Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command forces have been instrumental in the success of the war on terror. An Ohio ANG pilot with the 178th Fighter Wing flies a training mission.

An Oklahoma ANG C-130 crew flies a mission to support Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. With so much of USAF’s airlift capability residing in the reserve components, Total Force capabilities have never been more critical.

USAF will purchase four new AC-130 gunships—in high demand for the war on terror—to augment the current Air Force Special Operations Command fleet. Gunners aboard an AC-130 load a 105 mm round.

Reach Forward and Other Concerns

Airmen long have accepted a certain amount of tension between control and actual execution of air operations. Control might be centralized at a high level. Basic doctrine, however, called for pushing execution down to the lowest possible level. Such decentralization gave execution authority to those in close contact with the enemy and having the best information.

Now, that “sacred principle” is under pressure, says Rebecca Grant, a top airpower expert. In Grant’s view, a flood of digital data, instant communications, and new operational realities are eroding tactical-level authority.

“ The idea of centralized control is beginning to turn into something called centralized execution,” Grant told attendees at AFA’s Orlando symposium. This, she added, leads to a troubling question: “Is decentralized execution in danger? Are we in danger of risking part of what it is that makes air and space power the powerful force that it is today?”

Grant, a contributing editor of Air Force Magazine, is the president of IRIS Independent Research in Washington, D.C., and has worked for Rand, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. She is in regular contact with members of the operational Air Force.

“ We’ve heard, over the course of the last 18 months, some frustrations with the way this [centralized execution] is being applied,” she said.

The tensions stem from the constantly increasing level of persistent and high-quality intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and communications, which offers a detailed picture of the battlespace not just to the cockpit or to forward air controllers but also to a combined air operations center or higher headquarters. “There is a greater view of the battlespace than we’ve ever had before,” said Grant.

This has created a new phenomenon that she refers to as “reach-forward.” This term refers to a situation in which a commander or his staff, possibly thousands of miles away from a theater of operations, uses high-quality battlespace pictures and advanced communications to manage tactical events in real time.

This has led in some cases to micromanagement, with negative effects on the battle rhythm of an attacking force.

According to Grant, Desert Storm offered the first instance of centralized execution, mostly concerning stealth aircraft. “If you talk to some of the F-117 pilots who flew in that conflict,” she said, “they will tell you that they got a lot of centralized direction about what to do.” However, decentralized execution was still the rule in the Gulf War.

In Operation Allied Force in 1999, one saw more evidence of reach-forward. There was highly centralized control and in some cases even what might be called centralized execution through the transmission of real-time targeting changes, said Grant. A-10 pilots, for example, complained about having to call the combined air operations center for an OK to strike a tank on the ground.

Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 was a reaffirmation of decentralized execution. Air controllers on the ground, in the mountains, and even on horseback were able to call in airpower on demand because fighters and bombers, centrally organized, had been made ready for use on demand.

However, Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in early 2002 was altogether different. Many targets were so sensitive that attacks required approval from US headquarters at MacDill AFB, Fla. Anaconda, said Grant, points up the kinds of difficulties posed by the war on terrorism for the future.

In Grant’s view, technological and operational realities now have pushed airpower into a new and much more fluid era, one in which actual control and execution will depend on what circumstances exist at the time of an operation. Airmen will have to be more flexible than ever, she believes.

“ There will be times when you must have centralized execution for efficiency,” said Grant. “There will be times when you must have decentralized execution for the span of control. And what we see in modern warfare is that we cannot necessarily take one template of rules and apply it.”

The commander’s job will be a difficult one, she went on.

“ It will never be easy to know,” said Grant, “whether you should give execution authority out to that pilot in the cockpit, or out to that air battle management platform, or when, due to the goals of your operation and the political constraints that are there, you have to hold it closely.”

She concluded, there is “no one template that would always apply to every situation. That tension of centralization and decentralization will be with us for a long time.”

—Robert S. Dudney, Editor in Chief

The New Direction of United States Strategic Command

By the end of this year, the newly reorganized United States Strategic Command should have its concept of operations in place. This will propel the command well beyond simply the merger of the nation’s nuclear forces with US Space Command.

The new organization will have a portfolio that also includes global conventional strike, special operations, missile defense, command and control, and information warfare, according to the organization’s commander, Adm. James Ellis.

There are still many questions about which of these capabilities will reside in the Offutt AFB, Neb.–based command and which will be selected, a la carte, from other operational organizations.

Addressing AFA’s Air Warfare Symposium in Orlando, Fla., this February, Ellis said observers should not be fooled by the fact that STRATCOM’s name hasn’t changed.

