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"The [Gulf War] allies made a lot of destruction. They killed
a lot of people, but they didn't win the war. Don't just look
at the immediate results of a military conflict. Look at the
results in the long run. Those who supported the Americans, the
United States, in the Gulf War: Are they better off now than
they were in the 1990s? Are they more secure? Are they better
off economically? Are they stronger than they were in 1990? The
answer is simple: No. So those ... who joined the United States
in this campaign against Iraq actually lost."
Tariq Aziz, deputy prime minister of Iraq, in Nov.
13, 1997, interview with PBS talk show host Charlie Rose.
Fustest With the Mostest
"Crisis planning and execution under short-warning conditions
are likely to be the rule in many future conflicts. ... Waiting
to engage the enemy until most forces are in theater will likely
provide the opponent with an advantage that may be costly to
overcome. ... Air- and spacepower can make up for deficiencies
in other force areas for a limited period of time, making early
availability of air and space assets particularly important in
a short-warning war."
Three of the major "insights," or conclusions,
contained in the September 1997 Air Force paper "Strategic
Force," based on a wargame of the same title.
"Dramatic Decline"
"There has been a fairly dramatic decline in death rates
from aircraft accidents. The major accident rate per 100,000
hours flown has gone from 2.04 in 1990, down to 1.50 in 1996.
The number of aircraft destroyed in those accidents has declined
from 143 in 1990, to 67 in 1996. So there's been a rather dramatic
improvement there. ...
"In terms of accidents from all sorts, worldwide, there's
also been a fairly dramatic decline that, not surprisingly, mirrors
the declining rate in deaths from aircraft accidents. The figures
I have go back to 1980. The deaths per 100,000 have declined
from 117 in 1980, to 68 in 1996. ... There's been considerable
progress, but there are 1.4 million people in the military, and
if you multiply 68 per 100,000 by 1.4 million, you can figure
out--by the proper multiplier--you figure out how many people
die every year. It's a lot, but it [fatality rate] is going down."
Pentagon spokesman Kenneth H. Bacon in an Aug. 7,
1997, press briefing on safety issues.
Millions of Potential Deaths
"Iraq has declared almost 9,000 liters of anthrax, and they
said, 'We destroyed it all.' They declared several thousand liters
of botulinum toxin, and they told us they produced other agents
like aflatoxin and said they had it on missile warheads, etc.
So Iraq has declared a lot [and] said they destroyed it.
"I think the real issue is to understand what makes a
difference in terms of biological agents. ... Anthrax is a spore,
and if you ... inhale 10,000 spores of anthrax, it's sort of
generally accepted as a lethal dose for anthrax. If you try to
imagine what it is, you're talking about something that's smaller
than a speck of dust-something you wouldn't even see that you're
breathing. It's not like ... you're walking into a dust cloud
and you're saying, 'Wow, I'm in anthrax.' No. We're talking about
inhaling something that's really the size of a speck of dust,
that's generally lethal. And by generally lethal I mean that
if a group of people inhaled this amount, this number of spores,
about 80 percent of them are going to die.
"If an attack occurs in a clandestine way, symptoms don't
come for one to three days, depending on how much you get. This
initial exposure to anthrax is when you have a window for treatment.
So if you've been exposed and you've inhaled anthrax in your
system, you've got a short window where you've got to take some
medical action in order to enhance your survival chances. After
that, you develop flu-like symptoms and die within a matter of
a few days.
"That gives you a sense of what we're talking about with
anthrax. A kilogram of anthrax has literally millions and millions
of potential deaths in it."
An unnamed senior DoD official, speaking to reporters
at a Nov. 14, 1997, background briefing on Iraq's chemical and
biological weapons capabilities.
An Offer They Can Refuse
Reporter: "[Russian military] security
is perhaps as good as the US, but they also face different kinds
of threats, don't they? I mean, is there more likelihood of,
say, organized crime being able to procure a nuclear weapon?"
Habiger: "If what I saw is representative of
the Strategic Rocket Forces [as a whole], organized crime getting
their hands on a weapon out of their facilities would be [an]
extremely remote [possibility]."
Exchange between a reporter and Gen. Eugene E. Habiger,
commander in chief of US Strategic Command, at a Nov. 4, 1997,
press briefing on Habiger's visit to Russian nuclear facilities.
Steady as a Rock
"I went to bed every night praying to God that I wouldn't
wake up in the morning. I never actually attempted suicide. But
I thought about it, hard. I imagined what my suicide note would
say and to whom I'd send it. I knew where a gun was hidden in
a friend's house. I imagined myself driving by and getting it.
Shooting myself would have been too messy, though. I didn't want
my parents to have to clean up a mess."
Kelly Flinn, former B-52 copilot, writing in the
Nov. 24, 1997, Newsweek. Flinn accepted
a general discharge rather than face an Air Force court-martial
for lying under oath, disobeying an order, adultery with the
husband of an enlisted airman, and fraternization.
And Run, He Explained
"Take the general. You're looking at a very real possibility
of prison time."
Defense lawyer Frank Spinner's advice to Flinn when
USAF offered to drop charges if she accepted a general discharge,
as quoted by Flinn in Nov. 24, 1997, Newsweek.