In 1989,
before the Berlin wall came down, the Air Force began to devise a strategy
for adapting to the post-cold war world. That strategy surfaced in the
white paper "Global Reach, Global Power" in mid-1990 and was
soon validated by the Persian Gulf War, an airpower extravaganza.
The white paper came in handy right away. It set the stage for Air Force
reorganization around two new operational commands--Air Combat Command
for global power and Air Mobility Command for global reach-as the core
of the service's combat operations. It also stated the case for the Air
Force as the airpower service of choice.
The document went beyond the parochial to the ecumenical. "It lifted
people's sights to the broader aspects of airpower-to how airpower can
play with joint forces and in many peacetime and wartime roles," claimed
Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice.
Now comes the Navy with its white paper "From the Sea," which
sets forth its startling new maritime strategy for the postcold
war world. Global reach and global power are left unsaid but are implicit
throughout.
Strictly speaking, the Air Force and Navy white papers are unrelated
to roles and missions reviews under way at the Pentagon and on Capitol
Hill. In practice, though, they are all of a piece. The strategies in
the white papers underpin the roles and missions that each service believes
are rightfully its.
Airpower, the essence of both the Air Force and Navy game plans, is
a major issue-maybe the biggest-in the running debates over roles and
missions. The question is whether long-range, landbased airpower or carrier-based
airpower-and the planes and forces that go with each-should become the
main instrument of US global power at a time when the nation can no longer
afford, and may not need, its customary abundance of both.
A Common Purpose
Although competitive from the roles and missions standpoint, the "Global
Reach, Global Power" and "From the Sea" strategies serve
a common purpose in a larger sense. Each makes the case for maintaining
a powerful, though much altered, Air Force and Navy. Each, in its fashion,
is a persuasive appeal for a strong national defense at a time of civic
preoccupation with domestic affairs.
Lt. Gen. Steven B. Croker, vice commander of Air Combat Command, provided
such a perspective not long ago in a speech at an AFA symposium in Los
Angeles. These days, he said, "the toughest problem [for the US
military] is an intellectual problem." Why? Because "when the
cold war ended, we lost our common framework for debate, our common set
of assumptions, our intellectual model. We lost what we were all about.
. . . The old defense paradigm has been destroyed or largely discredited,
and there has been none to take its place. There's no widely held model
that everyone uses to talk about defense."
In its 1990 white paper, the Air Force "offered a new defense paradigm,
a new way to frame the [defense] debate," General Croker said. "It
has been largely successful. It hasn't been universally accepted yet,
but things are getting a little easier in Washington because of it."
The Navy is now "adopting the same paradigm, the same kind of intellectual
framework" as the Air Force in reshaping its organizations and operations
to adapt to a fast-changing world, the ACC vice commander noted. "The
Navy doesn't call it 'global reach, global power,' but they're talking
about CONUS basing, expeditionary forces, doing away with large carrier
battle groups [in some circumstances]," he said.
Roles and missions aside, what matters most is that both services are
preparing for the future in concert. Maintaining a strong national defense
is "an important challenge for us all," General Croker said.
As things stand, he said, arguments can be advanced for cutting the
defense budget every which way and by any number, and "they will
all have equal credibility because there's no common set of questions,
no common set of assumptions" on which to frame such arguments. "Until
we have a commonly accepted defense paradigm that people believe in and
can see working, we're going to have a very difficult time with the defense
debate," the ACC vice commander declared.
He claimed that it is chiefly up to Air Combat Command to make the case
for the Air Force. ACC is "where the rubber meets the road. . .
. If we don't carry it through-put meat on its bones-that paradigm will
be largely discredited, and we'll be in a period of intellectual vacuum
for quite a while."
Traps lie ahead for both services. Their partnership in the larger purpose
could come apart if their strategies become snarled in wrangling over
roles and missions. Despite the best intentions of both, they may not
be able to avoid falling out. If present trends persist, it is unlikely
that there will be enough money for both to buy all the planes that they
see in their futures.
The Air Force Edge
There is a school of thought that the Air Force has the edge as the
result of its running start with a game plan and airplanes to match.
Its strategy and requirements for future combat aircraft to carry out
that strategy were in place prior to the Persian Gulf War and came out
of it all the more credible. Its development of the hot, stealthy F-22
air-combat fighter for the next century has had some rough spots but
seems securely in place.
