With the arrival of the first B-2 bomber at Whiteman
AFB, Mo., on December 17, 1993, the Air Force and its
major combat component, Air Combat Command, entered
a strikingly new era. The B-2 not only added a unique
precision weapon to USAF's arsenal but also broke down
some barriers dividing fighter pilots and bomber crews.
At Whiteman, the best of the two groups are now embarked
on the validation of B-2 aircrew training programs,
which began in early January. Their work gives Northrop,
the prime contractor, and CAE-Link, the simulator house,
a chance to make improvements at an early stage. The
blending of these distinctive "cultures" in
the B-2 program mirrors initiatives that ACC has undertaken
on a smaller scale in other units.
What makes the B-2 special, of course, is its combat
power--specifically its ability to penetrate an enemy
air defense with what officials say will be near-impunity.
The B-2 is the ultimate "silver bullet" weapon.
Plans call for only twenty B-2s, with about sixteen
operational at any one time, but just two B-2s can
deliver thirty-two precision guided 2,000-pound bombs.
Such a mission would require sixteen F-117 fighters,
four tankers, and many more crew members.
In the early validation and verification period at
Whiteman, leaders of the 509th Bomb Wing, the operational
home of the B-2, have been striving to instill in pilots
and maintenance personnel what they call the "stealth
mindset."
It's working. Spend time with some of the 2,886 pilots
and enlisted personnel who work with The Spirit
of Missouri (the official name of the first B-2)
at its rural western Missouri base, and you pick up
a sense of awe regarding the new airplane. The attitude
stems partly from the B-2's immense complexity and
technological prowess but also from its simple beauty
and unconventional lines. Observing the sleek aircraft
one bright and bitterly cold day last January, assistant
dedicated crew chief TSgt. Henry A. Price paused and
summed up his feelings with these words: "We're
not worthy."
Wafer-Thin and Quiet
Those watching the barely visible B-2 during a takeoff
on that January day gasped when the wafer-thin bomber
lifted off and then rolled into a sharp bank, suddenly
revealing the vast sweep and size of the black wing.
Even more shocking was the quietness of its four F118
19,000-pound-thrust engines as they propelled the aircraft
into the sky. Normally, the roar of the jet engines
would have been ear-shattering, easily heard miles
away. The sound of the B-2, however, could almost be
called unobtrusive.
The stealth mindset recognizes that the bomber is
part of a whole. Until the 1991 Persian Gulf War, "I
don't think people really appreciated . . . what stealth
could do for us," observed Lt. Col. Tony Imondi,
one of the B-2's two qualified instructor pilots. "You
don't have [just] a stealthy plane; you have a stealthy
weapon system and everything that goes with it, from
ground planning to training to maintenance. You don't
go out and turn a wrench on a stealth airplane without
thinking, 'What's the impact if I scratch this thing?'
because there is an impact."
From the maintenance of its composite materials and
specialized skin to the proper use of its stable of
simulators that allows pilots to train for and even
rehearse complex missions before they log one minute
in the actual bomber, the B-2 was built from the ground
up with all potential tasks in mind. Every aspect of
aircraft support and training was included in the design
of the B-2 system.
In pursuit of the best training system possible, former
fighter pilots and bomber pilots debate the best way
to go about each task. Whether the subject is tactics,
training, or basic procedures, "It gets pretty
spirited," said Operations Group Commander Col.
William Fraser III of the B-2 team. "They [pilots]
sit around the table and say, 'Fighter guys do it this
way. . . . Bomber guys do it this way.' We have good
open discussions about it and come up with the best
ideas. . . . We don't censor anything."
It seems appropriate that the B-2 would go to the
509th BW, one of the most famous air units of all time.
Activated by Army Air Forces on December 17, 1944,
the 509th was created with one mission in mind--to
drop the new, supersecret atomic bomb on a Japanese
target. The first leader of the unit was Col. Paul
W. Tibbets, Jr., who hand-picked and trained his personnel
for the August 1945 mission. Leaders of the present-day
509th were chosen by Gen. John Michael Loh, the commander
of ACC, and Brig. Gen. Ronald C. Marcotte, the wing
commander.
