

## Origins of the Cold War

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**Dr. Hensel:** -- at the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War, and of course the outbreak of the Cold War. And of course there are a couple of corollaries to that third question. There was a deterioration, obviously. Was it inevitable that there would be a deterioration? And once it became clear that there was going to be a breach in the alliance, the wartime alliance between the Soviets, the Americans and British, was there anything the Americans could have done in order to have advanced their vision of the post war order? So we'll be looking at the perceptions of the post war order, the impact that they had on interest, objective, strategies, and we'll ask to what extent did this contribute to the outbreak of the Cold War.

But in a broader sense, beyond this case study of events, foreign policy, during the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War and immediately after the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War, about 1941 to about 1946, beyond that in a broader sense, my remarks are designed to illuminate the complexity between various terms. Terms which are timeless, actually, in analyzing foreign policy.

For example, everybody talks about national interests. Everybody says well do what's in the national interest. One should promote the national interest. But what are we talking about here?

Well, hopefully my remarks today will help illuminate examples of how the national interest might be defined for the Americans, the Soviets, and the British. Because that means by national interest broad, long-standing goals that states seek within the international system over a very long period of time. These remain constant over time. They don't radically change from one timeframe to another.

As a matter of fact, if I were to write a speech for George Washington or for Abraham Lincoln or for Franklin Roosevelt or for George Bush and just focus on the national interests, I could write the same speech for all four of those guys and all the other presidents in between because I don't believe the national interests do fundamentally change from one time frame to another, unless there's a revolutionary change in the nature of the system. I'll give you the example of how this would apply to Americans here, in just a moment.

So the first term that we'll be using is national interests; these long, broad goals that states seek over, again, a very prolonged period of time. That's different from national

objectives. Objectives are specific goals that states seek within a given situational context at a specific time.

Obviously, I couldn't write the same speech for George Washington or Abe Lincoln or for FDR or for George Bush because the situational context that they confront is different for each one of those presidents. The time is different. So the national objectives are situationally determined, and they are, obviously, the product of the given time that we're looking at.

A third term I'll be using is grand strategy, and by that I mean the use of various instruments of policy. Diplomatic, political, military instruments via specific courses of action so as to promote the attainment of those national objectives that I spoke of just a moment ago.

Beyond the actual case study of the outbreak of the Cold War we'll be looking at the application of these terms, and I think that's much more generalizable than just the timeframe that we're looking at here.

In addition, this is also a case study in the dynamics of coalitions at war, how well coalitions stick together and what are the conditions in which they break up.

And finally, it's a case study suggesting the difficulties of converting military victory into political success.

So that, by way of introduction, let me go on then and talk about United States policy. Let me begin by defining the national interests of the United States. Again, those broad, long-standing goals that states seek within the international system. But again, for the U.S., over the 225 years or so that we have been independent, how would one define that? How would you define these things in your own mind?

I would argue there are at least seven components to this. First of all, the first component would be to guarantee the political independence and territorial integrity of the United States. The political independence and territorial integrity of the United States. Now you might say, well, that's pretty generic, and indeed I think it should be fairly broad. Because again, these are broad goals.

Second, guarantee U.S. access to locations and resources that are vital to the U.S. economy and vital to U.S. national security. There are certain things that are vital to us because we need these things for our economic well being, or we need them for our national security. We must have access to these things. And I think that would be a second basket, if you like, within the national interest.

Third, promote the prosperity of the American economy and the global economy. We've always looked at the two as hooked in, one with the other, the prosperity of the American economy tied in with a broader global economy. And that's been true ever since 1776.

Fourth, guarantee freedom of the seas, freedom of navigation on the high seas. We've always, again, relied on the seas and we've always relied on freedom of transit across the high seas.

A fifth element, advance liberal democratic political values. What do I mean by that? Well, of course we're talking about democratic governments, we're talking about limited government, we're talking about the freedom of the citizenry, and we're talking about national self-determination of peoples. The types of things that are contained in the bill of rights of our own constitution. I think that would certainly be another basket within our national interest.

In a negative sense, we reject power politics and spheres of influence. We've always felt that power politics, spheres of influence, contributed to instability. And we accept the idea that there should be a peaceful resolution of international disputes and we have tended to reject the idea of the use of armed force as an instrument of national policy unless it is absolutely necessary that we should resort to the use of military force.

