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The Pentagon's new national military strategy declares
defense of the US homeland to be its top priority and
spells out new, businesslike plans for balancing near-term
and long-term readiness. It calls for having military
power sufficient to compel a change of a regime in
one Major Theater War, while at the same time, stopping
an enemy advance in another. It signals a shift in
US emphasis from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region.
The strategy also aims squarely at preventing shocks
and surprises such as the Sept. 11 terrorist strikes
in New York City and Washington. DOD hopes to succeed
by dispensing with a focus on "likely" threats
and identifiable foes and shifting to preparations
for dealing with dangerous capabilities, regardless
of who may possess them. The Pentagon also wants a
more robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capability such that the United States can keep "persistent" watch
over any given area, without gaps.
In addition, it maintains that long-range precision-strike
systems shape up as perhaps the most important transformational
capability on the horizon.
This new capabilities-based strategy anticipates that
enemies will use asymmetric means, such as cyber-war,
terrorism, and chemical and biological weapons, to
attack the United States and its forces and will not
challenge the American military in its areas of dominance,
such as air or naval power. The strategy would restructure
packages of American military power by the effects
they can achieve, rather than by their traditional
roles. To this end, the military would forge new joint
commands.
Such is the essence of the report on the 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review, submitted to Congress Sept. 30. This
QDR report, mandated in law, preoccupied the Pentagon
and the armed services for the seven months preceding
the September attacks.
Deep Uncertainty
"We cannot and will not know precisely where
and when America's interests will be threatened, when
America will come under attack, or when Americans might
die as the result of aggression," wrote Defense
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld in a foreword to the report.
"We should try mightily to avoid surprise, but
we must also learn to expect it," he added, noting
that intelligence about the intentions and capabilities
of enemies will never be perfect. The ability to prepare
for surprise and adapt to it when it comes is at the
heart of the new strategy, Rumsfeld said.
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz said the
QDR was "largely completed" prior to the
Sept. 11 attacks and that the events of that day "confirm" the
QDR's basic direction, particularly the move toward
homeland defense and preparations for terrorism.
Wolfowitz said that the 71-page document-which includes
a largely favorable assessment of its usefulness by
Army Gen. Henry H. Shelton, the now-retired Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--is a consensus product
of senior military and civilian leaders, but that the
consensus came only after heavy debate and a "push" by
Rumsfeld in certain directions.
In the QDR report, Rumsfeld wrote that the US will
follow a four-step concept: assure, dissuade, deter,
and defeat. The US will assure friends and allies and
foster a worldwide climate for freedom and prosperity.
At the same time, it will continue developing military
capabilities--through research, procurement, or operational
experimentation--that will dissuade potential enemies
from trying to develop their own rival capabilities.
If that doesn't work, he asserted, the US military
must be strong enough to deter an opponent from aggression,
and if deterrence fails, America's armed forces must
be able to "decisively defeat" any opponent.
Assurance would come in the form of forward deployed
forces and the willingness of the US to share military
technology with its friends and allies, to form strong
coalitions that will fight alongside each other in
a crisis.
Dissuasion would be achieved by maintaining dominance
in those military arts and technologies where the US
already has unquestioned superiority and by consistent,
though "selective," investment in new platforms
and technologies. A full three percent of the Pentagon's
annual budget will go to basic science and technology,
Rumsfeld pledged. Deterrence would come from maintaining
sufficiently sized, equipped, and exercised forces
to convince a rational opponent not to commit aggression.
Major
Theater Wars
In the event of two overlapping Major Theater Wars
in different parts of the world, the QDR states, the
US should have the ability to not only defeat one of
the enemies but occupy his country and force a regime
change. In the second MTW, US forces will have to be
able to "defeat the efforts" of the enemy,
preserving a later option to "decisively defeat" him
as well.
A decisive defeat was characterized by defense officials
as being equivalent to the outcome of the 1991 Gulf
War, in which Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was reversed
and its military capability severely degraded, but
Iraq itself was not occupied or forced to undergo a
regime change.
Meanwhile, the QDR calls for collaboration with law
enforcement, local emergency services, intelligence
services, and other Cabinet departments to defend the
nation and conduct operations abroad against known
enemies. These activities--ranging from diplomatic
sanctions to freezing of financial assets, criminal
arrests, responding to biological attacks, electronic
surveillance, and dropping bombs--have all been undertaken
against terrorist targets in the period following the
Sept. 11 assaults. In this sense, the new strategy
is already being pursued.
