Thank you for inviting me to be here today
with the members of the National Press Club, a group most important
to our national security. I say that because a major point I intend
to make in my remarks today is that the single most critical element
of a successful democracy is a strong consensus of support and agreement
for our basic purposes. Policies formed without a clear understanding
of what we hope to achieve will never work. And you help to build
that understanding among our citizens.
Of all the many policies our citizens deserve and need to
understand, none is so important as those related to
our topic today the
uses of military power. Deterrence will work only if
the Soviets understand our firm commitment to keeping
the peace, ... and only from a well-informed
public can we expect to have that national will and
commitment.
So today, I want to discuss with you perhaps the most
important question concerning keeping the peace. Under
what circumstances, and by what means, does a great
democracy such as ours reach the painful
decision that the use of military force is necessary
to protect our interests or to carry out our national
policy?
National power has many components, some tangible,
like economic wealth, technical pre-eminence. Other
components are intangible such as moral force, or strong
national will. Military forces, when they are strong
and ready and modern,
are a credible and
tangible addition to a nation's power. When both the
intangible national will and those forces are forged
into one instrument, national power becomes effective.
In today's world, the line between peace and war is
less clearly drawn than at any time in our history.
When George Washington, in his farewell address, warned
us, as a new democracy, to avoid foreign
entanglements, Europe then lay 2-3 months by sea over
the horizon. The United States was protected by the
width of the oceans. Now in
this nuclear age, we measure time in minutes rather
than months.
Aware of the consequences of any misstep, yet convinced
of the precious worth of the freedom we enjoy, we seek
to avoid conflict, while maintaining strong defenses.
Our policy has always been to work
hard for peace, but to be prepared if war comes. Yet,
so blurred have the lines become between open conflict
and half-hidden hostile acts
that we cannot confidently predict where, or when,
or how, or from what direction aggression may arrive.
We must be prepared, at any
moment, to meet threats ranging in intensity from isolated
terrorist acts, to guerrilla action, to full-scale
military confrontation.
Alexander Hamilton, writing in the Federalist Papers,
said that ìit is impossible to foresee or define the extent
and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent
extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy
them.î If
it was true then, how much more true it is today, when
we must remain ready to consider the means to meet such serious indirect
challenges
to the peace as proxy wars and individual terrorist
action. And how much more important is it now, considering the consequences
of failing
to deter conflict at the lowest level possible. While
the use of military force to defend territory has never been questioned
when a democracy
has been attacked and its very survival threatened,
most democracies have rejected the unilateral aggressive use of force
to invade, conquer
or subjugate other nations. The extent to which the
use of force is acceptable remains unresolved for the host of other
situations which
fall between these extremes of defensive and aggressive
use of force.
We find ourselves, then, face to face with a modern
paradox: The most likely challenge to the peace the
gray area conflicts are precisely the most difficult
challenges to which a democracy must respond. Yet,
while the source and
nature of today's challenges are uncertain, our response
must be clear and understandable.
Unless we are certain that force is essential, we run
the risk of inadequate national will to apply the resources
needed.
Because we face a spectrum of threats from covert aggression,
terrorism, and subversion, to overt intimidation, to
use of brute force choosing the appropriate level of
our response is difficult. Flexible response does not
mean just any response is appropriate. But once a decision to
employ some degree of force has been made,
and the purpose clarified, our government must have
the clear mandate to carry out, and continue to carry
out, that decision until the purpose
has been achieved. That, too, has been difficult to
accomplish.
The issue of which branch of government has authority
to define that mandate and make decisions on using
force is now being strongly contended. Beginning in
the 1970s Congress demanded, and
assumed, a far more active role in the making of foreign
policy and in the decision-making process for the employment
of military forces
abroad than had been thought appropriate and practical
before. As a result, the centrality of decision-making
authority in the Executive
branch has been compromised by the Legislative branch
to an extent that actively interferes with that process.
At the same time, there
has not been a corresponding acceptance of responsibility
by Congress for the outcome of decisions concerning
the employment of military
forces.
Yet the outcome of decisions on whether and when and
to what degree to use combat forces abroad has never
been more important than it is today. While we do not
seek to deter or settle all the world's conflicts,
we must recognize that, as a major power,
our responsibilities and interests are now of such
scope that there are few troubled areas we can afford
to ignore. So we must be prepared
to deal with a range of possibilities, a spectrum of
crises, from local insurgency to global conflict. We
prefer, of course, to limit
any conflict in its early stages, to contain and control
it but
to do that our military forces must be deployed in
a timely manner, and be fully supported and prepared
before they are engaged, because
many of those difficult decisions must be made extremely
quickly.
