, can we buy any
American parts? There were almost tears in their eyes as the military,
as they knew it, was grinding to a halt.
The planned Korean procurement of AWACS, advanced trainers, aerial
refueling tankers and attack helicopters have all been put on hold.
Indonesia and the Philippines were looking to buy new jet aircraft, but
they have been postponed as well. It has been well publicized that
Thailand's proposed buy of F-18s has been postponed, and they are
looking for a third party or someone else to take on that
responsibility. In Japan, they've delayed their proposed aerial tanker
and airlift program by at least two years.
These reductions in foreign military sales have a domino effect.
Clearly it is not good for our economy, but also, it is not good for our
military-to-military exchanges and the training opportunities that come
from these kinds of sales. Unfortunately, and most importantly, again
because there is no NATO in the Asia Pacific region, it also limits the
interoperability of our forces, exactly the kind of capability we need
in time of contingencies.
A secondary area of concern is host nation support. We rely heavily
in both Japan and Korea on host nation support to provide the vital
infrastructure and other types of necessary assistance to American
troops stationed there. As long as they are having economic
difficulties, there will always be some question about their ability to
fulfill those support requirements in the future.
Finally, the economic crisis has made our normal peacetime
engagement, what we do day-to-day in the Pacific, very difficult.
Countries of the region are already cutting back on officer exchange
programs, the very thing that General Jumper talked about being so
vital. If they cut back, our rules say we've got to cut back, too, and
that is something we are going to have to fight and work our way
through. Now is not the time to abandon our partners over there.
Our Asian allies will be doing less training because their flying
hours will be cut and in the end it may make it more difficult to work
together when we must, in times of contingencies, be they humanitarian
or crisis.
We also see a trend by these nations to reduce the scope of bilateral
and multi-lateral exercises, the very means by which we learn
interoperability and partnership. Specifically, we see them asking for
help to reduce costs in order to take part in these combined exercises.
They have asked for increased assistance in planning, in fuel, in
munitions and in rations. Because of a lack of funding, some countries,
who had planned on participating, will not be able to attend our Alaskan
Cooperative Cope Thunder that we have planned for this summer. Now we
are looking for innovative ways to stay engaged in the region without
causing undue hardships on our partners.
Last week, I got back from Thailand. While there, I flew in what we
call our Cope Tiger exercise. Let me give you an idea of how good this
can get in terms of our interoperability. It was hosted by the Royal
Thai Air Force. We were at Korat Air Base. I hadn't been back there for
20 some years. We had the Singaporean Air Force there with F-5s and
F-16s. We had the Royal Thai Air Force there with F-16s and their F-5s.
We had Marine F/A18s, and, of course, F-15s and AWACS from the U.S. Air
Force. I took off in a 50 plane force that flew in a very large area
where supersonic flight was authorized. It was as much like a Red Flag
mission as you would ever want to be in and the competency of all the
pilots involved was absolutely superb. What we have to worry about is
that over the next several years, as these economies take time to
rebound, that we will lose that edge that we've gained. It has taken a
lot of hard work to get to where we are.
We've got to figure out quickly how to stay engaged because everybody
is under the strain of budget cutbacks. We've re-examined how we have
done business. We are in the infancy of this effort and certainly don't
have all the bright ideas. Hopefully, some of you out there will have
ways to help us. Some of them revolve around simple things -- just
innovative ways to use the technology that we have today. Video
teleconferencing is a capability that comes to mind. That would be a
simple thing to do, a relatively cheap thing to do for the most part,
compared to field exercises, and may fill a gap in engagement that we
would otherwise be unable to fill.
We also are looking at conducting more computer-assisted exercises
rather than field training exercises. It is just going to be a fact of
life, where we'd like to go to the field, now we'll probably have to do
it some other way. We have established dialogue with our Pacific
partners and we plan to stay engaged. This is what they want us to do
and it is the right thing to do. While we have just begun to explore
these new ways to work together, the key objective has got to focus on
how to make it less expensive for them.