So overall, reflecting what political scientists refer to as a "liberal idealist model," the United States national interests have always been defined as an interconnected linkage between such concepts as economic security, democracy, individual freedoms, national self-determination, and international security, all woven together in a big web. Now again you can see these are pretty generalizable and they would work if I was writing a speech for Washington or for Lincoln or for FDR or for George Bush, but what about the national objectives, the specific goals, which are situationally determined in 1941 to 1945? What about those specific goals that the United States sought within the international system during that timeframe? Well militarily, we sought the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany and the unconditional surrender of Japan.

Beyond that politically, we sought to promote the establishment of liberal democratic governments throughout the international system. This would be based on national self-determination of people. Not just in liberated areas, areas that would be liberated from the axis powers, but also throughout colonial empires. This, of course, would be based on the principle of free election, to establish those democratically elected governments.

Economically, during the period of 1941 to 1945, the United States sought to promote a liberal international trade and investment regime. The promotion of free markets domestically, unencumbered by unnecessary governmental regulation, and the establishment of a free trade regime throughout the international system through the reduction of tariffs and the elimination of trade barriers, so as to promote the idea of free trade based upon the principle of comparative advantage.

And finally internationally, the United States between 1941 and 1945 sought to establish an international security order centered on the creation of a new international organization: the United Nations. To replace the old League of Nations. And this would be an international organization which would be capable of resolving international disputes and it would have the capacity for enforcement via economic and if necessary, military sanctions, should that become necessary. But again, military coercion would be the last resort.

So as you can see, the specific objectives of the United States are applied within the situational context that President Roosevelt found himself in as of 1941 to 1945. The specific goals. But what about the strategy, the course of action that we wanted to pursue in order to attain those goals? How did President Roosevelt then define the United States grand strategy from 1941 to 1945?

Well, first the national military strategic goals. We determined early on that we would focus on Nazi Germany first. Our Europe-first decision was made very early on in the war, even though Japan attacked the United States, we determined that Nazi Germany was the more serious of the two axis powers in terms of a threat, and consequently the decision was made early on that we would emphasize Europe first, and then Japan second. So I guess that would be point number one in terms of the national military strategic goals.

The second, of course, would be to retain control over the sea lines of communication in the north Atlantic into the Indian Ocean and the eastern, central, and south Pacific. Those sea lines of communication were vital in order to prosecute the war.

Third, destroy axis war-making resources and the logistical infrastructure via the Anglo-American combined bomber offensive. Hit at the resources that Germany and ultimately Japan had in order to prosecute the war.

The fourth element of our national military strategic goals would be to engage and destroy the German military forces via the opening of a meaningful second front in northern Europe as soon as possible. We wanted to focus on north Europe, have a cross channel invasion just as early as we could in order to engage the

German forces and defeat the German forces, again, just as soon as we possibly could.

And finally, the last element of our national military strategic goals would be to engage and destroy the Japanese Imperial Navy and the Japanese Army in the Pacific. And again, you can see this is aimed of course, toward the defeat of the axis powers, which was our ultimate objective.

But beyond that we had these other things that we were seeking too, in terms of the post-war order. For example, economically, via the Britain Woods Conference in July of 1944, we hoped to promote a new international trade regime predicated on tariff reductions and predicated on a new international investment regime which would be facilitated through the establishment of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Politically, via the Atlantic Charter of August of 1941 and subsequently the Declaration of the United Nations on January 1, 1942, we sought to promote the American vision of a limited, democratically elected set of governments based on the principle of individual freedom and national self determination. We made this clear right at the very outset via the various diplomatic documents that we concluded, first with the British and then with all of our wartime allies. This is clearly what we were after.

And then finally, internationally, via the Dumbarton Oaks Conference right here in the Washington area, from August to October of 1944 and then subsequently at the San Francisco Conference of April to June of 1945. We spearheaded an effort to draw up a charter for the United Nations that would establish that organization. A charter which would be predicated on the continued wartime cooperation among the wartime allies, specifically the British, the United States, and the Soviet Union, as well as of course China and France with the veto power within the Security Council. And we consciously arranged that charter in such a way that should there be a deterioration of relations among the great powers, and should ultimately there be a confrontation among the wartime allies, the United Nations could not be used as a vehicle for any of those wartime allies to use the U.N. against the other powers. This is why we built in the veto, so as to consciously pull the UN out of a great power confrontation.

