

**Remarks by Central Intelligence Agency Director
Michael V. Hayden
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Good morning, and thanks for that warm welcome. I was invited to speak at this conference back in January, when I was still in uniform. Now, this is my first big Air Force conference with an R-E-T behind my name. But the truth is, I feel as much an airman today as I did on June 30th—only with more suits and a mortgage.

It's always a pleasure to speak to an Air Force audience. I know you have heard from many distinguished speakers over the past two days—people uniquely qualified to discuss the opportunities and challenges facing America's Air Force and the aerospace community at large. I thought it would be most useful to spend my time with you discussing the other organization I've come to know and love: the Central Intelligence Agency. It's not just that I'm proud of the Agency I currently lead—though, I certainly am. I want to focus on CIA and some of the things going on in the Intelligence Community because they affect the entire US national security architecture.

As you may know, a primary focus in the IC today is integration. We're doing all we can to combine and synchronize the core capabilities and unique strengths of each agency, so that we can better achieve our mission. Of course, the military intelligence agencies are part and parcel of that. But I believe integration increasingly will extend beyond the 16 intelligence agencies to other partners, including the Air Force at large.

Each of you, therefore, over the course of an Air Force career, are more likely than ever to have intelligence-related issues in your in-boxes—whether your line of work is intelligence or not. So it will be more and more important to understand both the role of intelligence in keeping America safe and the work of each agency in contributing to that vital mission.

At CIA, we are operating at the highest operational tempo in our history. On all fronts—collection, analysis, technology, support, and covert action—the Agency is being asked to do more, and to do it more quickly and more precisely. The reason lies in both the nature of the threats we face and the nature of intelligence today.

Think about our most pressing national security problems: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, instability caused by non-state actors and rogue states, cyber security. Often the biggest challenge is simply knowing who the enemy is—detecting him, locating him, and understanding his capabilities and intentions. That puts intelligence front and center.

At the same time, intelligence is far more operational than it was only two decades ago. I see it at CIA every day, and I know the Air Force recognizes this fundamental shift too. I grew up in an Air Force where the “two” almost always preceded the “three.” Intelligence guided operations; it was an enabler, a support function. Intelligence still plays that role, but it’s much more than that: Intelligence is inherently operational.

Today, we routinely use kinetic force not just for its own effect, but to create a response that will allow us to collect more intelligence. We use military operations to excite the enemy, prompting him to respond. We create and benefit from a highly virtuous cycle: Operations generate opportunities to learn more about the enemy, the intelligence gained creates opportunities for follow-on operations, and so on.

Furthermore, in the years that I was in the Air Force, there was an undeniable, doctrinal leap from mass to precision. You can actually plot it on my resume: In 1972, I was with the 8th Air Force on Guam helping plan massive B-52 runs over Vietnam. When I was at EUCOM in the mid-’90s, the hallmark of the Balkans campaign was pinpoint strikes on key facilities. And most recently, in the conflict with al-Qa’ida and its followers, our pilots are targeting individuals, not even structures. To do that successfully, we need precise, real-time intelligence.

Now, let’s talk about what CIA is doing to ensure that we continue to meet the demands created by these changed conditions. Again, the key conditions are: Security threats that put intelligence front and center, an inherently operational role for intelligence, and the need for precision in both our collection and our response.

At CIA, first and foremost, we’re putting more weight on our forward foot—shifting people and capabilities to the field. We are a global agency with a global mission, and fulfilling that duty is more important than ever at a time of war. With so many of our national security resources right now devoted to the sweep of land from Baghdad to Bajaur, it is CIA’s responsibility, perhaps more than any other agency, to watch for and warn of potential dangers and opportunities arising in other parts of the world.

President Reagan called CIA “the tripwire across which the forces of repression and tyranny must stumble.” The term I like to use is “skirmish line.” We move ahead of the main body of troops, we keep our eyes both on the distant horizon and on the enemy before us, and at times, we are the first to engage.

