

## Air Force Intelligence

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**Lt. Gen. Deptula:** ... together, with precision and rapidly. We can do that now. What's amazing is we take that all for granted today, but it really didn't come into its own until really about the last ten years or so, but we can do that now. But now what's the question? The question is where is it do you want to strike? And oh by the way, do you really want to achieve a kinetic effect or do you want to do this non-kinetically, which therefore then begs the question about the importance of intelligence and not just intelligence but the whole ISR domain and where it stands, ergo, I think it was a very very appropriate decision to elevate the A2 up to, well we hadn't had an A2, but establish one and make it at the Deputy Chief of Staff level.

Yours truly shows up in July. The next month, in August, the Chief held an Intelligence Summit, brought in folks who had held the senior position in the Air Force before. We talked about where we've been, where we are, and what his vision of the future was. During that timeframe I asked him if he'd give me 90 days to kind of take a look and make an assessment of the arena and then get back to him with some recommendations. He allowed me to do that. I went back to him in December, and lo and behold I was quite surprised, in all honesty, that he did approve the recommendations pretty much as they were brought to him, and then we kind of went on a rapid track to put those into place.

What I'm talking about here are what I call some major muscle movements, and I'll get into that here in a second. We pretty much completed those as of June, and now we're sort of on what I call Phase II of our ISR transformation.

I won't spend a lot of time on the review methodology, but I went to and I ask him for this time to parse the challenges. I did it in three bins: ISR capabilities, organization, and personnel. Basically, what we did is we threw a wide net out, stood up some working groups, went and talked to a variety of different folks, people in the other services, our sister services in the intelligence community; we went to all the different agencies, we brought in some of the FFRDCs, basically put it all together and came up with a proposal in those three areas. If there was any one chart, if someone said all right you only have one chart to use, this is the one I would use to get across what we did. Of course, you have got to have a vision, you can read that as well as I can; it should make sense to all of you.

With respect to those three areas that we parsed the challenges into, with respect to ISR capability, the point was that we need to manage from a capabilities-based perspective, and we need to consolidate all of our ISR enterprise to assure that we're looking at all the different pieces to bring together a coherent capability in this regime; more on that later.

Organizationally, that has direct relevance as well. Intelligence has to be viewed as an Air Force-wide enterprise because otherwise people get different messages depending upon who they go to in the Air Force, and we've done some things to clean this up as well.

Personnel. This one was pretty easy to identify but will take some time to fix. Kind of the bottom line here is the Air Force has not had a general officer act as a COCOM J2 within the last six years. Now that's just not good from a joint perspective; not an Air Force perspective, but from a joint perspective because folks need to have the variety of perspectives that come from each one of the service components and the COCOMs certainly need to benefit from that, as does the nation. We'll talk a little bit about that.

So what I'm going to do in the remainder of the presentation is to talk about each one of these areas in a little more detail. And then if you're interested in delving into more detail, we can talk about that after the presentation.

ISR capabilities, findings and recommendations from the working group. The first one, Air Force ISR capabilities were not clearly defined which leads to all kinds of problems and challenges in Air Force Smart Operations, 21 Operations that uses languages like process seams, confuses ownership, but the bottom line is you don't have anyone in charge who is speaking for ISR capability. So what we did is we came up with a capability model that we're using to define ISR capability areas from which we will manage by. I'm going to give you an example here in a minute, which should be much more clear than just speaking ideologically right now.

Instead of focusing on management by program elements that those of you who are associated with what goes on in the Pentagon are well familiar with, I want to manage by capability areas so that we ensure that the left hand understands what the right hand is doing in that area.

Another finding from this study group was there was no single DCS, Deputy Chief of Staff, responsible for ISR capabilities. We fixed that by going to the Chief and asking him to redesignate the A2, the Deputy Chief of Staff for ISR. When I first came on board, I asked for folks to give me a chart and

show me all the relationships of all the individual pieces that make up ISR in the Air Force and who's responsible for what. If you were a Martian that came down from outer space with a clean slate and was trying to build the most confusing organizational structure you possibly could, you couldn't have done a better job. I mean, it looked like someone took spaghetti and threw it on a wall and that's the way it was. Now you know that is a little bit humorous but I also don't want to denigrate the great work that the people before did, but what happened is just the conglomeration of trying to fix things and make things better over a period of time, and these organizational structures were put into place before we had an Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, before we had a Director of National Intelligence, and before we had an Air Force A2. So we needed to clean up some things organizationally.

