Such prospects cause deep concern for Gen. Howell M. Estes
III, the commander in chief of US Space Command and commander,
Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo. He sums up matters
in this way: "The time has come to address, among warfighters
and national policy makers, the emergence of space as a center
of gravity for DoD and the nation."
He adds, "We must commit enough planning and resources
to protect and enhance our access to, and use of, space."
At Estes' direction, USSPACECOM has produced a game plan aimed
at doing just that. The so-called "Long Range Plan,"
made public April 7, is the first of its kind for the command.
It lays out a comprehensive set of roadmaps for constructing,
by 2020, a robust space warfighting system able to protect US
national and commercial interests and for exploiting space to
the fullest.
The LRP maintains that the arena of space will become a "vital
national interest" for the US--like Western Europe or the
Persian Gulf--around 2005, when the next round of space expansion
is completed. Potential enemies "clearly understand"
that this will happen, the LRP states.
The plan goes on to identify warfighting capabilities, concepts
of operations, organizations, and partnerships that will be needed
to meet any potential challenge.
The operational missions of the joint-service US Space Command
are performed largely by 14th Air Force, the Air Force component.
The Air Force provides most of the money and force structure
and launches and operates more than 90 percent of all Department
of Defense space assets.
In its plan, US Space Command does not prescribe specific
systems for 2020, only desired capabilities. However, planners
refer to linchpin programs such as the Space-Based Infrared System,
Milstar communications system, Global Positioning System, and
the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle.
According to the LRP, future US spacepower will hinge on four
operational concepts-space control, global engagement, full force
integration, and global partnerships.
Nothing gets greater emphasis in the LRP than space control-that
is, the ability of the US and its allies to reach space and operate
there freely, while denying an adversary the ability to do the
same thing.
Some refer to this condition as "space superiority."
Control of space is, in fact, "a complex mission that casts
[the head of US Space Command] in a classic warfighter role,"
according to the LRP.
The plan warns that, in decades ahead, foreign national military
forces, paramilitary units, terrorists, and other potential adversaries
will share the high ground of space with the United States and
its allies. The US should expect to find "counterspace"
weapons aimed against US systems and prepare accordingly.
The enemy's hostile capabilities may include kinetic, electronic,
nuclear, and directed-energy systems to negate US satellites.
An enemy may also use deception and information operations.
In the face of this danger, US Space Command declared that
it has five interrelated objectives to be met by 2020:
Assured access. This will require reliable, quick-turnaround
launch systems, space operations vehicles, a global space traffic-control
system, and a space-based relay network to provide access to
any satellite, regardless of its position.
"A major thrust ... is to lower launch costs," said
the plan. "This is the key to the affordable use of space.
We must work this as a No. 1 priority."
The goal is to lower the cost to put a satellite in low Earth
orbit from thousands of dollars per pound to hundreds of dollars
per pound by 2015.
The US will require a mix of reusable launch vehicles, expendable
launch vehicles, space operations vehicles, and space tugs to
deploy and sustain its space systems. Use of Atlas, Delta, and
Titan launch vehicles will do for the near term.
US Space Command says that, in 2002, the Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle will come on stream and start to reduce costs
by up to 50 percent and lift medium-size payloads within 45 days.
EELV heavy lift, with a response time of within 90 days, will
come on line in 2003. The currently planned Space Operations
Vehicle, formerly known as the Military Spaceplane, should begin
to fly around 2012.
By 2006, commercial services will launch most of the Defense
Department's routine payloads, according to US Space Command.
Surveillance of space. US military forces, the LRP declares,
will need to field systems to quickly track, identify, characterize,
and catalog space objects with great precision. Now being sought
are much more capable ground- and space-based sensors, which
will provide detailed situational understanding of space in near
real time.
Protection of critical space systems. US Space Command said
American and allied spacecraft need to be adequately shielded
from interference or attack. This will require warning of possible
threats to US and allied space systems, instantaneous reports
of possible attacks against satellites, cross-cueing with owners
or operators or other satellites, and directing forces to respond
to a threat.
Space systems must have onboard sensors to detect attacks
and quickly report anomalies or suspicious events.
