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I'm going to talk, from the perspective of my new portfolio, which I'll describe in a minute, about the US Air Force across the spectrum of conflict as I see it. First, this special ops low-intensity conflict and interdependent capabilities portfolio. Some say it means SOF and lots of other stuff, but what it really breaks down to is oversight of current operations worldwide and our future operational capability, from nuclear weapons down to SOF. Not surprisingly the way the world is, operations takes about 80 percent of my time these days, particularly operations in CENTCOM, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, but also other areas, Trans-Sahara, Philippines, Columbia, Mexico, etcetera. That said, we also spend a fair amount of time on long-term strategy, competitive strategy, with rising and resurgent powers, such as China and Russia. on the future capabilities side, our office authors the guidance for the development of the force that informs the program objective memorandum. We just finished POM 10 through 15, used to be known as defense planning guidance and strategic planning guidance. And then the department is also moving toward a portfolio, capability portfolio approach, and we are a co-lead for the force application portfolio, which is probably the 800-pound gorilla that's shooting and moving. It's about 214 billion dollars of the defense budget and it's about 1.15 trillion in acquisition programs that AT&L of course oversees but we have a role in requirements.

Now I'd like to turn to the central topic of my talk, and that is airpower, air and space power across the spectrum of conflict, and I hope to allow ample time for questions afterwards. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, I believe, was really a landmark document and our post-Cold War defense reviews. It really identified four core strategic challenges or core problems that we face--winning the war on terror, defeating extremist networks, defending the homeland in depth, shaping countries at strategic crossroads, very large, rising or resurgent countries, and then preventing the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction. I'm going to talk about really three of these today and their applicability for the Air Force.

The first is this war on terror or radical Islamist global insurgency that we confront. Unlike other insurgencies, it truly is global. To use Mao's phrase about guerillas are terrorists swimming in the sea of the people, well this is a 1.2 billion-person sea spread across the world and of course that's just the Islamic diaspora. They make common cause with lots of others as well, and so finding these terrorists and ameliorating the conditions or addressing the conditions that they exploit is a significant challenge and will likely require a long period of time.

Another thing that makes this war so difficult is the ideological motivation that these are religious revolutionaries, although they're politically motivated as well and of course the danger is access to WMD. The principal future battleground as the 2006 QDR notes will likely be countries with which we're not at war. That will necessitate a more indirect, sometimes clandestine approach. And there's also working by, with, and through our partners, and this is one area where as I'll talk to in a minute, airpower can really play a central role. But there's also the risk of failed states in a number of areas that I think will confront us through the next Administration and quite likely through the next decade. Our broad strategy for dealing with this strategy is to isolate, defeat this global threat, and then prevent its regeneration. And that last part is really important, even after we defeat them in certain areas, typically one sees you have to sit on them for an awfully long time. This requires constant pressure, something we're trying to develop through our capabilities and with our partners called the global counterterrorism network, and it requires that we deny them sanctuary anywhere they may seek to find it.

Now I'd like to turn to the challenge the QDR called shaping countries at strategic crossroads, and focus on the rise of China and then secondarily the prospect of a resurgent Russia. China poses a number of challenges for us--their progress in developing capabilities has gone at a much faster pace than I think analysts thought not only 10 years but as recently as a few years ago. They pose the most sophisticated anti-access challenge in the world. They of course have great strategic depth, developing robust space and cyber capabilities that pose challenges for us. They're developing what might be described as interior information lines that could benefit them in any conflict, and of course they have growing and already very robust economic strength. One of the key strategic issues of the 20th century was that we had at least twice the GDP of our principal rivals, sometimes more than twice the GDP, whether it was Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union in its heyday. That is very unlikely to be true with the future China, so the economic escalation dominance that we enjoyed in the 20th century won't likely be a characteristic of the 21st.