The goal is to form a cadre of highly experienced
pilots who will prepare other aviators to use the massive
combat capabilities of the B-2. Great care has also
gone into the selection of key ground crew members. "We're
talking about cream of the crop," General Marcotte
said. "These are very highly qualified aviators
and professional officers. They're not just test community.
These are card-carrying Air Force leaders, and they
have the records to prove it."
Sprinkled throughout the B-2 unit are individuals
who have been with the B-2 program virtually since
its inception. Some are officers who were whisked away
to California years ago to work on a project about
which they knew little or nothing. Sergeant Price,
the assistant dedicated crew chief of The Spirit
of Missouri, has been with the program since 1986.
He was sent to California to work with Northrop on
the top-secret program but could not tell anyone what
he was doing. Two years later, when the Pentagon took
the wraps off the program, Sergeant Price surprised
his co-workers when he showed up for work in his uniform.
They had had no idea he was in the Air Force.
Not Just for the Cold War
The B-2's transition from developmental to operational
status has been a rocky one. Initially developed during
the Cold War to be a penetrating bomber with a primary
focus on strategic nuclear operations, the B-2 hit
turbulent times when the Soviet Union collapsed. Critics
portrayed the bomber as a weapon without a mission.
Decisions made by the Air Force early in the program,
however, had given the B-2 the flexibility to employ
not only nuclear weapons but also conventional munitions
ranging from Mk. 84 500-pound dumb bombs to sea mines
to 2,000-pound precision guided weapons. Design changes
made early in the course of the program gave the B-2
a low-level bombing capability.
The B-2 can carry a payload of more than 40,000 pounds.
It has an unrefueled range of 7,255 nautical miles;
with refueling, its range is unlimited. That means
the B-2 can hit any target in the world within hours
and, because of its low observable (LO) characteristics,
officials can be confident that it will not be engaged
over hostile territory.
Said General Marcotte, "It could strike high-value,
time-critical targets in the initial phases of an operation
[to] slow down a force, to put out eyes and ears, to
drop smart weapons through those air-conditioning ducts,
to slow the force so we can get our deployment operation
ginned up to add more mass. Then . . . the decision
could be made to forward deploy the B-2. They would
then be able to fly more sorties closer together and
add a lot of mass to the attack. Or the decision may
be to reconstitute the B-2 in a different unit and
hold them in reserve for a second major regional contingency
or swing them. We're training that way. . . . We'll
train to deploy."
While the B-2 can carry eighty Mk. 84 500-pound bombs,
it's unlikely that it would be used in such a fashion. "We
won't use it as a bomb truck," General Marcotte
said. "The real operational capability will come
when we can get smart weapons on it. It can drop sixteen
smart weapons in a single pass, within ten-meter accuracy.
You can take out an airfield. You know how many bombing
sorties that takes other aircraft?"
Just Like the Real Thing
The heart of the B-2 system is its simulators. It
uses three such trainers--the Cockpit Procedures Trainer
(CPT), Mission Trainer (MT), and Weapon System Trainer
(WST).
The CPT provides a basic feel for where switches are
in the aircraft and what they do. This training is
supplemented by classroom instruction. If a student
throws a switch incorrectly, the system freezes. This
prevents inadvertent learning of any improper procedure.
Pilots learn procedures for both normal and emergency
situations.
Beyond the CPT is the MT and WST. The MT is really
a miniature WST, dealing only with the mission commander's
right seat. It complements the WST.
Colonel Imondi said the B-2 is easy to fly. Maj. Richard
Vanderburgh, currently undergoing instructor pilot
(IP) qualification training and simulator training,
agreed. "It's very well engineered. . . . It's
a pilot's dream," he said, adding that "your
intense work load comes from the avionics, and the
WST has virtually the same software as the airplane,
so the crew gets extremely high fidelity on the avionics." Major
Vanderburgh has logged thousands of hours on the B-52.
