

"Air National Guard Challenges"

Lt. Gen. Harry Wyatt

14 September 2009

Lt. Gen. Harry Wyatt: Good afternoon, I'm Bud Wyatt from Oklahoma. I always start my presentations that way because I'm proud to be from Oklahoma, number one, but number two, I'm a Guardsman, and every Guardsman has an affiliation with a state or a territory or the District of Columbia. So I think it's a way to instill a little bit of pride in the Guardsmen, but also to let people know that there is a difference between the Air National Guard and the active component, and the Air Force Reserve.

I'm going to share a few challenges with you today that the Air National Guard faces, but in order for me to do that I think it's important to kind of set the stage with what has brought us to this point. When I say us, I'm not only talking about the Air National Guard but I'm talking about the United States Air Force and, in some instances, the country. Where we are today, how we got here, and then some of the challenges that we face as a result of that.

We have a new President. Not news to you. But you all know that any time we have a new president and a new administration, we readdress the National Security Strategy, the defense strategy, the military strategies, and from those strategies then, the military services kind of get an idea of what it is that they're expected to be able to do for the people of the United States of America.

It has been like that ever since George Washington. It has gotten a little more sophisticated, I guess, as we've gone through time, but that's where we are today.

So a little, I'm not going to say uncertainty, but a little concern about what the new direction will be. We're going through a QDR. Again. An opportunity for the leaders of the country to tell the services exactly what it is that we're expected to do in the out years, where the challenges are, where they're coming from.

Speaking of challenges and threats, we all know that those change day to day. On top of that, we have the fiscal situation that the country is in, the downward pressure on budgets and the, perhaps, dwindling purchase power of the defense budget.

The pundits and the people who are experts in the matter tell me that the defense budget is going to remain

about the same in the next few years, but due to inflation and a lot of other things, the buying power is going down.

So you've got these issues, these concerns that a lot of people have. But I would suggest to you that this isn't the first time that this country has gone through this sort of situation.

The first time, we weren't even a country, back in 1636. The folks in the Massachusetts Bay Colony had exactly the same issues. They didn't even have a defense at the time. They didn't have a budget, so they really had budget pressures. They had a colony, and they had to figure out a way to defend themselves against the threats to their community.

And so what did they do? They had the first muster and they called the militia; 1636. And that's where the National Guard began. That's where my roots began.

The next time that I can think of was around 1776. Again, we weren't even a country a few years before that. We didn't have a very large what we would call a national army or even a nation at the time. Very few dollars. A lot of people with some good ideas, but not a lot of resources to put those good ideas to great benefit to the fledgling colonies.

So what did we do? Again, we relied upon the militia.

World War II. You know after the war to end all wars, World War I, we took a big cut in defense spending and the standing sizes of all of our armies, and we were pretty small in the late '30s. But when the country needed the military power to confront the Axis and the Japanese, they called upon the National Guard to mobilize National Guard units in great numbers.

So here we are in 2009, and I would submit to you that even though the weapon systems have changed and the people are much more educated and we hope smarter, we still seem to face the same old challenges and problems that we had before. So I'm suggesting to you that an answer, maybe the best answer, maybe the least costly answer to the country's current dilemma, is to reconsider an investment in the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard.

Let me tell you why. I'm going to stand up here as the Director of the Air National Guard, and I'm going to tell you that the Air National Guard is of value. And I hope you believe me, but if you don't, let's go through these slides.

Okay, I'll do it. [Laughter].

Where are we today? I'm going to tell you a little about why I think the Air Guard is of value.

People say we're an operational force now. I went back and I tried to figure out what Chief of Staff of the Air Force made the decision to make the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve operational. Can anybody tell me who that was? What Chief of Staff did that?

I can't. Because I don't remember any Chief of Staff of the Air Force making a conscious decision to make the reserve component operational, but we are. I can't remember a President saying, okay, today is the day that we're going to make the Guard operational.

I submit to you that we are operational because of a confluence of circumstances, one being that after the Wall fell in Berlin in the late '80s under President Reagan, that we decided as a country, probably for good reason, to declare a peace dividend and to downsize our military and to maybe delay acquisition of some of our weapon systems. For good reason. The big threat had gone away.

And then a couple of years later, Saddam Hussein decided to do what he decided to do in Kuwait and we needed a military again. We found out that we could kick him around pretty good, but there were some other things happening around the world.