If there is a more robust security competition it could manifest itself first regionally and then globally. One certainly hopes we don't see a repeat of the Cold War where it moves to proxies. Our strategy vis-à-vis China is very different than our strategy in the Cold War. It's to fundamentally engage China to make it a responsible stakeholder in the international system, and that's our primary effort. While we're doing that, of course, it's the responsibility of the Department of Defense and others to hedge that engagement might not turn out exactly the way we like. As part of that hedging strategy we need to reduce our vulnerability in certain areas whether it'd be bases or capabilities and we need to use our capabilities as part of a strategy to deter conflict and dissuade development of undesirable capabilities by complicating planning and by potentially shifting investment in more helpful directions. It's very important that our capabilities provide future presidents with the ability to deny sanctuary. That would be the best way

to deter war, and to isolate conflict as required.

I'd like to talk for a few minutes now about a resurgent Russia, particularly in the wake of Georgia. We certainly hope this isn't the case but it could be a roughneck decade here and perhaps more crises like the Georgia crisis. Russia remains of course a principal nuclear power, and poses quite significant asymmetric challenges, even more asymmetric than those posed by China, and of course it's the continental power in terms of landmass of all continental powers. Now the principal realm of any competition with Russia, and our strategy again is to engage Russia and make it a responsible stakeholder of the system, is likely to be in the area of influence and perhaps economic competition and strategic trade as they've tried to use their energy resources for strategic benefit, and then potentially as we saw in Georgia, challenges on Russia's periphery or near abroad as they describe it.

The third challenge I'd like to talk about with implications for air and space power is the potential movement toward a more proliferated WMD world. The track we had seen currently really has potential adversaries of the United States moving but if they succeed in developing nuclear weapons then possibly allies and partners may as well in East Asia or in Southwest Asia and that would be a very undesirable world in terms of its challenge for policy, stability, and military capabilities and operational concepts, will pose challenges to our power projection. It would make proxy war more likely for rogue states that possess nuclear weapons, so therefore this is something very much, as the QDR indicated that we are trying with our partners trying to prevent. Our strategy in this area is to delay and try to prevent and then if we are forced to adapt to be well-positioned to do so.

Now I'd like to talk about air and space power across this spectrum of conflict or challenges identified by the 2006 QDR. The first is the challenge of shaping countries at strategic crossroads or near peers, however we want to describe it. This is fundamentally a problem from a military point of view of both strategic and conventional deterrence, and should deterrence fail, being able to prevail in a conflict. This requires revitalization of our nuclear enterprise. I'm very pleased with the steps the Air Force has been taking in this area. There's some discussion of some internal reorganization to put more focused and senior emphasis on nuclear issues. The Air Force has a great tradition in this area with the Strategic Air Command, and I think it's something that can be reconstituted and of course taken to a higher level. This of course has implications for career paths, for those following this area as well as operational practices.

Second side of this of course is the modernization bill for our strategic forces is going to be coming due. With the Air Force comprising two legs of our triad, and then playing a role in another QDR high priority area, conventional prompt global strike, this will be an issue for the next administration--it's just getting underway--and the ones after that.

Now, we will have a nuclear posture review next year that will set conditions up for this modernization. The Air Force is really done a great job in extending the life of current systems but modernization will be required, as well as a renewed focus on the nuclear enterprise.

Now I'd like to turn to the area of air and space power in conventional deterrence. For the last 30 years or so, I believe that a revolution in military affairs has been underway that the US has just been at the forefront of, and at the forefront of that US revolution that really grew out of the late Cold War has really been air and space power. With precision weapons, it later coupled with MAS, unmanned systems, the emergence of unmanned systems, the increased exploitation of space systems, operationally and tactically, and finally the development of battle networks that can tie all these capabilities together.

