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Watch on the North. At a base in South Korea, a Patriot air defense
battery stands ready to respond. The missile menace extends far beyond
the peninsula, however. (Photo by Paul Kennedy)
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By Bill Gertz
orth
Korea has embarked on a broad buildup of its ballistic
missile force and is on the verge of fielding an Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile capable of reaching the United States.
This development of long-range missiles capable of
delivering chemical, biological, and eventually nuclear
warheads is taking place at the same time the secretive
Stalinist government in Pyongyang is facing severe
economic problems. North Korean poverty is staggering-one
recent US intelligence report said famine in the northeast
Asia state has led to cannibalism.
"It is now believed that two types of North Korean
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles can strike the
continental United States with weapons of mass destruction," said
Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-N.Y.), chairman of the House
International Relations Committee and head of a special
advisory panel on North Korea. "For the first
time in our history, we are within missile range of
an arguably irrational rogue regime. Regrettably, we
cannot defend against that threat."
The problem of North Korean missiles is made worse
by the fact that Pyongyang has become a wholesaler
of missiles and related technology and materials. In
the words of one US defense official: "They are
becoming The Home Depot for missile sales around the
world."
Defense Secretary William S. Cohen identi-fied North
Korea's long-range missiles as a key factor in Pentagon
plans to develop a nationwide defense against ballistic
missiles. "The threat threshold has been crossed," Cohen
said in an interview at the end of a recent trip through
Asia. "The threat is growing. I think that, with
the spread of technology, with the transfer of this
technology between rogue states, it poses an increasing
threat. I don't think there is any question about that."
"Strategic" Arms?
Today's three principal rogues-North Korea, Iran,
and Iraq-seek to acquire these long-range missiles
because they are strategic weapons. Long-range missiles
represent a threat by their presence alone. According
to a recent government study, "We judge that North
Korea, Iran, and Iraq would view their ICBMs more as
strategic weapons of deterrence and coercive diplomacy
than as weapons of war."
In another recent report, the Air Force's National
Air Intelligence Center at WrightPatterson AFB,
Ohio, described North Korea's missile program as extensive. "North
Korea has ambitious ballistic missile development programs
and has exported missile technology to other countries,
including Iran and Pakistan," the unclassified
report said. "The North Koreans have already flight-tested
their No Dong MRBs [Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles],
and the Taepo Dong 1 MRBM booster was used in an attempt
to orbit a satellite in August 1998." The test
showed the two-stage booster "apparently performed
successfully," the report said.
Cohen argued that defenses against long-range missiles
will prevent "intimidation, blackmail, or extortion" by
countries like North Korea. "We don't want to
be in a position of having someone blackmail us with
this kind of capability," he said.
North Korea has moved quickly to a high position on
the intelligence community's strategic missile threat
list, ranking a notch below Russia and China. A National
Intelligence Estimate--a consensus view of more than
10 US intelligence organizations--was made public in
September. It warned of new dangers from North Korea's
missile program.
"We project that during the next 15 years the
United States most likely will face ICBM threats from
Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran,
and possibly from Iraq," the report said.
The report notes that North Korea is the driver in
the spread of missiles. "The proliferation of
Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles-driven primarily by
North Korean No Dong sales-has created an immediate,
serious, and growing threat to US forces, interests,
and allies and has significantly altered the strategic
balances in the Middle East and Asia," it stated.
The report went on, "We judge that countries
developing missiles view their regional concerns as
one of the primary factors in tailoring their programs.
They see their short- and medium-range missiles not
only as deterrents but also as force-multiplying weapons
of war, primarily with conventional weapons, but with
options for delivering biological, chemical, and eventually
nuclear weapons."
The Clinton Administration has sought to highlight
the positive elements of its policy toward North Korea,
which was the focus of a major review by former Defense
Secretary William J. Perry. Perry reported his findings
to the President in September and called for continued
engagement with the communist government in Pyongyang
with the goal of normalizing relations that have been
hostile since the end of the Korean War.
Perry's "Urgent Focus"
The Perry report stated that "the urgent focus
of US policy toward the [Democratic People's Republic
of Korea, or North Korea] must be to end its nuclear
weapons and long-range missilerelated activities."
As part of the new policy, President Clinton lifted
some economic sanctions against North Korea, and in
response Pyongyang announced it would "not launch
a missile"--the Taepo Dong 2--during talks with
the United States. "Pledges are important," said
State Department spokesman James B. Foley of the North
Korean testing moratorium. "Actions are equally
or even more important, but I am not aware that we
have reason to disbelieve the pledge."
Within days of making the announcement, however, North
Korea's official Korean Central News Agency made clear
that the testing moratorium would not stop the weapons
buildup. "The DPRK has built up its defense power
very expensively," the agency said. "The
Korean people have strengthened the defense capabilities
to the maximum [by] fastening their belts."
