Space Control Requirements
To combat these threats, the unified and service space
commands want to build partnerships with other federal
agencies, industry, and allies to strengthen the nation's
space control capabilities.
Congress in 1999 ordered the establishment of a space
control program. Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, the newly
confirmed commander in chief, United States Space Command,
recommended in Senate hearings in fall 1999 that money
be spent on technology to address deficiencies in satellite
vulnerability, protection methods, and capabilities
such as low-power laser jammers.
US Space Command defines space control as "the
ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations
within the space medium, and an ability to deny others
the use of space." It is a condition that requires
several capabilities.
Space Surveillance. Space Command wants to
be able to monitor all vehicles as they move in and
out of orbit. They plan to achieve this goal with a
space-based ranging system, which is to become available
in 2009.
Improved situational awareness means having an ability
to determine the location of every orbiting satellite--whether
dead or operational--and all pieces of debris.
The military also wants to know who controls each
satellite and what it is doing in space. Just like
in air combat, the space forces need to be able to
tell "the good guys from the bad guys," said
Air Force Col. Robert Ryals, Space Warfare Center vice
commander.
Today, US Space Command can track space objects with
a diameter of at least 10 centimeters. The problem
is about to expand greatly, however. Ryals said the
new Low Earth Orbit satellite constellations being
deployed by the commercial sector have hundreds of
new satellites and greatly complicate efforts to achieve
situational awareness in space.
Today, space surveillance is carried out largely by
old radars and sensors based on Earth. Their usefulness
will remain for a while, but the Air Force wants to
move some surveillance systems into space itself, where
they can get a clearer view of objects in High Earth
Orbit.
Prevention. Another major thrust focuses on
prevention of unauthorized access to and exploitation
of US or allied space systems. US Space Command has
concluded that enemies will try to make use of these
systems either to acquire valuable data or insert bogus,
misleading information. The concept of prevention entails
denying an adversary this capability.
US Space Command's primary mission would be to provide
the command, control, and communication architecture
necessary to detect and report any unauthorized use
and to assess its impact. From that point, US tools
for prevention would be political, diplomatic, informational,
or economic.
Protection. The Air Force is planning new measures
to protect its own systems from compromise or attack.
Better warning of natural and man-made threats is desired
as is a reporting system for attacks against US satellites.
Most US satellites lack basic self-defense measures.
The spacecraft, by and large, can't tell if they are
tracked or targeted by ground radar or under attack
from laser beams or other types of energy.
To counter that deficiency, the US is now starting
to place sensors on satellites to detect attacks and
report suspicious events to ground control. They could
also provide targeting data for potential counterattack.
Negation. As the value of US space assets grows,
so does pressure to be able to carry out negation,
a relatively benign-sounding term that covers a controversial
and wide-ranging set of capabilities to deflect, disrupt,
damage, or destroy satellites of others, whether national
or commercial.
Negation of an adversary satellite is not currently
permitted under US policy. US Space Command would have
to obtain National Command Authority approval before
acting.
Technology and systems for negation are progressing
along several fronts, and several ways to accomplish
this objective are possible. Officials noted that there
are numerous ways to blind or "dazzle" an
imaging satellite or to interfere with the operation
of the standard communications satellites. A laser
on the ground or in space, for instance, can do the
job.
There are other creative ways to interfere with an
imager. One concept: deployment of a large, umbrella-like
vehicle next to the satellite to block its view of
Earth. Another: jam its data links and operating frequencies.
Ryals says building such offensive systems is fairly
straightforward and simple, but the same cannot be
said for other types of space hardware.
Development of a workable Space Based Laser, for example,
will require years and billions of dollars, but it
could be used in strategic and theater ballistic missile
defense missions as well as for space control. The
Pentagon has an SBL under development. It could be
deployed to shoot down ballistic missiles but also
could be used to attack targets in space or on Earth.
The Space Based Laser isn't due until 2020, at the
earliest.
"Space Based Lasers are inherently flexible because
they offer options for reversible and nonlethal effects," reports
the US Space Command Long Range Plan, which calls for
an in-orbit SBL in about a decade.
High-power microwave weapons are another way to disrupt,
degrade, and destroy satellite electronics.
Assessing the cost of developing a negation capability
is difficult, said AFSPC's Anarde. He said national
policies and treaties must be taken into account. Nonetheless,
space command officials believe commanders need to
have options ranging from lethal to nonlethal, in case
there is a reversal of US policy.
Said Myers: "We must be in a position to take
appropriate self-defense measures, including force,
if appropriate, to respond to infringement on our sovereign
rights." These measures would include, "if
required, negation."
Some are impatient to do more. Gray and Sheldon, for
instance, argue, "The United States to date has
deployed no-repeat, no-forces to effect many elements
of the space-control mission. ... Space control cannot
be achieved strictly with conventional terrestrial
forces, by electronic means, or by hopes and prayers.