Like the 1997 review, the 2001 QDR concludes that
the US faces no peer competitor in the world in the
near future, but it notes that regional powers potentially
will have the means to threaten US critical interests.
It observes that ballistic missile technology is proliferating
and puts high priority on achieving practical missile
defenses as soon as possible.
The QDR report flatly states that Russia no longer
poses a conventional threat to the US and that the
two countries actually share some military objectives,
such as the defeat of terrorism. It observes that,
with the exception of the Balkans, Europe is relatively
secure and that the US should shift its attention to
South Asia. There, it notes, national militaries are
growing commensurate with national economies, but governments
in the region tend to be unstable.
Rumsfeld assistant Stephen A. Cambone told reporters
the change in emphasis is not a shift but an example
of how DOD will tailor forces for given regions "to
meet ... evolving circumstances."
The QDR report suggests that the Navy should make
arrangements to homeport more of its warships in the
Asia-Pacific region, keep two aircraft carriers in
the area, and investigate whether friendly nations
there would allow the Marine Corps to conduct amphibious
training. Some Marine pre-positioned equipment should
also be moved to the Asia-Pacific region, according
to the QDR. Likewise, the Air Force will seek basing
arrangements in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.
Other critical areas where the US will act to preclude "hostile
domination" include Northeast and Southwest Asia
and the Middle East. Neither Central Asia nor sub-Saharan
Africa was mentioned as areas of critical interest.
The US will seek "peace and stability in the Western
Hemisphere" and act to preserve "sea, air,
and space, and information lines of communication," as
well as access to "key markets and strategic resources."
No Force Cuts
Although there was much public worry that the QDR
would devolve into a budget-cutting exercise--seemingly
driven by the faltering economy and revenue shortfalls
from a large tax cut--no call for force-structure reduction
appears in the document. The report confirms the existing
force structure, which includes about 1.4 million uniformed
personnel and 18 Army divisions, 12 aircraft carriers,
and 88 Air Force fighter squadrons. Of those USAF squadrons,
four are Air National Guard air defense squadrons.
The QDR also specifies that the US should maintain
the current number of combat-coded heavy bombers--112
of them. It is a figure that would preserve the Air
Force's current available bomber fleet, whether or
not the service is permitted to reduce its B-1B fleet
from 93 to 60 airplanes.
Despite the lack of changes in force structure and
end strength, Wolfowitz conceded to the Senate panel
that there had been an effort to find "efficiencies" by
reducing manpower and assets. After the Sept. 11 attacks,
though, the search for such reductions was considered "meaningless" and
dropped, he said.
Still, Wolfowitz acknowledged that, while "in
most scenarios" the force structure's size poses "moderate
levels of risk," in some others, "the risk
would be high."
Gen. John P. Jumper, the new Air Force Chief of Staff,
said he does not anticipate an increase in end strength
as a result of the QDR and worries that this will stress
the Air Force even further. But he also noted that
USAF is taking a hard look at itself to see if "all
of the people in the Air Force that should be on deployment
status are on deployment status."
Previous QDRs did not address "the full range
of threats to the US homeland" nor did they properly
account for the demands of Smaller-Scale Contingencies
or the requirements of forward deploying forces to
deter conflict, Wolfowitz told the Senate defense panel.
The 2001 QDR says, "The new construct explicitly
calls for the force to be sized for defending the homeland,
forward deterrence, warfighting missions, and the conduct
of Smaller-Scale Contingency operations." By planning
for all such needs, requirements for systems and capabilities
in short supply--airlift, for example, and special
operations forces--will be more accurately stated.
The QDR does not discuss specifics of airlift, such
as whether more C-17s should be acquired.
Under the new construct, comparable force packages
will be rotated to more evenly distribute the load
of undertaking contingencies and providing presence.
Air Force Aerospace Expeditionary Forces, for example,
or a Marine air wing might substitute for an aircraft
carrier in a given area.
Decisions Deferred?
The lack of force structure or end strength changes
puzzled Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Carl
Levin, who told Wolfowitz at the same hearing that
the QDR "seems to me full of decisions deferred." Paraphrasing
Shelton's QDR assessment, he described it as more of
a vision "than the comprehensive roadmap to the
force of the future" that had been promised. Wolfowitz
said the programmatic and budgetary changes that would
begin to implement the QDR would appear starting with
the Fiscal 2003 budget request.
The QDR has dominated the Pentagon's activities since
March, when the Bush Administration began making enough
leadership appointments at the Defense Department that
a serious overhaul of military strategy could begin.
