NATIONAL
defense stands at a turning point. The United States is engaged in a
reevaluation, the most comprehensive in forty years, of its security
needs and policies.
History will recall 1989 as sweeping change when the Warsaw Pact collapsed
and political shock waves spread through the Soviet Union. Enthusiasm
grew worldwide for principles and values long espoused by our own nation.
In the main, 1990 has been a year of transition as the nation explored
and improvised its initial response to global change. We have heard all
manner of plans for lowering our defense posture. Most of these proposals,
however, owe more to concern about the budget deficit than to sound strategic
evaluation.
Before the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, a twenty-five
per cent reduction to US armed forces was practically assumed, and still
deeper cuts were threatened. The Middle East crisis has had a sobering
effect on our national exuberance, but it remains to be seen if the reminder
is lasting.
We believe 1991 will be the pivotal Year of Decision, in which choices
are made that will shape the defense program and national security for
the next decade and perhaps beyond. It appears that the primary arena
for this debate will be the federal budget for Fiscal Year 1992.
The Air Force Association is concerned that the nation is heading
into this Year of Decision without a clear definition of defense requirements,
risks, and rational options. We see a definite possibility that
the defense program of the future may be based on speculation, optimistic
assumptions, arbitrary budget goals, and expectations of a massive
peace dividend.
The United States is inevitably a nation with global interests and global responsibilities.
Neither our safety nor our interests can be automatically secure. The world
of the next decade will be marked by massive and unprecedented change, instability,
uncertainty, and the redistribution of the year of power and the demand for
power. The old order is changing. The new order is not yet apparent.
AFA warns against a rush to disarm. Once we demobilize our forces and
let our defense investment options lapse, recovery in response to unforeseen
danger assuming that such a recovery is basically feasible will be an
expensive, long-range process. The future may not allow us the luxury
of time.
What Defense Must Do. The Air Force Association reaffirms its
belief in the strategy of deterrence. Our security is best served when
we make war, aggression, or armed intimidation unacceptable risks for
potential adversaries.
The first mission of US military power is to deter attack against the
American homeland. Our forces must be sufficient not only to defend the
United States itself but also, in cooperation with our allies, to protect
free world interests in Europe, the Pacific, the Middle East, southwest
Asia, Latin America, and other areas. They must defend US interests abroad,
including economic lifelines and routes of essential access, and be prepared
to project power as demanded by national policy and emerging circumstances.
Credible strategy requires manifest capability to meet a range of threats
across the spectrum of conflict. This strategy cannot be calibrated only
to the current environment. It must take into account military, economic,
and political developments that could affect our security in the years
ahead.
In addition to standard strategic and tactical missions, the nation
clearly expects the armed forces to be effective in drug interdiction,
counterterrorism, and other unconventional roles. It would be a mistake,
we believe, to mandate priority for these additional roles at the expense
of traditional missions.
The Threat. The paramount threat, Soviet military power, has
declined but not disappeared. The Soviet Union in 1990 remains the most
militarized nation on Earth. Its strategic nuclear forces continue to
increase in numbers, accuracy, and lethality. Soviet conventional forces,
even after the expected drawdowns and anticipated arms-control reductions,
will be the major military power on the Eurasian landmass.
The Soviet Union is modernizing every component of the strategic force
it would retain under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. It is developing
replacements for its first-line fighter aircraft, which already challenge
US fighters in capability. In many areas, including air defense, gains
in Soviet force quality are amplifying the direct military threat. These
concerns are compounded by the Soviet Union's internal instability and
by the uncertainty of its eventual role in the world and its relationship
with other nations.
Another dimension of the threat is the proliferation of high technology,
nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and chemical weapons. We must understand
that potential Third World adversaries are no longer a trivial military
problem. As recently as last summer, for example, few Americans had any
serious concern about Iraq, despite the fact that it is strategically
situated and that its military establishment is the sixth largest on
Earth.
Global instability on a scale not seen before in modern times poses
a threat that cannot be defined precisely. Powerful forces of change
are at work in Europe and elsewhere. It is impossible to predict their
ultimate effect.
Forces and Capabilities. To defend its interests against the
array of threats, the United States requires a balanced mix of land,
sea, and air forces. The caliber of forces depends on careful management
of four variables: force structure, force modernization, readiness, and
sustainability. All are important. None can be emphasized absolutely
at the neglect of the others.