As the QDR has directed, the shift of some capabilities to deal with these challenges, the Air Force since 2006 has made extremely promising starts in a number of areas for next generation long range strike, persistent ISR, we hope soon air refueling, we need to pay a little more attention to assured access for survivable basing, particularly in the Pacific, advanced munitions given where some hardened shelter technology is going. In space, control and including nascent efforts in space reconstitution, which I believe is very critical, high bandwidth communications, and of course precision navigation and timing. I am really encouraged by the progress I've seen in my time in this capacity in the department since the 2006 QDR, and I think it's absolutely vital that we sustain these efforts across the next administration and beyond. If we do that, we will be well positioned to execute the strategy that the QDR envisioned. The final point I'd like to talk about in the area of conventional deterrence is the imperative for our air and space and maritime forces to have a two-conventional campaign capability. There's been some continuing confusion about the force planning construct laid out in the 2006 QDR because it rightly emphasizes the need to conduct operations steady state as well as surge across three areas--in homeland defense, in irregular warfare or the war on terror, and in conventional campaigns with strategic deterrence being part of homeland defense. That force planning construct which is still being refined has differential implications for the services. Some naturally have to worry about protracted irregular warfare campaigns and they are big force structure drivers for them--our special operations forces and our ground forces. Our air and maritime forces, conversely, have to ensure that they maintain two conventional campaign capabilities while also addressing the imperatives of irregular warfare. And so rather than the two conventional campaign constructs we went into the QDR with this one has more differentiation to reflect the challenges we have but it's imperative that we maintain a two conventional campaign strategy as you look at these array of problems. And again, air and space and naval power will be central to that.

Now I'd like to talk about the irregular warfare challenge and its implications for air and space power. I think it's really imperative that this be seen as a core mission for the US Air Force, and the very different challenges of irregular warfare and these higher-end threats really necessitate not only a portfolio approach to capabilities across our department but I believe within our services and in particular in the Air Force. The requirements of the Global War on Terror require just enormous demands for ISR. The challenges in a high scale conventional campaign will require different forms of ISR. Now that ISR that we use for conventional can also be applied to irregular warfare but we wouldn't have it in sufficient numbers if we basically focused on one on trying to make a general purpose. We should use general purpose forces wherever we can but again these requirements are so diverse in terms of advanced air defense environments, versus just the need to have persistence over wide ungoverned areas that I think a portfolio approach is absolutely essential.

Some of the capabilities that are really the coin of the realm in irregular warfare from an air and space perspective are ISR, ISR, ISR, you know, this is the secretary's top priority; air mobility, of course, and then strike, through gunships, and others. I would be wrong if I didn't mention the critical role in extending our air and potentially space power in certain areas to our partners, and the critical role of aviation for internal defense or the vital role played around the world by our combat aviation advisors. We've recently doubled them, we may need to look at adding more capacity. They are a critical capability as we look at the capabilities we need in winning the war on terror.

Finally I'd like to talk about the Air Force Special Operations Command and its growth. As many of you know, we've recently transferred a Predator squadron to them. They may need even more ISR as they go forward. We will face significant challenges of maintaining our ability for special operations forces to penetrate denied area. I want to be very candid. These denied areas are getting more difficult as the larger Air Force knows. The idea that we can take common service platforms and continue to adapt them to penetrate these environments may be approaching the end of a period, but developing the platforms that we will need to insert our special operations forces early in a conflict is going to come with a big resource bill, and I hope the Congress. We are technologically capable of doing this. I hope the Congress and future administrations support this requirement, which has been identified in this QDR and previous QDRs, 2001 for example, but again it's a significant fiscal challenge. There may be some novel organizations worth looking into such as irregular warfare wings that we can harness to extend our own capabilities in this area and to extend them to our partners.

And with that I'd like to wrap up I mainly wanted to put a lot of issues on the table to give you lots of time for questions, but I want to leave you with this thought, and that is: Air and space power is absolutely central to US strategy across the spectrum of conflict. Again, given these diverse array of challenges we face and every time I go to a White

House deputies and principles meetings we remark on how 2008 is sure a heck of a lot more difficult as we look around the world than 1998 was or even 2001 was, and these challenges mandate a portfolio approach across our capabilities and even within our services. I believe this is a historic period for the US Air Force as it makes this transition and our Air Force couldn't be in better hands with the leadership we have, and with that I'd be happy to take your questions.

#### Q&A segment

Q: Thank you very much for an intriguing presentation, Mr. Secretary. What we're going to do because of the large audience--I'd like to ask you to write your questions down and I've got folks coming up and down the aisle to pick them up and I'll pass them on in a formal manner. Let me take the prerogative of the chair, though, to start you out with a couple of tough ones. We look at an Air Force that when I joined in 1972, average age of the air fleet was eight years old. We now have an air fleet approaching a quarter of a century old on average. We've got planes that are falling apart in flight, some 15, 20 percent have been grounded in the last year. We had a space speaker at an AFA symposium a while back that I jokingly said, "we've got satellites up in the air that are old enough to vote" and he responded back, "no, we've got some that are old enough to drink." When I look at the budget across (inaudible) I don't see the monies that are put in there to support a recapitalization even of a modest extent. And of course it's been troubled with tankers and CSAR-X and other acquisition problems. I also see an army with 7,000 tanks and 400 of which were so reused in Operation Iraqi Freedom. So my question to you, Mr. Secretary is, have we got an imbalance here and are we going to slowly shift this over time, and it seems to us on the outside that a large infusion, a large investment is going to have to be made in these areas pretty quickly.

