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Gen. John W. Handy has been vice chief of staff
of the Air Force since April 2000. He also serves
as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Requirements
Oversight Council. What follows are excerpts of April
12 remarks to the Defense Writers Group in Washington,
D.C.

Heavyweights. Foreign warplanes such as the Russian Su-25 match up
well with current-generation USAF fighters. Without sufficient numbers
of F-22s, Handy warns, "We couldn't do our job." (Photo by
Katsuhiko Tokunaga)
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Foreign Fighter Threat
"If we put our pilots in their [foreign] aircraft,
... nine out of 10 of those sorties are lost to our
guys in their airplanes. What that tells you is that
training is the difference between our aircraft today.
It is not technology, it is training. If I were weighing
the scale of capability and my challenge was I just
need to train better to beat you, I am going to spend
the money in training, because I've already got the
technology. That is a scary thought. ... The [Russian-made
double-digit] SAMs are an incredible threat. It is
a scary, scary thing. There is no sense in not developing
weapon systems that have the capability to defeat potential
enemies and potential technology breakthroughs as well
as those that we already know about."
Fighter Requirement
"[Reducing the planned buy of F-22 fighters]
would represent constraints that would unquestionably
lessen our ability to guarantee the security of not
only air forces but deployed ground forces. We couldn't
do our job. I've already said the requirement is 339.
In fact, the requirement could readily be more than
that. We constrained it many, many times already. You
all know that as well as I do. We are down to 339.
I am saying, categorically, that in our best analysis
of the threat, ground and air, our best analysis of
the tempo that this nation expects, that is the number
you need to prosecute the conflict."
Conventional B-2 Bomber?
"With regards to B-2C: You all know we have an
unsolicited proposal, and we just don't have the money
to afford the aircraft right now. We really, really
like the capability that the B-2 brings to the fight.
That is perhaps one of the most unremarkable statements
I'll give you all day. That shouldn't surprise anybody.
Its performance in the air war over Serbia was extraordinary
and well-documented. ... But with the existing topline,
we can't get where we are from, to there. We have an
incredible list of other priorities that are desperately
needed over and above that."
Aging Infrastructure
"Right now, our milcon [military construction]
rate, for example, is on a 250-year recap [recapitalization]
rate. ... The last people I know who could do that
were the [ancient] Egyptians. ... We are not in the
business of building military installations that can
last 250 years. Industry rate is 50 years. When you
ask about trade-offs, we've traded off a tremendous
amount of our infrastructure for what we have today,
and we need to get out of that. We need to get into
the business of here is the requirement, send that
bill to the President, and get on with it."
Two Major Theater Wars
"The whole debate about two MTWs and lesser contingencies,
... to some degree, presents more sizing constructs.
... I am not convinced that, even if we back off of
the two-MTW construct-which seems to be fairly popular,
if you read a lot of what you report-[it would] change
a whole lot in terms of numbers, because no one can
predict with certainty what the challenge is going
to be out there."
Anti-Access Issue
"I differ with [critics who] go straight from
anti-access as the issue ... to the B-2 as the solution--as
if ... long-range strike is the only solution to anti-access.
We could have an entire day together talking about
how you deal with anti-access [problems]. I would assert
that this nation can go anywhere in the world it chooses
to, any time it chooses to, through a wide variety
of kick-down-the-door accessible means. ... It is healthy
to discuss potential problems, but then it is also
healthy to follow that up with [a question], 'What
are the appropriate methods to attack the problem?'
All too often, it is just, 'long-range strike.' I am
not being pejorative about long-range strike by any
means. It is just one of [many] things in the tool
kit, and we should never be in a position of having
one arrow to fire in the name of solving a potential
problem."
Joint Strike Fighter a Key
"Categorically, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine
Corps need Joint Strike Fighter. We all agree to that.
... One of the issues we face as a department--I mean
all of us, not just the Department of the Air Force,
but all DOD--is interoperability. The Joint Strike
Fighter presents a huge advantage to this nation, to
get a fighter at a price that gives you a weapon system
that all of us are using. That concept is right on
the mark."