When we designed the UN with the veto power within the Security Council, we designed it like a circuit breaker or a fuse box within your home electrical system, where if the circuits are getting overloaded, what happens? The fuse breaks. Or the circuit pops, thereby shutting off the power. So that again you can stop the confrontation or at least not use the vehicle of the United Nations as a vehicle of great power confrontation. In

that sense, it was designed so that when there was decensus, the UN could not be used.

This is why it's a little unfair when people point to the United Nations and say well it didn't work during the Cold War period. Well, it wasn't designed to work when there was confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The circuit breaker was designed to pop so that, again, it could not be used as a vehicle for great power confrontation and to criticize the UN and say that the UN didn't work very well during the Cold War period, during this period of confrontation, is like saying your car doesn't work very well as a boat. Well, no, it doesn't work very well as a boat, because it was never designed to be a boat. Same thing with the UN, it was never designed as a vehicle for great power confrontation.

But at any rate, suffice it to say internationally, working to establish an international organization in very specific terms, via Dumbarton Oaks and the San Francisco Conference, politically pushing the idea of national self determination and democracies, economically working for a new international trade and investment regime, and of course, militarily, working hard to try to terminate the war successfully, as rapidly as possible against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.

So when one looks at the United States interests, sees them as broad goals, then you look at the objectives, the specific goals that we sought during this particular time, and then you look at well how are we going to do this. That's the grand strategy, the specific means that we're using in order to hopefully bring our objectives out.

Alright, so much for the Americans, what about the Soviets? Well, let me start again with Soviet national interests. How would we define those? You might be saying to yourself that the way we define the American national interests are so broad that wouldn't that work for all countries? Well, no, it really doesn't. Not in the case of the Soviets. The first element, I think would work and that, for the Soviets defended the USSR's territorial integrity and political independence. Well, that's true for us, too, I think it's true for most countries, actually.

But here's where we start to see the divergence between our national interests and the Soviet national interests, because for the Soviets the second element would be to maintain the monopoly position of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union over the entire political system, the economy, and literally all aspects of Soviet society.

Clearly, by the late 1930s, and even by the late 1920s, anybody who held any position of responsibility within the Soviet Union was a Party member and they were under Party discipline.

The Party controlled all areas of Soviet society ranging from the military to the police to the economy to the university professors to literally everything you can imagine was permeated by the control, the monopoly control of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

And we would of course never have anything like that where we would have our national interests, the monopoly control of the political party within the United States. Very, very different for the Soviets.

The third difference would be the Soviets sought to promote the rapid industrialization of the USSR and were prepared to pay whatever price was necessary in order to promote that rapid industrialization.

Fourth, undermine the capitalist powers abroad, especially in areas adjacent to USSR. The Soviets felt, for both power and political reasons, as well as ideological reasons that they were surrounded by capitalist powers which were threatening and consequently they wanted to undermine those powers as quickly and as effectively as they possibly could.

But the last element is to promote Soviet influence internationally, especially in those areas adjacent to the USSR.

Now, if you take the 74 years of Soviet history and go from Lenin, through Stalin, through Khrushchev, to Brezhnev, on to Gorbachev, I think these elements of national interests would work for them, because again, these are longstanding continuing goals that are sought by a given state within the international system.

But what about the specific objectives that were sought by J.V. Stalin from 1941 to 1945? Again, these are the situationally determined ones. These are going to be different that they would be for Lenin or they would be subsequently for Khrushchev, Brezhnev, or Gorbachev.

Well, of course, from 1941 to 1942, the aim is mainly survival. Survive under the threat, the onslaught of the German invasion, which began on June 22, 1941. So from 1941 to 1942, the Soviet main objective was just to survive. But beginning around 1943 and continuing thereafter, the Soviets began to look over the horizon beyond survival to the defeat of Nazi Germany. They looked for the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany, just as we did; they looked for the destruction of the Nazi state, just as we did; they looked for the de-Nazification of German society, again, just as we did; and they looked, in the case of the Soviets, they wanted to prevent Germany from ever again threatening the Soviet Union. That was a high objective for the

Soviets, prevent Germany from ever threatening the USSR ever again.