We had the Bosnia/Kosovo campaign shortly thereafter that. We were still in the Sinai Peninsula enforcing the treaty between Israel and Egypt brokered by President Carter, but nobody hears about that because we don't focus on that. But we've got military all over the world enforcing all sorts of agreements, but these are the ones that were getting all the attention.

After we kicked Saddam around the first time, we embarked upon Operations Northern and Southern Watch while we still had everything else going on. And then we get into Afghanistan in the early 2000s, you know. In 2003 we kicked off Operation Iraqi Freedom, and we're still doing that today here in 2009.

So when in this whole scenario, back in 1989 to where we are today in 2009, when did we make the decision for the Air Guard to become operational? I'm told it was over a bar napkin, where the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Director of the Air National Guard, one of my predecessors, Paul Weaver, and a couple of other guys got around and said, you know, we've got all this demand, this high operations tempo; it's too much for the active duty because we've downsized and we need some help here. What are we going to do? We've got to get on a regular cycle, a regular

operations tempo, and we need the Guard and Reserve to help us with that.

And the AEF was born. And so now we're into this AEF, and we have been, and we probably will be for a long time. I know we're getting ready to pull out of Iraq, at least on the ground. I don't think we will too much in the air; they will still need our help. I won't make those decisions. I'm just speculating at this point.

But I think we'll be involved in Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan for awhile, at least that's what Secretary Gates says, and who knows where else in the world. And oh by the way, we're still in the Sinai Peninsula.

So I guess we became operational right around the mid 1990s. No formal decision that the Guard is operational, but we decided to embark upon an AEF construct and that's where we are today. And I don't see that demand lessening.

So how are we going to face the future? This is the big challenge that I face as the Director of the Air National Guard. But it's a challenge that I don't face alone. It's a challenge faced by every one of these people.

Ty Bingham over here in the right hand corner, who is here today as one of the Air Force's Outstanding Airman of the Year. He happens to an Air Guardsman from Nebraska.

This grandpa and this young lady welcoming our Guardsmen home from a deployment. The dentist up here in the upper left-hand corner, who makes a whole lot more money practicing dentistry in his civilian occupation than he does for the Air National Guard, but he does it because he's a patriot.

And all this is, the graybeards down here in the lower left-hand portion, who have helped develop Airmen through the years in the Air National Guard. That's the alumni, if you will, for the Air National Guard Training and Education Center at McGhee Tyson in Knoxville, Tennessee, that have provided the wonderful people that have helped us transition all through those demanding periods of time since 1989 and even before. That place was stood up in the late 1960s.

Okay, the challenges that we have in the Air National Guard are two-fold. There are a lot of branches and sequels off that, but one is recapitalization because we fly the oldest stuff in the world. Even older than the United States Air Force. Not much older, but older.

The other issue we have is how do we find those wonderful people who become Air Guardsmen, and how do we train them to go from a citizen to perhaps standing on this

stage and talking to you in a few years as the Director of the Air National Guard? That's the other big issue that we have.

I'll focus on the recapitalization first. If this country wants the Air National Guard and the reserve component to remain operational, and I think it does, I think it has to because we don't have enough money to grow the United States Air Force active duty to a big enough size to handle all the demands around the world because it costs too much money.

We don't even have enough money to grow the reserve component, although I think that would be a smart thing to do. [Audience response]. Because the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve told us during their studies that it costs 23 percent of the cost of an active duty person to bring a Guardsman on line. The 2007 GAO Report says a reserve component member costs 15 percent as much as an active duty person does.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller says if you compare the operational capability of Wing A in the active duty with Wing B, similar platforms, in the Air National Guard, the Air National Guard can do it for 28-29 percent of the cost of the active duty.

That is not to slight the active duty; the active duty needs to be there. They are available all the time on a moment's notice. But so is the Guard. They might not be there at the first minute, but our charter is to be able to employ and deploy overseas and be in place and ready to go in 72 hours. That's not bad. I think that's worth 71 percent of your dollar to do that.

But that's a decision that will be made by someone else. That's the economic argument. You've also got to throw in the cost that you can operate an Air National Guard base for a lot less money than you can an active duty base. Because Guardsmen don't live on the base. We have jobs. We work outside the base, most of our force is traditional Guardsmen.