That means we must teach our new clandestine service officers the best tradecraft and get them out into the world as quickly as possible. It means using increasingly creative forms of cover and non-traditional approaches to gain access to our high-priority targets. It also requires our officers to operate in some of the world’s most dangerous places—alongside our military in Iraq and Afghanistan—but in many other inhospitable, hazardous places, as well, areas where they operate without the benefit of a US military

presence, and in some cases, without diplomatic protection. Risk is a constant in their work.

When it comes to our National Clandestine Service, our espionage arm, you'll understand why I can't cite specific figures. But I can at least give you an idea of its growth since 9/11. From FY 2000 to FY 2007, the NCS budget increased more than fourfold, its staff expanded by 44 percent, its number of Stations and Bases rose by 40 percent, and the volume of intelligence reports nearly tripled.

In addition to human intelligence collection, the NCS is primarily responsible for our covert action mission. CIA is the US government's sole covert action agency. This authority, executed at the direction of the President, goes back to 1948, and it's been used by every commander in chief since Truman. While it is not something we can talk much about, you should know that covert action is a critical and significant part of what CIA does for our nation.

My Agency also remains the only full-service analytic entity operating outside the policy departments. Put another way, I am the only leader of a US intelligence agency that does not have a Cabinet member between me and DNI McConnell. That's important, because it gives CIA—specifically our Directorate of Intelligence—the objectivity that is demanded by those making decisions for our country. As former CIA Director Richard Helms once said, “Without objectivity, there is no credibility, and an intelligence organization without credibility is of little use to those it serves.”

Like the National Clandestine Service, our Directorate of Intelligence has grown substantially in the last seven years. In fact, more than half of our analysts have joined CIA since 9/11. Many are right out of college. But many others have years of experience in the private sector, the military, or other government agencies. So “new” doesn't necessarily mean “young,” but there is a steep learning curve right now for our analysts. They are expected to get up to speed on both tradecraft and substance much more quickly than those who came in earlier.

We have found that one of the best ways to accelerate the learning of our analysts is to send them to the field. Putting our officers into a foreign culture, surrounding them with the politics, traditions, and thinking of a place, requiring them to communicate in the native language—all that deepens their understanding and quickly improves their capacity to provide insight. That's the goal: not simply information, but insight rooted in a high level of expertise.

To build that expertise, CIA also is giving analysts more time on target—letting them work the same issue for many years—and getting them out of their offices to mix with academics and others who have valuable insight and experience to share. This is especially important now, because the knowledge and understanding we need is very different from that required in the bipolar world of the last century.

Today, we need deep expertise in non-Western cultures, histories, religions, and traditions, and officers fluent in difficult languages, such as Arabic, Pashto, Farsi, Chinese and Dari. As an Agency, we must rely on America to help us achieve the level and type of expertise we need. And while there has been a slight shift in academia and elsewhere toward subjects such as Islamic studies, Chinese history, Middle Eastern and South Asian politics, culture, and society, we still have a very long way to go as a nation to achieve the kind of mobilization that occurred at the dawn of the Cold War.

The core CIA capabilities I've just run through—all-source analysis, human intelligence collection, and covert action—are unique and formidable assets for our nation. They are essential to US national security, and they define CIA as an agency. Strengthening them is my Agency's top priority, even as we more closely collaborate with our partners in the Intelligence Community and beyond.

Let me give you my view on where we stand with integration. It's no overstatement to say the walls have come down since 9/11. CIA is working more closely than ever with IC colleagues, the military, and our foreign partners, building and fostering relationships that have made a decisive difference, particularly in the war on terrorism. We are finding new ways to communicate with our partners and share our finished products. CIA officers serve in agencies across the Community, and others routinely send their people to CIA. Let me give you just one example: NSA used to have only an officer or two at Langley, serving as reps in our Ops Center. Now, nearly 100 NSA officers are at CIA Headquarters working very closely with ours.

CIA's relationship with the Air Force also is stronger, broader, and deeper than only a few years ago. Major General Mark Welsh recently took over as our Associate Director for Military Affairs. He succeeds Major General John Brennan, another exceptional Air Force officer, who really strengthened and improved the way ADMA functions inside CIA. The office serves as the primary bridge between CIA and the military—a single point of entry and exit on most DoD matters, from intelligence and operational support to target deconfliction.