The WST's combination of hydraulically activated motion
and high-fidelity images gives pilots something approaching
the actual feeling of flight. Air pumps jolt each seat
to simulate turbulence or even a rough landing. The
WST compartment exactly duplicates the B-2 cockpit.
The pilot in the left seat is responsible for the
actual flight of the aircraft, and he monitors all
the parameters of the aircraft. The right-seater is
responsible for carrying out the military mission.
He handles navigation and bombing duties, as well as
some piloting.
That division of labor is key. Early in the program,
the Air Force considered the merits of a crew consisting
of one pilot and one Weapon System Officer. After some
internal debate, it was decided that two pilots would
be needed. Either mission can be performed from either
seat.
Each station has four multifunctional color displays. "Bezzle
buttons" surround each screen. By pushing these
buttons, pilots are able to call up "pages" of
information on almost any system in the aircraft.
"There are not a lot of little sensor heads and
knobs associated with turning on systems," Major
Vanderburgh said. "Everything is done electronically
through the computers. We do a lot of actuating with
the bezzle buttons and the multipurpose display units.
We also have . . . a data entry panel."
To the right of the mission commander is the mission
recorder, where a tape with the mission data is loaded
into the aircraft's computers. The B-2 may be retasked
while in flight. New mission data can be loaded into
the system through the data entry panel.
Elation and Fatigue
Maj. Steve Tippets, another officer in the B-2 IP
course, said, "You come out of a simulator mission,
after three or four hours, and you really feel as if
you've flown the aircraft. You feel the same elation
and fatigue, depending on how difficult the flying
is." Major Tippets has logged more than 1,000
hours in F-16s.
As the pilots fly simulator missions, they are thoroughly
monitored by instructors in another room, who see everything
the pilots see. Every action, every button pushed is
electronically recorded and stored, so that pilots
can study their missions line by line. The information
is kept in each pilot's training file so that his progress
can be monitored.
These data are important for validating the trainer
system. The training syllabus and software are constantly
being revised and upgraded, prompting the Air Force
to seek experienced pilots for the course at this stage
of the program. If problems occur and pilots fail to
grasp certain information, chances are the fault lies
with the training system, which can quickly be corrected.
Having the same software in the WST as in the B-2
allows pilots to rehearse missions before actually
flying the aircraft. Lt. Col. Walter Denne, operations
and training director of the B-2 Site Activation Task
Force, said, "We can take mission data and we
can put it through a mission generation system and
actually plug the mission into the simulator. So when
a crew comes in to fly the simulator, they'll actually
be flying the real mission as planned for the next
day. And mission rehearsal is where we pick up an awful
lot of invaluable training because we can simulate
hostile territory. . . . We can simulate threats with
the best available data. The reason you have two pilots
in here is because things rarely go as planned."
If the bomber itself displays system problems, technicians
can use the simulator to check it out. "We've
already had maintenance guys go to the simulator and
do what we did in the airplane to try and find what
the problem was because the simulator flies our airplane's
software," Colonel Imondi said. "We put the
same data into there. I've told them what happened
in the airplane, and, I'll be darned, right there in
[the simulator] session it happened."
The training program lasts about six months, with
the first three months spent in the classroom and simulators.
During the last three months, pilots focus on flying.
However, once the six months have passed, the pilots
start all over again. This cycle will be repeated indefinitely.
"Just Be Quiet"
Much has been written about B-2 tactics. B-2 operators
contend that they are still trying to get a handle
on how the bomber will be used, but some things are
obvious.
"Our main tactic is to be quiet," Colonel
Imondi said. "Just be quiet [and] manage our LO,
which covers every spectrum--acoustic, [infrared],
and radar. All those things are tied together. Everything
we do is low-power. If we have to, we can go in and
go out without doing anything external to the airplane,
depending on how the systems are operating. . . . We
can go out and pinpoint things with our radar and other
equipment without being detected, so the whole airplane
is balanced."
The B-2 is most detectable when the bomb bay doors
are open, but that time is negligible, Colonel Imondi
said. "The doors are open three to five seconds.