I'm getting ahead of myself on the organizational piece. ISR capability. Don't worry, I'm not going to explain every sub-bullet here and put you to sleep. But we define ISR capability as the integration of those elements that you see across the top. Operating within a prescribed set of activities under specific conditions to achieve a particular outcome. Now why is this important? It will become clearer when I give you my example, because if you take and look at the way that we manage ISR today in terms of systems, what we look at and what we deal with are individual program elements, and by doing that we end up sometimes, not all the time, in a confused situation.

Let me give you an example which I think will help to clarify. If you would define one of the ISR capability areas as direct support in the imagery realm and you take that model and you split up the different elements, collection, processing, analysis and dissemination, and then you look at all of the individual pieces that fall into each one of those, what you'll see is that collection of ovals and squares and lines and arrows tell you that there are lots of different people and lots of different organizations involved in delivering an overall capability. But if you only manage by looking at one of those, you have the potential of the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing.

Here's the example. Distributed Common Ground System Architecture is, what a horrible acronym by the way. What does that mean? How many people know what that means? No, really; let me see a show of hands. There are a lot of DCGS-friendly people in here. [Laughter]. But it is the ISR processing and dissemination system is a better description of what DCGS is.

To make a long story short, you know it's highly reliant on very specific software. Well the software needs to be upgraded. So there was a software upgrade designated DCGS 10.2 that was designed to provide much better connectivity and tools for

managing this distribution system, but when it was built and after it was completed, it turns out that because things were managed by program elements, it didn't work with the latest version of the sensors that we are now building to put on U-2 and Global Hawk. So we got to spend 20 months and 20 million dollars to do a spiral to upgrade the old DCGS 10.2 into a version that will work with the sensors that we're now building for the future. But we just can't afford to operate that way. Here's a case where the left hand didn't know what the right hand was doing, not because it was intentional but because of this system and the way it was built.

So what I'm going to try to do, and what we're putting into place, is an architecture whereby I am inventing, if you will, ISR capability area integrators, not program managers; they're not going to have any budget authority, but they will be an individual who basically looks at and monitors all the activity in a particular ISR capability area to make sure that if there is a significant event going on over in the sensor element of that capability area, how that change is going to be affected by or affect datalinks, for instance, and then bring those two elements together so the left hand knows what the right hand is doing. In this way, hopefully, we'll be able to overcome and lend some overarching vision to how we bring ISR capabilities to bear for the nation and the Air Force.

Which kind of moves right into the organizational piece of this as well, because there are some organizational changes that had to occur. What we did is we broke down the organizational challenge into two pieces; one inside the Air Staff and one external to the Air Staff across the entire Air Force. I'm not going to bore you with all the bureaucratic challenges that existed and still exist inside the building, but one of the things that we tried to do because as the A2 was stood up, what we found out is there are a variety of different responsibilities that were assigned to a variety of different organizations across the Air Force, and that led to, you bet, seams, gaps, inefficiencies, duplication of effort, and so on and so forth.

So one of the benefits of assigning A2 the end and functional responsibility for Air Force ISR are those sub-bullets that you see there, and we hope that that's what we're doing in terms of this reorganization. And it is paying off, although we could have that discussion with respect to the UAV project. For example, following up on the Chief's initiative to get some common sense into where we're going with the UAV enterprise, the A2 has sort of been the point man for that function across the Air Staff. And we're doing that across the board.

Now externally, when we come to the table one of the questions I asked is hey, we've got an organization that does magnificent work called the National Air and Space Intelligence

Center, but it's a national center and it works for an agency who works for one of ten major commands. What's with that? Again, if you were coming into the organization, I thought intelligence was an Air Force-wide enterprise, not just the responsibility of one major command. Who does space? Oh well, we do space. Well you're not working for AF Space, you're working for ACC; what's the deal?

So what we did was we did some realignment to make the case that ISR is in fact an Air Force-wide enterprise and also to attempt to streamline the processing of some of the issues that the organization formerly known as the AIA had to work with. Here's kind of why. I already alluded to this in words. You have all those organizations up top who now know where the single point of pressure is, if you will, inside the Air Force on all things ISR, and that's the A2. But we had a situation where my only connectivity to the rest of the Air Force, particularly the Air Force Intelligence Agency, was phone con and goodwill, so we needed to fix that up.

Here's that other chart that I talked about. You know, who speaks for ISR inside the Air Force? Depending upon what it is that you are talking about, generally it was one of the organizations highlighted in yellow. There simply was not a single focal point. We took care of that.