Indeed, widespread famine has killed thousands in
North Korea. In 1996, North Korean leader Kim Jong
Il called for a crackdown on cannibalism after three
cases were reported, one US intelligence report said.
"There is reason to be concerned about North
Korea today," Gilman said. "The threat to
US interests continues and is in fact spreading into
less conventional areas. The DPRK has deployed three
new types of missiles since 1993--the newest capable
of striking our nation. This is a clear and present
danger to our national security and allows North Korea
to create a balance of terror in northeast Asia."
Gilman views North Korea as the greatest of the world's
proliferators of missiles and enabling technologies. "Its
transfers to South Asia and to the Middle East are
particularly distressing and potentially destabilizing," he
said.
Worse, Gilman believes the North Koreans secretly
are continuing to develop nuclear weapons-despite agreement
with the US not to do so. "North Korea may still
be pursuing a nuclear program," he said. "The
DPRK may be seeking a parallel program based on Highly
Enriched Uranium which strongly suggests that North
Korea never intended to curb its nuclear ambitions.
"My greatest fear is that this unpredictable
regime in Pyongyang will combine its covert nuclear
weapons program with an Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile capable of striking the United States-and our
policy will have failed to prevent it."
Clinton "Very Hopeful"
President Clinton brushed aside North Korea's unpredictable
behavior and said he is hopeful the pledge not to test
the Taepo Dong will hold. "[The agreement] offers
the most promising opportunity to lift the cloud of
uncertainty and insecurity and danger that otherwise
would hang over that whole region, including the American
servicemen and -women who are there," the President
said Sept. 22. "I am very, very hopeful about
it. If it works, it does. If it does not, there will
be other options open to us."
The United States maintains about 100,000 airmen,
soldiers, sailors, and Marines in the Pacific. All
are vulnerable in one way or another to North Korean
missiles. US military planners believe any North Korean
military operation will be a blitzkrieg--an all-out
attack on South Korea, bolstered by deadly conventional,
chemical, biological, and possibly nuclear missile
attacks on US forces in the region. The goal would
be to inflict as many casualties as possible on the
United States in the shortest period of time because
of North Korea's inability to resupply its forces.
Robert D. Walpole, the CIA's national intelligence
officer for strategic and nuclear programs, stated
in Congressional testimony that North Korea has joined
Russia and China as one of the very few nations capable
of striking the United States with a strategic missile.
"After Russia and China, North Korea is the most
likely to develop ICBMs capable of threatening the
United States during the next 15 years," Walpole
said.
North Korea shocked Asia and the world in August 1998
when it test fired its first three-stage Taepo Dong
1 over the Sea of Japan and into the Pacific Ocean.
The missile test has become the prototype for states
that are building long-range missiles. It was disguised
as a space launch vehicle and nearly succeeded in orbiting
a small satellite. Walpole told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Sept. 16 that the military version
of the Taepo Dong 1 most likely will carry biological
or chemical warfare agents far enough to hit the United
States.
The real danger, he said, is in a longer range Taepo
Dong 2 that US intelligence agencies have been closely
watching. The TD 2 was set for launch last summer according
to CIA officials. It was delayed under frantic US diplomatic
pressure and appeals to China to intervene with North
Korea to put off the test.
"A two-stage Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a several
hundredkilogram payload to Alaska and Hawaii and
a lighter payload to the western half of the United
States," Walpole warned. "A three-stage Taepo
Dong 2 could deliver a several hundredkilogram
payload anywhere in the United States. North Korea
is much more likely to weaponize the more capable Taepo
Dong 2 than the Taepo Dong 1 as an ICBM."
A senior US intelligence official who briefed reporters
on the CIA missile threat report said that North Korea's
long-range missile program will only be slowed, not
stopped, by diplomatic efforts.
"If they don't fly it, then they don't know if
the first stage will work the way they want it to," the
official said. "They would be relatively confident
the second stage would work because it's already flown
once as a first stage."
The lack of a flight test for the Taepo Dong 2 "would
certainly slow the program down, stall the program," he
said. "Then what we'd be faced with is a threat
from an untested system, a completely untested system.
That gets pretty hard to try to define, so I think
it would really stall the program. Does it eliminate
it? No."
