Ten years
ago, the Air Force did not have enough spare parts to sustain wartime
operations. In fact, 7.4 percent of the fleet was grounded by supply
shortages in peacetime. The maintenance troops dug routinely into war
reserve kits and borrowed parts off one airplane to get another one
fixed. The wheezy old data system could not even forecast the spare
parts
requirement.
Given that state of affairs, there was some smirking in 1983 when Air
Force Logistics Command announced it was switching emphasis from peacetime
efficiency to wartime effectiveness and that it had a plan to fix the
spares shortage, the grounded airplanes, and the data management system.
Nobody is smirking now. When Operation Desert Storm opened last August,
the Air Force's wartime readiness kits and operating stocks were in excellent
shape. Logistics Command accelerated the repair of some 80,000 critical
parts and expedited the overhaul of seventy aircraft. Returning these
aircraft to operation ahead of schedule gave the Air Force a cumulative
931 days of additional flying service.
Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center (ALC) became the second largest aerial
port operation in the United States as cargo volume increased from sixty
tons to 300 tons a day. San Antonio ALC surged and shipped 539,183 propulsion
parts and accelerated the overhaul of 45 jet engines.
Flying units in Saudi Arabia were so well-stocked with spares that readiness
rates for many systems were better than at home in peacetime. Depot maintenance
teams went to the war zone to repair battle damage on the spot. The list
could go on and on.
In May, the Federal Quality Institute presented Air Force Logistics
Command the 1991 President's Award for Quality. It was an honor richly
deserved.
Logistics excellence is not all wartime surge and excitement. It depends
in great part on careful attention to details and everyday persistence.
Is the part that's supposed to be in the warehouse actually there? Is
it really the part showing on the inventory? The AFLC work force (which
is ninety percent civilian) demonstrates an impressive sense of purpose.
A "Quality Bill of Rights" entitles anyone in the command to
challenge procedures and expect quality to be put ahead of production.
Wayne Hayes, a sheet metal mechanic on the F-15 repair line at Sacramento
ALC, had occasion to discover how sincere that policy is. Mr. Hayes,
working with parts from a repair kit, was not satisfied with the fit
of a cap on the aircraft's vertical stabilizer. He exercised his quality
rights and stopped the F-15 repair line. The commander backed him and
sustained a nine-day shutdown until the problem was corrected.
Gen. Charles C. McDonald, AFLC commander, told the Senate Armed Services
Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability, and Support that the transition
to wartime operations last August was "almost transparent" because
the command was already attuned and geared to support combat.
In July, just days before Iraq invaded Kuwait, AFLC planners had completed
one of the computerized logistics exercises they run regularly. This
one, by coincidence, had a Middle East scenario, so the system was primed
even more than usual when Saddam Hussein made his move in August.
The loggies are living up to the promises made in 1983. Even the new
data systems, which looked to be the hardest part of the task, are working
out well. Nine projects, known collectively as the Logistics Management
System, are coming on line gradually. Some proved their value in the
Gulf War.
The Weapon System Management Information System (WSMIS), for example,
tracked each unit's 30-day combat capability and impending parts problems.
The ALCs then used this information to expedite repair or procurement
of critical items. The system, General McDonald told the Senate, was
spotting weapon system support problems in one to seven days. Previously,
identification of the same problems would have taken sixty to ninety
days.
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the loggies have a big job on their
hands. Aircraft and engines were flown near or beyond their limits. There
is battle damage to repair. Regular depot maintenance, sidetracked to
support the war effort, awaits completion.
A leading concern is the spare parts and other stocks that were expended
in combat. Operation Desert Storm was fought on the strength of war readiness
kits and spares funded between 1984 and 1987. Since then, budgets for
these items have been cut sharply.
Like the rest of the Air Force, the loggies are searching for ways to
preserve their effectiveness while absorbing the reductions that have
already begun. It is some comfort to know that they approach the lean
years with their priorities straight, their data systems in good order,
and a tradition of quality established.
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