I served six years on active duty, from 1971 through 1977, got in the National Guard, went to law school and became an attorney and later on a judge, and I was a traditional Guardsman from 1977 until February 1 of this year when I became a Title 10 officer as Director of the Air Guard. And I never lived on a -- I lived on an Air Force base on active duty, but I never lived on one as a traditional Guardsman.

But I flew the same airplanes as my active duty brothers and sisters and trained to the same standards. If

you ask anybody now, you go overseas, you can't tell the difference. That's the way it ought to be. That's what an operational Reserve is. Because the Air Force gave me the opportunity as a Guardsman to fly the same equipment, to train in the same locations, to go to Red Flags, to do all the things that the active duty does; they allowed me to do that.

Now we used to have a recapitalization plan in the United States Air Force, back when we had 5,500 fighters and even more. And 10,000 bombers and a million tankers and whatever it was we had back in those days. The good old days -- remember those?

And the fielding strategy at that point in time was whenever we had a new platform come on board with the active duty, that we would trickle down the legacy air frames to the Air National Guard, and that worked pretty good because we were not an operational force at the time.

I flew F-100s. My first Guard airplane was an F-100 when there were no F-100s in the active duty inventory. I'd go across country, and it was like a museum taxiing up on the ramp. People would come out to see the airplane, you know -- [laughter] -- just wow, that's an F-100. The Thunderbirds used to fly those 40 years ago, didn't they? Yeah, sure did.

But that worked then, because we had the airplanes to do it. The Guard was not an operational Reserve. If there was a war, you know, it was going to be a cold war and the Guard would have, you know, three months, six months to spin up and we could retrain and maybe help out a little bit.

We had a really good flying club, I'll tell you that much. I mean, it was fun.

But we weren't very capable. We certainly weren't very relevant. And if we had had to answer the call within 72 hours, we would have been there and that's about it. I don't know that we could have helped out a whole lot. But the country could afford to have irrelevancy, I guess, at that point in time.

I hesitate in saying that because the pioneers that took me through the Air National Guard worked hard to get just what they had. And it's a good thing they did, because we finally got to that point after the Wall fell when the country quit acquiring new equipment and had enough equipment to trickle down some to the Guard that we were flying the same stuff that the Air Force was.

I went through a period in the '70s and '80s flying A-7s when we didn't have A-7s in the United States Air Force.

And I missed the first Desert Storm war because we were supposed to transition to F-16s in 1991 and we were in A-7s.

And it's kind of ironic because not too many of the Active Duty F-16s had targeting pods at that point in time, and the COCOMS wanted precision munitions on target, and so they wanted targeting pod-equipped F-16s. There weren't too many of them around.

We had an A-7 that could bomb the lights out of targeted pod F-16s at the time. We had an old system, but it was pretty darn good. And with the experience and the talent that we had and the maturity of our force, we could out-bomb the new F-16s. Now I'm bragging, but if it's truth, if it's fact, it ain't bragging.

But we weren't called because of this logistics tail that the Air Force had no part of and did not want to support in theatre. So by virtue of a fielding strategy, an old one that we had used in Cold War days, the Air National Guard, by definition, was strategic and not operational. Second tier, not relevant, in today's fight.

So we go through the mid '90s and, because the Air Force was not acquiring new stuff but still trying to meet budgetary requirements and downsize, some of this relatively modern equipment starts coming into the Guard, to the point that right now prior to the CAF redux 2010, we have over 600 F-16s in the Air National Guard.

We've got some Block 25s up in Duluth, Montana, but we've got some 52s out in South Carolina. So we're doing okay. But where do we go from here? Because these airplanes are getting old.

I've talked before about a fighter bathtub. The Air Guard flies the oldest stuff. We bear most of the institutional risk for any delays or any failure to bed down the Air National Guard with this capability. Right now, the roadmap for the Air National Guard to get into the F-35, which will replace the F-16, has one unit getting in before about 2021, and that's it.

So as these airplanes come out of the inventory because of age, and as we begin fielding the F-35, and let's just say for supposition purposes that in 2015, when they F-35 line is supposed to be at full capacity at 80 a year, in 2015, and the current bed-down is that in 2015, 80 go to the active duty. In 2016, 80 go to the active duty. In 2017, 80 go to the active duty. In 2018, 80 go to the active duty.

After five years, you've got 400 airplanes in the active duty. Where's the strategic Reserve? Where is the operational capability of the Guard? It's not there. And as that's happening, you've got F-16s going out of the inventory. How do you get those, the most experienced air crews in the world, the best maintenance in the world, from an obsolete airplane into a new airplane if you don't concurrently and proportionately recapitalize the Air National Guard at the same time you do the Active Duty?