Now from June 22, 1941 on until August of 1945, the Soviets focused only on Germany, they were not at war with Japan. The Soviets had actually concluded a non-aggression pact with Japan in April of 1941 and they honored that non-aggression pact with Japan from April of 1941 all the way until August of 1945 when they abruptly overturned that non-aggression pact and entered the war in the Far East.

When they did, of course, they sought the unconditional surrender of Japan and the elimination of Japanese power and the Japanese threat to the Soviet Far East. Now I'll talk more about the Soviet entry into the war in the Far East in just a little while, but again, you might want to keep that point in mind.

So again, the defeat of Germany, and as of August of '45, the defeat of Japan. But beyond that, the Soviets, in terms of their specific objectives of '41 to '45 looked to construct a sphere of influence, a security zone around the USSR consisting, first of all, of a series of satellite states and then beyond those satellites, a series of buffer states to protect the security of the USSR.

In addition, the Soviets also intended to use the resources of Soviet occupied Central and Eastern Europe in order to facilitate economic reconstruction of the USSR. And we'll talk about the damage that was caused in the USSR during the course of the war in just a moment, however, well, the Soviets intended that the economies of Eastern and Central Europe should ultimately pay for all of that to help reconstruct the Soviet economy.

And finally, without risking confrontation with the West, now that's an important caveat, without risking confrontation with the British, or more specifically, the Americans, take advantage of post-war opportunities to undermine Western influence and promote Soviet influence beyond the area of the sphere of influence that the Soviets intended to erect around the USSR.

Those are the objectives. But what about the strategy? Well, the Soviets intended to translate their political, to attain their political objectives through military means, through diplomatic means, and they intended to change the map of Europe. Now what I have up here is an inter-war map of Europe and I'd like to point out a couple of features of it just by way of orientation. You'll notice the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; you'll notice Poland is much farther to the east here, during the inter-war period, than it is in the post

World War II period. Moreover, you'll notice this portion of Romania is part of Romania prior to the Second World War.

You'll also notice that the Soviet Union does not share a common border with any of the other East European states. It just shares a border with Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Romania.

Well, Stalin intended to change the map of Europe so as to help him attain or gain that security zone that he wanted within Eastern Europe. So what specifically did he seek? Now, if I pull up this map, it might help just a little bit.

The first thing and here we can talk about primary territorial objectives, secondary territorial objectives, and tertiary territorial objectives within Europe.

The primary ones are the ones Stalin was prepared to fight for. The primary ones were the ones that he was prepared to go to war for, even war with the United States and Britain in order to attain. So what were they?

Well, one was to get the West to agree that all of this area, all this kind of deep red area would be annexed into the Soviet Union. Now during the period of 1939 to 1941, during the Nazi/Soviet Non-aggression Pact, yes, the Soviets and the Nazis had arrived at a non-aggression pact, beginning on August 23, 1939 and extending to June 22, 1941, the Soviets had taken advantage of that and had annexed Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the entire Eastern portion of Poland, as well as this portion of Romania, Bessarabia into the USSR. While the 1939 border of the Soviet Union was here, the 1941 border of the Soviet Union ran something like this.

The Soviets were adamant that that area should be recognized by the West as the Soviet Union, and when the United States protested this and said, well gee, we can't go along with that, I mean, that would be to reward you for cutting a deal with the Germans, with the Nazis during '39 to '41, the Soviets said look, the border for the Soviet Union is the 1941 border, not the 1939 border. The Soviets made it clear they were absolutely adamant about this.

That's point number one, that their primary territorial goals that they were prepared to fight for. A second element that they were prepared to fight for was the annexation of this little area down here, Eastern Ruthenia, or the Karpathos Ukraine, as it were.

It's not really shown on this map, but it will be shown on the next one. This little area here controls the mountain passes between the plain of Hungary over here and the entrance into the Ukraine on the other. So it was vital, in Stalin's eyes, that

they control that little chunk of what was formerly part of Czechoslovakia, now that should be incorporated into the USSR also.