This is the way that the Air Intelligence Agency was previously aligned, reporting to Air Combat Command, but like I mentioned there really wasn't any tie now between the A2 and the AIA. The service cryptological element, and forgive me, I don't want to get into too much detail here, resided in AIA but therefore was separated from the A2, and that didn't make sense.

So what I recommended to the Chief and General Keys was a pretty simple move but it had a heck of an impact, and that is to move the Air Intelligence Agency out from underneath ACC as a field operating agency reporting to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. And we changed the name at the same time, of the organization, from AIA to Air Force ISR Agency, not simply as a name change but also to realign their focus as well. Those of you who are in the business understand that the focus of AIA was predominantly SIGINT. Well now I want to change that and turn it into a multi-INT organization with that kind of a focus. This officially occurred in June of this year, and it is working out very well so far.

Which takes us to the personnel area. I already mentioned this, the Air Force simply hadn't been adequately represented in joint national or a COCOM billet. How do you fix that? You increase the number of senior Air Force officer positions, general officer billets. General Moseley is committed to doing that; he has already done it. There are two new brigadier

generals operating in the headquarters of Air Force A2, and General Moseley is on his way to basically, I hesitate here because you know any time you talk about general officer billets the A1 gets real sensitive. So let me just leave it as the Air Force is committed to increasing the number of general officer billets dedicated to ISR and who ultimately will, we're going to grow 14-Ns to be general officers, and that number is going to increase, and it's going to increase significantly, which is a pretty big commitment on the part of the Chief considering the number of billets that we're drawing down overall.

Obviously, it's a challenging thing. You just don't make a 14-N general officer overnight. And it's not just about the general officers. It's about building a career track to assure that when airmen get to that level they are competitive and they have the experience base so that they're desirable on the part of those COCOMs and senior combat support organizations in the intelligence career field so that they will be hired into those positions.

These were the major muscle moves that we have accomplished over the last year. Designated the A2 as the focal point for ISR throughout the Air Force. Organizing ISR as an Air Force-wide enterprise. We redesignated AIA into the Air Force Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance Agency and moved it out from underneath one MAJCOM to report to the Air Force A2 to bring an Air Force-wide perspective to this enterprise. And then we're committed to and on the way to expanding the number of general officer billets.

But it ain't over. That's just sort of the beginning, setting the stage for Phase II of this transformation, if you will, and this is sort of where we're headed now with some of the major bullets that I'm interested in pursuing.

Don't worry, I'm not going to talk about all of these, but let me talk about a couple of them and then I'll save some time if you want to ask some questions about the other.

A big one on my list is that one right there up top. We have the capability today to impose effects at a rate much greater than we can assess the impact of those effects if we use traditional BDA methodology. General Horner is very familiar with this challenge. We experienced it all the way back in Desert Storm. Believe it or not, we experienced it in OIF. That's a long period of time. We should have been able to fix that. But the attention wasn't there to figure out how to do that. So we're proceeding along to work that.

Now what I'm talking about, because I see some question marks over some folks' craniums out there. There are some target sets that it's pretty easy to figure out from an effects-based

perspective what happened without counting every one of the holes that a kinetic weapon went into and then doing the analysis of whether it affected that particular structure and then rolling it all up. Electricity is a real good one. Just a short anecdote to tell you how this works, and I'll always remember this, it's kind of burned in my memory, a product of your experiences.

On the 15<sup>th</sup> of January of 1991 we got a report from the CENTCOM J2 that said we had not accomplished our overall objectives in the electric target set because we had not killed to 80 percent level of destruction each of the 26 power plants that were on the electric target set category. When some of us got that report, we just started laughing because there hadn't been an electron flowing in the Iraqi power grid for the previous 12 days. And that's when we stopped applying force against those particular target categories because the idea here wasn't to blow stuff up; the idea was to get them to stop using electricity. The feedback mechanism is simply an overhead shot of the country at night, and it's black. You kind of get it, you know, so why do you need to go back out and blow a bunch of stuff up?

In fact, we had found out that a couple of the power plant managers had figured this out and gone out and just simply shut down their production, which is perfect. That's exactly what you want them to do. Because you don't want to blow anything up because historically we have to go back in and spend lots of money and rebuild it. So that's what I mean by effects-based assessment. There are some target categories that it's easy to do that with. There are others that are much, much more difficult. It's the ones that are much, much more difficult that we're after.

Plan for processing and integration of non-traditional ISR and planning to resolve ISR shortfalls, eliminating LDHD challenges. Those two kind of go together, and let me try to explain why. You hear a lot, or some of you may have heard a lot about non-traditional ISR. The subject area kind of causes one to take a look back at, and I like to use this as an example of how our traditional nomenclature tends to constrain thinking about the capabilities in new weapons systems.

