Price of Safety
"I think we have an excellent safety program. We are being
penalized . . . by the fact that, by definition, if an aircraft
receives $1 million in damages or more, it's categorized as a
major aircraft accident. With the cost of engines today and costs
of some of our components, you can lose an engine due to foreign-object
damage or some other means, and it will be listed as a major
aircraft accident. . . . But as it is, I stand behind the US
Air Force's safety record any day, before anybody, anywhere."
Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF Chief of Staff, in
a June 7, 1996, press conference following release of an accident
investigation board's report on the April 3, 1996, CT-43A crash
that killed Commerce Secretary Ronald H. Brown and thirty-four
others.
Proaction in Action
"IFOR [the US-led NATO implementation force] is now in a
position to expand its presence throughout all of Bosnia[-Hercegovina]
to establish a safe and secure environment for civilian implementation.
Our troops will conduct more visible and more proactive patrols
throughout the country. This will improve conditions for freedom
of movement and put war criminals at greater risk of apprehension."
Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher, in a June
2, 1996, statement in Geneva, Switzerland, indicating that the
Alliance force would be more aggressive in arresting Serbian
war criminals.
Here's a Second Opinion
"I would remind you that when IFOR . . . went in, [it] went
in with a certain, very strict mission, and it did not include
running down people who were suspected of war crimes. . . .
"IFOR troops can arrest anybody who's been charged with
a war crime with whom they come in contact, but they are not
charged with, in effect, being the domestic or the international
police force and targeting people and going after them."
President Clinton, in a June 12, 1996, press conference
at the White House.
Russian Politics Explained
"This was not an attempted coup. It was an attempt to put
pressure on the President."
Gen. Alexander Lebed, Russian defense minister, in
a June 18, 1996, news conference, referring to an attempt by
Russian generals to put the Army on high alert to thwart the
firing of Defense Minister Pavel Grachev.
Lesson Learned
"Many people have raised the question, 'What will happen
in Bosnia in 1997?' Is there a danger of the war restarting?
. . . The deterrent to that war restarting, implicit in NATO
air, is very powerful. All of the former warring factions have
had very vivid examples of the capability and effectiveness of
NATO air strikes."
Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, in a June
13, 1996, press conference at NATO headquarters, Brussels, Belgium.
His reference is to Operation Deliberate Force, the US-led NATO
air campaign in late 1995 against the Bosnian Serbs.
Gray Threats
"I doubt very much we will buy another C-5 or anything like
a C-5 class. We can't afford it. I recommended to [Lockheed Martin]
folks that they come in with ideas on how to modernize the C-5s,
so we can keep them around for forty or fifty years. U-2s will
probably be seventy-five years old before they are retired. B-52s
are already thirty-eight; they will probably be fifty-plus when
retired. With the F-22 coming in, with the procurement rates
we are talking about, F-15s will be forty-five years old before
they are retired. It is aging aircraft and how to modernize them
[that is] the name of the game."
Arthur L. Money, assistant secretary of the Air Force
for Acquisition, in a May 24, 1996, address to the Air Force
Association's Acquisition Update conference held in Colorado
Springs, Colo.
Prevent Defense
"The security of the US continues to require us to maintain
strong military forces to deter and, if necessary, to defeat
those who threaten our vital national interests--and we do. But
today, the US also has a unique . . . opportunity . . . to prevent
the conditions for conflict and to help create the conditions
for peace. . . .
"America's security policy in the postCold War era
requires us to take advantage of that opportunity: to make 'preventive
defense' the first line of defense of America, with deterrence
the second line of defense, and with military conflict the third
and last resort. . . . Preventive defense creates the conditions
that support peace, making war less likely and deterrence unnecessary."
Secretary Perry, in a May 13, 1996, address to the
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
Air Dominance
"I would describe the difference between 'air dominance'
and 'air superiority' as one of magnitude of ability to influence
events in a given piece of airspace. For instance, when you begin
to conduct any kind of a combat or theater-wide operation, normally
that theater commander's first priority is to make sure that
you have air superiority over your own troops, [which
should] generally guarantee that you will not have your troops
attacked. . . . The next stage has been called air supremacy,
where you, for all intents and purposes, not only are able to
defend your own people, but you pretty much dominate the space.
You can operate at will in there. Air dominance . .
. is a term that's sort of grown up in the last couple of years
in joint doctrine. . . . Dominance to me is kind of an extension
of the supremacy idea that says, 'Nothing moves or operates in
that guy's airspace.' I mean, you totally control it. It's a
step above."
General Fogleman, in March 14, 1996, testimony before
the Senate Armed Services Committee.
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