A: Thanks. That's a great and difficult question. One of the tensions of modernization as you described is between recapitalization because the force is either old and we had a procurement holiday or because it's being worn out by current operations and both factors are impacting our services there, but also the need to balance that against deferred transformation. The problems that were identified in the 2006 QDR require some fundamentally new capabilities and they require them not just by 2018 or 2020, but they would be very useful to have as soon as we could get them. And this would put enormous pressure, all these challenges would put enormous pressure on budgets and we recognize that. Quadrennial Defense Review coming up, the 2010 QDR, I think we'll have to again make its assessment of the future security environment and our capabilities across our portfolio, and look where joint interdependencies can perhaps realize some savings in various areas, but I think within each service and their capabilities there will be painful choices about shifting as we recapitalize some, shifting from some capabilities to newer capabilities. This will require I think as we shift the surface attack mission to our bomber force, some drawdown in fighter force structure,

which is already underway in the POM. But these will be wrenching choices, and even with these wrenching choices as I said in a number of these areas, whether its next generation insertion platform for SOF or whatever it is, there's going to be very painful decisions for our future leaders. If we fail to do this and we don't have the right military in 2018 or 2020, it is going to be far worse. And so again I think the capabilities identified really should be our top priorities but we recognize how hard this is going to be given the demands on the force.

Q: You talked a little bit about winning the war on terrorism and working in denied areas. This is a couple-part question. The winning problem is, can you really win, how long will it take, and is this possible in our lifetimes, and the second part of the question is, in the news there's been air strikes, employment of forces in Pakistan in kind of a denied area in federally administered tribal areas. Is there blowback from Pakistan, and does the administration, are they going to continue these types of attacks?

A: Well if you'll pardon me I really don't want to talk about any ongoing operations for obvious reasons of sensitivity. I will say that Pakistan is a vital partner of ours in the War on Terror, and it is an area of great strategic importance for lots of reasons; the al Qaeda senior leadership have a sanctuary there. They disrupt cross-border attacks disrupt operations and strategy, put our strategy in Afghanistan at risk, and of course there's a threat to Pakistan's stability and so we work very closely with our Pakistani partners to try to address these challenges. Yes, the war on terror is winnable. As you look at irregular warfare whether it's insurgencies in a single state or dealing with a protracted terrorism problem, these conflicts take long periods of time to resolve. They are most often resolved through political accommodation of some kind or political change. Even in sophisticated states, for example, Western Europe of the 1970s and 80s, scores of terrorists, Red Brigades, and Baader-Meinhof, caused mayhem and lasted for a long period of time. Like it or not, this is the fight we find ourselves in, we didn't ask for this fight it was brought upon us, but it's one that we must win and we can win. The key to winning this conflict over time, as I said, is to isolate this threat, is to take away its capabilities of global reach, and then to defeat it with our partners, and then to prevent its regeneration, which by all historical standards, will take a significant period of time. Now whether that is, short of a decade or several decades one can't predict at this point, the future is too uncertain. These conflicts also have a way of being nonlinear in a sense, you know, you can suppress them down to some level and they bounce back a bit, or it's hard to defeat them until the political conditions are right to do that, but again that's the conflict we find ourselves in. We can't do this without our international partners. That is the one caveat I would say, there is no way to win this conflict without harnessing scores of partners around the world and on every continent in common cause.

Q: This next one focuses a little bit on our special operations forces. What do you see for the future of special operation forces and what is your opinion of the priorities of

USSOCOM in the near term and mid term?