The F-22. When people talk about F-22, they think about air-dominance fighter and rightfully so, they should. But I would tell you that the F-22 is not just an F-22. It's an FABRCEAEAWACS-22. [Laughter]. It can do all of that stuff. It's a flying ISR sensor. Now, you know, my fighter buddies in the audience, they get all, I can see them start, you know, squirming in their seats now. It doesn't take anything away from the capability. As a matter of fact, it reinforces the fact that I can go places and do things against adversaries that no other platform can do. But guess what? What I might value that asset for the most is in a non-hostile situation, going places that no

one else can go to do some collection and maybe do some resolution of stuff and pipe it back to give us a clue that we otherwise wouldn't have using any other system and not doing anything lethally.

All right, well how does that tie into resolving ISR shortfalls? To resolve ISR shortfalls, you just don't go out and plop a whole bunch of other money down to buy x-number of more Rivet Joints or JSTARS or U-2s or Global Hawks because we're facing, and I don't have to tell everybody in here, an environment where we're increasingly constrained for resources. So what we need to do is capitalize on the capabilities that are resident on our new platforms. It ain't just F-22; it's F-35 and, quite frankly, every air platform and space platform that we build from now on out should have, must have, some sort of ISR capability associated with it.

So the way we solve those shortfalls are capitalizing on what we've got. And we're already doing that. Every platform that is flying in the theater, I daresay, the majority of the ones that are normally associated with force application, what are they carrying today? Targeting pods. Are they using them for targeting? No. They're using them for sucking up information predominantly and then piping that into a system that can then distribute that information, and that's where we also need to go too.

We oftentimes forget about the distribution and processing architecture that has to go along with the collection pieces to get it out to the users, the COCOMs. In this regard, we really do have an unsung hero in our military, particularly in our Air Force, and that is the Distributed Common Ground System. This is the first truly net centric weapons system that is operational and has been working and is working today. And it just is a magnificent capability. Now what we've got to figure out is how do we plug into this distribution and processing system, these connects from all these other non-traditional systems. What I'd eventually like to get to is in five to ten years get to the point where no one refers to non-traditional ISR. It's part of the process, and it's part of the way we go forward. And then as I've been talking, you've been reading about these other things.

A big one that I'm also very much interested in is integrating space into our Air Force ISR architecture. For too long, when you talk about ISR and the Air Force, you think about airborne platforms. Space is a huge piece here, and we need to integrate it and we're on the path to doing that. The problem is that a lot of stuff you just can't talk about.

In summary, I would tell you we have some of the world's most dedicated, motivated and just magnificent people working to accomplish the objectives of our combatant commanders around the

world. The work that they do is absolutely magnificent. No one is broken. That's not why General Moseley stood up the three-star and the DCS position. He did it because of the increased relevance of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to our future.

I've already talked about our major muscle movements and where we're going in the future in the terms of changing the paradigm, if you will, of the importance of ISR. You know, I have been on the other side. I have been a consumer of intelligence. I've worked with the intelligence community in many different ways, and over the years I've come to wish that I could figure out a word other than operations and intelligence that would indicate the importance of integrating these two pieces. And I'm working very hard to get folks to recognize that intelligence isn't a support effort anymore. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, intelligence is operations. They're inseparable; you can't do one without the other.

A good example there is again from a year ago. Al Zahari hit in Iraq. Six hundred hours of Predator time to find and fix this guy, and about seven minutes of F-16 time. So what was the operation here? With all due respect to my F-16 buddies. [Laughter]. The fact of the matter is they were both required. You couldn't pull off the objective without the close and tight integration of two of the pieces.

Well thank you very much for your attention, and that was a pretty quick rundown, but I'll be happy to entertain any questions until General Elder has to come on board.

Yes Sir, Dave.

**Qq:** Can you tell me your linkages and relationships with cyber domains?

**LtGen Deptula:** Well since the provisional headquarters has just been stood up, we don't have, I mean that is TBD. All right, but intelligence will play in Cyber Command the same kind of role it has played in traditional organizations. But actually, the question is a good one because some people have this view that cyber will ensconce or absorb the intelligence function. No. Cyber is a domain, just like air, sea, space, land is a domain. So intelligence will provide a critical role in conducting cyber activities and will be an integral element in the organization. But specifically, you know, number of people, how that organization is going to work, TBD.

