 |
March 2005, Vol. 88, No. 3
print-friendly 
pdf
By Robert S. Dudney, Editor in Chief
Airpower and Optical Illusions
|
Many still find it easy to discount the value of airpower.
|
|
In a Dec. 3, 2001, column, entitled “Face the Facts: Bombing
Works,” Newsweek’s Fareed Zakaria spotlighted
a bizarre aspect of our recent wars.
“Over the last decade,” he wrote, “every time the
United States has engaged in a strategic bombing campaign, it has
achieved its goals.” Even so, he continued, “after each
war, influential experts and journalists have emphasized that the
central lesson of the operation is ... Airpower alone doesn’t
work.”
These commentators acted as if the wars were “optical illusions,”
not reality. “What looks to the naked eye like victories produced
by airpower,” quipped Zakaria, “were really—with
some creative interpretation—victories from the ground.”
Zakaria, unfortunately, could write the same story today. Three
years have gone by, yet many still find it easy to discount the
value of airpower.
Newspaper analysts—even Pentagon officials—tell us they
see a limited role for “traditional” airpower, given the
need to put greater emphasis on terrorism and other “nontraditional”
threats.
Some claim—erroneously—that airpower hasn’t played
much of a role in Iraq during the insurgency there. Elsewhere, one
even hears we have too much airpower—“excessive overmatch,”
in DOD parlance.
Not surprisingly, questions about the need to modernize USAF’s
combat force have multiplied. The assumption, says Loren Thompson
of the Lexington Institute, is that the US can delay airpower programs,
take greater risks, and divert funds elsewhere.
Indeed, DOD says it will use the $10 billion gained in its recent
drive-by shooting of the F/A-22 fighter to fund other programs.
The Theory of the Declining Utility of Airpower has been around
for a while. The pattern is clear. First comes skepticism about
airpower. Next, shock at its success. And last, tortured claims
that airpower was not “decisive” after all.
The Gulf, 1991. On Aug. 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. In a comment
typical of the time, Col. Harry Summers, the late Army strategist,
decried “the fanciful notion that a war can be won quickly
and decisively by the use of airpower alone.” Early on Jan.
17, 1991, though, air attacks destroyed Iraq’s ability to
control its forces or mount a response. Forty-two days of bombing
destroyed bunkers, bridges, shelters, and communications, plus
huge numbers of tanks and guns. Coalition land forces, coming
in at the end, pushed Iraq’s battered units out of Kuwait.
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said the decisive factor was
airpower. Army backers claimed it was the 100-hour ground offensive.
Bosnia, 1995. As the US mulled action against Bosnian Serb forces,
analysts warned that Balkan forests, mountains, and poor weather
would thwart effective use of airpower. Then, a US-led NATO force
conducted a three-week air campaign, hammering Serb heavy weapons,
bunkers, ammo dumps, and other targets. The Serbs stopped their
“ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia and sued for peace. Richard
C. Holbrooke, the US point man in the Balkans, said the Serbs folded
because of airpower. Others claimed the Serbs feared Croat ground
forces.
Serbia, 1999. When Operation Allied Force began, critics warned
that “airpower alone has never been decisive.” That was
before NATO aircraft, in a 78-day war, destroyed most Serbian military
and industrial targets. As Slobodan Milosevic withdrew his forces
from Kosovo, NATO ground troops still had not engaged in combat.
It wasn’t long, though, until the world heard a claim that
Milosevic caved in because of the threat of “US Army ground
forces in Albania”—24 attack helicopters, with about 5,000
support forces.
Afghanistan, 2001. Operation Enduring Freedom began Oct. 7,
2001. As Zakaria noted, critics quickly claimed “airpower
never works, Afghanistan is ill-suited for it,” and so on.
By November, the Taliban and al Qaeda were on the run, defeated
by lethal, precise, and innovative USAF, Navy, and Marine Corps
bombardment. Within weeks, we heard that the key to success was
action by Afghan irregulars, not airpower.
Iraq, 2003. Land force partisans worried that planners emphasized
airpower at the expense of land troops. What was surprising was
the extent to which airpower supported troops on the ground. USAF
averaged some 300 strike sorties per day, 80 percent in support
of land forces. In a single week, airpower destroyed 1,000 Iraqi
tanks and reduced the strength of Republican Guard divisions by
at least 50 percent.
Airpower, in each case, proved valuable in unexpected ways. We
will be glad to have such a flexible, hard-hitting weapon the next
time we run into a nasty surprise, as we inevitably will. Future
air wars might be more demanding than many now expect. Note that,
when USAF pilots in F-15Cs recently engaged in mock combat with
Indian Air Force pilots, the Indians often won. China is modernizing
its military forces faster than anyone expected.
In today’s dynamic world, it would be unwise to prepare only
for threats that are visible now. US power must be flexible and
adaptable.
In every conflict for the past 15 years, airpower has provided
that kind of capability. Retired Gen. Richard E. Hawley, former
head of Air Combat Command, says Pentagon officials should “have
a little humility about their ability to predict what kind of a
fight we may be in 15 years hence.”
Hawley added: “Those who would bet the future security of
the nation on their ability to predict the future are on the wrong
track. None of us can know what the future holds, and only a balanced
mix of forces and capabilities will allow us to face that future
with full confidence that our military will not fail us when we
need it most.”
Copyright
Air Force Association. All rights reserved. |
|
|