A: Well, special operations forces have been central to the war on terror and they've been major growth stock at the Department of Defense since 2001. SOCOM's budget has nearly doubled since then, it's personnel is in the process of doubling even in the transferring out of I think 11 thousand plus troops to the general purpose forces and reserve civil affairs and SIOPS. SOCOM has become the supported plan for planning synchronizing and when directed executing the global war on terror although their role is predominately planning and synchronizing that effort globally. We are in the process of the largest period of SOF growth in our history as a nation. It will be completed, the growth directed by the 2006 QDR toward the end of the next administration. We still have gaps in our capabilities and capacities, rotary wing lift for example, it's another thing like ISR, particularly rotary wing lift that can operate in high altitudes that we will likely have to address in the next QDR. Civil affairs and SIOPS are in really short supply despite expanding them. But as we move forward through the next four years our capabilities and our capacities are going to grow more. Special operations forces are a principle element of this global counterterrorism network and that really is their primary responsibility. SOCOM headquarters responsibility as both as a force provider and as a warfighter planning and synchronizing the war on terror. Our special operations forces also have to be ready to support conventional campaigns in denied areas as you alluded to and that requires then some specialized capabilities as well specialized forces beyond the large force that we're growing and developing for the war on terror.

Q: The next question is on Africa. We see an increased interest in Africa from Russia and to a large extent from China. We know that terrorism flourishes in places that are partially governed. I read recently from a former senior official in the CIA that said, Nigeria, with more Muslims than Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states combined, will be a terrorist problem in the future. What do you see going forward with Africa in terms of what we need to do there to either build capacity or work with allies and friends in the region?

A: Well the department is in the process of fully standing up Africa Command as many of you all know and this is a very welcomed development that I think will provide greater strategic oversight of this critical continent. It is a large continent that poses a number of challenges to us. The terrorism problem alone currently is centered in the Trans-Sahara and the Horn of Africa but it is extending into areas like Nigeria. Instability, you know Africa's gone through a very painful period both from a humanitarian perspective and from prolonged instability in the core of the continent and in the west over the past two decades and that will remain a challenge. And then you also mentioned the security and economic influence competition that is occurring that are intertwined because of access to Africa's resource wealth as well. And so one can

expect to see more engagement albeit low-key and indirect in Africa than I think we've had. We face the challenge right now because we're engaged in two wars and operations elsewhere but one would expect with Africa Command more and more of these types of engagement operations as well as maritime security and others, and again this is an area where with large ungoverned spaces that air and space power really can play a great enabling role for our partners and for our own forces.

Q: Back to Russia and China--we've seen with Chinese doctrine an emphasis on cyber attacks and we've seen at least reportedly two nations attacked, Georgia and a country in the Baltics attacked by Russian or at least emanating partly from Russia. What do you see in the cyber sphere going forward both on the defensive side for us and possibly on what other nations might be doing?

A: Well, cyber warfare after a long gestation period has really emerged as a new way of war with lots of ramifications. It is really come of age, and you cited a couple of examples of the use of cyber warfare that posed significant challenges for us. This is one issue that the department is looking at as part of a congressionally directed roles and missions review, about how we can organize and posture ourselves for cyber operations. The president has directed a national comprehensive cyber initiative, balancing both defense and offense, to ensure the security of our critical cyber networks. So there's a lot going on in this area, but a lot of which I can talk about beyond what I just did, but cyber warfare is really come of age. I mean it's the pre-cursor for conflict in many cases, I mean it's ongoing, steady state, it is now a very different world than we knew a little while ago.

Q: Do you see a role, in the follow-up, do you see a role for all the services in this area, or is this going to be the domain of Strategic Command. How are we organized for it and is there international policy and law that talks about a cyber attack being in a real attack?

A: Well the legal part is a little out of my depth so I'll defer that but this is a nascent area and so even though it's maturing in terms of capabilities and its effect there's still lots of issues to work out. I mentioned organizationally and building our own capabilities but legally and others is what constitutes an act of war and what does not, and again I'll defer to other experts on that. I think it's important, this new domain of warfare and capabilities, that each service will likely require some capabilities with this area starting with the new triad and the nuclear posture review in 2001, you know, cyber became an element of our strategic deterrence. And STRATCOM has done a wonderful job in integrating those capabilities as well. There is a division in the intelligence community, Title 50, and Title 10 in this area as well as cyber has become more important across the board. They're intimately linked, I don't think I can say more than that, and so this poses a number of challenges for us as to roles and missions and how we organize ourselves and others, which is as I said the senior leadership of the department is

working on very aggressively.