There is no way they're going to lock us up and shoot
us down in three to five seconds. The endgame takes
a whole lot longer than that. That's the whole paradigm
of stealth. It's not that they can't see you. . . .
They can't get you."
Colonel Fraser said that tactics are still being developed
and defined. "We have an aircraft that is very
capable, that has a lot of features built into it.
Now it is incumbent upon us to train and develop the
best employment tactics for the aircraft."
The B-2 can sense active threats and avoid them. According
to the Air Force, the B-2 is not necessarily invisible
to radar. However, air defense radars must do more
than merely detect a B-2 if anyone seeks to destroy
the airplane. The enemy must make enough consecutive
detections to establish a track, then track the B-2
for some distance, and finally guide a missile to it.
An air-to-air missile would have similar problems
because it must acquire, track, and fuze properly as
it closes on the B-2. No known system can make it through
all those gates.
Experts say that some very-high-powered, landbased,
long-range early warning radars, with the right power
and wavelengths, can in fact detect the B-2--but without
any degree of precision. This imprecision disrupts
the defense process. Air defense fighters must search
an area so vast that their fire-control radars are
unlikely to detect a B-2. Big, fixed, and stationary
radars are vulnerable to such defensive tactics as
flying under or circumventing their coverage.
B-2 pilots know which parts of the aircraft are most "detectable," which
radars are most effective, where the emitters are,
and which position most greatly reduces the radar's
effectiveness. Countermeasures are expected to improve.
Thus, the Air Force argues, the B-2 will be a potent,
survivable platform for many decades.
Sometimes Simpler
Maintaining such a revolutionary air vehicle requires
unique methods of care on the ground.
The B-2 may be complex, but its maintenance in some
ways is easier and more efficient than that of older
systems. For example, Sergeant Price said that in the
old days he spent long hours diagnosing B-52 problems. "Now
this airplane spits out a reference designated indicator
and it tell us what's wrong with it," he said.
"Each component on the airplane that is electrical
or mechanical has an RDI assigned to it. Once the part
fails, it's hot-wired and sent right to the flight-control
computer on the airplane, which gives us a readout
on the maintenance printer, and that tells us what's
wrong. The flight-control computer diagnoses its own
problems. The airplane senses every little glitch,
and it goes through all its memory banks, and it talks
to itself. Sometimes it will correct itself in flight.
It may just reset itself."
Diagnosing a problem quickly means that the bomber
can be turned around in less time and with fewer man-hours.
If a problem occurs in flight, the aircraft "tells" the
pilot about it.
One of the more challenging aspects of maintaining
the B-2 is its composite materials. Unique methods
have been developed to patch damage. Areas are specially
prepared to accept a patch. Materials must be cured
for certain periods of time at extremely high temperatures
while hundreds of pounds of suction are applied to
remove air bubbles that would ruin a patch. Some things
can be patched on the aircraft; other repairs must
be done at the shop.
Sometimes maintainers are thankful for little advances.
For example, the B-2 has antilock brakes. Sensors detect
when a brake is about to lock and automatically release
pressure, which shifts the burden to other tires. This
keeps tires from skidding and wearing out at a fast
clip. Sergeant Price said that, so far, he has only
had to replace two worn tires.
Under current plans, the first B-2 unit will not be
fully operational until 1996 or 1997, though General
Marcotte says that it could happen sooner. He noted
that when the first B-2 arrived at Whiteman it was
in "code one" status, meaning it could have
been refueled and flown again right away. It flew a
few days later and, again, it was code one. It had
two minor write-ups on its third flight but still could
have flown again.
"We're meeting and exceeding our expectations," General
Marcotte said. "What we did different in the B-2
than in the B-1, for example, was we did more of the
work up front, training our people, putting training
systems on the base, putting Weapon Systems Trainers
on the base. We were ready to maintain this airplane
and ready to fly. If we continue to be successful and
do our job like the first one, there is a potential
that things would be operationally ready sooner."