This is a sensitive
moment for the F/A-22 Raptor. The White House’s Office of Management and Budget recently
ordered Pentagon officials to take a hard new look at USAF’s premier fighter,
now entering operational testing. The result conceivably could be curtailment
of the program, or worse.
OMB’s questions sounded ominous. Does
the Raptor have true “transformational
value” or is it “merely another step” in a long evolution
of fighters? Is the requirement “still relevant”? Are there “alternatives”?
There have been six previous Raptor reviews. Each time, the Air Force was
able to make a strong case for the fighter, but this time could be different.
Some believe OMB schemed with the F/A-22’s critics in the Pentagon
to stack the deck against the fighter. They observe that USAF won’t
be allowed to take part in the review and can only answer questions
when asked.
The study will probably wind up this summer. We can expect
to hear a number of plausible-sounding reasons for
why it would be OK to decimate the F/A-22
program.
Those arguments will either ignore or fudge certain facts, presented here
for handy future reference.
The F/A-22 has been conceived by the world’s foremost practitioner
of airpower, the United States Air Force, which has unequivocally stated
that the F/A-22 is
key to air superiority in future combat. USAF’s credentials are
impeccable; no American ground forces have suffered enemy air attack
since 1953.
The airplane has bounced back from recent problems and
is performing well. (See “The
F/A-22 Force Forms Up” on p. 34.) USAF expects the F/A-22 to go
operational by December 2005.
Today’s front-line fighter, the F-15 Eagle, is physically wearing
out. It entered service in 1975 and is based
upon 30-year-old technology. The F-15
fleet,
with an average aircraft age of 17 years, is costly to maintain,
operates under flight restrictions, and must be replaced.
As the F-15 cycles out, the Raptor will be the only plausible
successor. Even a radically upgraded F-15 cannot
be made stealthy in any useful way.
The stealthy
F-35 fighter is often held out as an alternative, but it is not optimized
for air combat and would have to be substantially redesigned, at
great cost.
Modern foreign fighters and “double-digit” air defense systems
now on the export market have caught up with the F-15 in capability.
Without the
F/A-22, the Air Force will gradually lose its ability to guarantee control
of the skies. This is perilous for an expeditionary Air Force that fights
on someone
else’s turf.
Though often derided as a mere “dogfighter,” the F/A-22 is
expected to have a potent multirole capability—a fact largely
unappreciated by critics. A stealthy F/A-22 will
provide not only air-to-air combat
prowess
but also precision
attack and defense suppression capabilities. The F/A-22 is the only fighter
able to autonomously counter anti-access threats on Day 1 of a war and
thereby open
the way for other US forces.
The F/A-22 already has suffered a drastic reduction from
the original production goal of 750 fighters.
The latest officially stated USAF plan called for a
force of 339 F/A-22s. That figure, set in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense
Review, had
no relationship to combat requirements whatsoever. It was determined
by budget needs. More recent pressures have pushed
the number down to about 300 or
fewer fighters.
The 339-airplane force, which critics want to whittle
further, is small by any standard. For example,
USAF bought roughly 1,100 F-15s and 2,200 F-16s.
According
to USAF, 339 Raptors would yield, on any given day, only 214 combat-coded
aircraft. That works out to fewer than nine full (24-airplane) squadrons.
Nine squadrons won’t cover requirements. After the 1997 QDR,
USAF organized itself into 10 air and space expeditionary
forces, or AEFs.
USAF could not
provide even one full F/A-22 squadron per AEF. Getting to one squadron
per AEF requires
a fleet of 381 F/A-22s. Officials say having two squadrons per
AEF would take a total inventory of 762 F/A-22s.
The Raptor doesn’t consume a huge portion of the budget. At
its peak, the F/A-22 program would require less
than six percent of the
Air Force budget,
less
than two percent of the Defense Department budget, and one-quarter
of one percent of the federal budget. This is in
line with earlier periods of fighter modernization.
Most development money has already been spent and therefore
is a “sunk cost.” USAF
is poised to capitalize on the expenditure with serial production of
F/A-22s. Stopping or limiting the process now would deprive the
US of a full return
on its investment.
Some critics say the Raptor should be de-emphasized in
favor of future unmanned combat air vehicles and
space-based systems. That position is not favored
by most defense professionals. In a July 22, 1999, pro-F/A-22 letter
to Congress, seven former Secretaries of Defense argued
thus: “It is not enough to
say that something better may be available in the future. Something better
is always
available in the future. Serious threats to American air superiority may
arise sooner, and the nation’s security cannot tolerate a loss of command
of the air. Congress and the Administration must focus on this fundamental
reality and
fully fund the nation’s only truly stealthy air superiority fighter.” One
of the seven signatories was Donald Rumsfeld.
Copyright Air Force Association. All rights reserved.
|