As numbers decline, quality becomes critical, and the tolerance for
marginal effectiveness decreases. If we indulge the delusion that today's
systems and capabilities will do for the requirements ahead, US forces
will find themselves second best on some future battlefield. Force modernization
and technology development must continue.
Most of the present qualities of military force will continue to be
important, but we believe certain characteristics will increase in significance.
- Range. With overseas deployments and basing
less certain and the site of future actions unknown,
US forces maybe required to project power for greater
distances and perhaps from American shores. Even
with overseas bases, the need to conduct long-range
operations will intensify.
- Precision. In wars of the future, it will
be necessary to locate and destroy difficult, high
value targets with greater accuracy and weapons efficiency
than is possible today. It will become essential
to do this from beyond the range of lethal defenses.
In lower intensity conflict, US forces may be called
upon to penetrate hostile territory and achieve limited
but extremely precise results.
- Intelligence. For strategic and tactical warning,
arms-control verification, targeting, battle management,
general surveillance, and other purposes, US forces
of the future will need better information, collected
and communicated much more rapidly than is possible
today.
- Mobility. A reduction in force levels and
a diminished US military presence abroad will put
more pressure on our ability to deploy forces, along
with whatever they require to sustain operations,
to the scene of crisis or combat.
- Endurance. Forces must be more capable of
sustaining operations with less reliance on logistics
and maintenance support. systems must be of high
reliability and survivable against sophisticated
opposition.
In this context, airpower has certain inherent advantages. It is fast,
flexible, long-reaching, and unrestricted by geographic barriers. It
can be applied to a diversity of purposes from dropping troops to delivering
bombs. We believe airpower is central to defense requirements of the
future. We further believe, however, that sound strategy calls for the
coordinated development and employment of all elements of military power.
At this juncture, the nation would be poorly served by service rivalry
for roles and missions.
Areas of Specific Concern are:
- Defense Manpower. Able, experienced, well-trained
forces are the single greatest asset a military commander
can have in crisis or in battle. A radical drawdown,
taken in haste, will surely degrade the ability of
the armed forces to perform their missions. On principle
and to preserve morale, motivation, and force quality
the impact on military members and defense employees
must be a constant consideration as we reduce and
restructure.
- The Defense Industrial Base. The decline
of the defense industrial base, already a problem
of disturbing magnitude, has accelerated dangerously
in the past year. US forces depend on a strong industrial
base for weapons and technology that keep abreast
of the threat. When vital industries disintegrate
or disperse to other markets, the capacity will be
beyond practical recovery, since rebuilding would
take many years.
- Technology. Tomorrow's capabilities begin
with today's technology base. In periods of retrenchment,
when force modernization programs are curtailed,
it is critical to continue exploration of promising
technologies. This is an investment in a range of
options to meet requirements that the future will
almost surely bring.
The Question of Resources. An adequate defense is not beyond
the nation's means. Defense did not cause the federal deficit, nor has
it robbed domestic programs by consuming an excessive share of resources.
Over the past twenty years, the relative defense burden and the rising
federal deficit have followed generally divergent trends.
The current cost of defense is about five percent of GNP and falling.
It is projected that by 1995, defense will account for its lowest share
of GNP in fifty years and the smallest percentage of federal outlays
since before Pearl Harbor.
Radical reductions, taken without reference to requirements and realities,
would be wasteful as well as strategically unwise. Moreover, such reductions
will not solve the nation's economic problems, which derive from a different
set of circumstances.
Restructuring Responsibly. We believe the United States must
continue its role as a force for freedom, stability, and peace in the
world. It may now be possible to achieve this and to protect our national
interests and objectives as well with a reduced military force, provided
that Soviet reductions proceed as anticipated and that US reductions
are conducted carefully, with understanding, and in a responsible manner.
The Air Force Association pledges increased effort to promote education
and public understanding of the issues that will define the coming debate.
In the Year of Decision, it is imperative that we decide wisely, rationally,
and in full awareness of our defense requirements. In a dangerous and
unpredictable world, we cannot gamble our security on the premises that
the future holds no surprises or that freedom needs no defense.
Copyright Air Force Association. All rights reserved.
|