Third element of the primaries, and that is there should be a new Poland, reconfigured geographically to include part of Old Germany's East Prussia as well as this portion of Germany. In other words, it would be shifted to the West. To compensate Poland for the loss of this territory, they would gain this territory and this territory, so it would shift to the west. But beyond that, Poland would be under a pro-Soviet, Communist government. And Stalin was adamant about those two points, too. That again, there should be a pro-Soviet government and Poland should be reconfigured territorially in a westerly direction.

Beyond that, Stalin wanted a pro-Soviet regime in Romania and a pro-Soviet regime in Bulgaria. And then he wanted a Soviet occupation zone in the Eastern part of Germany, and again, these were the primary territorial goals that Stalin was prepared to fight for, if necessary. He was absolutely adamant about this.

Now, secondary territorial goals, beyond this satellite system that he intended to erect, would be areas where neither the Soviet Union, nor the West would have hegemony. This would include Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.

And then, finally, his tertiary territorial goals, he was prepared to support Communist efforts to seize power in areas beyond the buffer, such as in Greece. Again, Stalin seemed prepared to acknowledge that Greece was part of the West's domain. Now, if he could make a gain there, through the use of the Communist Party of Greece, all the better, but he wasn't prepared to go to war for that one. Again, a gain, if possible, without jeopardizing the gains that had already been made.

Now in order to illustrate this, let me flip over to a physical map of Europe. And ask yourselves as you think about this, put the red star on your hat for a moment here, or imagine you're on the general staff or you're on Stalin's staff or you're Stalin for that matter. Twice during your lifetime your country has been invaded from the West, twice during your lifetime they've been invaded by Germany. Now, as military men and women, where would you rather defend against an enemy coming from the West? Would you rather defend on a line that goes from Leningrad, which is slightly off the map, comes down roughly like this, and then over to the Black Sea, which is anchored on nothing and separated by the Pripet Marshes, which is one of the largest marshlands in the world, or would you rather defend here, perhaps, along the line of the New Poland. Running like here, then down to the mountains, the Carpathian Mountains, then along the crest of the Carpathians, over to the Black Sea. Or would you rather have the Eastern Ruthenia that I talked about? That's

the area that controls these mountain passes between the Plain of Hungary located here and the Ukraine over here. One of the three possible invasion routes into Russia, like this, the other one being like this, and the other one being like this. You control that one.

Or would you rather have those satellite regimes in Poland, in Romania, in Bulgaria? So instead of defending here, you have to defend over here, on this line, down to the mountains of Bohemia and then across to the Carpathians and then you're defending along here with the Transylvanian Alps under your control, down to the iron gates through which the Danube flows, one of the other routes of invasion into the USSR. Then of course, you control the Balkan Mountains located down here. So you'd be defending on a line that would run roughly about like this.

Or would you rather even defend a little farther to the West with your occupation zone in Eastern Germany?

I suggest to you that if the choice is defending here, on the 1939 border or along here, Stalin would much rather defend along a line farther to the West, and I think it's probably pretty understandable that he would view it in that way.

What about in Asia? Well, flipping over to his primary goals in Asia, first of all, the annexation of the southern part of Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands.

Second, the establishment of an independent Outer Mongolia, which would be a Soviet satellite. Now, Outer Mongolia had long been a Soviet satellite, a Russian satellite even, but it was technically part of China. Consequently, Stalin wanted the independence of this satellite Outer Mongolia, which of course it would continue to be a satellite of the Soviet Union.

Then third, Stalin wanted a satellite regime in Northern Korea. These again were the primary goals at which I think he was prepared to fight for.

The secondary goals, which he didn't feel quite as strongly about, was a dominant position for the Soviets in Manchuria and in North China. Beyond that, Stalin sought a revision of the Montreux Agreement which controls the Turkish straits, which are just off the map up here. In addition, he also sought a satellite regime here in Northern Iran, if at all possible.

And then tertiary objectives would of course be a general takeover in China, but Stalin was not optimistic about that in 1941 to 1945 or even '46, '47 that there would be a general Communist takeover throughout the whole of China.