Again, to piggyback off something General Hawley said, it is naive to
think we are going to be forever free of wars. Folks who do my stats say
that in the previous three millennia, only 268 years have been free of
major wars in the Asia-Pacific region. That averages out to only eight
peaceful years a century. Fortunately, because of our presence in Asia
Pacific, a lot of those years have been recent. With those odds, it is
understandable why one of the most significant concerns for the vast
majority of Asia-Pacific countries is the withdrawal of U.S. forces from
the region. Here you've got to be careful when you talk about
withdrawal, actual physical withdrawal or a more subtle form of
withdrawal which is disengagement because of lost training opportunities
and so forth. Both types of withdrawal are bad.
Resolution of economic turmoil requires political and military
stability. Everybody over there agrees that we help ensure that
stability exists. Loss of American presence could lead to an escalation
of the crisis beyond the current economic turmoil. Our goal is to
prevent any military crisis. Accordingly, it is in these times of
economic uncertainty that it is most important to stay engaged. To be
engaged, we need our overseas bases. We need to keep our forward
presence in Japan and Korea as well as our key strategic location on
Guam. By the way, Andersen Air Force Base, as you probably well know,
has sustained major damage from Super Typhoon Paka. It was a direct hit
on the island. It was slow moving and the winds they clocked were 236
miles per hour before the wind machine was blown away. In fact, the
Pacific typhoon warning center is located in base operations and the
roof of base operations was ripped off. One of the things that we must
do in the Pacific with our friends at the Air Staff and hopefully with
some Congressional help and help from the third floor at OSD, is to work
hard to get funding to restore Andersen to pre-Paka conditions because
that is a key location for us. In particular, we had three of our four
aircraft hangars there badly damaged and we need to restore them to pre-Paka
conditions.
The value placed on our forward presence was once again reconfirmed
during my recent trip to Asia when we met with the sultan of Brunei, a
small country, but important politically, and when we met with high
level Thai officials. They reaffirmed in as strong of terms as they
could reaffirm it, the importance of our presence in the region.
While it is important to be there, we also must be a competent force.
That requires that we adapt to a new environment to be able to carry out
the CINC's taskings. Just as the Asia economic situation has impacted
the Asian militaries, our own shrinking budget and the world situation
has forced us to dramatically alter the way we do business. In the last
10 years, we've gone from being prepared to fight a major war against
the Soviet Union to a broader mission of being ready to deter and/or
fight major theater wars and expanded contingency operations. New
technologies, new operational concepts, such as near-precision weapons
delivery by bombers, full integration of space assets, exploitation of
information, and the transformation into an air expeditionary force are
all allowing us to be much more nimble than we used to be.
History has taught us many lessons in the Pacific. One of them is
that without air superiority you have things like Pearl Harbor and with
it, you have things like the victory in Korea. Nothing has changed to
alter those lessons of history in the many contributions of airpower.
The vast distances involved and the short warning times of the
information age have ensured American airpower a dominant role in the
Asia Pacific region in both peace time emergencies and war time
operations.
Airpower provides our national leaders a quick reaction force, one
that can deploy and strike, if necessary, anywhere in the region in
minimal time. Taking advantage of the new technologies and operational
concepts I just mentioned will only enhance our capability and
credibility. For example, one of the places where forward-deployed air
power is absolutely key is the Korean Peninsula, and it is also a place
where new technologies are having quite an impact. While the importance
of the halt phase, and particularly airpower's contribution to it, are
debated inside the Washington Beltway, there is no debate in Korea.
Warning times there are very short. So, a quick and effective response
is absolutely vital. Fast responding airpower is the force available
immediately to halt the invading forces. Day-to-day in-place forces are
going to need reinforcement and airpower again is ideally suited to
rapidly respond to this situation.