CIA is cooperating with the Air Force, specifically, on issues ranging from cyber security, to transport of materiel and personnel, to air support for operations in the combat zones. We work closely with the A2 and A3, and with leaders ranging from the Secretary of the Air Force to the head of the Air Force ISR Agency. We recently hosted the STRATCOM Commander, General Chilton, and his staff out at Langley for a broad ranging discussion of our common mission and shared battle space.

The collaborative spirit is strongest in the field, especially the war zones. In Iraq and Afghanistan, there is little if any partitioning or sense of turf—everything is subordinated to the shared mission at hand. I have visited both countries several times, and at any one of our Stations or forward bases there, you find CIA officers—analysts, case officers, support, and technical people—serving alongside Community colleagues and the military. That close, personal interaction allows operational decisions—the nuts

and bolts of inter-agency deconfliction and coordination—to be made at the lowest possible level.

Now, it's important to note that we're not integrating for integration's sake. We're doing it because it improves our nation's performance in both intelligence and military operations. As a result—and this is the most important point—our country is tangibly more secure.

You need look no further than the 2006 operation that eliminated Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, the former head of al-Qa'ida in Iraq. It was the merging of many sensitive data streams—from human sources, technical ops, intercepts, and more—that culminated in two smart bombs gliding toward their target.

To act precisely, you need the precision intelligence you get from bringing together the expertise of different agencies. And operations like the one that took out Zarqawi aren't limited to well-known, high-value targets. They are used to kill and capture terrorists at all levels—it's just that the results don't always make it into print or the nightly news. And that's by design, because it allows us to exploit leads and gather information for the next strike.

I should add that the value of integration extends well beyond kinetic strikes and capture missions. Working side-by-side with the troops in western Iraq, CIA analysts picked up insights they otherwise wouldn't have. That added dimension enabled our officers to play a key role in the engagement of Sunni tribal leaders, a real breakthrough in the conflict last year.

Another good example of IC-wide collaboration was our team effort on the undeclared nuclear reactor in Syria—details of which were made public a few months ago. By combining rigorous analytic tradecraft, skillful human and technical collection, and close cooperation with foreign partners, we were able to determine not only what this building in the remote eastern desert was, but also who was involved in its planning and construction.

There's plenty of reason to celebrate the merits of each success, but there's something more, too: Every time we artfully combine our capabilities, we not only learn how to do it better, we build the muscle memory to do it again and again. Perhaps the best thing about this trend toward closer collaboration is that our officers return from the field with the expectation that it will continue. They have internalized integration—the mechanics of it and the value of it—and they bring a collaborative instinct to their follow-on assignments. They strive to work more frequently across CIA's directorate lines and across agency lines.

Something else that will keep us on the right track is more joint-duty assignments. At CIA, we are phasing in a requirement that officers serve in another intelligence agency or a national center, such as the National Counterterrorism Center, before they can be promoted to the Senior Intelligence Service. It's just one more way to institutionalize

greater collaboration. We want to make it part of the culture, and therefore, less dependent on individual personalities.

So that's where we are today at CIA. We're an integral part of an Intelligence Community that has never been more cohesive or effective in its history. We retain our essential identity as the nation's skirmish line. And we are taking the fight directly to the enemy, working in close support of the warfighters.

When I was on active duty, one of the things I was often asked by military colleagues was: "What's it like to be an Air Force four-star running CIA?" The question implies that one should expect major differences between the culture I worked in for almost four decades and the one at CIA. But what I found when I arrived at the Agency two years ago was a culture that any airman would easily recognize. Less hierarchical, but expeditionary and very can-do.

CIA parallels the military very closely in terms of the values that underlie our work. We're all here to serve the United States. We all understand the enormous trust the American people place in us as we work to keep them safe. That shared mission is the most important thing.

If you remember only one thing from what I've said today, let it be this: The men and women of CIA are full partners with you in the conflict that defines our time, the war against terrorism. They are with you in all the places that matter most. And they will remain in the fight—bringing all the focus, skill and dedication necessary—until we ultimately prevail.

Thanks again for the invitation to be here. It's been a privilege.