**Qq:** General Deptula, I really applaud you on your new concepts and your new focus on [inaudible] capabilities. What I'd like to ask you is, if that had been in place prior to the decision to implement DCGS 10.2, how would that have affected the

outcome? Would it have changed things? How would that manager with those capabilities gone to the program manager of DCGS and say hey fellow, this ain't going to work, you've got to change it? He has no authority to do that but --

**LtGen Deptula:** Thank you for the question. It's a good one, and I would hope -- first, this is hypothetical because we haven't done this yet. It is an approach that I'm trying to put in place. The way I would envision it working, given that situation, is the integration director, if you will, watching and seeing that there was going to be an upgrade to DCGS software would have gone and said okay, you guys do understand that we're bringing these sensors on board for Global Hawk and U-2 and that your software needs to be able to work with these sensors. And then they would have gone oh, thanks for telling us, we didn't know that. And then they would have written the appropriate software.

Now if there's pushback, which was probably going to be your next question, well what if they said thank you very much for your interest in national defense, you have no authority over us, go pound sand, then that guy would have come to me and then I would have picked up the phone and talked to Chuck Johnson and said hey Chuck, let's talk. [Laughter]. I mean, that's very simplistic but you know that's the way things work. I mean they've got to work. You've got to keep things simple to make them work. That's the notion. It's an informational relationship.

**Qq:** How did lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan contribute to this process, and how do you see it benefiting the warfighters on a daily basis?

**LtGen Deptula:** A great question. I mean, it obviously contributed enormously because 1) General Moseley was the Joint Force Air Component Commander for both OEF and OIF; and yours truly was his Air Operations Center Director and also participated in Desert Storm, so we're very much familiar with the challenges in assessing information, the importance that ISR brings to not just the Air Component Commander but to all the components and the combatant commander.

How has it influenced what we're doing? It also goes to the point, if you were there for the four-star roundtable this morning, you General Moseley's comment in terms of one of the pieces of the unmanned aerial system, the way ahead is to devise an ISR theater ConOps, Concept of Operation, not just for UAVs but for all the elements of ISR, which is, quite frankly, one of the challenges that we have today. Each one of the components is operating independently, and they're operating their ISR systems independently, and we need to bring some unity to all the different ISR pieces and elements for the combatant commanders.

So we're in the process right now of drafting a generic theatre ISR concept of operations that we can take to Joint Forces Command, that will hopefully be used as a model in the future to avoid some of the challenges that we're running in today. But it is that macro-level perspective to integrate these disparate pieces of the ISR enterprise together that I think will provide useful output for the combatant commanders.

**Qq:** Building on that question, General. Could you describe the role of the Air Force ISR versus the other ISR capabilities [inaudible] and other national [inaudible]?

**LtGen Deptula:** I don't know if I understand the intent of your question. How we relate with the other service components?

**Qq:** Yeah [inaudible].

**LtGen Deptula:** Well clearly we're focused on the air and space piece; however, sort of tying back to my last answer in terms of building a theater-wide ISR concept of operation, what we're trying to do here is not just limit that to air and space assets but to be all inclusive to include all the elements of ISR that a theater commander might be interested in. So in that regard, I interface with the other 2's of the other services to move forward in that regard. But again, I'm also interested in, and my primary focus is, Air Force ISR. But yes, any time there is a common issue we get together and we get together routinely anyway. As a matter of fact, we're getting together on off-site this weekend with not just the other services but the members of the leadership of all 16 intelligence organizations and the Director of National Intelligence to discuss how we move the national intelligence architecture forward, and that's very, very important.

**Qq:** For the consolidation of the air-breathing ISR wings together, getting them all to sit at the same table, was a great move and [inaudible] many benefits, but where is the [inaudible] or the connection with now the air-breathing and space part of ISR?

**LtGen Deptula:** That's my last bullet down there. We're working on that, and there is, quite frankly and to be honest, a lot of work to be done bringing those two communities together. I've been out to Space Command; as a matter of fact we are hosting our next, I'm hosting the next Senior Intelligence Officer Conference at Air Force Space Command to bring the other senior officers in the intelligence community who would normally work airborne issues out to Space to get them more exposed to the demands, the needs, and also the awareness of what we need to think about in terms of intelligence in space.

You hear the term "space situation awareness" thrown around by our friends at Air Force Space Command. It sounds to me like intelligence in space; different term. So we're going to get to these issues. It's going to take some time, but we'll get there.

Well thank you very much, Ladies and Gentlemen. If there is anything you want to ask but you didn't want to do it in front of the large audience, I'll be hanging around up here and happy to do a one-on-one.

[Applause].

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