In 1986,
Democrats in Congress pronounced Ronald Reagan's defense spending proposal "DOA"--Dead
on Arrival. The cutting and rearranging seemed severe at the time, but
back then, standards for measuring severity were different. Compared
to the 1991 defense budget presented on January 29, that DOA program
in 1986 was a picture of health. If the congressional attack this year
turns out to be as radical as the speech-making suggests, defense could
sink to uncharted depths.
From the perspective of the defense community, the budget proposal is
harsh. It abolishes weapons and force structure by the wholesale lot.
Adjusted for inflation and other economic factors, it provides $22.4
billion less in 1991 for defense than did the previous forecast--itself
down considerably from earlier projections--issued last April. It takes
another $167 billion out of the Five-Year Defense Plan. On top of earlier
reductions, that amounts to $231 billion cut from the FYDP in the past
twelve months.
By the end of Fiscal Year 1991, the Pentagon says, active-duty US military
strength will fall back to where it was in 1980. Army and Air Force troop
levels will be at their lowest since 1950.
As seen by others--including some strong-minded members of Congress--
the reductions are timid. A new arms-control offer, announced by President
Bush in his State of the Union address, would bring 80,000 US troops
home from Europe. That, too, was promptly derided as insufficient.
The stampede to cut defense is driven by two main sources of excitement.
One, of course, is the revolution under way in the Soviet Union and eastern
Europe. The other is a scramble over shares of the federal budget.
The ceiling set by the Gramm-Rudman- Hollings Act for the 1991 deficit
is $64 billion. Even with bogus numbers and voodoo accounting, the government
had great difficulty with the $100 billion ceiling for 1990. This year's
goal is harder. If the regular process does not bring the deficit within
$10 billion (the tolerance allowed) of $64 billion by October 15, Gramm-Rudman
will allocate reductions automatically by predesigned formula.
The politicians are desperate for a "peace dividend" as leverage
on the deficit. Sen. Jim Sasser (D-Tenn.). Chairman of the Senate Budget
Committee, complains that the peace dividend from the 1991 defense budget
is a "mere fraction" of what "we'll need to hit next years
deficit target under Gramm-Rudman."
It is not simply the Pentagon that Congress must fight to get more deficit-reduction
money. Citizens, conditioned to blame defense for hogging all the money,
now believe there is to be a windfall, and they are lining up to spend
some of it.
Seymour Melman, writing in the New York Times on behalf of the
National Commission for Economic Conversion and Disarmament, lays out
a program to use an envisioned peace dividend of $165 billion. Housing
and education get $30 billion each. There is $10 billion to electrify
the US rail system, and so on. In making his pitch, Mr. Melman repeats
the old fiction that "half of all federal tax dollars go to the
Pentagon."
It would be instructive for Mr. Melman to check the official Budget
of the United States Government. From this six-pound document,
he will discover that while defense did account for 50.8 percent of
the outlays in 1961, its share today is 24.8 percent. By contrast,
an aggregate of social and benefit programs that the budget groups
as the "Human Resources Superfunction" has progressed from
30.5 percent of outlays in 1961 to 51.5 percent in 1990, rising to
56.0 percent by 1995.
On the present track--even with the reductions being so timid--defense
outlays will be just 21.6 percent of the total by 1995. The 1991 proposal
is for a 2.3 percent decrease, after inflation, in defense budget authority.
That has implications, both for Mr. Melman's plan to electrify the railroads
and for deficit reduction. As Tom Kenworthy observes in the Washington
Post, the Gramm-Rudman calculus has changed. The law is no longer the
handy tool it once was for squeezing the Pentagon. Half of any automatic
cuts still come from defense, which spends about a fourth of the money.
The kicker is that cuts are from a "baseline''--last year's level
of outlays, plus inflation.
The defense budget is already about $5 billion below its baseline. Automatic
cuts might not take it much further down than the level Congress is likely
to approve anyway. Some of the pressure from a budgetary impasse would,
therefore, shift to domestic programs.
Defense will almost certainly be cut further, not because it's good
strategy or because the Pentagon has hogged an ever-growing share of
the resources, but because this budget is a movable object in the path
of an irresistible force.
The government is confronted here by two tasks. It must resolve the
federal deficit and also plan an adequate defense program for uncertain
and changing times. Neither objective is well served by emotional or
impulsive decisions. Those who insist on seeing an unlimited peace dividend
at the end of the rainbow are not helping us reach any responsible solutions.
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