So these, then, are the Soviet interests, the objectives and the strategies. What can we say about the U.S. reaction to all of this? Well, Mr. Roosevelt obviously rejected the concept of spheres of influence. Not only did that clash with our national interest, it clashed with everything that we were fighting for. We felt the balance of power was inherently unstable and we felt the balance of power system would create the context for future wars. As I say, we felt that spheres of influence were incompatible with the principles of national self determination of peoples and freedom for peoples, things that we were fighting for. Moreover, a lot of Americans questioned whether the Soviets would be happy, would be content with their sphere of influence as they defined it, or would they want more later?

Another concern on the part of the Roosevelt administration was if we accepted the sphere of influence concept, would that not create a situation where Americans might decide to pull back in to our sphere of influence, which was the Western Hemisphere and just focus on that and abandon the universalist responsibilities that the Roosevelt administration envisaged for the United States.

In addition, the United States, the Roosevelt administration was very upset with the Soviets and their sphere of influence concept because of the East European electoral vote within the United States. Obviously there's a fairly good Eastern European ethnic vote in the United States and how would they react to what might be perceived as an abandonment of the people of Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and other places.

But in the broadest sense, the United States went to war to prevent Germany from dominating the European continent and we went to war to prevent Japan from dominating East Asia, now would we turn around and allow the Soviets to dominate the area? Many people thought that would be an abandonment of everything that we had worked for.

Well, during the course of the conferences, Roosevelt hoped that he would be able to strike a personal relationship with Mr. Stalin and, as it were, talk Stalin out of this sphere of influence concept.

He did this in several ways. He tried to avoid appearing too close to the British, generally, and certainly avoid appearing too close to Prime Minister Churchill, specifically. But you know, J.V. Stalin was not the kind of guy who was easily charmed by any means. But beyond that, Stalin felt that the Soviets had earned a reliable guarantee for Soviet security.

Stalin knew how extremely closely they had come to defeat between 1941 and 1945 and these lines show the advance of the Germans into the Soviet Union between 1941, June 22, 1941 and the

farthest that they got by 1942. All of that area of the Soviet Union had been a giant battle ground. And of course, there had been extreme destruction, not only on the way in, but as the Soviets then pulled back out, back to liberate that area into Eastern Europe and into Central Europe.

And of course, during this extremely heavy fighting that occurred on the Eastern front during the course of the war, you have massive property destruction, which has occurred within the USSR and you have at least 25 to 30 million Soviet citizens who were dead, dead at the end of this period, 1941 to 1945. Never before in human history had so many people died in such a short time as a result of war.

Moreover, the Soviets felt that they had earned a reliable security system based on the role that they had played in the course of the war. After all, virtually the entire German army was concentrated against the Soviets in 1941 and even as of 1944 after D-Day, no less than two-thirds of the German ground divisions were concentrated against the Eastern front, against the Soviets.

The Soviets felt that they had broken the back of the Wehrmacht during the fighting in the Second World War and frankly, I would tend to agree with them. I think at least 60 percent, maybe 70 percent credit for the defeat of Nazi Germany should go to the Soviet Union.

But in the final analysis, Stalin simply did not want to rely on the American's scheme for international security, relying on the United Nations. Stalin felt that it's fine for the Americans to argue for the UN, we have two oceans on either side of the United States, we have weak neighbors to the north and the south. The Soviets do not have such an advantageous position geographically and consequently, Stalin was adamant that he wanted to protect the Soviet Union via the spheres of influence and was prepared to fight for it if necessary.

There's a third partner, though. That's the British. So let me turn quickly to them.

Now, in contrast to the Americans, who embraced this idealist vision of the post-war order, Prime Minister Winston Churchill adopted a different perspective from that argued by President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull.

Mr. Churchill was what the political scientists would call a realist. He basically argued that international relations is based on territorial and power political considerations. So consequently, Mr. Churchill intended to place the West in an advantageous power political position for the future.

Now, let's look at British national interests. Same as we did for the Americans and for the Soviets. What would we say?

Well, first of all, of course, protect the security of Great Britain and the security of the socioeconomic political system of the United Kingdom. Second of all, maintain the balance of power on the European continent so that no one power would come to dominate that continent. And the third element of the interests of Great Britain would be to protect the security of the British Empire.

Now let's turn to the objectives; the specific goals that the British sought, because again, these interests are broad generic things. What about the specific goals from '41 to '45?