North Korean Missiles
|
| Designation |
Stages |
Propellant |
Range
(miles) |
Status |
| Scud B |
1 |
liquid |
185 |
Operational |
| Scud
C |
1 |
liquid |
310 |
Operational |
| No Dong |
1 |
liquid |
800 |
Operational |
| Taepo Dong 1 |
2 |
liquid |
925-1,240 |
Development |
| Taepo Dong 2 |
2 |
liquid |
2,500-3,700 |
Development |
| TD
1 plus |
3 |
liquid/solid |
2,400-3,500 |
Development
(test fired 8/31/98) |
| TD 2 plus |
3 |
liquid/solid |
anywhere in US |
Development |
| Source:
NAIC and North Korea Advisory Group report. |
North
Korean Sites
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Launch Sites
Mt. Kanggamchan (Chugsan County, South Pyongan Province)
Mayangdo (Sinpo, South Hamgyong Province)
Paekun-ri (Kusong County, North Pyongan Province)
Nodong-Taepodong (Hwadae County, North Hamgyong Province)
Chonggang-up (Huchang County, Chagang Province)
Nodongja-ku in Okpyong (Munchon County, Kangwon Province)
Chiha-ri (Ichon County, Kangwon Province)
Sangwon County, Oryu-ri, and Chunghwa County (in Pyongyang)
Toksong County (South Hamgyong Province) (under construction)
Yongo-tong (South Hamgyong Province) (under construction)
Four missile production sites:
Plant No. 26 in Kanggye, Chagang Province (missile components)
Plant No. 118 in Kagam-ri, Kaechon County (engines)
Plant No. 125 in Chunggye-tong, Hyongjesan District, Pyongyang
(component assembly)
Yakchon Machinery
Plant in Mangyongdae-ri, Pyongyang (explosive compounds).
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| Source:
South Korea's Hangyore (Internet version).
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Work Continues
In fact, the US Intelligence Community has concluded
that the development of the Taepo Dong 2 is continuing,
despite the pledge by North Korea not to conduct a
flight test. USAF's National Air Intelligence Center,
the community's premier missile monitoring center,
reported that Pyongyang is "continuing development
of the Taepo Dong," said one official who has
seen the report.
"They are still improving the TD 2 and proceeding
with development," said the official. "In
fact, their level of confidence in the TD 2 may be
high enough to have it available [for use] without
any flight test."
The official stopped short of saying the missile is "deployed," but
he noted that, because of the unusual methods used
by the North Koreans for developing their missiles
with a few flight tests, the missile has to be considered
a threat.
The CIA believes the Taepo Dong 2 could be tested
at any time the North Koreans choose to do so, although
there are no signs a test launch is imminent.
The major fear of Clinton Administration policy-makers
is that a second long-range missile flight test will
cause support from Japan and South Korea for the nuclear
agreement with North Korea to evaporate.
Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, said during a recent hearing
that North Korea has been working overtime on its missiles.
"One of our worst fears has materialized," Helms
said. "North Korea, right now, could convert its
Taepo Dong 1 missile to drop anthrax on the United
States."
Worries do not end with the Taepo Dong. North Korea
also has developed a new 620-mile-range No Dong missile.
The No Dong was flight-tested only once but is believed
by military officials to be deployed and to pose a
direct threat to troops not only in South Korea but
at bases in Japan as well.
Deployed or Not?
Officially, the Pentagon won't say if they consider
the No Dong deployed and threatening. However, one
senior intelligence official said that one flight test
was enough to show the North Koreans that the missile
works. "Given everything that's gone on, you would
be real smart to consider it deployed," the official
said.
Cohen has refused to say publicly that the No Dong
is deployed. Last year he was asked about the system
and would say only that it has "completed development." The
careful answer was an apparent attempt to mask the
fact that the missile currently threatens US troops
in Asia and there are no defenses against it yet.
The Congressional panel headed by former Defense Secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld, however, appeared more candid.
The panel's report issued in July 1998 states: "The
commission judges that the No Dong was operationally
deployed long before the US government recognized that
fact. There is ample evidence that North Korea has
created a sizable missile production infrastructure,
and therefore it is highly likely that considerable
numbers of No Dongs have been produced."
Because of the Intelligence Community's failure to
assess both the scope and pace of the No Dong development,
the Rumsfeld commission warned that "the United
States may have very little warning prior to deployment
of the Taepo Dong 2"--the missile that can target
the United States.
The North Koreans also have exported the No Dong to
Pakistan and Iran. The No Dongs have been, as one official
put it, "repainted" and named the Ghauri
and Shahab 3 missiles.
"Obviously, North Korea has them, and Pakistan
has the No Dong derivatives as a Ghauri," the
official said. "The Shahab 3 is based on it as
well with some other foreign assistance. I don't expect
it to stop there. ... I expect over time we're going
to see more countries emerge with them."
The US Intelligence Community also is very concerned
about North Korea's continuing nuclear weapons program,
which was supposed to be halted by the 1994 Agreed
Framework that was to have frozen Pyongyang's drive
for what could only be nuclear missile warheads.
"We've been concerned about that nuclear program
for some time," the intelligence official said. "The
North Koreans had enough nuclear material for one or
two nuclear devices several years ago."