Q: As the strategist for perhaps the largest covert CIA operations in history, there's a great line in the movie, Charlie Wilson's War, near the end of the movie, where Charlie Wilson was toasting success, and you were reportedly asked, don't you think this is wonderful, and you said, at least in the movie you said, "we'll see." Has Afghanistan turned out kind of the way you expected it to turn out and are we spending enough money in trying to rebuild the infrastructure and help the Afghanis move away from an opium-based economy?

A: Great question. Well, the guy who said that in the movie was actually my former boss at the CIA, who was an ethnic Greek and was prone to comments like that. I don't know whether he actually said it or not but it certainly reflected his thinking in a lot of cases. I think looking back at that period, the victory in Afghanistan of course was a major contributor to the end of the Cold War, a historic event, but those of us that were involved in it were cognizant at the time that this would have, it would leave to tremendous upheaval within Afghanistan and perhaps elsewhere. It's fair to say no one anticipated the war on terror that grew out of it, but we knew that Afghanistan required rebuilding afterwards. I think the most important line of the movie and movies are movies, I would commend the book to you which I think is a little more historically accurate, was actually the line attributed to Charlie Wilson at the end about not disengaging from Afghanistan and Pakistan, which those of you that know the history know we did for some 12 years and that's certainly a mistake we don't want to make again. Secretary Gates has said this over and over that if there's one thing we learned from that conflict is not to disengage after a victory. I believe that's the key to success in Afghanistan now. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen has said on numerous occasions, Afghanistan has been since the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, since 2002, since 2003 at least the beginning of OIF, an economy of forced conflict. That's not by choice, that's by necessity. I believe a strategic shift is underway now, Afghanistan does require more resources, more US military resources as well as economic resources, and above all it requires sustained engagement.

Q: This is a little off that, but let me ask: Do you see a change in the acquisition processes to support the portfolio approach that you discuss and will Congress support changes in this process?

A: I would defer that to my AT&L colleagues who are far better qualified than I am to address that. Looking at it from a requirements perspective or an operational perspective, though, there have been some real successes of late, in the MRAP area, the mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles where we've had special acquisition programs. We're doing some things in the ISR area now that I think are quite innovative to speed things to the battlefield. If operationally responsive space lives up to its

potential, there could be some very novel acquisition approaches there. Some of course are undertaken by our Special Operations Command, and then in the intelligence community who have really produced critical capabilities in very, very short periods of time that we should look to emulate, but the broader challenge we have in acquisition, and again this is not my area of expertise, is one, just the enormous demands put on it. As you said, budgets of some level, the twin challenge of recapitalizing and transforming at the same time, but also the great expense of a lot of systems that we have that we just got to get our arms around. We've had some success of late in the submarine force. We feel strategically we need to go to two submarines a year beginning in 2011. To do that we had to get the cost of the Virginia-class down to 2 billion. They've successfully done that, it looks like, so that's one example of a pretty significant acquisition success, but this remains a very challenging area.

Q: What improvements do you see that are needed in airlift for irregular warfare, to include foreign and internal defense?

A: Well things like the joint cargo aircraft will be very helpful, and again providing a transport, ISR, and light strike capability to our partners that's affordable will be very critical as well. As we place greater emphasis on irregular warfare, or more appropriately as the strategic environment demands that we do, and as we shift because of either geopolitical trends or because changes in warfare, as our air and space and maritime power becomes the portion of the joint force that we can organize our conventional campaigns around, some contingencies way more than others, the requirements for conventional campaign lift, given that we might do one protracted irregular campaign for ground forces and then a conventional campaign, actually may decrease. You know irregular campaigns tend to be very protracted--you know, the problem isn't getting there, it's winning after you get there. And so there's been a change in thinking in that area. But there are a number of aspects to the air mobility problem, as I mentioned, the denied area problem requires very, very high end capabilities that's different than the Global War on Terror or counterinsurgency problem, and so each has to be taken on its own merits.