Some on the national scene think they can always avoid
making tough decisions. Some reject entirely the question
of whether any force can ever be used abroad. They
want to avoid grappling with
a complex issue because, despite clever rhetoric disguising
their purpose, these people are in fact advocating
a return to post-World War I isolationism. While they
may maintain in principle
that military
force has a role in foreign policy, they are never
willing to name the circumstance or the place where
it would apply.
On the other side, some theorists argue that military
force can be brought to bear in any crisis. Some of
these proponents of force are eager to advocate its
use even in limited amounts simply
because they believe that if there are American forces
of any size present they will somehow solve the problem.
Neither of these two extremes offers us any lasting
or satisfactory solutions. The first undue reserve
would lead us ultimately to withdraw from international
events that require free nations to defend their interests
from the aggressive use of
force. We would be abdicating our responsibilities
as the leader of the free world responsibilities more
or less thrust upon us in the aftermath of World War
IIóa war incidentally
that isolationism did nothing to deter. These are responsibilities
we
must fulfill unless we desire the Soviet Union to keep
expanding its influence unchecked
throughout the world. In an international system based
on mutual interdependence among nations, and alliances
between friends, stark isolationism quickly
would lead to a far more dangerous situation for the
United States: we would be without allies and faced
by many hostile or indifferent
nations.
The second alternative employing our forces almost indiscriminately
and as a regular and customary part of our diplomatic
efforts would
surely plunge us headlong into the sort of domestic
turmoil we experienced during the Vietnam war, without
accomplishing the goal for which we
committed our forces. Such policies might very well
tear at the fabric of our society, endangering the
single most critical element of a
successful democracy: a strong consensus of support
and agreement for our basic purposes.
Policies formed without a clear understanding of what
we hope to achieve would also earn us the scorn of
our troops, who would have an understandable opposition
to being used in every
sense of the word casually and without intent to support
them fully. Ultimately this course would reduce their
morale and their effectiveness for engagements we must
win. And if the military were
to distrust its civilian leadership, recruitment would
fall off and I fear an end to the all-volunteer system
would be upon us, requiring
a return to a draft, sowing the seeds of riot and discontent
that so wracked the country in the '60s.
We have now restored high morale and pride in the uniform
throughout the services. The all-volunteer system is
working spectacularly well. Are we willing to forfeit
what we have fought so hard to regain?
In maintaining our progress in strengthening America's
military deterrent, we face difficult challenges. For
we have entered an era where the dividing lines between
peace and war are less clearly
drawn, the identity of the foe is much less clear.
In World Wars I and II, we not only knew who our enemies
were, but we shared a clear
sense of why the principles espoused by our enemies
were unworthy.
Since these two wars threatened our very survival as
a free nation and the survival of our allies, they
were total wars, involving every aspect of our society.
All our means of production,
all our resources were devoted to winning. Our policies
had the unqualified support of the great majority of
our people. Indeed, World Wars I
and II ended with the unconditional surrender of our
enemies ... . The only acceptable ending when the alternative
was the loss of our
freedom.
But in the aftermath of the Second World War, we encountered
a more subtle form of warfare warfare in which, more
often than not, the face of the enemy was masked. Territorial
expansionism could be carried out indirectly by proxy
powers, using surrogate forces
aided and advised from afar. Some conflicts occurred
under the name of "national liberation," but far more frequently
ideology or religion provided the spark to the tinder.
Our adversaries can also take advantage of our open
society, and our freedom of speech and opinion to use
alarming rhetoric and disinformation to divide and
disrupt our unity of purpose. While
they would never dare to allow such freedoms to their
own people, they are quick to exploit ours by conducting
simultaneous military
and propaganda campaigns to achieve their ends.
They realize that if they can divide our national will
at home, it will not be necessary to defeat our forces
abroad. So by presenting issues in bellicose terms,
they aim to intimidate western
leaders and citizens, encouraging us to adopt conciliatory
positions to their advantage. Meanwhile they remain
sheltered from the force
of public opinion in their countries, because public
opinion there is simply prohibited and does not exist.