And what do you do to the active duty if you don't concurrently and proportionately bed down the Air National Guard? You know, if you get 400 in the inventory and somebody like Iran or China or Russia or somebody we don't even know yet decides they want to play with us big-time, you've got 400 F-35s that are all in the active duty.

These airplanes, according to General Schwartz, who spoke to the National Guard Association of the United States a couple of days ago, these airplanes are designed to fly 24 hours a day, and you can turn them over and over and over again and the only thing that limits you is the pilot. I'll come back to that.

I've got to tell a story about pilots. I can, because I am one. I can tell lawyer jokes because I am one too. [Laughter].

I had a Chief Master Sergeant when I was Wing Commander at Tulsa, back in the early days of the UAS come to me, and he was one of these guys that he always told you the way it was. He shot straight, and I loved him for it. Most of the time.

He said, hey boss, you know you're a dinosaur. I went, what are you talking about? He said, you are a dinosaur. You're a pilot. The Air Force is going to UASs; you're going to be toast in a few years. You are a dinosaur. I said, wow, Chief, I never had thought about that; you're probably right. But you know, there'll always be one thing that a pilot can do that a UAS can't do. And he said, what's that? And I said, fire your butt. [Laughter].

So what are we going to do when we get to that war at 400 F-35s or 600 F-35s or maybe at 800 F-35s and we don't have any reserve component capability in that particular platform? I'm talking F-35s now, but this applies to every capability that you want to talk about. Engineering, medical, legal, lift, ISR, light attack, light mobility, UAS, you name it, it doesn't matter; this applies across the board.

You get to that point and you don't have enough pilots and enough maintenance to fly them 24 hours a day. Or you

can fly them 24 hours a day, but you've got to park some of them because you don't have the strategic reserve surge capacity capability that is offered by the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve.

So I guess we can call up whomever and say, okay, we've got crew rest coming up here; we'll fight you from eight in morning until eight at night. You know, eight to eight; call a truce, rest up, come back. You know that's preposterous. That's not going to happen.

How long can you do that before you drive your active duty into the ground? And if anybody has been in combat, I mean, after a day you're bushed, you can't get enough sleep. So how long can you do that? Not very long. I don't think it's very smart to do that.

I think the smarter thing to do is to take those first 80. The Air Guard flies about 35 percent of the fighter force in the United States Air Force. Take about 30-35 percent of those and bed down one unit of Air National Guard every year; 24 airplanes. That's right; 30 percent of 80 is 24. How about that? It works out to be one squadron a year, beginning in 2015.

And you do that all during the course of the acquisition of this airframe, and it doesn't matter if the country decides that they're going to go six-generation after 200 of them or 400 of them or 800 of them or 1,763 of them. It doesn't matter if the fiscal situation of the country says, well, we can't buy anymore than 400 of them. We were going to buy 1,763 but now we're going to buy 400 of them.

If you begin from the very beginning and you concurrently and proportionately field the reserve component, Guard and Reserve, in the same capability that you do the United States Air Force, you have a more robust United States Air Force; you have an active duty that can fight every day of the week and not tire out because they've got their Guard and Reserve buds to pick them up and give them a little bit of strategic reserve capacity and help when they need it.

And when you don't need the Guard and Reserve, you don't have to pay for it. That's why we cost 23 percent [less]. Because I guarantee I would have loved to have practiced law, and got a huge retainer fee and flight pay at the same time; that would have been great. But Guardsmen don't get flight pay unless they fly.

Okay. That's another topic that -- I don't want to get off on that.

So the coin of the realm, the challenge that I see from the Director of the Air National Guard is that we, the Air National Guard, and we, the United States Air Force, total force, and isn't that total force? If we're going to be total force, why don't we be total force? Why don't we not just talk total force? Why don't we do total force? Why don't we resource total force concurrently and proportionately?

It sounds fair but, more importantly, it's the best thing we can do for the country. It's the best thing we can do for our active duty brothers and sisters so that they're not left out to dry. So that we don't burn them into the ground after their first tour. So that we don't force them into thinking about another job or profession when they have the first opportunity to leave.

And if they do decide to leave, if we're a strategic Reserve, they've got a place to go. I mean this is so simple and so basic in my mind, I don't know why we haven't done that since the Air Force became the Air Force.

