Really Bad News . . .
"The Russian nuclear command-and-control system is being
subjected to stresses it was not designed to withstand as a result
of wrenching social change, economic hardship, and malaise within
the armed forces. . . . Despite official assurances, high-level
Moscow officials are concerned about the security of their nuclear
inventory. . . .
"[The Strategic Rocket Forces units] have the technical
ability to launch without authorization of political leaders
or the general staff. . . . [The threat of blackmail] conspiracies
within nuclear armed units . . . has become a concern as living
conditions and morale have deteriorated in the military, even
among elite nuclear submariners, nuclear warhead handlers, and
SRF. . . .
"Political authorities probably could neither execute
a nuclear strike--even from a command post--without the cooperation
of the general staff nor prevent the general staff (or perhaps
some other national-level command post) from launching on its
own. . . . Russian military writings still portray Western policies
as hostile, and . . . Moscow's exercises have simulated short-warning
nuclear attacks against Russian strategic forces and their supporting
command structure."
Excerpts from the September 1996 CIA report "Prospects
for Unsanctioned Use of Russian Nuclear Weapons," quoted
by reporter Bill Gertz in the October 22, 1996, Washington
Times.
. . . And a Second Opinion
"The Russian Strategic Rocket Forces are probably their
most elite, or among their most elite, forces. We believe that
they're well disciplined and well commanded. The Russians have
recently completed a strategic nuclear exercise similar to ones
that they've carried out . . . each of the last four years, and
their forces appeared to be in good shape. It's no secret that
we're concerned about the custody of nuclear weapons everywhere
in the world, including the United States. This is an issue of
grave concern to us. The Russian forces are also concerned about
the security of nuclear weapons in Russia. We think they've taken
prudent steps to keep the forces safe and secure."
Defense Department spokesman Kenneth H. Bacon, in
an October 22, 1996, Pentagon press briefing in reaction to the
Times article.
The Timetable
"Today, I want to state America's goal: By 1999--NATO's
fiftieth anniversary and ten years after the fall of the Berlin
Wall--the first group of countries we invite to join should be
full-fledged members of NATO."
President Clinton, in an October 22, 1996, speech
in Detroit, Mich., concerning NATO enlargement.
Blood, Toil, Tears, Sweat
"Part of the problem that the Air Force faces . . . is that,
while we can develop a clear vision of what airpower can do,
describing and analyzing how airpower acts has never been easy
and not very well understood by the nonbelievers or the uneducated.
We should not feel badly about this, because we are in pretty
good company in not being able to describe this. In fact, it
was Winston Churchill who once remarked, 'Airpower is the most
difficult of all forms of military force to measure or even express
in precise terms.' Now if Churchill, with his command of the
English language, could not do it. . . . Put it this way: I am
trying to keep this quote away from the long-range planners,
lest they give up in despair."
Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF Chief of Staff, in
an October 18, 1996, address to AFA's National Symposium in Los
Angeles, Calif.
Perry's Position
"My going-in view on force structure [in the upcoming Quadrennial
Defense Review] is that we need to maintain the numbers we have--the
divisions, wings, and approximate number of ships we have. But
it might be possible to find some efficiencies in support areas."
Defense Secretary William J. Perry, in remarks quoted
in the October 3, 1996, Wall Street Journal.
Miracles
"There was a real prospect of war in a country where we
had 37,000 soldiers. We were head to head with North Korea. They
had a million men under arms and a totally unpredictable nature,
but they actually signed up to what we wanted: an end to their
[nuclear] program. And somewhat miraculously, it has stuck."
Ashton B. Carter, former assistant secretary of defense
for International Security Policy, as quoted in the October 28,
1996, New York Times.
Strobe Light
"One challenge America faces . . . is to overcome Russian
suspicions, Russian conspiracy theories, and Russian old-think.
More to the point, I'd say that is a challenge the Russians themselves
face; they must overcome their lingering Cold War stereotypes
about us. . . . If the Russians overindulge their misplaced suspicions
that we want to keep them down, then words like partnership and
cooperation, translated into Russian, will become synonyms for
appeasement, subservience, [and] humiliation at the hands of
the West. The result then could be that we will indeed cooperate
less, and compete more, on precisely those issues where it is
in our common interest to cooperate more and compete less. .
. . It would be bad for everyone but--without doubt--it would
be particularly bad for the Russians themselves. They would risk
repeating at least some of the mistakes that made nine-tenths
of the twentieth century such a disaster for them. Those mistakes
included defining their security at the expense of everyone else's
and misdefining security itself as the expensive and wasteful
capacity to destroy and intimidate."
Strobe Talbott, deputy secretary of State, in an
October 29, 1996, speech at The Harriman Institute in New York.
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