The core of the protection effort, according to the LRP, will
be deployment of robust "battle managers" that receive,
process, correlate, and distribute critical information reliably,
unambiguously, and rapidly to various spacecraft.
According to Ryan, the Air Force is working on ways that would
allow satellites to "actively defend" themselves when
under attack, but much work remains to be done.
Prevention of unauthorized access to, and exploitation of,
either US or allied space systems. The LRP maintains that enemies
will try to make use of US systems. Prevention would deny, at
least temporarily, an adversary's ability to exploit US systems
or allied space capabilities.
The main tools would be political, diplomatic, informational,
or economic--all of which fall well short of using force. US
Space Command's main role will be to provide the command, control,
and communication architecture necessary to detect and report
any unauthorized use and to assess its impact.
Negation, or the direct disabling of an adversary's space-related
capabilities. Such action might range from conventional attacks
on a vulnerable ground station, disruption or destruction of
ground-to-space links, or a precision strike against a foe's
own satellites or those from which it receives data.
Commercial satellite companies already sell intelligence photos,
communications, and weather data to national militaries. Minor
military powers have access to information of striking military
value. "The space 'playing field' is leveling rapidly,"
said US Space Command.
Space-based jammers and lasers as well as high-power microwave
weapons are among options US Space Command said are being considered
for the task of degrading or killing a satellite, either temporarily
or permanently.
Negation raises the prospect of weapons in space and so is
politically sensitive. The LRP maintains that developments will
follow an evolutionary path, giving everyone plenty of time to
study the problem and reach workable solutions.
"Negation will evolve from current concepts, which emphasize
terrestrial attacks on an adversary's ground nodes, to a full
range of flexible and discriminate techniques against the most
appropriate node," it said.
Negation will require a wide variety of weapons effects-ranging
from temporary to permanent, from devastating to merely disruptive.
That is because friends and foes may be using the same systems
at the same time. The US will need to be able to discriminate
in the level and type of attack it mounts so as to deny a foe
the information without similarly denying an ally or friendly
nation.
In any event, said the LRP, "The United States will need
to develop national policies supporting space warfare, weapons
development and employment, and rules of engagement."
Strikes From Space
Space control isn't the LRP's only sensitive topic. In an
equally controversial step, US Space Command has proposed that
the US start preparing now to use space-based systems for direct
military effect on Earth.
The LRP calls this operational concept "global engagement."
Global engagement would require the United States to put together
a far-reaching space-based surveillance capability that would
give commanders "worldwide situational awareness."
Systems would also be produced for airtight ballistic missile
defense and "a limited ability to apply force from space
against high-value, time-sensitive targets," according to
the LRP.
US Space Command said any future missile defense would be
based on ground-based interceptors, space operations vehicles,
space-based platforms and lasers, and high-power microwaves.
The tools for applying force on Earth could spin off from
such missile defense systems. Some planners envision precision
strikes from spacecraft, though force-application missions might
also be flown by "aerospace planes" that take off from
Earth, enter space, and return to Earth.
Today, the region of space contains no such force-application
assets. When and if they arrive, said the plan, they would provide
the United States "effective forward presence in space"
as forward basing of terrestrial forces decreases.
US Space Command planners are only too aware of the political
sensitivity of this concept, often decried by arms controllers
and other critics as "militarization of the heavens."
In the LRP, space planners highlighted these words: "At
present, the notion of weapons in space is not consistent with
US National Policy." They added that the document calls
only for "planning for this possibility" so that the
US will have a capability if needed.
The LRP said space operations vehicles and space-based platforms
could support force application by offering increased responsiveness
and versatility that will provide better coverage of targets.
Somewhere in the period 200812, said the report, the US
should be able to carry out much but not all of this mission,
if current development programs stay on track.
The LRP maintains that everything would depend on having a
high-quality, integrated system for surveillance of space, air,
and surface areas, with the blending of systems for surveillance,
warning, and command and control.
Data would move through automated battle managers that permit
combatant commands to respond rapidly to threats such as the
readying of ballistic missiles for launch.
Space AWACS?