The Navy is running behind. Its new strategy and latest requirements
for future aircraft grew out of the Gulf War and seem well justified
in the hindsight of that war, but the strategy and the requirements may
be somewhat out of sync.
The spotlight is on the A/F-X multirole aircraft that the Navy is counting
on as its mainstay multirole fighter for the twenty-first century. The
Navy is modifying its original requirements for the plane to tailor it
to the new strategy, and the tailoring may prove troublesome. The Air
Force has eyes for the A/F-X and has enthusiastically endorsed its proposed
modifications thus far. But the plane is looking less and less like the
long-range interdiction aircraft that the Air Force will need and more
and more like the stealthy fighter that the Air Force will have plenty
of.
If the A/F-X does not pan out, the Air Force can always turn to building
an air-to-ground variant of its F-22. Such a variant has been a live,
though understated, possibility in Air Force planning circles since the
Advanced Tactical Fighter development program began, as the genesis of
the F-22, more than a decade ago.
None of the above is a knock on the A/F-X or on the Navy's new maritime
strategy as such. In performance alone, the stealthy, speedy A/F-X looks
like a winner. So does "From the Sea." It is widely hailed
as a well-reasoned document that makes a persuasive case for the Navy's
break with its blue-water past, a break sharp enough to leave old salts
incredulous. As a jolt to hidebound traditionalists, "From the Sea" ranks
right up there with the Air Force's decision to scrap time-honored distinctions
between strategic and tactical airpower and to merge SAC and TAC.
The new naval game plan, which postdates the Gulf War by almost two
years, places much less emphasis on the open-ocean, big-fleet, so-called "blue-water" operations-always
on the lookout for oncoming Soviet attack submarines and long-range bombers
and cruise missiles-that were central to US maritime strategy through
the cold war-indeed, all the way back to John Paul Jones. "From
the Sea" does not take the Navy out of the blue-water business but
brings it much closer to shore.
Signed by top officials of the Navy and the Marine Corps, "From
the Sea" proclaims that both will place "far greater emphasis
on joint and combined operations" while providing "unique capabilities
of indispensable value in meeting our future security challenges."
Claiming for naval and Marine forces such natural attributes as powerful
forward presence, strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection,
and sealift, the white paper proclaims that "these maritime capabilities
are particularly well tailored for the . . . crisis-response missions
articulated in the President's National Security Strategy."
Farewell to Blue Water
"From the Sea" postulates "a fundamental shift away from
open-ocean warfighting on the sea [and] toward joint operations conducted
from the sea. . . . Our ability to command the seas in areas where we
anticipate future operations allows us to resize our naval forces and
to concentrate more on capabilities required in the complex operating
environment of the 'littoral,' or coastlines, of the earth."
It declares, "Mastery of the littoral should not be presumed. It
does not derive directly from command of the high seas. It is an objective
which requires our focused skills and resources.
"With the demise of the Soviet Union, the free nations of the world
claim preeminent control of the seas and ensure freedom of commercial
passage. As a result, our national maritime policies can afford to deemphasize
efforts in some naval warfare areas."
Thus, notes the white paper, "the answer to every situation may
not be a carrier battle group." Some situations, it says, may call
instead for an "amphibious readiness group" with a large amphibious
assault ship, such as Iwo Jima (LPH-2), as its flagship, and/or a "surface
action group" composed of warships with Tomahawk cruise missiles,
such as those that struck strategic targets in Baghdad's environs with
telling effect at the onset of Operation Desert Storm.
Or, says the white paper, a given mission may well require "the
overwhelming power of a carrier battle group and an amphibious ready
group with embarked Marines, operating with Air Force and Army forces." Withal,
it asserts, "the key is continuously tailoring our forces to anticipate
and support national needs."
Not long ago, Vice Adm. Layton Smith, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Plans and Operations, and Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Thomas Wilkerson,
Deputy Assistant Commandant for Plans and Operations, joined in a discussion
of "From the Sea" with defense writers in Washington. They
predicted, among other things, tighter teamwork between Navy and Marines.
"The Fog of the Littoral"
Under the Navy's former strategy, war meant "war at sea . . . with
the Soviet Union," Admiral Smith explained. Under its new strategy,
he said, the Navy "will have to go into the battle scene . . . fight
in the fog of the littoral."
