May 1997 Vol.80, No. 5
The Fighter Requirement Falls Due
More than 25 years ago, toward the end
of the war in Vietnam, the US armed forces began introducing a
new generation of tactical aircraft. The F-111 and the A-6 flew
in the 1960s. Most of the fighters, including the Air Force's
F-15, F-16, and A-10 and the Navy's F-14 and F-18, entered service
in the 1970s. The Marine Corps AV-8B came along in the early 1980s.
The development cycle then shifted to emphasis on strategic systems
through the 1980s and mobility systems in the 1990s. Meanwhile,
other nations went to school on our tactical aircraft from the
1970s. Today, at least half a dozen advanced foreign fighters
have begun to gain parity with--and in some instances, spot advantages
over--their US counterparts.
For example, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman,
a former F-15 demonstration pilot, told the Congressional Airpower
Caucus in March that he flew the Russian Su-27 a few years ago
and found it "the equal of any F-15 in terms of engine thrust
and airplane maneuverability." The follow-on Su-35 has better
avionics than the Su-27. In certain engagements, it might beat
an F-15.
Initially, the services laid plans to introduce the next generation
around the turn of the century with eight separate fighter modernization
programs.
That was not to be. The armed forces in the 1990s were taking
massive reductions, and the defense budget had gone south.
The revised plan was to replace eight types of aircraft with three:
the Air Force's F-22 air-dominance fighter, the Navy's F/A-18E/F,
and the Joint Strike Fighter to be operated by the Air Force,
the Navy, and the Marines. Production was to be spread out over
25 years.
The time is now upon us for a funding decision, however, and a
clamor has arisen about cost and need. The Pentagon is accused
of building an unaffordable "bow wave" into future procurement
programs and creating a funding "spike" in the outyear
budgets. A January 1997 Congressional Budget Office study exploring
options to terminate one of the three fighter programs or reduce
quantities by as much as 50 percent was accorded great attention
on Capitol Hill and elsewhere in official Washington.
These expressions of dismay seem overwrought. There is no bow
wave. The cost of the three fighter programs fits well within
the ceiling of the current defense budget proposal. All three
aircraft are fully funded as far ahead as the Future Years Defense
Plan reaches. Over the six years of the FYDP, these programs consume
only 10 percent of the Pentagon investment account (which includes
both research and development and procurement). At no point over
the next 20 years do the tactical airpower programs exceed 18
percent of the investment account.
The imputed budget spike is, in actuality, the normal upturn in
a procurement cycle that bottomed out in 1995 when the Air Force
bought no tactical fighters at all. The combined cost for the
F-22 and the Air Force share of the Joint Strike Fighter will
be about four percent of the USAF budget, compared to six percent
of the budget spent on the F-15, F-16, and A-10 in the previous
round of fighter modernization.
In testimony to Congress, General Fogleman passed up an invitation
to seek funding for Air Force aircraft at the expense of production
for the other services. He said the nation needs balance in tactical
airpower modernization. He left no doubt, however, that the F-22
occupies a special place on the requirements list.
Without the F-22 to ensure control of the air, it is questionable
how much the F/A-18s and Joint Strike Fighters would be able to
accomplish, to say nothing of the ground forces, who depend on
air superiority for survival.
"You will not be able to achieve air superiority nor will
you ever come close to air dominance if you are operating with
equipment and weapons that are on parity with what the other guy
has," General Fogleman told the Congressional Airpower Caucus.
The Air Force heads into the opening decades of the twenty-first
century with its tactical aircraft requirements necked down to
two programs, one for air dominance and one for stealthy, precision
attack. That is about as short as we can afford to cut it.
US military doctrine is predicated on "full spectrum dominance."
That depends to a great extent on the quality of our airpower
and its ability to control the skies, halt an invading enemy in
his tracks, and cut off his strategic options.
We have let more than 20 years go by since our last round of tactical
aircraft modernization. As we have seen already, other nations
do not stop producing new fighters just because we do. The inroads
they have made during the lull in US fighter development are not
insignificant.
The United States has held the upper hand in tactical airpower
so long that we may imagine that our leadership is automatic.
That is a dangerous misconception.
In theater conflicts of the future, somebody will control the
air and, by means of airpower, dominate the battle. If we do not
step up to the requirement for the next generation of fighters,
it may not be us.