Rumsfeld
empaneled 19 separate study groups to examine various
facets of defense organization, technology, strategy,
and business, in search of more relevant or efficient
practices and places to invest. These were in addition
to a panel Rumsfeld himself chaired, before becoming
Secretary of Defense, on the organization of military
space activities, which wrapped up in January.
(See "The
Space Commission Reports," March 2001, p.
30.)
These study groups considered the strengths that the
US should not give up--its current asymmetric advantages--but
also offered ideas on how the military should transform
itself to confront future threats. Those that "reported
out" in a public way concurred that longer-range
platforms, highly precise attacks, information connectivity,
and leap-ahead technologies are essential to preserving
the US military edge.
The Pentagon's biggest managerial challenge will come
in trying to balance near-, mid-, and long-term risk,
says the report of the QDR. In the near term, the US
is engaged in combat operations, and funds must be
devoted to maintaining them. In the midterm, military
facilities which have suffered from long budgetary
neglect must be rebuilt or repaired, or service personnel
will quit. In the long term, new technologies must
be matured into new weapon systems for future readiness.
The Pentagon is developing formulas for assigning
risk in each of these areas and to determine how best
to trade one against the other. However, given the
long neglect of military facilities, revitalizing them
can't happen overnight, Pentagon comptroller Dov S.
Zakheim said.
Shelton, in his assessment of the QDR, noted that
DOD has "successfully raised annual procurement
spending to the $60 billion level" but warned
that it may take an addition of $100 billion to $110
billion a year to arrest the problem of "rapidly
aging weapon systems."
Transformation of the force will be a priority, but
the speed of transformation will depend on what the
nation devotes to defense spending in the coming years.
Since most weapon systems were not gradually replaced
as they should have been in the 1990s, the cost of
rapidly replacing them all at once would be very high,
Wolfowitz said before the Sept. 11 attacks.
"To think we can't afford what we need ... is
simply wrong," he emphasized in his October testimony.
He added that "we need to move in those directions
more rapidly and with more resources than we would
have envisioned before the attacks."
The 10 to 20 Percent Solution
In testimony, Wolfowitz asserted that he would consider
the force radically altered if only "10 or 20
percent of the capability is transformed." This
would allow the older, nonreplaced assets, "what
we call the legacy forces, to perform their missions
more effectively."
Transformation will be undertaken to achieve six critical
operational goals, according to the QDR. These are:
- Protecting critical bases of operations, such as
the US homeland and allies, and defeating weapons
of mass destruction.
- Assuring the integrity of information systems and
conducting information attacks.
- Projecting and sustaining US forces in distant
theaters where anti-access means are being employed
and defeating those means.
- Denying enemies sanctuary "by providing persistent
surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with
high-volume precision strike, through a combination
of complementary air and ground capabilities against
critical mobile and fixed targets at various ranges
and in all weather and terrains."
- Enhancing the capability and survivability of space
systems and their support infrastructure.
- Using the leverage provided by information technology
and innovative concepts to develop "an interoperable,
joint C4ISR [Command, Control, Communications, and
Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance]
architecture and capability that includes a tailorable,
joint operational picture."
The
fourth goal--high-volume precision strike at various
ranges, including long ranges--is a "major transformational
capability," Wolfowitz pointed out to the Senate
panel. He said the Pentagon is looking for better ways
to tie the eyes of special operations forces on the
ground to bombers and strike aircraft looking for hard-to-find
moving targets. Such a capability is one "we would
like to have today," he added.
Anti-access capabilities-weapons of mass destruction,
shore-based anti-ship batteries, theater ballistic
missiles, and anti-space capabilities that could interfere
with US satellites--will likely be located throughout
an enemy country, the QDR notes. Given advanced surface-to-air
missiles, access to enemy airspace could be denied "to
all but low observable aircraft."
The development of "robust capabilities to conduct
persistent surveillance, precision strike, and maneuver
at various depths within denied areas" will be
critical in the near future, according to the QDR.
The report also touts space control as an emerging
transformational mission.
"Space surveillance, ground-based lasers, and
space jamming capabilities and proximity microsatellites
are becoming increasingly available," says the
report. A "key objective for transformation ...
is not only to ensure the US ability to exploit space
for military purposes but also as required to deny
an adversary's ability to do so."
Mum on Systems
In keeping with its emphasis on capabilities, the
QDR avoids discussing specific new systems, such as
the F-22 fighter or Crusader artillery vehicle and
their relative contributions to transformation but
instead focuses on the effects desired from the military
as a whole.
