Wednesday, September 9, 2009

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6153097/US-Gen-Stanley-McChrystal-rebukes-Germans-over-Afghan-strike-that-killed-civilians.html

The link above is to a Daily Telegraph story today re the F-15 strike on the Taliban tanker, in support of the German forces that called in the strike.

Analysis below is from an informed AFA member:

This whole episode is really bothersome, particularly Gen. McChrystal's post-strike actions (though, in fairness, he may be facing higher command pressures that prevent him from doing otherwise). In any case, it shows how we really have become the United Nannystates of America, and how far we are removed from a WW-2, Korea, SEA, or even Desert Storm air-ground operations mindset.

Let me be clear: this strike was both necessary and appropriate, and there is a great likelihood that there are coalition forces (the Germans who requested it) who will return safely to their homes alive and uninjured because of it. It is daunting to imagine what the likely casualties would have been to coalition or friendly Afghan forces if the Taliban had turned these tankers into gigantic fuel bombs.

Indeed, in retrospect, there was, frankly, a rather satisfying rough justice in this whole affair: the Taliban suffered the identical fate they would have inflicted on others. If there were other victims who were innocent of being Taliban, that is sad, but the potential outcome permitted no other reasonable response.

Rather than criticizing it, we should be using this strike as an example of rapid responsive joint coalition air-land action addressing an unfolding threat and triggering it in such a fashion as to turn the threat onto the perpetrators who devised it.

Instead, I suspect we are likely to crucify all involved, and it is likely to continue, and even elevate to a new level, an already established and disturbing pattern of reining-in air power that has evolved over many years. Already it has become routine to have lawyers bless targets, even though that can prevent the seizure of opportunity: (remember the CENTCOM JAG who frustrated a potentially decisive leadership strike in Afghanistan at the onset of the Afghan war because one just couldn't be 100% sure there weren't at least some innocents present--even in an enemy compound?).

But the attacks on air power have accelerated greatly in the Gates era.

Consider:

• We have seen the weird attack on effects-based warfare by Gen Mattis earlier this year, essentially an argument that "all war is so unpredictable that you can't use an EBO strategy and targeting approach." (Come again?)
• We had the Gates shut-down of the F-22, followed by trimming and cancellation of a number of Air Force programs.
• In Afghanistan, we have seen the replacement of bombing with buzzing (giving "buzzbomb" a whole new meaning). (Admittedly this could increase our deployable joint air power combat forces, since we could now deploy the Thunderbirds and Blue Angels. But memo to buzzers: don't forget the MANPADS and gun threat to your buzzing airplane, as the French Air Force learned in the Balkans where they lost a Mirage to an IR SAM up the tailpipe).
• We have seen the increasing emphasis on ground vs. air response (ironically, a popular new commentator, George Will, has quite properly articulated a counter-argument for stand-off air control vs. land occupation), which increasingly endangers our surface forces precisely because it strips them of the value of stand-off engagement.
• And now we have seen the progression of criticism of air power go a disturbing step further: Where we were once (as in the Balkans) obsessively concerned about enemy casualties and collateral damage when US and friendly lives were not at risk, we are now concerned about enemy casualties and collateral damage even when US and friendly lives are threatened. That is a truly incredible change, and a disturbing one.

To fully appreciate it, it is instructive to go back a decade to the Balkans and see how things have changed in ten years. Remember the hand-wringing we witnessed a decade ago when an F-15 blew away a bridge at the same moment that a train happened to cross over it? Then, US or friendly forces were not at risk. The bridge was a legitimate target. One could argue the train was as well (trains certainly were in every previous war, unless marked with a big red cross). The proper response (echoing WW-2 experience) would have been a DFC to both the pilot and WSO for a "two-fer," followed by a memorable squadron party. Instead, we had learned minds wondering about whether the crew should be hauled off to the Hague for trial for causing unnecessary civilian casualties. As I recall, the common-sense point that if your country is at war with America, it is logical to expect we will drop at least a few bridges, and thus it might not be the smartest decision to take a train escaped all commentators.

Fast-forward ten years: Now we are doing the same hand-wringing but over a strike that prematurely tripped a bomb-in-the-making that was directed toward our own forces, and which would have killed and injured them in a particularly brutal fashion. Instead of thanking ourselves for having avoided a horrible disaster, we are seeing criticism of the potential victims and by implication the Strike Eagle crew. In "Common-Sense World," the Germans deserve plaudits for a rapid identification of the tankers, a rapid assessment of the threat, and then a swift call to the best and most responsive form of military power that could respond. And the Strike Eagle crew deserve at the least an "attaboy" for putting the bombs on target. Threat ended, lesson taught to the perps, and case closed.

But no...we no longer live in Common-Sense World where combat forces are free to fight as they bes t see fit. We live in "United Nannystates World," where terrorists preparing an attack and their supporters become victims. So we are once again engaging in a veritable orgy of hand-wringing preparatory to finding some unfortunate to sacrifice. The advantages of striking at an enemy at a distance, of controlling that enemy through precise, focused air power, and using the psychological power of air attack to deter further behavior thus continue being thrown away in favor of...what? More hand-wringing? More willingness to risk our deployed forces (and those of our friends) so we can congratulate ourselves for being "good people"? More emphasis on walking the ground and placing our people in close proximity to the enemy (thereby solving their engagement problem, not our own)? More criticism of air power?? These kind of reactions can only continue the neutering of American air power. It is not a desirable outcome.