Going Gray
"Last June, [the Congressional Budget Office] projected
that DoD's planned purchases of F-22s, F/A-18E/Fs, and [Joint
Strike Fighters] should make up most of the [fighter] shortfall
created as the three services retire their older aircraft. .
. . The services will, however, need to keep planes in the fleet
for unusually long periods to prevent shortfalls from reaching
unmanageable levels. As a result, the large number of older aircraft
will drive the average age of DoD's fleets to unprecedented levels.
. . . The average ages of Air Force aircraft will be higher than
those in the Navy and Marine Corps, exceeding 15 years by 2003.
That average age will climb to about 18 years by 2010."
Cindy Williams, assistant director, National Security
Division, Congressional Budget Office, in a March 5, 1997, statement
to the House National Security Committee.
Sixteen Wings
"Some airpower missions demand the best technology the nation
can produce. The construct that produced airpower . . . for the
Vietnam War came from a conscious decision, in pursuit of cost-effectiveness,
to build a force with capabilities only incrementally better
than the [adversary's]. That left us unable to achieve anything
like general air superiority in eight years of operation over
North Vietnam. Consequently, the US Air Force alone lost 16 wings
of aircraft in those eight years. Not only did we not have the
capability to dominate the battlespace, [but] our freedom of
action was constantly limited by enemy aircraft and other air
defenses."
Gen. Larry D. Welch, USAF (Ret.), former Air Force
Chief of Staff, in a February 26, 1997, speech to the Association
of the US Army in Washington, D.C.
Storm Warnings
"This last year, the Air Force was able to recruit just
over 30,000 enlisted folks. Over 99 percent of them have high
school diplomas, and 82 percent scored in the top half of the
Armed Forces Qualification Test, but it is getting very, very
difficult to recruit. . . . Retention at this point is very good.
. . . Our rated retention is an area, though, that is starting
to give us some problems as we look out into the future--our
rated force. I've talked this over with the Chief of Naval Operations,
and he sees the same trends."
Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, Air Force Chief of Staff,
in February 25, 1997, testimony to the Senate Armed Services
Committee.
Back in Business . . .
"[The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet] is the right plane at the
right time to lead Naval Aviation into the twenty-first century.
Super Hornet will help sustain operational primacy and add a
great offensive punch to the forward-deployed aircraft carrier
battle groups of tomorrow."
Adm. Jay L. Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations, in
a January 18, 1997, statement after the F/A-18E/F's first carrier
landing.
. . . Or Out of Business?
"The Clinton Administration has ordered the retirement of
all Navy [A-6 Intruder] medium-attack aircraft, leaving the deep-strike
mission to the Air Force long-range bombers. . . .
"After examining alternatives in the early 1980s, the
Navy decided to keep the Intruder in production with a modernized
A-6F model, with all-new electronics and engines. But Pentagon
bureaucrats killed the program during the Bush Administration,
arguing that a new stealth airplane, the A-12, would be better.
A year later, the same whiz kids persuaded the Secretary of Defense
to kill the A-12 on the grounds that it was too costly, and the
smaller F/A-18 would have to do. The agenda all along was to
get the Navy out of the deep-strike business.
"Well, as . . . [Sen.] Lloyd Bentsen might say, I know
the A-6, and the F/A-18 is no A-6. The F/A-18 is a fine, versatile,
reliable airplane, but when the latest E model reaches the fleet,
it will still have only about half of the attack capability of
the Intruder."
John F. Lehman, Jr., former Secretary of the Navy
(198187) and Reserve A-6 bombardier-navigator, in the Wall
Street Journal, February 28, 1997.
Goodpaster, Butler, and Perle
"I have read the joint statement by my friend Gen. [Andrew
J.] Goodpaster and Gen. [George] Lee Butler. . . . In the real
world, there is no serious possibility of an agreement eliminating
all nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. Generals Goodpaster
and Butler seem to recognize this when they say, 'The phased
withdrawal and destruction of nuclear weapons from all countries'
arsenals would take many years, probably decades, to accomplish.'
But elsewhere in their joint statement, the Generals acknowledge
that 'No one can say today whether or when this final goal will
prove feasible.'
"Nevertheless, despite uncertainty about whether the
course they recommend will prove feasible, they urge
us to undertake now a serious commitment to it. I should have
thought that embarking on a policy, the feasibility of which
cannot be shown, is a most doubtful and risky way to shape our
future security."
Richard N. Perle, top Reagan Administration arms-control
official, in a February 12, 1997, statement to a Senate Government
Affairs Committee subcommittee concerning nuclear weapons abolition.
Premonition
"The more that I stayed awake last night thinking of [sending
a major US combat force to Vietnam], . . . it just worries the
hell out of me. It's damned easy to get in war, but it's going
to be awfully hard to ever extricate yourself if you do get in."
President Lyndon B. Johnson, in a May 27, 1964, telephone
conversation with National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, the
tape of which was released in February by the Lyndon B. Johnson
Library and Museum in Austin, Texas.