As he tells it, the term “strategic” has merely been imbued with its classic definition. And global operations, Ellis said, no longer is synonymous with the term “nuclear.”

STRATCOM has already had several versions of a charter, the most recent of which was signed by President Bush in January. While the focus so far has been to knit together the old Space and Strategic Commands, the emphasis for the rest of this year will be on bringing in the new missions, Ellis observed.

The frequent changes indicate that there is “a commitment to tailor things as we go, to accept that we may not have a perfect vision. We can’t wait for it to become perfect.”

He also told of making the mistake, when briefing Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, of calling these “new” mission areas. Ellis recalled Rumsfeld saying: “Jim, they are not new mission areas. They were previously unassigned mission areas, and they are about to be assigned to you.”

Ellis acknowledged that he faces a challenge in figuring out which commands will be support-ed and which support-ing in performing some tasks. He is still working out which commands will be components of which organizations.

For example, the Air Force prefers to send one single officer to serve as its representative to the headquarters of a combat commander. Air Force Space Command’s chief will be that component representative to STRATCOM. However, Air Combat Command provides the bombers that STRATCOM would call on for either nuclear or conventional global missions, so it would have to put those bombers at Space Command’s disposal under certain conditions.

Ellis recognized the difficulties.

“ My own personal view,” he said, “is that we need to rethink concepts of componentcy and acknowledge that we could not have enough task force to possibly satisfy the span of control and span of responsibilities that has migrated to this command.”

He even suggested that organizations might not work for a single individual.

“ We have to find mechanisms that allow me to interface with senior leadership in each of these service components and, with their concurrence and cooperation, work through them to task the capabilities ... in their subordinate commands.”

He added: “It is what I call capabilities-based componentcy.”
Ellis said that he could not possibly replicate the capabilities resident in other commands at his own organization—“there aren’t enough skilled professionals to do it all”—and said he will have to tap the expertise where it already exists.

“ The service component/agency relationships will be the key to our success,” he said. “We will not have the skills and the depth required to do all this in headquarters. We are not going to get the manpower. I don’t want that manpower. What I need is assured access to those skills wherever they reside in our Department of Defense.”

In an interview following his remarks, Ellis said, “It is my intent to draw from the [service] components to help in that regard, and I think it is entirely appropriate. While we bring the joint oversight, we ought to draw from the service capabilities and not duplicate them.”

All this means “we are going to a nontraditional structure” at STRATCOM, Ellis said in his AFA remarks.

For the near term, he said, STRATCOM will be organized for “what we do that is most important,” rather than for what it does most.

There will be “flag and general officers” at STRATCOM heading up “information warfare, strike warfare—both a nuclear and conventional piece of that—[and] global operations.”

While the ideal approach to information operations would be to have it mixed in through the entire organization, Ellis said, the mission area is not yet mature enough for that, and “we are going to nurture it a bit in a separate category” until it matures.

Information operations, Ellis said, cannot be defined broadly enough.
The mission started with US Space Command’s work on computer network defense and computer network attack. However, it also includes electronic warfare, strategic deception, operational security, and psychological operations.

“ All of those pieces are a part of how we define information operations,” said Ellis, “and now that is being brought together in a single, uniform organization. That is us.”

Information operations does not yet provide a sufficiently reliable and likely successful “genuine alternative to a kinetic option” as an offensive weapon, Ellis asserted. Before IO attacks can substitute for real ordnance, the rates of success and dependability will have to go up “if we are ever going to get it beyond the realm of a science project.”

Ellis also said no network will ever be hack-proof, and a major network defense effort will be to limit the damage that anyone can do.STRATCOM will work to compartmentalize aspects of the military network so that areas can be isolated and damage controlled.

Global Strike, which Ellis described as a “previously unassigned” mission, will involve “the capability to plan for and deliver rapid, limited-duration precision kinetic and non-kinetic effects half a world away.” The emphasis on this mission area will be speed at global distances, he said, and while there will be “full cooperation with the regional combatant commander,” it is still a delicate discussion to decide who is supported and who is supporting.

As an example of where STRATCOM would supercede the regional combatant commander, Ellis said that “maybe it would be nice to bring in a capability that does not require the in-theater support, that does not pre-alert your adversary that you are coming, and still allows you to deal with the threat in a very real and capable fashion. That is what we are looking for in Global Strike.”

In the interview, Ellis said that a global, rapid-strike conventional weapon could come in many forms, all of which are now being studied.
“ We’re brainstorming,” he said. Concepts include the Common Aero Vehicle, a hypersonic or suborbital platform with one or many submunitions, as well as other “hybrid vehicles that operate in both [air and space].”