Anyway, that's the equipment part. Let's talk about the people part now, because this is perhaps the most important part.

What I'm talking about is the capability; this is platforms, this is capability, this is people, plus the cost saving that the reserve component brings, is value added to America. And you're going to hear that term a lot. General McKinley, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, certainly believes it and I do too.

Who's this guy? If you look up on his nametag there, it says Wyatt. I had to argue with my staff about putting that picture up there, because I didn't like the comparison between then and now. [Laughter].

I'm a lot heavier, and I don't have as much hair, and I've got all my teeth there, too. Yeah. But this is a picture that was taken in 1972 at pilot training in Laredo Air Force Base. I survived. Laredo didn't. So that's the good news story.

But the challenge we have as an Air National Guard is the same challenge that the United States Air Force and the Air Force Reserve has.

I didn't push any buttons, so I don't know how that happened. Let's see if I can get back to where we were.

The challenge we have is the same one that the United States Air Force has.

Did somebody push that because they didn't want to see it anymore? [Laughter]. Yeah, okay. Rufus Force did that. I know you. You're over there by the machine.

The challenge we have is getting this guy all the credentials, all the experiences, all the education, all the joint PME duties post credit that qualify that individual to stand on this stage. How did that guy get here?

I'll tell you how that guy got here. And I'm going to borrow a line out of *Madagascar 2* for this. [Laughter]. How many have seen -- how many have kids or grandkids and you've seen *Madagascar 2*?

Okay, I can set the stage. The penguins are in the airplane, right? They're going to evacuate the animals off of Madagascar, you know, take them back to New York to the zoo because they all love the zoo and they call the penguins to come in and fly them.

Who said penguins can't fly? They've got this little thing that looks like a B-25 Mitchell or something like that, and they launch it out and they go through this pretty hairy flight and they crash it and everybody survives and this airplane is sitting out there and it's in pieces and the lion -- they're talking about fixing the airplane and the lion says, how are you going to fix that airplane. Because I mean it's just in pieces.

And the captain says, "A little spit, a little grit, and a whole lot of duct tape." [Laughter]. That's how that guy got here. [Laughter]. Okay. A little spit, a little grit, and a whole lot of duct tape. No particular plan, just got lucky. Mostly just got lucky.

Did a couple of things that probably helped a little bit along the way. One was I got some active duty experience. That certainly helped. I even got some Air Force Reserve experience. That was after I was a Guardsman the first time and faced the challenges that a lot of Guardsmen do in having to manage a job.

I was practicing law, representing some banks and some water districts in Oklahoma, raising a family, trying to fly jets, stay current and deploy, do all the things that the Guardsmen are required to do, and not doing a real good job of all of it, and decided something has to quit, something has to stop.

I had four kids at the time and a wife that I'd married in 1971; still married to her. I figured I needed probably to hang onto that part of it. Needed to feed them, so I probably needed to hang onto the job, so I said I'm getting out of the Guard. So I got out of the Guard.

This is probably mid '80s, something like that, and I went to the Air Force Reserve as an Air Force Academy liaison officer. Category A, I think, is what they called it, where you drill for points only but you've got to log what you do. I was too busy to log what I did, so I worked a year free for the Air Force, didn't get any points, lost a good year, and this isn't going to work.

And I had a couple of guys that I'd flown with at a Red Flag exercise call me during a Red Flag exercise and they were having a ball and I spent about 30 minutes on the phone laughing and talking about flying. My wife was listening, and she said, those were Guard guys you were talking to, weren't they. I said, yup. She said, you need to get back in the Guard. So I did.

I didn't even know what a director was at the time. Didn't even know what an adjutant general was, who are the TAGs that head up the Guard in each of the states. Didn't really know who the wing commander was at that time, but I found out and talked that wing commander into letting me back in the Guard.

But the moral of this story is that this guy didn't have a clue on what it took to get here, and if it hadn't been for a couple of smart mentors and senior officers along the way that said, hey Wyatt, why don't you go to Air War College, I probably wouldn't be here. The only reason I went to Air War College is just because Steve Cortwright said, you need to go to Air War College. So I did.

I was a lieutenant colonel plans officer at the 138th Fighter Wing, and I did Air War College by seminar down at Tinker Air Force Base, and I missed one year of my daughter's basketball season because she played ball on the -- she was a high school player. In fact, all three of my girls were high school players; all three of them were college players, a couple of them all-state. Pretty good ballplayers. Basketball was big in our family, but I missed a complete year of the Tuesday night basketball games because I went to Air War College.