Our freedom presents both a challenge and an opportunity.
It is true that until democratic nations have the support
of the people, they are inevitably at a disadvantage
in a conflict. But when they
do have that support they cannot be defeated. For democracies
have the power to send a compelling message to friend
and foe alike by
the vote of their citizens. And the American people
have sent such a signal by re-electing a strong Chief
Executive. They know that President
Reagan is willing to accept the responsibility for
his actions and is able to lead us through these complex
times by insisting that we
regain both our military and our economic strength.
In today's world where minutes count, such decisive
leadership is more important than ever before. Regardless
of whether conflicts are limited, or threats are ill-defined,
we must be capable
of quickly determining that the threats and conflicts
either do or do not affect the vital interests of the
United States and our allies.
... And then responding appropriately.
Those threats may not entail an immediate, direct attack
on our territory, and our response may not necessarily
require the immediate or direct defense of our homeland.
But when our vital national
interests and those of our allies are at stake, we
cannot ignore our safety, or forsake our allies.
At the same time, recent history has proven that we
cannot assume unilaterally the role of the world's
defender. We have learned that there are limits to
how much of our spirit and blood
and treasure we can afford to forfeit in meeting our
responsibility to keep peace and freedom. So while
we may and should offer substantial
amounts of economic and military assistance to our
allies in their time of need, and help them maintain
forces to deter attacks against
them usually we cannot substitute our troops or our
will for theirs.
We should only engage our troops if we must do so as
a matter of our own vital national interest. We cannot
assume for other sovereign nations the responsibility
to defend their territory without
their strong invitation when our freedom is not threatened.
On the other hand, there have been recent cases where
the United States has seen the need to join forces
with other nations to try to preserve the peace by
helping with negotiations, and by
separating warring parties, and thus enabling those
warring nations to withdraw from hostilities safely.
In the Middle East, which has
been torn by conflict for millennia, we have sent
our troops in recent years both to the Sinai and
to Lebanon, for just such a peacekeeping
mission. But we did not configure or equip those
forces for combat they
were armed only for their self-defense. Their mission
required them to be and to be recognized as peacekeepers.
We knew that if conditions deteriorated so they were
in danger, or if because of the actions of the warring
nations, their peacekeeping mission
could not be realized, then it would be necessary
either to add sufficiently to the number and arms
of our troops in short to equip them for combat, ... or to withdraw
them. And so in Lebanon,
when we faced just such a choice, because the warring
nations did not enter into
withdrawal or peace agreements, the President properly
withdrew forces equipped only for peacekeeping. In those cases where our national interests require
us to commit combat force we must never let there be
doubt of our resolution. When it is necessary for our
troops to be committed to
combat, we must commit them, in sufficient numbers
and we must support them, as effectively and resolutely
as our strength permits. When
we commit our troops to combat we must do so with the
sole object of winning.
Once it is clear our troops are required, because our
vital interests are at stake, then we must have the
firm national resolve to commit every ounce of strength
necessary to win the fight
to achieve our objectives. In Grenada we did just that.
Just as clearly, there are other situations where United
States combat forces should not be used. I believe
the postwar period has taught us several lessons, and
from them I have developed six
major tests to be applied when we are weighing the
use of US combat forces abroad. Let me now share them
with you:
(1) First, the United States should not commit forces
to combat overseas unless the particular engagement
or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest
or that of our allies. That
emphatically does not mean that we should declare beforehand,
as we did with Korea in 1950, that a particular area
is outside our strategic
perimeter.
(2) Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat
troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly,
and with the clear intention of winning. If we are
unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary
to achieve our objectives,
we should
not commit them at all. Of course if the particular
situation requires only limited force to win our objectives,
then we should not hesitate
to commit forces sized accordingly. When Hitler broke
treaties and remilitarized the Rhineland, small combat
forces then could perhaps
have prevented the holocaust of World War II.
(3) Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat
overseas, we should have clearly defined political
and military objectives. And we should know precisely
how our forces can accomplish those clearly
defined objectives. And we should have and send the
forces needed to do just that. As Clausewitz wrote, "no one starts
a war or
rather, no one in his senses ought to do so without
first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve
by that war, and how he intends to conduct it."
War may be different today than in Clausewitz's time,
but the need for well-defined objectives and a consistent
strategy is still essential. If we determine that a
combat mission has become
necessary for our vital national interests, then we
must send forces capable to do the jobóand not assign a combat
mission to a force configured for peacekeeping.