"If we have the Marines ashore in a contested area, the [aircraft]
carriers will be right in there with them, providing what they need in
terms of cover, close air support, interdiction, or whatever," the
Admiral declared. "We will have a very direct-not an indirect-effect
on the war on land."
General Wilkerson predicted "much closer integration between [Marines]
and the Navy, because they'll be spending more time in the regime of
naval combat power where we've been all along and less time in the regime
of the deep ocean."
Rear Adm. Riley Mixson, the Navy's director of Air Warfare, emphasized
at a US Naval Institute seminar on US airpower late last year that "From
the Sea" is not an attempt to take the play away from the Air Force.
The US "must maintain . . . a mix of long-range bombers, landbased
interdiction aircraft, and seabased tactical aircraft," he declared.
Admiral Mixson contended, however, that the Navy is "unique" among
the US military services and among the world's navies in its prowess
for "projecting power ashore." He called this the Navy's "core
competency," the capability that sets it apart from the other armed
services and from all other navies as well. The Navy now plans to "put
one of its feet on land" and must "maintain a very robust,
seabased aviation force as a vital part of the air triad," he said.
The Admiral pictured future scenarios in which "naval aviation
from aircraft carriers and, if required, landbased expeditionary aircraft
will supply Marines ashore with sustained, high-volume tactical air support
to extend the landward reach of our littoral operations." Navy aircraft,
he explained, are "well-suited for expeditionary airfield operations
ashore when additional landbased support is needed."
Near the end of 1992, the Navy moved to tighten its teamwork with-some
would say, its hold over-Marine aviation. It announced a plan to disband
two Navy squadrons on each of two aircraft carriers-Theodore Roosevelt
and Abraham Lincoln-and replace them with four Marine squadrons of F/A-18
strike fighters and EA-6B electronic warfare planes. The Marine squadrons
will operate off the carriers or from airfields ashore at the discretion
of their carrier battle group commander, a Navy admiral. The Navy plans
more of the same if the switch works out.
Meanwhile, the Navy is encouraging the Marine Corps to sign up, as the
Air Force has done, for the planned A/F-X multimission fighter. The Navy
needs all the A/F-X buyers it can get in order to achieve economies of
scale and thus keep the plane's cost under control. The A/F-X may be
the Navy's best and last hope for the urgently needed modernization of
its carrier-based aircraft fleet in the long term.
Two Tracks, Two Crashes
In the early 1980s, the Navy introduced a two-track plan to replace
its aging A-6E carrier-based bombers. It proposed producing an updated
variant called the A-6F and then, in the longer term, the stealthy Advanced
Tactical Aircraft, later designated the A-12. Both the A-6F and the A-12
programs were subsequently canceled amid financial difficulties.
After the A-12 went off the boards in early 1991, the Navy came up with
another two-track aircraft modernization plan with a somewhat different
twist. This one dealt with fighters as well as bombers. It called for
development of the F/A-18E/F "stretched Hornet" strike fighter
to replace-and greatly improve upon-the F/A-18C/D in the near term, and
for the A-X, as it was called at the time, to replace the A-6E as the
fleet's mainstay, long-range, all-weather bomber.
Last summer, while putting the finishing touches on "From the Sea," the
Navy switched signals on the A-X. Senior Navy officials announced that
the plane would be designed as a multirole fighter-bomber, not exclusively
as a bomber, to replace not only the A-6E but also, ultimately, the F-14
long-range interceptor and the F/A-18 strike fighter well into the next
century. They began calling it the A/F-X.
The Navy's move caused a stir on Capitol Hill, where the Pentagon's
aircraft-acquisition plans were already under fire. As the leader of
a congressional move against roles and missions redundancies, Sen. Sam
Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, claimed
that the nation could not afford and would not need each and every airplane
the services had on their shopping lists.
The central question to be resolved in sorting out superfluous airplanes,
said Senator Nunn, is this: "What is the best and most cost-effective
way to provide air interdiction in the future-with long-range bombers
from the United States or with large numbers of aircraft carriers with
medium-range bombers on their decks?"