It was tough to do, but Cortwright said, you need to do this, so I did. A year or two later, he had already moved on; he was then the Adjutant General of Oklahoma, and the new commander was a guy named Ronnie Turner, and Ronnie calls me into his office and I'm a lieutenant colonel with 26 years, a plans officer, so I know what this conversation is about. [Laughter]. There's the gate, Wyatt. Thanks, it's been real. We'll see you.

And he walked in and he said, how would you like to be an O-6? And I said, wow, yeah, I'd love to be an O-6. He

said, string attached though. And I said, what's that? And he said, you've got to be the maintenance crew commander. And I said, maintenance! What is that? Because I'd been an operator my whole life. He said, you know, those guys that live on the other side of the base. I said, yeah, yeah, the south end. He said, yeah.

So I went down there, and they had some pretty good people down there, so I said, okay, I'll do this. Best thing that ever happened to me. I got out of the comfort zone, and I did something I'd never done before and I met the most wonderful people in the world and it helped me when I was wing commander immensely.

I went back and I asked Cortwright, how did you decide to give me the maintenance job and promote me to O-6? I said, what did I do to impress you? And he said, you're the only O-5 we had that went to Air War College. [Laughter].

A little bit of luck, a little bit of you know. Talk about deflating your ego. [Laughter]. You were the only choice we had, so --

But the point of the story is, that is the challenge in the Air National Guard, and it's the challenge on active duty, and it's the challenge in the Reserve. To take a guy like this who is only interested in who his flight commander, IP, and his wingmen are, and give that individual the education, the skills, the broad knowledge base, broad experience base, to be able to stand on this stage and visit with you today.

Now you all know that there's not a path that says, okay, you've got to do this first and then this and then you need to move over here and you need to do that and you need to do that and you do that. But that's the challenge.

And what we have done a very poor job of in the Air National Guard is letting our young Airmen know, and this is not just officers, it is enlisted too. And I'll say the enlisted have done a lot better job than the officers have of preparing our younger folks, giving them challenges, telling them what they need to do, affording them opportunities, encouraging them to go out on their own and do things, and get out of their comfort zone.

Because as they move from this guy's technical concentration to the tactical level of their career, to the operational level of their career, to the strategic level of their career, it's really easy to get comfortable in each one of those sections and never want to move out. I did that.

It cost me about 10 years when my wing commander came to me and he said, hey Wyatt, you ready to move on to some more responsibilities around the wing? And I said, no, Sir, I just want to fly jets. You know. He didn't tell me he was going to let me fly jets and be an ops group commander or a squadron commander at the time, so it cost me about 10 years. It was a fun 10 years; I got to fly airplanes a lot and that was fun, but it cost me about 10 years.

But the point is, we need to make opportunities available for these people. And in today's environment, it needs to be joint; it needs to get people out of their comfort zones.

In the Air National Guard, we have a tendency to stay within the confines of our states; it's one of our strengths. Community based, longevity.

I could go out and fly a four-ship with guys in my squadron, and we didn't even have to brief. We did, just to make sure we covered -- you know. But I knew what Jed Wright was going to when he was confronted with an F-14 at so many thousand feet. I knew exactly what he was going to do, because we had done it so many times with one another.

That's the cohesion that you get, and that's a strong thing, but it's also inhibitive when it comes to experiencing some of those things that people need to experience to be able to make that transition.

We'll move on, because I'm going to use up all my time and I wanted a little bit to --

Part of that experience is it's our responsibility to promote opportunities within our Air National Guard, so that we become the diverse organization that we need to be.

These are Air National Guard leaders across the country. And these are all chiefs on the bottom and all general officers on the top. I'm not going to take the time to go through them by name. I've got their names, but the important thing is that we are diverse.

The Air National Guard is diverse. We encourage people to get out of their comfort zones; not to the degree that we should, but we encourage people to do that.

We've got to recognize that the next person down the road that is standing on this podium might not look like me. Might not be a male. Might not be white. Might not speak English. Might not even have wings on his or her chest. Wow. What blasphemy. A Director of the Air Guard, Chief of Staff of the Air Force without wings on his or her chest.