(4) Fourth, the relationship between our objectives
and the forces we have committed their size, composition
and dispositionómust be continually reassessed and adjusted
if necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change
during the course of a conflict. When they do change,
then so must our combat
requirements. We must continuously keep as a beacon
light before us the basic questions: "Is this conflict in our
national interest?" "Does
our national interest require us to fight, to use force
of arms?" If
the answers are "yes," then we must win. If the answers
are "no," then we should not be in combat.
(5) Fifth, before the US commits combat forces abroad,
there must be some reasonable assurance we will have
the support of the American people and their elected
representatives in Congress.
This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid
in making clear the threats we face; the support cannot
be sustained without continuing
and close consultation. We cannot fight a battle with
the Congress at home while asking our troops to win
a war overseas or, as in the
case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to
win, but just to be there.
(6) Finally, the commitment of US forces to combat
should be a last resort.
I believe that these tests can be helpful in deciding
whether or not we should commit our troops to combat
in the months and years ahead. The point we must all
keep uppermost in our minds
is that if we ever decide to commit forces to combat,
we must support those forces to the fullest extent
of our national will for as long
as it takes to win. So we must have in mind objectives
that are clearly defined and understood and supported
by the widest possible number
of our citizens. And those objectives must be vital
to our survival as a free nation and to the fulfillment
of our responsibilities as
a world power. We must also be farsighted enough to
sense when immediate and strong reactions to apparently
small events can prevent lion-like
responses that may be required later. We must never
forget those isolationists in Europe who shrugged that "Danzig is not worth a war," and "why
should we fight to keep the Rhineland demilitarized?"
These tests I have just mentioned have been phrased
negatively for a purpose they are intended to sound
a note of cautionócaution that we must observe prior to committing
forces to combat overseas. When we ask our military
forces to risk their very lives in such situations,
a note of caution is not only
prudent, it is morally required.
In many situations we may apply these tests and conclude
that a combatant role is not appropriate. Yet no one
should interpret what I am saying here today as an
abdication of America's responsibilities either
to its own citizens or to its allies. Nor should these
remarks be misread as a signal that this country, or
this Administration, is
unwilling to commit forces to combat overseas.
We have demonstrated in the past that, when our vital
interests or those of our allies are threatened, we
are ready to use force, and use it decisively, to protect
those interests. Let no one
entertain any illusions if our vital interests are
involved, we are prepared to fight. And we are resolved that
if we must fight, we must win.
So, while these tests are drawn from lessons we have
learned from the past, they also can and should be
applied to the future. For example, the problems confronting
us in Central America today are difficult. The possibility
of more extensive Soviet
and Soviet-proxy penetration into this hemisphere in
months ahead is something we should recognize. If this
happens we will clearly
need more economic and military assistance and training
to help those who want democracy.
The President will not allow our military forces to
creep or be drawn gradually into a combat role in Central
America or any other place in the world. And indeed
our policy is designed to prevent the need for direct
American involvement. This
means we will need sustained Congressional support
to back and give confidence to our friends in the region.
I believe that the tests I have enunciated here today
can, if applied carefully, avoid the danger of this
gradualist incremental approach which almost always
means the use of insufficient force.
These tests can help us to avoid being drawn inexorably
into an endless morass, where it is not vital to our
national interest to fight.
But policies and principles such as these require decisive
leadership in both the Executive and Legislative branches
of government and
they also require strong and sustained public support.
Most of all, these policies require national unity
of purpose. I believe the United
States now possesses the policies and leadership to
gain that public support and unity. And I believe that
the future will show we have
the strength of character to protect peace with freedom.
In summary, we should all remember these are the policies indeed
the only policies that can preserve for ourselves,
our friends, and our posterity, peace with freedom.
I believe we can continue to deter the Soviet Union
and other potential adversaries from pursuing their
designs around the world. We can enable our friends
in Central America to defeat
aggression and gain the breathing room to nurture democratic
reforms. We can meet the challenge posed by the unfolding
complexity of the
1980s.
We will then be poised to begin the last decade of
this century amid a peace tempered by realism, and
secured by firmness and strength. And it will be a
peace that will enable all of us ourselves at
home, and our friends abroad to achieve a quality of
life, both spiritually and materially, far higher than
man has even dared to dream.
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