Where the Air Force's new technology also makes a huge impact is our
bomber force. We have dramatically increased the conventional
flexibility and lethality of our bomber force. Now we have the option of
using CONUS-based bombers to quickly respond with precision or
near-precision munitions. With the vast distances of the Pacific, our
B-52s, B-1s and B-2s, with their long-range and large bomb loads, give
us an ability to quickly and accurately strike anywhere. General Hawley
just briefed the two CINCs in the Pacific, CINCPAC and the CINC on the
Korean Peninsula, to show the capability of the bombers and make them
aware of how many changes there really have been as we bring the bomber
to maturity in the conventional sense. He will tell you that the two
CINCs embraced these ideas for a more active role for our bombers. This
is an area where the details are nowhere near fully fleshed out. The
bomber is going to play a crucial role in the Pacific, and we've got
agreement that is the right thing to do. On the Peninsula, these bombers
could let us take out high-value assets at the start of hostilities.
This would free up fighter sorties for other priorities. To support the
increased use of bombers in the Pacific, we will be conducting our first
B-2 deployability exercise in the very near future.
Another place technology is making a difference is getting real-time
information to the cockpit. Recently, increased priority has been placed
on attacking the long-range artillery near the DMZ. These artillery
positions are mostly hidden in hardened shelters, underground tunnels
and they can range Seoul. To effectively counter this elusive threat,
the F-16 interim data modem is badly needed. It gives us the ability to
pass information on the location of those sites and when the gun might
be out of its hardened shelter so we can go attack it. One of the places
this information could come from would be the JSTARS aircraft. During a
recent deployment to Korea just a few months back, 7th Air
Force, for the first time, worked out a concept of operations on how to
fold the Joint STARS into its war plans. This was a very successful
deployment and it opened a lot of eyes.
All this improved technology also helps us with the ballistic missile
threat. In Desert Storm, we learned the importance of real-time
information when it came to Scud hunting. In Korea, it is more important
than ever that we effectively counter this threat because there we tend
to associate chemical weapons with theater ballistic missiles.
As for new operational concepts, General Jumper talked about the air
expeditionary force and that is especially appealing to PACAF, because
we have some very vast distances to cover. There are some very specific
logistical considerations that we've got to be aware of. Designed to be
light, lean and highly capable, AEFs can respond quickly during the
early stages of a contingency and potentially prevent further escalation
with prompt action. Prepositioning of needed assets at strategic forward
operating locations in PACAF will reduce the amount of airlift needed to
support any operation.
In addition to its role in responding to regional contingencies, AEFs
can also be extremely useful in providing assistance during humanitarian
emergencies and natural disasters, which plague the region. I should
mention the role of the Reserve forces in AEFs. We essentially had an
AEF when we sent two C-130s specially equipped to fight the forest fires
in Indonesia. They were Air National Guard crews. This was a very
stressful deployment because as they were dropping the water, the back
end of the airplane filled up with smoke causing a hostile environment.
In fact one of the most important things we did was make sure we had the
right medical team to go with them to ensure that the crews maintained
their health throughout this whole operation. It was not an easy one.
But it was a very successful one in terms of fighting fires and also in
terms of the goodwill that it brought to the U.S.
The importance of engagement with our allies and the success of the
AEF concept to PACAF cannot be overstated. We rely on access to key
strategic bases overseas for pre-positioning assets and other logistical
support requirements. Our day-to-day relationships, as General Jumper
said, make this base access possible. That is why we've got to stay
engaged.
Let me give you a real-world example of how our nimbleness has helped
us today. When the aircraft carrier Independence and its carrier airwing
were deployed to the Gulf to help with the Mid-East crisis, they turned
to the Air Force to backfill the absence of the carrier airwing near the
Korean Peninsula. In short order, we deployed an air expeditionary force
of 20 planes, put them into their contingency operating bases and also
put five bombers on alert in the United States. This is another example
of how the AEF concept works for us and works for our CINCs.
If this AEF concept is to continue to work, lots of things have to be
done. General Jumper covered some of those. One I think that we
sometimes over look is our modernization program. The F-22 is a superior
and more capable fighter than the F-15 it is going to replace. What
people don't think about very often, though, is the amazing advances
we've made in our ability to deploy and maintain the F-22. A squadron of
F-22s requires half the airlift of an F-15 squadron. This lift
requirement could be further reduced for short duration deployments. The
F-22 also significantly reduces the personnel needed to deploy and fight
because it requires only half the maintenance team of our F-15s.
Modernizing our force is a necessary part of making the AEF concept work
and we are doing just that with the F-22.