Long-Range Airpower. The B-2 bomber gave an "extraordinary" performance
in the Balkans, and USAF would like more, but slack funding and multiple
needs mean "we can't get ... there." (USAF photo by Gary Ell)
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Fighter Trade-off?
"Why not more F-22s instead of Joint Strike Fighter?
Well, I'll just make it clear that the reason for the
combination of the high-low mix-F-22 air superiority
and Joint Strike Fighter for the predominantly air-to-ground
role--is that mix. As you migrate into the future and
you want greater and nicer and more capable technology
and interoperability, then it makes good sense to continue
with that high-low mix concept. ... I don't want to
ever get in the debate of trading one for the other;
we need both. ...
"I don't think it is wise to ... try to pit ...
two very specific fighters against each other. They
have roles to play and the advantage that we would
have in the Air Force is that in that day when you
have that appropriate high-low mix between F-22 air
superiority fighters and a JSF with the predominantly
air-to-ground role and some variants, perhaps, of the
F-22 as we go through time, that we will have replaced
our very old fighter force with a very modern fighter
force. Let me emphasize that. You all know the average
age of our force right now is 22 years. By 2020 it
is going to be 30 years, even with the current acquisition
programs."
Fighter Maintenance Costs
"The thing that is killing us today [is that]
our flying hour program [cost] has increased from seven
to 12 percent a year over the last five years. ...
The F-15 costs per flying hour, maintenance man-hour
per flying hour, is on about a 45-degree angle on any
chart of cost. ... We've loved the F-16. We love the
F-15. The A-10 is an incredible workhorse. The F-117
is an incredible aircraft. But all of those are old
technology, and ... it is costing the nation too much.
... Right now, in 2001, we are looking at a $500 million
increase to the '01 flying hour program due entirely
to the increases in the costs per flying hour. That
is $500 million that we could have been spending somewhere
else, but we are going to have to find out how we get
through this year."

To Transform a Force. The cost of flying and maintaining old-technology
aircraft is "killing us," said Handy, who adds that the solution
is modern aircraft such as the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter. (F-22 team
photo by Judson Brohmer
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Future Electronic Warfare
"Inside the Air Force, we debated long and hard
about the EF-111 and our whole EW capabilities, and
we've just last fall had a major EW summit to address
some of the questions you are talking about. The Air
Force is not discounting any option. On the other hand,
we are not looking to-. ... The solution in the EW
world is probably a joint solution. We want to work
with all of our service teammates to answer the question,
to discuss potential solutions. And it could be any
one of the litany of things you are talking about plus
others that we consider. ...
"We will continue to look at the business of
EW. You could say, Is there a space solution? Is there
an airborne solution? Is it a common wide-body? Is
it potentially a UAV [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle]? Do
you need to man a platform to do the things you are
talking about doing to detect signals? Is it the manned
platform or a potentially unmanned platform that really
reacts? All of the above."
Excitement About UCAVs
"We are heavy into ... UCAV [Unmanned Combat
Air Vehicle]. These things are neat, exciting ideas.
They present some capabilities that we have never seen
in the past. All services, I think, are excited about
it, and I can certainly tell you the Air Force is.
A lot of [this is] myth. Heck, I am a pilot, but I
am not on any crusade to keep jobs for pilots. That
is not what we are about. It is an issue of exciting
technology. It represents some tremendous capability,
and we shouldn't limit ourselves in any fashion to
what we can do with the UCAV or any other unmanned,
unpiloted platform."
Air Force and Osprey
"We need to see what the current facts in the
[V-22 Osprey] investigation reveal. We need to see
what the current test program reveals. The prudent
answer is, we want to watch and see what the actual,
real facts are. I really can't go any further than
that. We need the V-22. Our SOF [Special Operations
Forces] are in the position, almost an untenable position
if we don't get the V-22. Don't misread my comments.
It is just that common sense says, 'Let's look and
ask some tough questions.' "
Worries About the Force
"Right now, we are able to recruit our numbers.
We are about 102 to 103 percent of our goal in recruiting.
We have banked 100 percent of our requirement, but
we still have not met our retention numbers in the
areas that you are most concerned about, and that is
in second-term and career airmen. We'd like to retain
95 percent of our career people until retirement. Ninety-one
percent is the current position. People are a real,
real serious problem to us."
Experience "Death Spiral"
"Our maintenance folks are manning aircraft maintenance
at 100 percent today. But if you look inside the number,
you are overmanned in the recruit. ... We are undermanned,
at about the 75 percent level across the board, [in]
seasoned technicians. ... You don't have the technicians
that you need to ... train the next breed of people.
It can quickly become a death spiral. We can throw
money at parts. We can put money against the flying
hour program. It is difficult to just say that the
people problem is a money issue. It is not just money.
It is recruiting, training, retaining. Looking after
families. Avoiding high-demand, low-density, silver
bullet-type weapon systems. ... I cannot overemphasize
the importance of people to us."
Two Types of Age
"There are two things to consider with the age
of something. There is a technological age, and that
is how you modify and modernize the system so it has
got better radar, better internal capabilities. ...
The other one would be the structural age or the chronological
age. All of us age chronologically. You can improve
yourself technically with glasses and hearing aids
and knee replacements; weapon systems are not unlike
that. ... B-52s [that stood] on alert in the days of
the Cold War weren't flying an awful lot. So, [in]
chronological age, which is the one we are both quoting,
it is an old airplane. [In] flying hour age, there
is a tremendous amount of flying hours left on the
airplane. From an engineering perspective, not from
the technological internal weapon systems, but from
an engineering perspective, the airplane is not as
old as the years would imply."
Copyright Air Force Association. All rightsreserved.
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