Well, of course the first one would be to ensure the British Isles from attack by Germany, prevent any cross channel invasion of Britain by Germany, and also reduce and ultimately eliminate German air attacks against Great Britain by Germany.

A second feature would be to ensure the lines of communication. Lines of communication that would extend across the Atlantic to the United States, that lifeline of supply, which brought the supplies necessary to fight the war, from the United States to the UK and also the imperial lifeline which connected Britain to the colonies, the lifeline that extended well around the Cape of Good Hope, of course, but through the Mediterranean, through Gibraltar, past Malta, through Suez, the Bab el Mandab at Aden and off to India, ensure that imperial lifeline to the colonies and the dominions.

Another element of British objectives would be the unconditional surrender of Germany and the defeat of Imperial Japan. But looking to the post-war period, and Churchill was looking over the horizon to the post-war period, Churchill wanted to perpetuate the Grand Alliance to prevent any resurgence of Germany or Japan in the future. Beyond that, Churchill felt that the Soviet Union was the next threat. He feared that the Soviets wanted overwhelming power within Europe and therefore he wanted to establish a viable political and military counterbalance to the Soviets on the European continent. That was one of the key objectives for Mr. Churchill between '41 and '45.

And then finally, preserve the British Empire, as I mentioned, and in that context Churchill had some reservations about all that talk about free trade that the Americans were offering, if that meant abandonment of Imperial preferences.

Moreover, he also had some reservations about that talk by the Americans about national self determination of people, if that meant, obviously breaking up the British Empire. So in any

case, he wanted to be in a position so as to defend the British Empire in the post-war period.

Now what about the grand strategy for the British? Well, the wartime national security strategy was obviously to destroy the war-making resources and logistical infrastructure of Germany via the Anglo American combined bomber offensive.

In addition, second, he wanted to secure via naval control, control over the Mediterranean, which of course was key to the Imperial lifeline, as well as the North Atlantic. But especially that area of the English Channel, which of course would be key to any cross-channel invasion by the Germans.

Third, he sought to secure the defeat of Japanese forces in Southeast Asia.

Fourth, Churchill wanted not a quick cross-channel invasion and an establishment of a western front up here in Northern Europe the way the Americans wanted, he wanted a Mediterranean strategy. He talked especially about establishing a new western front down here in the Balkans, which of course would counter balance the Soviets as they moved into the Balkans. And when the idea of a second front in the Balkans was ultimately dropped at the American insistence, Churchill decided that well he would try to see if he could get some western influence in the area diplomatically. He flew to Moscow and met with Mr. Stalin and there he arrived at the infamous Percentages Deal.

Basically what this involved was a diplomatic deal between the British and the Soviets, the Americans were not part of this, whereby the Soviets would get 90 percent influence in Romania, compared to the West's nominal 10 percent. The Soviets would get 75 percent influence in Bulgaria, to the West's 25 percent. Hungary, Yugoslavia, would be split 50/50. In Greece, the West would get 90 percent influence and the Soviets would get 10 percent influence.

This deal was agreed to by Mr. Stalin and Mr. Churchill. When the United States found out about it, we were absolutely livid, because we felt that this violated everything that we were fighting for.

Regarding the post-war period, on the European continent, we wanted, the British wanted to make sure that the low countries were securely in Western hands. In addition, in the post-war period, Churchill wanted to restore France into a great power status and he wanted to perpetuate the Anglo-American political alliance so as to create a powerful British-American-French counter balance to the Soviets in Europe. And finally, he wanted to perpetuate the imperial lifeline, as you can see, through the

Mediterranean and elsewhere, off to the British Empire, especially in a post-war challenge to the Empire as such.

Well, this brings us finally to the termination of the war. The war in Europe at least, because on May 9, 1945, the war in Europe came to an end and Germany collapsed. This led to wild celebrations in London, in New York, and in Moscow, but as I mentioned, the final victory needed to be attained in the Far East, against Japan. Here, the dramatic conclusion came with the detonation of the first atomic bomb over Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. Forty-eight hours later, the Soviets entered the war in the Far East, and you might say wow, gee the Soviets wanted to get in on the kill. Bear in mind, it was the United States at Yalta in February of 1945, where we arranged with the Soviets for them to enter the war. We set the date for the entry of the Soviets into the war in the Far East. And of course, when they did attack, their lightning campaign in Manchuria, they destroyed the Quanton Army, taking needlessly heavy casualties, perhaps, in doing so.