In terms of AEFs in the Pacific Theater, we've convinced the CINC
that we need to exercise the AEF in the theater. We are going to do it
1999 and we are going to do it in conjunction with a carrier battle
group. This is just in the planning stages right now. But it will be
fleshed out shortly so in about a year we will be exercising that
particular concept.
I hope this presentation has provided some insight into our current
challenges in the Pacific and what we are doing to cope with them and
help shape our environment. With the current emerging challenges that we
have, one is reminded of that old Chinese curse, "may you live in
interesting times." In ancient China those interesting times come
from armies running back and forth across your village. We are trying to
keep it from getting too interesting.
We are going to need a lot of people's help to make that happen. Some
of the people that I want to mention before I quit are the wonderful,
the energetic, the innovative men and women who serve in the Pacific Air
Forces all the way from Alaska and Hawaii to Diego Garcia. We've got the
best folks in the world and that has been talked about here by every
speaker. It is the truth. When you are on these visits you are
absolutely pumped up when you come back because of what these young
folks are doing, be they enlisted, officer, civilian or contractor
personnel supporting our operations. My hat is off to them. Thanks for
the opportunity to update you and I look forward to your questions.
Gen. Shaud: The first question has to do with
readiness. General Hawley mentioned several problems impacting airmen
and equipment. Have these problems reached the Pacific, and if so, what
has been the impact on the readiness of our Air Forces under your
command?
Gen. Myers: We are very lucky because we get some
supply priority in both Europe and the Pacific because of the distances
involved. We tend to mirror Air Combat Command, but just a little later
time line. Right now, our readiness has shown no decrease. I agree with
what General Hawley said and that the trends are all in the wrong
direction. We enjoy good support right now. Most of our numbers are just
a few percentage points higher than ACCs.
Gen. Shaud: The USAF-Korean exercises have taken on
political overtones recently. How do you compensate when exercises get
canceled for political reasons?
Gen. Myers: We have worked our way around that one
to some degree because with Ulchi Focus Lens, and RSOI, we have two
exercises that the CINC thinks that he needs to be ready to deploy in
support of him. Right now, we've gotten good support from everybody to
continue those exercises. So we feel we have the exercises we need to do
the job.
Gen. Shaud: With the instability in the region, have
PACAF forces had to come to a higher state of readiness and does the
build up in the Gulf take away from forces that are ready in the Pacific
Theater?
Gen. Myers: What they do is cut into our training,
and General Hawley hit upon it, because of the constant deployment to
Southwest Asia. But specifically, no. We are ready. When we deployed
those forces into Korea to make up for the lack of a carrier air wing,
one of the things we had to do was cancel one of our prime exercises up
in Alaska. That will deny us some training opportunities. But as long as
this is fairly short-lived, I don't see any degradation to our
readiness.
Gen. Shaud: In a previous incarnation, you were
assistant to the Chairman. When you would visit on the other side of the
river, is aerospace power well represented in the councils of the
National Security Council?
Gen. Myers: It was when I was there...The answer is
obviously yes. One of the main players in that is the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
There is no better person that understands air power and an advocate for
air power than General Ralston, who represents fairly the capabilities
of the Air Force and all the services.
Gen. Shaud: Final question. We hear much about
pressure by Okinawa to reduce military presence on the island. How will
this affect Air Force operations in the Pacific, if true?
Gen. Myers: My view is that this is one of those
situations you have to manage very carefully, almost day by day. As long
as the Korean Peninsula is a potential hot post, keeping our forces
forward-deployed on Okinawa will not be a problem. Once and if the
situation on the Peninsula resolves itself, then that will be more
problematic. My own view is that the U.S. Air Force will probably be
there for a very long time. What you don't read in the papers is the
wonderful relationships that our base there has with the five townships
that surround the base. Every once in a while the mayors have to put on
their political face and they'll say one thing. But in the
person-to-person relationships, they are very good and very supportive
of the Air Force presence there. I am optimistic that the U.S. Air Force
and the people of Okinawa can get along for a very long time.
Return to the Orlando '98 Foundation Forum Page