Jumper said the QDR "talks a lot about what the
Air Force does anyway," with regard to global
operations, the use of a rotational force--as manifested
in the 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces--"and
it talks about space and information warfare, command
and control, and information technologies--all already
enjoying a full head of steam in the United States
Air Force."
But "what I see this portends for the Air Force
is what I call the horizontal integration of manned,
unmanned, and space. And when I say manned, I don't
necessarily mean airborne or spaceborne platforms;
I also mean things on the ground, like people, who
do simple things like put eyeballs on the target." Jumper
sees the next requirement as integrating all ISR assets
and combat systems "at the digital level, so that
they're networked in a way that can resolve ambiguities
about target location/target identification at the
machine level."
Overall, "I think that we are on the road in
each of these major categories that they've described," Jumper
said.
Transformation will also involve organization, and
the QDR seeks to establish a new Standing Joint Task
Force under each of the regional combatant commands,
such as Central Command and Pacific Command. These
will ensure interoperability and communication capability
among the services and with likely allies in the area
and establish standard operating procedures and tactics.
The SJTFs will "develop new concepts to exploit
US asymmetric military advantages and joint force synergies." Besides
collecting the best that each service has to offer,
the SJTFs may offer a lighter, leaner, and more efficient
approach to dealing with crises.
An enabling technology for SJTFs will be a space based
radar, as well as airborne and human intelligence,
to track moving targets and pass the information to
area strike assets.
The SJTF "could serve as the vanguard for the
transformed military of the future," the Pentagon
asserts in the QDR.
The Pentagon is also contemplating a joint opposing
force to play the enemy to SJTFs in exercises and experiments,
which will take place every two years at a minimum.
Future technologies seen having potentially large
impact on the US military include nanotechnology, for
very small devices and ISR systems; extreme stealth;
advanced, high-speed computers; biometrics for tracking
adversaries and identifying people for security purposes;
and commercial satellite imagery.
Base
Closure Coming
Rumsfeld's QDR also serves notice on Congress that
more base closures will be sought. DOD wastes up to
$4 billion a year by keeping unnecessary bases open,
the report contends. The QDR forecasts the joint use
of military bases by more than one service or other
government agencies.
Emphasis is also placed in the QDR on retaining people,
deemed the most critical military asset. The QDR underlines
the need to revitalize dilapidated facilities for personnel
and their families and to make sure they are not pressed
past their limits.
The Defense Department "should not expect its
people to tolerate hardships caused by inequitable
or inappropriate workloads within the force, aging
and unreliable equipment, poor operational practices,
and crumbling infrastructure," according to the
report.
Jumper said he was heartened that the QDR did not
become a cost-cutting exercise.
"As we got into [previous] reviews it became
evident very quickly that the idea was to reduce force
structure. This QDR does not."
He's also happy that the QDR did not become a turf
battle between the services. "I'm very pleased
to say that the services did not fall into that trap
this time, as opposed to the last Quadrennial Defense
Review, where the services were pretty much at each
other's throats." There has been a realization,
he said, that "there's a profound requirement
for each of the specific skills that each of the services
bring, and they're not always used in equal proportions,
but that doesn't mean that they won't be used next
time."
Jumper said, "We are ... finally past this stage
we went through in the last QDR, of trying to describe
how each [service] would go win the war all by ourselves.
... Nobody ... in any of the leadership thinks any
one of us is going to do it alone."
In his foreword to the QDR document, Rumsfeld insisted
that it is critical for America to invest more money
in defense.
"The loss of life and damage to our economy from
the attack of Sept. 11, 2001, should give us a new
perspective on the question of what this country can
afford for its defense," Rumsfeld asserted. "It
would be reckless to press our luck with false economies
or gamble with our children's future. This nation can
afford to spend what is needed to deter the adversaries
of tomorrow and to underpin our prosperity. Those costs
do not begin to compare with the cost in human lives
and resources if we fail to do so."
What the Force Must Be Able To Do
From Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary
of defense, in Oct. 4 testimony to the Senate
Armed Services Committee:
"In the QDR, we are proposing
a new, more comprehensive approach. US forces
will maintain the capability to:
- Defend the American homeland.
- Deter conflicts in four critical
areas of the world, by demonstrating the
ability to defeat enemy attacks, and do so
far more swiftly than in the past or even
today.
- Defeat aggressors in overlapping
time frames in any two of those four areas.
- At the direction of the President,
decisively defeat one of these two adversaries--to
include invading and occupying enemy territory.
- Decisively impose our will
on any one aggressor of our choosing.
- Conduct a limited number of
contingencies short of war in peacetime without
excessive stress on our men and women in
uniform."
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