Well, of course this was followed by the second atomic bomb at Nagasaki and then the official surrender of Japan and the conclusion of the war in the Far East on August 15, 1945.

So as the war came to a conclusion, obviously the united efforts of the British, the Americans, and the Soviets had produced victory, and indeed we were all very pleased to be sure about that. This was a political achievement by the British, the Americans, and the Soviets and it was also a military achievement by the British, the Soviets, and the Americans. And many people, particularly the Americans, looked forward to the prospect of a New World Order which could be created now in the wake of the most destructive war in human history. But the question now became would the Grand Alliance perpetuate or rather, would a new balance of power inevitably emerge, which would pit the wartime allies one against the other.

Well of course, the question was quickly answered as the Soviets took action within their security zone to implement their security satellite system. We viewed those actions as a violation of the principles for which we had fought. Mr. Churchill himself, in his great Fulton speech declared that an iron curtain had descended across the face of Europe. But this raises the question what could the Soviets have done then, to prevent the Soviets from establishing that security zone in Eastern Europe?

Well, let's look at the balance of power very quickly between the British and the Americans, on the one hand, and the Soviets on the other. On the American side we had great leaders, like General Marshall, at the helm. In Europe, we had Eisenhower and his commanders, and of course, General Patton. And in the

Far East we had General McArthur. In addition, we had unprecedented air, ground, and naval power. Plus we had the atomic bomb, and you might say that must give us tremendous leverage over the Soviets, to be able to enforce our will.

But what about Soviet power? Well, Stalin obviously had a tremendous Soviet political, economic military system behind him. He had extremely seasoned commanders who had fought their way, well, they had broken the back of the Wehrmacht and had fought their way all the way back through Europe against no less than two-thirds of the German divisions during the course of the Second World War. And behind these talented commanders, he had a 19.5 million man army in 1945.

What options did we have? Well as I say, the Soviets would fight for the primary objectives that they had. They would fight for that sphere of influence.

In terms of the secondary areas, we might have had some leverage, but here the problem was in places like Czechoslovakia, the Communists did win a free election in 1946. In the case of Yugoslavia the Communists were genuinely popular. So our leverage in those areas was somewhat limited. In the end, we could certainly work around the margins, but basically, Stalin was in control of the areas that he wanted. Possession is nine points of the law and again, our only successes were in the very marginal areas, such as Northern Iran and places such as that.

Meanwhile, as this confrontation began to emerge between the West, on the one hand, and Soviets on the other, another post-war conflict began to emerge, too, and that was the movement toward decolonization. So the challenge for the West was to manage both of these conflicts simultaneously. The challenge from the USSR and the challenge of the strong reemergence of the forces of national liberation.

Well what can we say in conclusion? I think as you can easily see, as one goes through this, the Soviets, the Americans, and the British had radically different ideas regarding their national interests, their visions of the post-war order, and their national objectives. Hence their grand strategies were formulated based on strikingly different assumptions and an understanding of these differences was central to understanding how military power was actually applied by the Soviets, the British, and the Americans between 1941 and 1945. And looking beyond the war, it seems like it's almost inevitable that these differences would drive a wedge between wartime allies once the threat posed by the axis powers of Germany and Japan had been eliminated.

This of course relates to larger questions regarding the dynamics of coalition cohesiveness as well as the difficulties of

converting military victory into political success. But in the broadest and most theoretical sense, I hope you can see the synergistic relationship between the concepts of perceptions of one's own interests within the international system, one's vision for the future, its relationship to national interests, its relationship to political objectives, and its relationship in turn to grand strategy of which the military component is only one of many components that are available to a statesman.

I firmly believe that a familiarity with these concepts and the synergistic relationship among them is absolutely central to understanding, formulating, implementing, and evaluating grand strategy, national military strategy, and theater strategy. And this relationship, the relationship between interests, objectives, grand strategy, national military strategy, theater strategy, is central to understanding foreign policy both during the time that we have looked at here from '41 to '45 as well as any time within the international system.

Thank you very much.

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