Gen. Eugene E. Habiger, USAF, is commander in chief of
US Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb., which comprises the nation's
nuclear deterrent forces. On Nov. 4, 1997, he met with reporters
in Washington. He had just returned from Russia, where, at the
request of Defense Secretary William S. Cohen, he examined the
security of Russia's nuclear weapons. Here is how Habiger replied
to questions posed by the press.
Nuclear Weapon Safety
"I've just experienced something that I never thought possible.
... As a Cold War warrior, I spent most of my adult life sitting
alert with B-52 bombers. For a period of five days last week,
the Russians showed me a great deal, specifically about their
Strategic Rocket Forces, from their command and control to allowing
me [to be] the first, as I understand it, nonRussian to
ever go into a nuclear weapons storage area and to see how they
keep their nuclear weapons secure and safe."
Genesis of the Visit
"I first met Gen. [Igor D.] Sergeyev [Russia's minister
of defense] in October of last year, when Dr. [William J.] Perry,
then Secretary of Defense, asked me to accompany him to Moscow
for some high-level talks. ... I extended an invitation to him
[Sergeyev] to come visit me at ... Offutt, and in late March,
early April of this year, he did come. I spent six days with
him. ... I showed him my headquarters in some depth, and I took
him to one of our nuclear weapons storage facilities at F.E.
Warren AFB in Cheyenne, Wyo., the first time that a Russian has
ever been in one of our weapons storage areas. ...
"During [NATO meetings in October], Secretary of Defense
Cohen ... asked Sergeyev's view of the safety and security of
their nuclear weapons and, as I recall, General Sergeyev said
that his nuclear weapons were as safe and secure as those in
the United States. Secretary Cohen said, 'Well, General Habiger
is going to be visiting you within the next few weeks. Could
you perhaps show him how you go about doing that?' General Sergeyev
said yes."
Questions Asked and Answered
"I was ... not expecting ... to actually go into a nuclear
weapons storage site. On Friday, two weeks ago [Oct. 24], that's
exactly what I did. I went to a nuclear weapons storage site
at ... [an] SS-24 missile base at Kostroma, which is a little
over 300 kilometers northeast of Moscow. I was taken into the
facility. I was shown the security.
"I went into a nuclear weapons storage bunker and saw
an operational nuclear weapon. Actually, there were eight of
them on an SS-24 missile. I went in to talk to the security people
who were guarding the facility, as a matter of fact, and every
one of my questions was answered."
Three-Person Policy
"I was shown a lot of things that I was impressed with.
"For example, in the United States we have a two-person
policy involving nuclear weapons. In other words, you have to
have a minimum of two people in order to get close to a nuclear
weapon. In Russia it's the three-person policy. ... I'm talking
about access to a nuclear weapon itself. The launching of a nuclear
weapon is very complicated. It is very--the controls are very
robust. There are a lot of safeguards built in. Trust me. ...
"At our [weapon storage] sites, you need two people to
go do that, who understand what they are doing, whatever tasks
they are going to do. In Russia you need three people. And, oh,
by the way, in Russia, when you open up that igloo, you have
to have a written order signed by the full colonel, who is the
special technical unit commander, whereas we don't have those
specific kinds of requirements."
Other Safeguards
"In the United States, we have a thing called a personnel
reliability program where we monitor our people medically for
any kind of abnormal behavior that would make them unstable around
nuclear weapons. The Russians do not have a program that's exactly
like ours, but they have a similar program. Before missile crew
members or before security personnel go on their alert tours,
which are three- or four-day cycles, they are personally interviewed
by a medical doctor and a psychologist.
"I actually saw a demonstration of the capability of
their security forces. It was not something that was planned;
it was something that I asked for at the spur of the moment,
and I was very impressed with these nine young men, the security
force that was tasked with guarding this particular facility.
The detachment of nine individuals was commanded by a senior
lieutenant, all very professional. They knew what they were doing."
Representative or Unique?
"Now, the caveat I would give you is that I saw one facility.
Was it representative? I'd like to think so. They made it very
clear that the facility I was in at Kostroma was very representative
of the missile bases in Russia.
"As a result of what I saw, I had further discussions
with Gen. Col. [Vladimir N.] Yakovlev, who is the commander in
chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, who replaced General Sergeyev,
and we agreed to exchange security specialists from our respective
commands. ... We also agreed that we would establish a shadow
program where we would take the equivalent of a wing commander
and squadron commander, a flight commander, and a missile crew
member from one of his missile bases to come to the United States
and shadow their respective counterparts for a one-week period--meetings,
fitness center, dining facilities, everything--and then he would
reciprocate with a team from my command."
| Nuclear
Warheads |
| Type |
Cold
War 1990 |
Current
1997 |
Change
1990-97 |
|
|
United States |
| ICBM |
2,450 |
2,400 |
-50 |
| SLBM |
5,760 |
3,776 |
-1,984 |
| Bomber |
2,353 |
1,781 |
-572 |
| Total |
10,563 |
7,957 |
-2,606 |
|
|
USSR/Russia/CIS |
| ICBM |
6,612 |
4,544 |
-2,068 |
| SLBM |
2,804 |
2,480 |
-324 |
| Bomber |
855 |
922 |
67 |
| Total |
10,271 |
7,946 |
-2,325 |
Low Tech
"On the down side, we tend to use high-technology devices
much more than the Russians do. For example, we use television
sensors, low-light television cameras, to monitor certain areas.