Space control, indeed space power, requires the deployment
of dedicated space forces."
Assured Access to Space
Control of space also depends to a great extent on
swift and sure access from Earth.
In coming years, military space operations will move
beyond today's limited capability. The new era likely
will feature spaceplanes, space tugs, and other new
types of vehicles that, with or without pilots, will
be able to perform more complex missions in orbit.
Near-term emphasis is on improving current Expendable
Launch Vehicles and doing preliminary work that could
lead to development of entirely new vehicles. DoD must
rely on current Atlas, Delta, and Titan ELVs until
around 2003, when the more-efficient Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle goes into operation.
"We're working hard to make access to space less
expensive," observed Gene H. McCall, Air Force
Space Command's chief scientist. "It costs $10,000
per pound to put an object in Low Earth Orbit. We need
to reduce that by a factor of 10 to 50 before space
becomes an everyday commodity."
Routine military satellite launch operations will
rely more and more on the commercial sector and commercial
spaceports. By around 2012, extremely large military
satellites, such as the Space Based Radar and Space
Based Laser, will require heavy lift launchers.
A Space Operations Vehicle (a concept that superseded
the earlier proposed military spaceplane) could enter
flight operations around 2012.
Possibly available several years sooner would be a
Space Maneuver Vehicle, able to recover sensitive assets
in orbit. Space Maneuver Vehicles are in the prototyping
stage now. SMV models will undergo two to three years
of aerodynamic testing before the concept will be ready
to advance. Congress has, however, authorized $25 million
for an SMV program this year, with money to acquire
a flight-test article.
For more sophisticated space operations, a space tug
would bring the ability to refuel or repair satellites
in orbit, saving money. "We spend so much to put
things into space, and when they run out of fuel, they're
dead," McCall said. "If we develop a capability
to service them, it will require a redesign of the
satellites as well."
If the military adopts microsatellites--another concept
in the demonstration stage--the Space Maneuver Vehicle
would be used to replenish a constellation of a half
dozen of the tiny satellites within 12 hours.
Force Application From Space
Future military space requirements are closely linked
to missile defense programs, since US Space Command
is responsible for planning and developing requirements
to support the engagement of forces against a ballistic
missile attack on the US homeland.
Many of the same tasks for missile defense are key
to the concept of force application from space.
Current US policy does not permit warmaking with space
systems, but US Space Command's plan maintains the
NCA may need to have at its disposal "a means
of engagement ... to neutralize threats without widespread
destruction."
It goes on to say, "The ability to apply force
from space may employ orbital systems or ground-based
systems."
No serious development of space weapons could take
place without a firm public consensus supporting it.
Space Command's operational concept provides a plan
to provide alternatives to civilian leaders in case
of a policy change.
The command seeks to revolutionize the necessary "high
ground" capabilities with more dramatic capability
than military aircraft did when they changed the nature
of operations decades ago. By 2020, the global engagement
concept would provide worldwide situational awareness,
an integrated worldwide umbrella missile defense, and
a limited ability to apply force from space against
high-value, time-sensitive targets.
The Long Range Plan advocates building coalition support
for space-based defensive systems and 21st century
treaties. "If successful, this construct will
allow us to deploy potent defensive systems, but the
source of the threat will remain. The next step is
deploying systems for force application that add to
collective security by strongly deterring rogue states," the
plan says.
Computer Network Warfare
Last October, US Space Command was given the mission
of the Joint Task Force-Computer Defense Network, established
in recent years as the focal point for defense of the
Department of Defense computer networks and systems.
The task force monitors incidents and potential threats
and coordinates agencies across DoD to act to stop
or contain damage and restore normal computer operations.
It gets intrusion data from sources across DoD and
from non-DoD agencies, fuses it, and adds information
about ongoing operational missions plus intelligence
and technical data to give a big picture synopsis of
the incident.
Maj. Michael Birmingham, a US Space Command spokesman,
said a whole range of intrusions, from mischief to
sophisticated attempts to hack into the networks, has
been seen. The computer defense task force gets 80
to 100 alerts each day. Of those, about eight to 10
provoke genuine concern. Only about 10 per week lead
to investigations.
The command has identified the need for 100 more personnel
to plan and manage network attack missions, and these
new workers could be added in late 2000. As Myers said, "We
believe it's only a matter of time before they [cyber
intruders] successfully penetrate the thick walls surrounding
our secure systems."
US Space Command has also been given responsibility
for the supersecret Computer Network Attack mission--initial
standup is slated for October of this year.
Theresa Foley, a freelance writer living in Florida,
is a former editor of Space News. Her most recent article
for Air Force Magazine,
"The
Battle for Bandwidth," appeared in the October
1999 issue.