STRATCOM will focus on “accelerating, assessing, and rapidly culling ideas, trying [them] in laboratories or in concept.” The idea will be to find what works rather than starting from “a preordained answer.”
Another concept being considered is ICBMs with conventional warheads, he acknowledged.

“ They are a very rapid response, long-range capability,” said Ellis. “[But] they don’t have as much precision associated with them as our current tactically delivered precision guided munitions do. The combination of those capabilities might offer some promise, but, again, it needs to be examined in the entire [STRATCOM] context. ... It’s a concept that’s certainly worth exploring.”

The command’s “global sensors” will bring an added dimension to its ability to strike targets worldwide, he added. And, in a particularly time-sensitive situation, STRATCOM has well-established lines of communication and decision with the national command authority, Ellis observed.

Ellis also took pains to say that the nuclear element of STRATCOM is not taking a backseat, either in importance or attention, to the new missions. Given the unfolding events in Korea and elsewhere, he said, the nuclear element is “an important piece of reality.”

The nuclear arsenal is aging, Ellis noted, and with the exception of the Trident D-5 missile, every component of the nuclear Triad “is out of production.” Coping with aging and upgrades will warrant a great deal of his attention, he said.

“ It is absolutely essential that this remain as it always has been: a zero-defect program,” he added.

The Minuteman ICBM upgrade program as now laid out is “satisfactory” to guaranteeing the reliability of the missile leg and is funded, Ellis reported in the interview. The responsiveness of ICBMs, the survivability of sea-launched missiles, and the flexibility of the bomber force remain unchanged, and the nuclear Triad concept is still valid “for the foreseeable future,” he said. Nevertheless, the shape of the future nuclear force “is part of the discussion that needs to be held,” he noted.

While he is not planning to pull the Space Command framework wholesale out of the Colorado Springs, Colo., area—some things “are legitimately and appropriately either literally or figuratively hardwired into Cheyenne Mountain”—Ellis said some aspects “need to be resident with us” at Offutt and will be moving to Omaha. Elements crucial to supporting NORAD will remain where they are, but 400 billets will be moving to Nebraska.

Missile defense will include “what I call the preboost phase, ... which is actually hitting the thing before it leaves the pad,” Ellis noted.

Consolidating so many missions into a single command will allow trade-offs that have not necessarily been made in the past, he said.

“ We also think there is an opportunity here to talk trade-offs, ... for the first time to be able to assess the costs of on-orbit resources vs. upgraded air breathers vs. terrestrial capabilities and maritime systems ... as we work toward those concepts of persistence and steering capability.”

Ellis will be careful not to develop a wish list, since, he said in the interview, “the services have to deliver and buy these systems. They have to fund them ... out of their budgets.” He added, “From a joint perspective, I need to understand those constraints and realities.”

As STRATCOM commander, “I need to say what we really think, [but] it’s also appropriate that I understand the competing demands and stresses the services are under,” said Ellis. “We all want the same outcome, which is to genuinely enhance ... the systems that are deemed most important ... to the national security.”

This, he said, “is our goal as we realign the organizational piece and draw on the components’ support.”

—John A. Tirpak, Executive Editor, and Adam J. Hebert, Senior Editor

F/A-22 Fixes Paying Off, Sambur Reports

The pace of flight testing on the F/A-22 Raptor is quickening, and there has been marked improvement in the aircraft’s software stability since the program was restructured last year, USAF officials reported at AFA’s Air Warfare Symposium in Orlando, Fla. Leadership changes and a conservative funding plan should also ensure the program’s success, they asserted.

“ Recent test activities show changes to the program ... are paying off,” said Marvin R. Sambur, Air Force acquisition executive. He reported a fivefold improvement in the stability of F/A-22 software—now 8.8 hours between problems—and noted that this is a “very, very significant accomplishment” toward achieving an operational standard of 10 hours.

Meanwhile, flight-test points have been completed at 2.5 times the previous rate, and critical test launches at supersonic speeds of both the AIM-9 and AIM-120 missiles have been successful. The first Raptor was delivered to Nellis AFB, Nev., in January, and Air Combat Command maintenance crew training on the jet has begun, Sambur noted.

Top USAF acquisition officials said recent changes to the F/A-22 program represent a good beginning. They cautioned, though, that USAF will cancel the next generation fighter if the program doesn’t maintain dramatic improvements.

“ These highlights demonstrate the Air Force–Lockheed Martin team is getting the program back on track,” Sambur said, but he cautioned that the achievements simply represent “a good beginning.” He said it’s likely the program will encounter “unknown unknowns” that will demand aggressive management to meet an initial operational capability in late 2005.