The Russians have not made that capital investment. Manpower
is relatively inexpensive for them, and they use more eyeballs,
if you will. I specifically asked if they use things like night-vision
goggles, and I was assured that they do.
"During the course of this little exercise, when I asked
what would you do if this were to happen, the two-star Russian
Strategic Rocket Forces general who was accompanying me directed
them to show me exactly what they would do, and they went to
the extremes of not only getting their weapons out but issuing
the ammunition and then pulling out an armored personnel carrier
that was in a garage right behind the facility where the troops
were bedded down--an experience that I was impressed with.
"We have a lot more work to do, a lot more transparency,
a lot more details, but from my observations, I was impressed
and have confidence that the Russians, from what I saw at that
one base, have a program which is ensuring the safe, secure processes
involved regarding nuclear weapons."
Fail-Safe
"I was also exposed to their command centers, from the national
level command center down to the command center in a road-mobile
missile, and also a rail-mobile missile, and at all levels [I]
saw the individuals on duty, talked to them, asked them questions.
Every question I asked was answered in depth, and the thing that
struck me about going into their command centers, command-and-control
centers, is that they are very much geared to a fail-safe mode.
And what I mean by that is that any one of the command centers,
from the national level down to the unit level, can inhibit the
launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile."
Safe as in the US?
"I saw one site, and I was assured by General Yakovlev and
General Kirillov, who is the commander of the 27th Rocket Army
[and] who accompanied me on this leg of the trip, that what I
saw was representative. And if what I saw was representative,
yes, I have confidence in the safety and security of their nuclear
weapons stockpile.
"They are deadly serious about this. This is a very valuable
resource. It is something that in the wrong hands would be a
very dangerous resource, and they go to great lengths. The security
personnel, I was told, and just from what I saw, I would tend
to believe, that they are elite. They call themselves the 10-Alpha
Force. They are regularly tested by an anti-terrorist group that
comes around to these kinds of facilities and attempts penetration."
Subs and Bombers
"[There was no discussion of submarine-launched or bomber-launched
nuclear weapons], and that's one of the things we need to do.
When I gave my debrief to the Secretary, [I said] we need to
now start looking at the long-range aviation, the bomber folks,
and the submarine folks to make sure that these kinds of measures
are in place at the other nuclear-weapon legs of their triad."
"Comforting" Answer?
"I did ask them ... about the accountability of the weapons.
In other words, how did they know they had all of their weapons
where they are supposed to?
"I got back a very comforting response. At the wing level,
there is a section called the 6th Directorate, and it's a shop
of three or four officers, and their sole function is to make
sure they know where every nuclear weapon in that wing is. At
the Rocket Army level there is a similar kind of organization.
"At the Headquarters, Strategic Rocket Forces, there
is a 6th Directorate, and then, for whatever reason, the Ministry
of Defense is called the 12th Directorate, and their sole function
is this accountability issue.
"General Yakovlev was very open to me. As a matter of
fact, we spent almost three hours just talking one-on-one with
a Russian interpreter. General Yakovlev showed me, for example,
his computer screen, which is tied to a local area network, and
he sees the equivalent of up to top-secret information. Now,
I do not speak Russian, do not read Russian, and when he showed
me what was on his computer screen, it was in Russian, but he
told me what was on there, and as a very senior officer in the
Russian military, I believed him. He showed me, for example,
the page that listed the whereabouts of every nuclear weapon
in his command. ...
"Whenever the Russian Rocket Forces move a weapon, whether
it's 30 yards from a bunker to a facility to do maintenance or
from a missile field back to the home base, which may be 30 or
40 miles, a minimum of a two-star on the Rocket Forces staff
approves that."
"The initial operational capability of that missile has
been slipped significantly over the past two years, and I think
it's just a matter of coming up with the funds to get that system
on the streets. Because of some very, very wise investments,
I do not see the United States even thinking about having to
modernize any of our forces until the year 2020.
"It [the initial operational capability of the SS-27]
depends on whom you talk to. I'd say the middle of [1998] some
time. ... They just test fired one here not too long ago, a successful
test. They are proceeding with the construction of a silo to
put it in. They have done some work on the Transporter Erector
Launcher, the TEL. The program is going along well.
"We made some very wise investments back in the 1980s.
... The Russians weren't modernizing their forces as we were
during that time frame, and what's happening is that the service
life of their systems is coming to an end, and that's one of
the reasons why, in my view, the Russians very much want to get
down to START III levels very quickly, because the SS-18, for
example, which is their heavy ICBM with 10 warheads, the thing
is just flat, you know, running out of service life."