Why not? Why do we -- Isn't part of diversity not just color and gender and economic situation and education, but isn't it AFSC sometimes too? I mean, why are we just saying you can't be Chief of Staff of the Air Force unless you are a pilot, if we had an individual who was truly deserving of that opportunity?

Martin Luther King in his famous I-have-a-dream speech said he dreamed of the day when his children would be judged not by the color of their skin but by the content of their character. It is our responsibility as an organization to develop the content of their character. Integrity, service above self, excellence in all they do, but education.

And those decisions are sometimes made at the lowest level in our organization. And if we make those decisions based upon how these people look or talk and not on what they offer the organization, we are destroying our organization. That's why diversity is so important to the Air National Guard.

It's important to the people, but it's equally, perhaps more, important to the organization. Because one of these days, one of those folks on the previous slide -- It could be any one of these folks.

This is General McKinley, Director of the National Guard. You know General Schwartz in the middle, and Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, on the right.

Who said a Guardsman couldn't be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Is there a law that says that? If there is then maybe we need to think about changing it.

But who says that the guy that's occupying General McKinley's chair can't be an active duty person? Why not, if they're qualified?

There's a lot of Guard guys that are going, don't do that, Wyatt. [Laughter]. Don't do that. [Laughter]. There are a lot of active duty guys saying, don't do it to us.

Why couldn't a Guard guy be Chief of Staff of the Air Force if they're the best qualified? Okay.

Okay. That's the challenge we have of moving our people through the experiences needed to occupy roles of leadership and to continue the great traditions of the Air National Guard, because in this time of reduced resources we need people who are adaptable, who are flexible, who are capable, who have experiences in life that cannot be diagrammed and written out in a linear form. So we've got to develop those types of people.

I'm going to stop right there and take any questions. The time is just about right, because it's only 1:00 and I'm --

Okay, we'll start with this guy back here in the back. Yes, Sir. Tell me who you are, first of all.

Question: [Inaudible].

Lt. Gen. Harry Wyatt: What state are you from?

Question: New Mexico.

Lt. Gen. Harry Wyatt: Okay.

Question: We're hearing a lot from the Air Force from a strategic planning standpoint, the QDR is coming out, about starting to put some major modification in the Air Force with regard to thwarting counter-insurgency. We're looking at a whole class of new types of airplanes which share a mission capability [inaudible] counter-insurgency - the turboprop, close air support, large airplanes, a couple of different kinds of transports, the [inaudible] program, the [inaudible] program, etc., etc.

We have parts of the DoD Guard and Reserve force which represent all of our capability in that particular area. We don't have anybody that actually has that responsibility. The active duty force [inaudible] all on the Guard and Reserve.

Going back to what you said about --

Lt. Gen. Harry Wyatt: You're talking about C-26s and C-27s, those sorts, RC-26, okay --

Question: [Inaudible]. In the Army --

Lt. Gen. Harry Wyatt: MC-12s.

Question: -- civil affairs piece [inaudible].

Lt. Gen. Harry Wyatt: Yeah, Army. Yeah, okay.

Question: [Inaudible]. Going back to what you said about the F-35. An excellent idea. As we set up the F-35s, two-thirds/one-third, 75/25, whatever.

Lt. Gen. Harry Wyatt: That's 75 in the Guard and 25 -
- I'm with you. I'm with you so far. Go ahead.
[Laughter].

Question: So now we've got this job which [inaudible] towards counter-insurgency and towards a flaccid aircraft which is going to work in an environment where [inaudible]. It's much less kinematic and much more about maturity, understanding a very [inaudible] situation that you only get when you frankly are a major, lieutenant colonel, [inaudible].

But my fundamental question is if we decide to go this way, if we start buying a bunch of aircraft which are primarily associated with this new kind of mission, do you see this, rather than be something where we might want to think not in terms of we buy three squadrons and then we buy one for the Guard; we buy three more squadrons, then we buy one. Do you think we need to start thinking more about a 50/50 mix? As we acquire this [inaudible], for whatever reason, acquire these airplanes where we'll put half in the active duty, half in the Guard because perhaps they are a little specialized. They're specialized for [inaudible] environment, but since we're not exactly sure what way this QDR [inaudible], we need to think about close air support and counter-insurgency as maybe more of a role for the Guard than something that we want to primarily have [inaudible].

Lt. Gen. Harry Wyatt: Yeah. You know, I think the percentages will vary.