The Energy Department intelligence office, which monitors
nuclear weapons programs around the world, reported
last year that a North Korean government trading company
was shopping for uranium enrichment technology in Japan.
The report said that the North Koreans, with help from
Pakistan, could develop a uranium-fueled nuclear weapon
in six years.
"On the basis of Pakistan's progress with a similar
technology, we estimate that the DPRK is at least six
years from the production of HEU"--Highly Enriched
Uranium used in nuclear weapons, the report said. "On
the other hand, with significant technical support
from other countries, such as Pakistan, the time frame
would be decreased by several years."
The North Korean missile program began with the purchase
of Sovietdesigned Scud short-range surface-to-surface
missiles from Egypt. The North Koreans then built their
own longer range Scuds and began exporting Scud know-how
around the world.
North Korean Scuds and Scud production equipment have
been transferred to Egypt, Iran, Syria, Libya, and
Pakistan.
Instant Missile
On June 25, Indian authorities seized a North Korean
ship bound for Pakistan carrying 170 tons of missile
components, as well as blueprints, drawings, and instruction
manuals for missiles. US intelligence agencies later
determined that some of the equipment may have been
Chinese in origin.
According to Indian press accounts, the North Korean
ship was carrying all the components needed for building
missiles. It included heavy-duty presses, lathe machines
used for flattening and milling high-grade steel sheets,
a plate bending machine with three rollers capable
of rolling 16 mm-thick sheets into 700 mm diameters
(for use in the manufacture of engine casings), "Torroidal" air
bottles (used to guide missile warheads), two sets
of theodolites (used to survey missile launch sites),
three electronic weighing machines, a digital micron
soldering machine, 1.5 mm forged steel bars (used for
making missile components), and water refining and
filtration machinery (used to purify water for washing
missile casings). The equipment was destined for a
missile factory in Pakistan.
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., a private analyst who specializes
in North Korean missile programs, said North Korea
has been building missiles for 30 years. "It's
only in the past 10, however, that we've really taken
notice in that it's threatening not only our allies
but is beginning to threaten us directly," Bermudez
told a House committee hearing in October.
"During the past 15 to 20 years, it has taken
that program and exported the products of the program,
which has extended its threat, indirect threat, to
other allies in other areas of strategic interest to
the United States," he said.
Bermudez has categorized North Korea's missiles in
three groups: Scuds, No Dong, and Taepo Dong. The short-range
Scuds threaten all of South Korea, while the No Dong
is the first North Korean missile designed specifically
to deliver nuclear warheads. The Taepo Dongs have built
upon the Scud and No Dong, literally. According to
US intelligence officials, the North Koreans built
the Taepo Dong 1 by taking the medium-range No Dong
and placing a Scud on top of it.
According to Bermudez, the Taepo Dong 1 test in August
1998 combined a third stage to launch a satellite.
It failed to reach orbit but still successfully demonstrated
the most important elements of long-range missile technology,
such as stabilizing a payload during launch and successfully
separating three stages.
"If that system had been used instead ... [as]
a ballistic missile, [it] would have a range in excess
of 4,000 kilometers," Bermudez said. "If
they had done a few other things, it could have a range
of approximately 10,000 kilometers with like a 200-kilogram
warhead-not very significant in size, but in range
it actually puts the United States at risk."
The North Koreans have produced a total of between
750 and 1,150 ballistic missiles, and as many as 400
of them have been sold overseas. "Those states
include Egypt, Iran; there's been possibly some cooperation
with Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, United Arab Emirates,
and Vietnam," Bermudez said.
The Air Force NAIC report on continuing Taepo Dong
development is one of several intelligence reports
circulated to senior Clinton Administration policy-makers
in September and October indicating that the new conciliatory
approach to the reclusive communist state is not working.
In addition to continued long-range missile development,
US intelligence agencies uncovered information about
North Korea's sales of missiles and related goods to
rogue states.
Pentagon intelligence agencies reported in the fall
that North Korea offered to Sudan an entire factory
for assembling Scud missiles, like those produced in
North Korea. Also, North Korea recently supplied 10
tons of aluminum powder obtained from China to Syria,
another intelligence report stated. The aluminum powder
is being used by the agency of the Syrian government
involved in building weapons of mass destruction and
missiles, said an official who has seen the report
sent to senior US policy-makers.
One official said the recent intelligence reports
are a clear sign the new policy is not working. "So
much for the Perry approach," this official said.
Bill Gertz is the defense and national security affairs
reporter for The Washington Times and author of Betrayal:
How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security,
published by Regnery Publishing. His most recent article
for Air Force Magazine, "Missile Threats and Defenses," appeared
in the October 1998 issue.
Copyright Air Force Association. All rightsreserved.
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