He raised many related questions, such as: Will the Navy really need
both the A-X (as it was still being called outside the service) and the
stretched F/A-18E/F? Should the Navy be required to relinquish its longer-range
bombers like the A-6E and the A-X and make do on carriers with shorter-range
strike fighters like the F/A-18?
Not long thereafter, at the Naval Institute's airpower seminar, Admiral
Mixson said, "Could we make do with our existing aircraft, forgo
the [F/A-18]E/F, and wait for [the A/F-X]? Yes, we could do it. But the
problem is, we don't have much growth left in our current [F/A-18C/D]
Hornet out there, and we would have to do some things to some other aircraft,
which are also costly." He said the Navy "very much needs" the
F/A-18E/F "to fill the void" until the A/F-X comes along.
The Navy is being careful not to pit its two premier aircraft programs
against one another in terms of their future needs for annual funding.
It recently slipped the A/F-X program schedule two years, thus deferring
the plane's initial operational capability until 2007. One reason for
this was to comply with a congressional requirement to develop competitive
prototypes. Another was to put more distance between the A/F-X program's
peak funding years and those of the F/A-18E/F.
The Navy seems to be out of options where the A/F-X is concerned. It
urgently needs to replace its A-6Es, and time is running out. Though
still admirable in many respects, those burly bombers are very old, relatively
slow, and decidedly unstealthy. If the A/F-X program comes to grief,
like the A-12 program before it, the Navy may have to default on its
deep-strike bomber mission.
Some defense aficionados suspect that the Navy is already taking that
very risk by turning the A-X into the A/F-X and tailoring it more to
coastline operations. This means less emphasis on-and less built-in range
for-the deep interdiction mission, and more emphasis on supporting amphibious
operations in the air-superiority mission, now performed by F-14s and
F/A-18s, and in close air support, a mission now dominated by F/A-18s.
Deep Interdiction Less Likely
At a recent session with defense reporters, Secretary of the Navy Sean
O'Keefe claimed that the Navy does not require the A/F-X to be "a
long-range interdiction aircraft" because deep interdiction missions "are
not the highest probability [for the service] in the years ahead." Thus,
he said, it makes sense that the A/F-X "evolved" from its A-X
beginnings as a straightforward replacement for the A-6E bomber to become "an
attack fighter aircraft, with primary focus on attack."
"We just don't need . . . this extraordinary 750-mile range" once
earmarked for the A-X, said Secretary O'Keefe, "because nobody's
going to be out there" for the plane to attack.
Adapting the A/F-X to littoral warfare may draw the Marine Corps into
its program. Admiral Mixson predicted as much. However, the modifications,
including a likely 100-mile reduction of the plane's required maximum
range, seem risky for the Navy in other respects. They fortify the argument
that the service has no need for both the F/A-18E/F and the A/F-X. And
they may influence the Air Force to think twice, sooner or later, about
buying the A/F-X to replace its deep-interdiction F-111 and F-15E.
The Air Force is not making waves at the moment. Gen. Merrill A. McPeak,
the Chief of Staff, told an AFA symposium audience last October that
the A/F-X is "as much a requirement for us as it is for the Navy" and
that the Air Force is an "enthusiastic" partner in the program.
"I foresee a lot of problems yet to solve in the program, but we're
in it for the long term . . . fully signed up," General McPeak declared. "This
is not a sham, where we are half-hearted in our participation."
Secretary Rice took the same approach at the AFA symposium, but with
a pointed reminder. He noted that the Air Force has the F-22 "in
reserve" and asserted, "We can always fall back to an air-to-ground
version of the F-22 if that's necessary."
Dr. Rice claimed that the Air Force still finds the A/F-X very much
to its liking, even though it has lost weight and range in the reordering
of its performance requirements. He said the multimission A/F-X designed
for carrier launching "will probably provide us a little more capacity
to adapt it to an F-111 or an F-15E-like mission off a long runway than
will the F-22."
He explained that the Navy, in switching from bomber to multirole fighter,
can now draw more fully from advanced fighter-engine technologies, as
well as from the avionics and the materials, that the Air Force developed
for the air-superiority F-22.
There is nothing phony going on. The Air Force and the Navy are clearly
in this together-in their mutual quest of the A/F-X and in their promotion
and implementation of new strategies for a strong national defense. The
thing to watch is how well and how long both stay with the A/F-X.
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