Space planners believe that many surveillance capabilities
currently delivered by surface and air platforms will migrate
to space. One would be a system analogous to the AWACS for missile
and air surveillance and another analogous to the Joint STARS
for mobile and fixed surface targets.
The surveillance system would be expected to provide instantaneous
target identification and characterization for 100 percent of
a missile defense target set and a "finite" number
of high interest targets for force application.
One space officer said that such advanced space systems will
be able to detect the location of individual artillery flashes
on Earth or an enemy fighter's afterburner plumes.
Capabilities under development right now should support all
of these missions by 2020, said the report.
Much less controversial are US Space Command's final two operational
concepts-what it calls "full force integration" and
"global partnerships."
Essentially, full force integration means the dispersion of
space forces and information throughout the national military
structure.
The LRP maintains that space-based systems for navigation,
weather, meteorology, missile warning, Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance, and communications have become so powerful
that no operational commander would consider fighting without
them. However, because each of these sectors evolved separately
over many years, their management is spread among many agencies
and this often inhibits their full use.
US Space Command prescribes educating soldiers, sailors, and
airmen about space capabilities early in their careers. It wants
to establish new policies and doctrines. Also pledged are more
extensive exercises and modeling and simulation.
US Space Command even foresees something resembling the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet for space so that it will be sure to have access
to commercial services when needed.
The concept of global partnerships stems directly from the
explosive growth of commercial and international space.
The idea, in brief, calls for the US military space establishment
to join forces with many other federal agencies, commercial firms,
and international concerns in order to augment the power and
reduce the cost of military space capabilities.
Down to the Core
The Defense Department would identify and continue to provide
for its core military space capabilities-for example, missile
launch detection. However, it might well contract out much of
the rest, such as navigation and weather reporting.
"GPS operations, traditionally considered a core military
function, may be a worthy candidate for transition to commercial
management," US Space Command planners wrote.
The global partnerships plan, said the LRP, is based on simple
fiscal realities-the Pentagon cannot afford to fund its out-year
warfighting requirements, and the commercial space segment is
booming.
The armed forces already make extensive use of commercial
communications satellites. The military mapping community is
the leading customer of the commercial Landsat remote sensing
system.
Space planners suggest that the military space establishment
might have to share some of its technologies and know-how as
an inducement for full cooperation from the civilian and commercial
communities, but there will be no letup in military space.
"Partnering doesn't mean reduced vigilance for defense,"
said the LRP. "It's not a goal in itself, nor is it a naive
attempt to provide peace and harmony by trading away our sophisticated
technologies. Instead, it recognizes what the United States can
gain by adding to our prowess in space."
US Space Command's plan does not enjoy universal support.
Some Defense Department analysts are not convinced that the US
will face a serious threat in space for quite a while. The assessment
is echoed by a few private space commentators. They say the Soviet
(now Russian) military space program may at one time have posed
a potential threat but does not now do so.
Predictably, opponents of anti-satellite weapons argue that
US interests in space would be best served by seeking to limit
or block the development of anti-satellite weapons and maintaining
space as a sanctuary free of weapons.
The Clinton Administration has given mixed signals. On one
hand, space officers were heartened this January when President
Clinton approved significant changes in the Unified Command Plan,
giving the command high-level backing to plan for space control
and global engagement operations.
On the other hand, the President used his line-item veto authority
last fall to eliminate appropriations for three space programs
that, pursued to their fullest, would add to US space control
capabilities.
It will be a while before the US fully thrashes out such questions.
For one thing, US Space Command doesn't have authority to decide
many issues critical to the success or failure of its preferred
course. The LRP contains a section, called "Out of Our Lane,"
listing 19 policies, treaties, and agreements that it said Washington
needs to review and either alter or eliminate. These include
the 1972 ABM Treaty and International Space Sovereignty Policy.
"These concerns are urgent and critical," said the
LRP.
US Space Command did not estimate the cost of executing its
Long Range Plan. However, Estes and other space officials state
explicitly that the United States has no real alternative to
moving out in space now, even if that requires taking funds from
other more-traditional defense areas or coming up with creative
ways to finance the effort.
The LRP declares, "Flourishing businesses and nations
recognize basic realities, make the best choices, and find the
resources."