Q: Also not in your portfolio, but it seems like to me we've got a great deal of work to do in capacity building. Are we spending enough time and energy in doing that in some areas? We've given away a lot of our equipment so our own stockpiles are low. Are their low-tech ways that we can help other countries deal with the problems that they have in fighting terrorism?

A: Well building partner capacity is really a central aspect in our war on terror strategy, as I said, that relies principally on an indirect approach. This is one of the nine joint portfolio areas by which we're increasingly managing the department. And this is why we've had an expansion of a lot of forces that really specialize in this; our special forces,

for example, our combat aviation advisers and others, and we may need to expand some further. And general purpose forces, they need to take on a larger role in this area than they have historically. But whether it's hardening allies to withstand conventional attack or building partner capacity to win the war on terror, it's a central element now of US strategy.

Q: Back to China. China's recently come out with at least a hint of a doctrine of unrestricted warfare, and they have near military strategies to fight and win in the five domains. We don't seem to be talking much about that and don't seem to have a strategy to deal with that. Maybe something's going on in the Pentagon that we don't know about, but would you like to comment on China's talking and philosophy in these areas?

A: Yes, I think there's been increasing attention paid to Chinese military modernization and strategic thinking over the past decade or so. What they call high tech local wars and in some cases unrestricted warfare and the approach they take to that, and the key capabilities they have identified. I think it's fair to say that they favor highly asymmetric approaches, and then one of the challenges that I think arises from that--if you were to look at the future security environment or current future security environment as I described it from rise of China to al Qaeda, one of the significant challenges for the United States as it tries to prevail in the wars in which it's engaged and deter other wars and shape the international environment ultimately more favorable direction, is the tremendous asymmetries in each of these areas in cost balances. So advantages that we had, for example, in the Cold War in certain areas, now because of significant asymmetries that multiple competitors or potential competitors or adversaries and potential competitors use really forces us to think about our strategy and what capabilities can best shift those cost balances. Again you know the 9/11 attacks were something like a \$500,000 operation and they inflicted enormous damage on the United States. In the China capabilities areas and others, and Russia seek to exploit similar asymmetric concepts, very high leverage asymmetric concepts, that pose a significant challenge for us that, again, we're doing our best to address.

Q: The last question is on proliferation. We've seen a growth over the last two decades of the number of nuclear capable states and most recently we've seen the Israelis take out an attack on Syria that press report says, North Korean cooperation with Syria--what is the Department doing about trying to prevent this from going forward and is this something that's kind of the genie's out of the bottle and we're just going to expect the spread of nuclear weapons around the world?

A: Well of course the major achievement of this administration was the Nuclear Proliferation Security Initiative to bring multiple partners to bear on this problem, and nonproliferation and counter proliferation remain central elements of our strategy, as I said, to prevent or delay some of these capabilities or this more proliferated world from

arising. So it is an area of strategic focus of the department; it is a challenge. And as we look ahead, this problem has become more complicated in a sense of STRATCOM has been assigned countering WMD missions. There's an identify challenge of, can we actually interdict the movement if we fail to prevent something, can we detect and then interdict the movement of WMDs before it reaches its destination. That has a number of capabilities and posture and other implications that we're wrestling with since the 2006 QDR, but this will remain a significant challenge not just against states but non-state actors and again across the spectrum of WMD.

Q: I've been at these symposia, this is only my second year, but I don't think I've ever seen as many questions that have come up from the audience. I want to thank the audience and I'm sorry I didn't get to them all. I do want to tell you that I'm going to give this to the Vice Commandant of the Air Command and Staff College to take back to assign to the students so you all can answer these questions with papers and things going--OK I'm only joking. I think we've heard today an extraordinary session from an extraordinary man and an extraordinary warrior. I think the nation's lucky to have Secretary Vickers in his present position, and Sir on behalf of all of us I want to thank you for a remarkable talk, a very interesting talk, and on behalf of the Air Force Association, I have for you a book that talks about the Honor Guard at the Air Force Memorial and the background and history of it, and once again, thank you very much.

A: Thank you. Thank you very much. I will treasure this and it was a pleasure to be with you.