You know, when I talked about concurrent and proportional, I should have added that as long as the capability is shared across the three components I think we need to expect that the percentages of that particular capability that reside within the particular components may vary from MDS, from platform to platform, depending upon such things as -- you just talked about some of the expertise.

The reason the RC-26 does so well in Special Operations-type flying is because the people that operate that are Guardsmen, but it's not because they're Guardsmen. It's because that airplane was used in counter-drug operations. And part of the thing they do is observe. They have sensors and they observe.

Now the sensors in theatre are enhanced a lot better, different types. There are legal restrictions on CONUS use of some of that capability. So, because we do not spy on our fellow Americans -- It's okay to spy on criminals, I mean, but -- I'm trying to be funny. It wasn't funny. [Laughter].

But the reason that the Guard guys are so good is because they have been tracking people. They can see them, they can sense them, and they track drug dealers in and out

of buildings. They have the capability of doing that, and that's a capability that takes a lot of practice, a lot of skill, a lot of expertise to be able to do.

That's why it's such a value to the United States Air Force, because these guys take what they do in their civilian jobs, counter-drugs. Some of them work for DEA, some of work for Border Patrol. Some of them have civilian jobs when they're not in the Guard that match up pretty good with what they do in the Guard, and also matches up pretty good with the type of counter-insurgency-type activities you're talking about.

So yeah, I could see certain platforms where the percentages might be 50/50. You know, if you're talking about -- and you went -- I facetiously said 75 percent F-35, but if you talk about operations tempo, which is the other side of what you're talking about, that might be a higher operations tempo, which would not necessarily be a good Guard mission. But we need to be in it to some degree to provide that strategic reserve surge capability if needed by the Air Force.

But on the high-end stuff, where the plan is to have an F-22 or an F-35 that maybe only goes into combat once in a person's career, twice in a person's career, or three times in a person's career, if that's truly high-end, or bombers. You know, long-reach bombers. Why wouldn't you put that in the Guard that has a lower operations tempo? I mean you train to the same standards. You just put more of that in the Guard, and then when World War III kicks off you mobilize and you go.

So that argument could be made the other way. But whatever the capability is, there needs to be some sort of -- all three Reserve components need to be in it. The percentages of participation may vary a little bit from capability to capability, depending upon the demographics. Can you recruit to that in a particular state and not in another one? And those sorts of things, but yeah, what you're saying is feasible.

Question: [Inaudible]. The Air Force recently released its vision for [inaudible] Air Force. I wonder if you can talk a little bit about how [inaudible] are being integrated into the Air Guard [inaudible], and then you have Predator, Reaper, and I think I understand that crews have to be activated to do that. So --

Lt. Gen. Harry Wyatt: Yeah, we're, you know, the Air Force is working toward the 50 CAP level, I think, and I'm not really up to speed right now. I think we're at 35 right now, somewhere around that number.

The Air National Guard is providing 8 CAPs right now out of North Dakota. Let's see if I can get these states right. North Dakota, Texas, Nevada, California.

New York is just getting -- I'm going up to New York here pretty soon to -- the Reaper will be in New York. They're not operational yet, but they're getting close. We'll take some more of that. I mean, we like the UAS.

Right now it is heavy ops tempo. Because of the status that we're in right now, expanding -- Not everyone, but most of the folks that we're training and most of the new capability that comes on board is being used to stand up these, to get to the 50 CAP goal.

Now when we get to 50, is it going to go up? It probably could, depending upon the world's situation.

So right now, these operators are spinning pretty fast, and the operators we have that are doing the MQ-1 have been mobilized the last two years. They come off the -- the Fargo guys come -- Fargo, North Dakota, comes off in November of this year. But they're Guardsmen, and we have enough volunteers to do another year after they come off mobilization, so we're going to fly them. We're going to provide the capability.

We anticipate that one of these days the pilot and sensor training will reach that point where we can start embedding associations into these Guard units, active associations where active Air Force member would come to these Guard units and help with the operations tempo. They'd be there every day, and so we would not have to rely upon mobilization and we could offer some of these folks who have been mobilized for two years and are now volunteering for another year of duty to get back to their civilian job and get into a regular rotation, a regular OpsTempo, a traditional Guard OpsTempo. I hope that helps.

Folks, thanks for the opportunity. I want to thank AFA for the opportunity to be here today. I didn't mean to offend anybody; just telling you like I see it from my biased chair, I guess, okay. Thanks, Jim. [Applause].

#