Sambur noted that the new program and test management in place at the program level, in flight test, and at Lockheed Martin amounts to an A-Team of top performers.

The status report and the introduction of the management team to the press was part of the service’s effort to demonstrate “what we are doing to turn this program around,” Sambur explained.

He had harsh words for Lockheed Martin, noting that the company’s F/A-22 and the Space Based Infrared System have both suffered from problems and that sub-par performance on such key systems was unacceptable.

“ We’ve been very hard on the Lockheed management,” Sambur said. “We told them how important this program is and that they needed to clean up their act because we in the Air Force were not going to tolerate that performance.”

He echoed remarks from Air Force Secretary James G. Roche that if the program doesn’t perform, “in spite of its importance to the Air Force, we will cancel” the F/A-22. Lockheed Martin’s “performance has to change, and it has to change very dramatically,” Sambur warned.

Ralph Heath, Lockheed Martin executive vice president, said he has taken personal charge of the program and insisted that it is “without question, the ... No. 1 priority” for the company. Heath said he has at his disposal the resources of the corporation and its teammates, including Boeing, to get the program performing on time and as advertised.

Heath also said the transition from development to production is “the defining moment ... of the life of a program.” Production requires “different resources, a different mind-set [and] perspective” than development, he explained, adding that Lockheed and the Air Force “effectively have made that transition.”

Sambur reported that the Air Force has taken “a different approach” to this program. While budgeting rules usually call for a spending plan of 50–50, which means “you have a 50 percent probability of making it and a 50 percent probability of not making it,” the F/A-22 will see an 80–20 budget, he said. “We wanted to make sure this program would succeed.”

Under the revised program, the Air Force will not raid any other accounts to pay for the F/A-22. The service is taking a build-to-budget approach, which means that if there are cost overruns in development, they will be covered by production dollars. The service is operating under a $43 billion production cap. For that money, USAF now expects to be able to build 276 of the 381 Raptors it says it needs.

The Air Force will not request additional money for the F/A-22, senior leaders told Air Force Magazine. (See “The F/A-22 Gets Back on Track,” March, p. 22.)

Lt. Gen. (sel.) John D.W. Corley, USAF director of Global Power Programs, said 381 is “the floor, the minimum number of airplanes you should be procuring of the F/A-22,” based on a Defense Planning Guidance study last summer. (See “The F-22 On the Line,” September 2002, p. 36.)

The 381 is the operational requirement, while the 276, at this point, is the “fiscally constrained estimate” of what the Air Force will be able to afford, said Corley.

Sambur noted that under the “very conservative” approach to funding being taken by the Air Force, 276 is the number that now appears can be built. However, “produceability” cost savings could still kick in at a much better than expected rate, meaning “we are actually hoping we’ll be able to do a lot better than [276],” he said.

Corley said the Air Force has considered various alternatives to the F/A-22, from extending the service life of the F-15 to the benefits that will accrue from fielding new, stealthy, more precise munitions, but nothing else will do.

While there will be “enhancements” to radar and the lethality of munitions the F-15 can carry, “it will never yield the capability that this aircraft [the F/A-22] can,” Corley asserted. Likewise, he said the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter lacks the unique characteristics—supercruise and all-aspect stealth—necessary to defeat “the next two generations of double-digit surface-to-air missiles.” Moreover, the F-35 will not be available in large quantities until perhaps 2014 or beyond, he added.

Cutting back on the F/A-22 “is going to create ... a capability void that can’t be fulfilled with legacy types of airplanes, through upgrading F-15s or other legacy aircraft, or even the procurement of more Joint Strike Fighters later on,” Corley maintained.

Canceling the F/A-22 now would add costs to the F-35, which will use systems developed for the F/A-22, such as engines and avionics. “If you truncate F/A-22 today, you will push a bill to the F-35 in the future,” said Corley. “That is not what we want to do.”

The maximum number of airplanes the F/A-22 program will produce is 36 a year, which will be achieved around 2005, according to the new F/A-22 program director, Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Owen.

At that rate, USAF will finish the program in 2011, but Corley said the 276 figure is “only an estimate” and more might be built. The key, he said, is “to stabilize this program.” He added, “We understand we have a problem with competence and with credibility, ... and we are turning the corner on that right now.”

Neither Corley nor Sambur could say what the Air Force will do to make up the difference in capability between the 381 required and 276, should that be all that actually gets built. Corley asked, “Is there a disconnect between what our requirement is and the fiscal constraints?” and replied, “Yes, there is.”

However, since there are eight years till the notional program completion, he said, “We’ll have an opportunity to re-examine, if you will, what the next strategy is or how the world changes between now and then.”

—John A. Tirpak, Executive Editor